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ABSTRACT
This study provides an analysis of the growth of corporate art intervention in America 
and Britain during the Reagan-Thatcher era of the 1980s. The premise is that the factors 
governing business intervention into the art world are inseparable from the free-market 
enterprise culture and the government-specific policies deployed to promote it. After a 
general introduction, Chapter 2 investigates the concept of the state and its rôle in relation 
to the arts. The public perception of differences between the American and British arts 
funding systems is further explored in terms of the financing of American art museums, 
and the arts provision provided by the state before the 1980s is examined in the practices 
of the Arts Council of Great Britain and the National Endowment for the Arts. The 
public arts policies of the New Right, and in particular the use of tax deduction 
incentives, are analysed in Chapter 3. It also examine the host of measures implemented 
by the two governments to inject the principles and ethos of the free market into these 
public arts agencies, and to transform them into paragons of arts privatisation. The 
corporate takeover of art museums is the subject of Chapter 4. The crucial rôle played 
by the corporate élites who served on the boards of trustees of these institutions is 
investigated, together with the great influx of corporate capital into them. Chapter 5 
gives an account of how corporations integrated themselves into the arts support system, 
by holding art exhibitions themselves, and by establishing branches of public art museums 
within corporate premises. Chapter 6, which concentrates on corporate art collections 
themselves, shows how these came to fulfil the dual function of private investment and 
public image-enhancing, how they sought and achieved validation and legitimation, how 
artists reacted to them, and how they succeeded in re-defming the meaning of cultural 
production. A conclusion summarises the various developments of corporate art 
intervention under the "casino economy" of the Reagan-Thatcher decade, and looks 
forward to possible directions for the future.
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It takes art to make a company great.




With the Government giving less to Art and Education, somebody’s got to give more. And 
that somebody is America’s corporations.
— Chase Manhattan Bank, NA.^
A common feature of the Reagan era, this sort of advocacy advertising, designed to 
position the Chase Manhattan Bank in the public consciousness as an enlightened patron 
of the arts, is indicative of a wider historical phenomenon, that of the unprecedented 
expansion of business intervention into contemporary culture which characterised the 
decade of the 1980s under successive Reagan and Thatcher governments. Never before 
had corporate America and Britain exercised wealth, power and influence on such a scale 
in mobilising its resources to gain access to this particular domain, where business 
involvement had previously been thought of as inappropriate, if not completely alien.
Of course, corporations had in the past made contributions to art museums and other 
cultural organisations. Over the previous decade, while continuing in the generally 
passive role of being solicited for donations, businesses had also begun to become more 
active participants in the framing and shaping of the discourse of contemporary culture 
across the Atlantic. But unlike its earlier involvement, uneven in practice and limited in 
scope, corporate intervention in the 1980s was ubiquitous and all-embracing. There was 
not simply an incremental increase in quantity, but a fundamental qualitative shift.
During the 1980s corporate art collections were being set up with increasing frequency 
on both sides of the Atlantic, following the cradling years of the 1970s. Using its 
economic power, the modern corporation, armed with its own curators and art
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department, vigorously emulated the former prerogatives of public art museums and 
galleries by organizing and touring its own collection throughout the country and abroad, 
and by incorporating an art gallery or hosting a branch of a public museum within its 
corporate premises. Above all, corporations initiated contemporary art awards to reward 
living artists, which made them not only culturally highly visible, but also gave them the 
appearance of being the arbiters of society’s taste. Their subversion is thus well 
advanced in every phase of contemporary art: in its production, dissemination and 
reception. In short, they have altered the cultural landscape.
This phenomenal growth and increasing power of the business sector in the cultural 
sphere under the Thatcher and Reagan regimes, with their proclaimed policy of 
advocating private patronage over public cultural funding, and the resulting subjection of 
cultural products to the force of the market place, is the subject of this study. Drawing 
specifically on contemporary art, I will argue, firstly, that the significant inroads that 
businesses made into the cultural arena in the 1980s were the direct effect of public 
policies. These, while not necessarily the precondition for the cultural mobilisation of 
businesses, were unquestionably the single most powerful facilitator.
Secondly, it will be argued that the underlying essence of this business intervention is by 
no means the expression of genuinely cultural aspirations in the traditional sense, despite 
the fact that companies generally project themselves as disinterested patrons of art. It is 
rather an extension of their power and political dominance in both American and British 
society.
Thirdly, this study makes an attempt to determine the impact of corporate intervention 
on contemporary art. Without claiming that my findings are in any way conclusive, I do 
believe that it is possible to put the legacy of the Reagan and Thatcher era into some sort 
of perspective following their departure from office, and to understand some of its central 
features.
Finally, the thesis will address the question of the extent to which the appropriation of 
contemporary art by the business sector, under a much reduced obligation to public
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accountability and scrutiny, has signified the transformation of corporate economic power 
into a cultural hegemony both in Britain and America.
1.1. A Comparative Study: Its Constraints and Possibilities
Throughout the eight years o f my presidency, no alliance we had was stronger than the 
one between the United States and the United Kingdom.
— Ronald Reagan, An American Life.^
The United States and Great Britain are by no means unique among the industrial 
capitalist democracies of the late twentieth century in their commitment to minimalist 
government: that is, to reining back the growth of the public sector, to cutting direct 
taxes and to reducing the "shackles of government regulations" in order to free the 
economy so that it can function more efficiently and liberate the individual from an 
intrusive and overwhelming state bureaucracy. The choice of the two countries for 
comparison is not simply a research convenience. Were more nations included in this 
study, a more comprehensive picture of business cultural intervention in the global arena 
would certainly emerge. This, however, would mean that only a much smaller sample 
of companies in each country could be included, and a detailed scholarly investigation of 
significant features of specific developments would not be possible.
Since Winston Churchill first coined the phrase "a special relationship" between the two 
countries in 1946,^ the concept has been subject to continuing academic debate.'^ The 
historical, cultural and linguistic ties between the two nations unquestionably give this 
choice of comparison advantages over any other pairing. But the Thatcher-Reagan 
entente is far more than a continuation of that "special relationship." Their abiding 
insistence that every aspect of the economy and of society must be organised around the 
market principle demonstrated their ideological commitment that capitalism was not only 
an efficient form of economic structuring, but also implied a morally superior model of 
governmental functions. The public policies of both administrations could not be more 
strikingly similar, and they have accordingly, since the mid-’80s, been a focus for 
comparative studies in a variety of disciplines within the social sciences.^ Cultural
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production, however, has not been a subject for such comparative studies.
As far as the mechanisms of arts funding are concerned, alongside the French Ministry 
of Culture, the British arm’s-length model, as represented by the former Arts Council of 
Great Britain, and the "United States model," that is almost synonymous with private 
philanthropy, have gained wide currency since the ’80s as three distinct forms of 
institutional funding systems.® This discourse itself, of course, was a product of the 
cultural politics prevalent during the Thatcher-Reagan years, as one particular aspect of 
American arts patronage was overwhelmingly emphasised while others were consciously 
ignored. By comparing what had been generally perceived to be a dichotomy in arts 
support mechanisms, these assumptions about arts funding in general, and the British and 
American systems in particular, can be meaningfully investigated and discussed.
None of this implies that we can simply ignore the enormous differences in history and 
culture which separate Britain and the United States, not the least being the huge 
discrepancy between the size of their economies and geographies. In comparing 
corporate intervention in both countries, the focus is on why and how companies and 
their spokespersons (very often the chief executives/chairmen) entered the cultural arena 
and on what they did as social agents therein. The assumption that similar social 
processes and changes in corporate behaviour and public institutions in both countries can 
be reasonably investigated and evaluated is crucial to the analysis, and the disparity of 
their sizes is not. In other words, I am more concerned to analyse the ideologies and 
models of cultural management in the two countries, and not to make the kind of specific 
per capita comparisons or "scientific" statistical analyses which have proliferated over the 
past decades as social scientists have turned to this new area of study.^
There are two reasons for this selective approach. The first is the difficulty inherent in 
any cross-cultural and cross-national research. It is a formidable, if not impossible, task 
to make a "precise" comparison of public arts funding between America and Britain, if 
one is to take into account the various types of spending at a federal/central government, 
state/regional and local/local authority levels, and those indirect subsidies which operate 
through various tax laws. Even at the federal/central government level, one still runs
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into a mélange of expenditure which various governmental departments and quasi- 
governmental agencies channel into contemporary art. For example, in Britain the 
present Department of National Heritage, the Arts Council, the British Council, the 
Crafts Council and the Government Art Collection, and in America, the National 
Endowment for the Arts, the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Institute of 
Museum Services, to name but the most obvious ones, are all in one way or another 
related to and mediating the production and consumption of contemporary art.
Secondly, my strategy is based on pragmatic grounds. Most of the existing comparative 
statistical data were complied by social scientists who did not distinguish "contemporary 
art" as a specific category from other types of arts and thus have very limited applications 
here (here I will have to run the risk of generalisation). In particular data collected by 
certain arts agencies and researchers were gathered with either an explicit or implicit 
political agenda in mind.® For example, the data on corporate arts sponsorship collected 
by the Association of Business Sponsorship for the Arts in Britain or the Business 
Committee for the Arts in America have never been subjected to any rigorous empirical 
scrutiny, in particular the figures for the ’60s or ’70s, when the subject of arts 
sponsorship was still in its infancy. Moreover, they were, and still are, the only bodies 
which have a vested interest in researching into this area, and which provide the only 
available "authentic" data circulating in the popular press. The dilemma then is that to 
use their prepackaged, and very often incomplete, information, is to acknowledge its 
validity. It is not my aim to adopt and circulate a discourse laid down and developed by 
these bodies. To do so is inevitably to endorse the legitimacy of the material and the 
institutions which produced it.
The problem is that the significance of corporate art(s) intervention, and its history- 
making capacities derive, to a large extent, from its economic power, which unfortunately 
is not to be easily measured. This is partly because of the limited time and resources 
which any research project of this kind imposes. But even without this limitation, it is 
extremely problematic to arrive at a comprehensive picture of the actual sums of 
corporate money involved and how effectively it affected the market and the livelihood 
of artists. In contrast to their often insatiable desire for publicity, corporations, or their
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spokespersons, became reticent or secretive when it comes to the release of actual 
figures. The questions on arts expenditure in my own surveys not infrequently met with 
responses such as "confidential."
1.2. A Decade of Privatisation: The Question of Public and Private
The decade of the 1980s witnessed a fundamental political transformation in the United 
States and the United Kingdom. After Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan achieved 
political office in 1979 and 1981 respectively, they and their allies robustly advocated the 
doctrine of free enterprise throughout their successive terms of office, pushing the 
political discourse firmly to the right. The postwar social democratic consensus of 
welfare-state capitalism in Britain, and to a lesser degree in America, which accepted and 
maintained collective public provision alongside the marketplace, was replaced by an 
aggressive advocacy of the so-called free market economy. The public policies and 
ideological commitment of Reagan and Thatcher were radical, not only because they 
significantly altered the role of the state in the political formations and social landscape 
in both countries, but also because they departed, in a fundamental way, from their 
predecessors within their own parties, which had publicly endorsed a steady improvement 
in social services in the 1960s. Limited government, deregulation, privatisation and 
enterprise culture, in its various forms and degrees, were the buzzwords of the day and 
the ideological staple diet of politics on both sides of the Atlantic.
The thrust of the Reagan-Thatcher public policy to substitute the market for government 
as the key economic and social institution, and to propagate the marketplace ethos of 
capitalism during their tenure, ran in parallel with equally cogent political action and 
social engagement by businesses in both countries.^ The interrelationship between 
business and government, two of the three pillars of C. Wright Mills’s American "power 
élite," is e v i d e n t . W h a t  is less clear is the extent to which the Reagan and Thatcher 
governments facilitated the rise of business power in both societies, or the way these two 
governments’ policies, especially in the economic domain, were actually formulated and 
transformed by the business elites who oversaw the corporations, which, after all, is only
28
a logical extension of the close interaction and intimate terms that the two regimes had 
with business.“ To answer the latter question is really beyond the scope of this study, 
and the discussion that follows will therefore focus on the former. In particular their 
policies in the cultural sphere will be explored in terms of the discursive formation of the 
question of "public" and "private," and within that, the analysis will be confined largely 
to the issues surrounding "public" museums, especially art museums and galleries.
It may seem to be a little dubious in the first place to treat America as a nation of 
collective public cultural provision comparable to a country like Britain, where the whole 
network of national/local-authority museums and galleries is directly funded by the public 
purse. It is true that the origin of art museums in America was rooted in the private 
wealth of old families whose descendants now still sit on their boards of trustees and 
govern their affairs. The notion that American art museums are therefore "private" 
institutions is, however, problematic. Despite the magnitude of this private philanthropic 
tradition, the fact is that if this money had not been given away, most of it would have 
been taken away in tax. A brief review of the historical development of the top federal 
personal income tax rate in the United States (for which the wealthy art donors would be 
eligible) will clearly demonstrate this point (see Table 1-1). This top rate jumped from 
15 to 67 percent at the time of the First World War, and fell back to 25 percent for a few 
years in the ’20s, before rising to around 90 percent during and after the Second World 
War. To the extent that the majority of the money concerned is thus tax foregone, it 
should be considered as an indirect form of public subsidy. After all, it is each taxpayer 
that has to "chip in" to endorse the private decisions made by the wealthy patrons, either 
individuals or corporations.
While in the United States the concept of tax expenditure, revenues lost through various 
arts-related tax incentives or exemptions, has been debated for some time, in the trans- 
Atlantic conversion, the Thatcher government had never discussed the nature of this 
private philanthropy and the whole range of implications this would have had if carried 
out in full in Britain, not least because of its manifest social unfairness. In their 
efforts to produce a political and social climate amenable to the enterprise culture, 
Thatcher and her allies hailed the American model as the only lifeboat on the horizon.
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Consequently, the other way of looking at the so-called American tradition of "private 
support" is resoundingly and consciously silenced. This is quite clear from government 
publications and reports in the media, from the speeches of arts ministers, down to any 
arts development officers throughout the country, whose organisations had suffered from 
the "financial squeeze" of successive Tory governments.
Like most of the privatisations under the Thatcher régime, the promotion of privatisation 
itself depended in part on government intervention and subsidies, albeit in contradiction 
with free market ideology. The privatisation of culture was no exception. Despite the 
fact that the Conservative party had liberalised the tax regime for private donors (both 
individuals and corporations) much further and faster than the model they set out to 
emulate, the government established a Business Sponsorship Incentive Scheme (BSIS) in 
1984 to hand out cash inducements for business sponsors. The detail of the scheme will 
be discussed in Chapter 3.1, and it is enough to state here that the most insidious and 
threatening aspect of the whole Thatcher project has been not only the blurring of the 
boundaries between public and private, and the reframing of the discourse of the debate, 
but the fact that the Tory government effectively used public money to enhance the 
prerogatives of private capital.
1.3. The Corporations and the Corporate Elite
A central premise of this study is that contemporary art, along with other cultural 
products, functions as a currency of both material and symbolic value for corporations, 
and in a different way, for their senior executives, in Western capitalist democracies of 
the late twentieth century. Although most of the empirical data in this study takes the 
company as the unit of analysis, corporations are not just abstract concepts, but 
commercial institutions run by men (and few women) with their distinctive social traits 
and aspirations. On the basis of this research, coupled with other findings, it is evident 
that the initiatives and leadership of the chief executive/chairman, or in the case of 
professional firms, the senior partner(s), is the single most important determinant in any 
form of corporate arts intervention.^^ These top executives, "an élite within an élite,"
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in particular those overseeing large corporations, are often reported in the media as 
having great or even "mad" passions for art. Their close involvement in corporate arts 
ventures can not be conceptualized as purely incidental, but rather has to be understood 
as a locus of social distinction to which their élite status and class aspirations are 
anchored. Corporate intervention cannot accordingly be fully appraised without 
addressing both these interrelated elements.
The theory of "cultural capital" developed by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu is 
conceptually useful for understanding the system of taste and value, of which 
contemporary art is part, within the general structure of political, economic and social 
formations. Bourdieu’s main interest in the arts is arguably as a form of hegemonic 
ideology, in which the transmission of the arts from generation to generation serves to 
preserve and reproduce the dominant position of a dominant class. Cultural capital, his 
widely influential concept, thus serves as an "instrument of domination, "i*
Second, the social relations between economic capital and cultural capital, which he 
rigorously constructed and argued at the level of individuals, can be equally applied to 
economic entities such as companies without modification. Obviously, none of the 
companies in the study can venture into the cultural arena without a substantial 
accumulation of economical capital. In other words, the prospect for businesses to build 
up cultural capital, not unlike individuals, can only be realised through their economic 
power.
Nevertheless what Bourdieu means by "cultural capital" has to be modified, to some 
extent, and specifically delineated here in the analysis of corporate "taste. " This is partly 
because when he speaks of "cultural capital," he sometimes means the knowledge of and 
familiarity with various artistic styles and products, while at other times he refers to the 
prestige and social value which are often conferred on those who have shown such 
competence. Nor are the ways in which he uses the term throughout his numerous works 
always consistent; sometimes it is interchangeable with other terms such as "symbolic 
capital" or "social capital. As it is extremely difficult to conceptualise how a 
commercial company as an entity can master and demonstrate artistic competence in the
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way Bourdieu argues, this analysis will be more concerned with cultural capital in the 
second sense, namely the social status and value that accrue to a company engaged in 
cultural practices. Yet unlike the bourgeois/petit bourgeois in Bourdieu’s analysis, the 
commercial enterprise in this study actually owns the means to materially appropriate the 
works of art, as evidenced by their enormous art collections. The term "cultural capital," 
thus, refers to this form of ownership as well as to the material appropriation of symbolic 
objects.
But there is an obvious limit in applying a Bourdieuian conceptual apparatus in our 
research. Although the material interests that companies and individual members of 
society own or control, and the material conditions under which they have to operate, 
may be similar, the concept of class structure and formation of which Bourdieu speaks, 
and which is fundamental to his reading, is not readily applicable to an understanding of 
the corporate domain. The dichotomised schema of the dominant and the dominated, and 
their associated cultural practices and social distinction, has thus limited use here in the 
analysis of companies.
This may have more to do with the state of social science research than with the 
impossibility of pursuing a similar line of inquiry. As companies had never entered into 
the cultural sphere as social agents in such a collectively dominant way as they did in the 
1980s, they have yet to be seen as an object of inquiry in terms of their economic 
positions, social relations and cultural practices, except for a few case studies in which 
attempts have been made to explore exceptionally notorious instances.A pparen tly  
when social scientists address the issue of market capacities of companies, and/or their 
domination, they limit their comments to the economic activities and positioning of 
companies. Interestingly enough, it is in journalistic writing that a possible interpretation 
of companies’ social advancement in their arts endeavours is often perceived and 
articulated.
In contrast to the individual level, where the relationship between economic wealth and 
cultural capital is freely interchangeable, and where the accumulation of cultural capital 
serves specifically to reproduce and consolidate the position of the dominant class, the
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purpose of business’ efforts to secure cultural capital is not as straightforward. One 
cannot simply speak of the domination of companies in the same way as one can of a 
ruling class. In other words, what is being dominated in the case of businesses is 
oblique. There are different levels and forms of domination. The economic strength of 
a company in the marketplace is a form of domination over other competitors, but 
companies are also dominant in our consumer society, in particular the multinationals, 
in the sense that they exert a profound influence over our living space, they influence the 
political process, and they circumscribe our individual choices.
It is in maintaining this influence that the accumulation of corporate cultural capital 
makes economic sense. The material and symbolic exchange in the case of corporate art 
collections is an obvious and direct one, but in most instances what companies acquire 
from their arts participation is quantitatively less tangible. Alert to their symbolic 
standing in people’s (consumers’) minds, companies utilise the arts, replete with their 
social implications, as another form of advertising or public-relations strategy, or to adopt 
the jargon of corporate culture, to go in for "niche marketing": a way of striving to gain 
an entrée into a more sophisticated social group through identifying with their specific 
tastes. It is in this locus of vested interests that the pursuit of cultural capital as a means 
to economic ends, or the conversion of cultural capital into an economic one, assumes 
its most transparent, and sometimes politically pernicious, form. The Philip Morris 
Companies, for instance, after some thirty years of cultivating and accumulating "cultural 
capital," was able to cash in by calling on eminent arts institutions to "lobby" on its 
behalf against anti-smoking legislation in 1994 in New York, a matter we are to deal with 
in more detail in Chapter 4.
If the application of the concept of "cultural capital" in corporate analysis is in need of 
further research and refinement, it is less so in the case of top executives. On this 
individual level, Bourdieu’s concept of cultural capital provides a useful analytical tool, 
particularly in conjunction with Max Weber’s notion of the status group, and 
contemporary writings by the American sociologist Paul DiMaggio and other scholars 
who have explored the subject of corporate elites in relation to the political economy of 
capitalism.
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These high-powered grey-suited men, to paraphrase DiMaggio’s description of cultural 
capitalists, are the "cultural managerial capitalists."** They are not traditional capitalists 
in the sense that the majority of them do not make their wealth from industrial enterprises 
as those of the nineteenth century did. Unlike those earlier capitalists and their 
"inheritors," these chairmen/chief executives are professional managers who emerge 
through the so-called "managerial revolution."*^ Their power within the corporation is 
thus achieved through their corporate position rather than family lineage. But they are 
capitalists nevertheless in two senses. At the top of the corporate ladder, they are the 
managers of large capital, and thus in turn often have substantial vested interests in the 
company’s profits such as "stock option" plans and year-end bonuses. Nor are the 
managerial interests necessarily distinguishable from ownership interests; profit 
maximisation is still the primary concern of these managers, according to various 
research findings.
As family capitalism has declined in the twentieth century, so has the archetype of the 
nineteenth-century magnate art patrons, those cultural capitalist so capably analysed in 
DiMaggio’s essay. The cadre of new cultural managerial capitalists referred to in this 
study is therefore the byproduct of an incomplete transformation of family capitalism to 
institutional capitalism and their uneasy coexistence in business community today.^* 
People such as David Rockefeller, the grand persona of the tycoons of a bygone era, 
who, as chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank, initiated a corporate art collection for 
the Bank in the United States in the ’60s, represent therefore a transitional phase of this 
transformation.^^
The majority of the chairmen/chief executives I am referring to do not enjoy family 
inheritance in the way Rockefeller did. But they are nevertheless the individuals who 
possess substantial volumes of different forms of capital in the terms of Bourdieu’s 
analysis. Despite the relative availability of universal higher education since the Second 
World War in Britain and the United States, and despite a number of "up-from-nowhere" 
achievers, the world of top corporate management continues to be dominated by an 
economically privileged, and thereby socially and educationally prominent, class in both 
c o u n t r i e s . T h e s e  executives, more often than not, come from an upper-class
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background and have been educated in public schools and the Universities of Oxford and 
Cambridge in Britain, or their counterparts in America, leading preparatory schools and 
Ivy League Universities. They share with each other the directorships of various 
corporations; they are not only active in business associations and exclusive social clubs, 
but also the trustees of charitable and cultural institutions throughout the c o u n t r y . I n  
other words, like those earlier entrepreneurs, the corporate élites strive to maintain and 
consolidate their dominant position and status within the corporate and social life through 
an intricate web of economic/social networks and relationships. Engaging the companies 
they oversee in the arts and in cultural activities is part and parcel of this strategy.
This raises the whole question of social status and the values that artistic/cultural products 
signify in advanced capitalist society. Art has long been patronised by those with power 
and status in society, and artistic products have thus always functioned as a status symbol 
as well as objects with market value. To quote Paul DiMaggio: "they [cultural goods] 
are consumed for what they say about their consumers to themselves and to others, as 
inputs into the production of social relations and identities. Although "status 
distinction," according to Max Weber, is not always linked to "class distinction," they 
are evidently identical in this i ns t ance .Th i s  is particularly true in the sense that these 
corporate elites, through the mediation of the popular press, intentionally or 
unintentionally, have cultivated the image of being art patrons — of being late twentieth- 
century Medicis. They visit galleries, tour artists’ studios and buy at the main auction 
houses, and all this on top of their already extremely demanding schedules. They do so 
as if it is a specific style o f life in full public view, and above the shabby cut-and-thrust 
of the business world.
This phenomenon in which the business elites utilise their corporate location as an 
extension of their personal interest is not, of course, a mere speculation. An empirical 
study of the corporate giving economy of Minneapolis/St. Paul conducted by Joseph 
Galaskiewicz argues that it serves not only to improve the company’s marketplace 
position, but also to create and maintain businessmen’s position within their élite 
c i r c l e s . T h e  universality of the situation has prompted Americans to coin a term for 
it: they call it "incorporated pocketbook." But within the hierarchical power structure
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of a corporation, this is taken as a given. It is not to be challenged, certainly not in 
public, if the chairman spends a couple of million pounds to refurbish his suite in 
accordance with his taste and style, as happened in the case of an American bank in 
London.^* It is only, and very infrequently, to be challenged in such celebrated cases 
as that of Armand Hammer’s art scandals in America, in which top executives were 
investigated in court in connection with their arts projects, where the true nature of their 
involvement received public exposure.
1.4. Methodology
To draw any definitive picture of corporate intervention in contemporary art in the 
Reagan and Thatcher years is no easy task. Despite the fact that art historians have a 
long-standing interest in art patronage, few of them have seriously engaged with research 
in the patronage of contemporary art by public art agencies or corporations, not least 
because the study of patronage does not produce any popular monographs on "great" 
artists. The interests of the art historian have centred mainly on patronage in the more 
prestigious and safely distant periods in history, such as the Renaissance or the Low 
Countries in the seventeenth century. This, of course, reflects only the character of art 
history as a discipline and the institutional and ideological power of its establishment. 
Its practitioners, however "objective" they claim to be, have by and large engaged with 
"historical" analysis rather than with the more controversial "history" of the present. 
Two recently completed theses within the University of London, for instance, one 
concerned with the institutional patronage of abstract art and the other with the New York 
art market, were part of this t radi t ion.Whi le  they developed the conventional themes 
of patronage and the art market in relation to a more recent time and place, they did not 
offer any systematic methods for dealing with what is my main concern here, namely the 
contemporary living situation.
The substantial time lag between contemporary art patronage and its acceptance into the 
discourse of art history as a "legitimate" area of study, or at least tolerance in the 
margins of its discipline is not the only problem here. As our research is concerned with
36
the social process of institutional change and the social relations of patrons, the state of 
the social history of art is of paramount relevance to this study. Despite its theoretical 
advances over the past decades, the social history of art does not offer solid grounds for 
empirical work.^^
The Social History o f Art
The pioneering efforts of Arnold Hauser in the 1950s, among others, inspired by a 
changed view of art and social structures, received very reserved responses if not outright 
a t t a c k s . I t  was not until the end of the 1960s that a change in the political climate 
encouraged a critique of the dominant culture and ideology within various disciplines and 
the new formation of cultural studies, that the social history of art was then able to break 
through, albeit in an incomplete manner, the resistance of the art historical establishment 
and create the necessary political space within academia for a different d i scour se .The  
subsequent writings of T. J. Clark and others since the early 1970s have effectively 
argued for a critical social history of art, a history which takes into account "the 
connecting links between artistic form, the available systems of visual representation, the 
current theories of art, other ideologies, social classes and more general historical 
structures and processes. But the main problem with the social history of art, 
according to Janet Wolff, is that "radical developments though they are in the context of 
traditional history and criticism," they are almost invariably critical readings and re- 
readings of texts and prioritize text over social relations and process.
It is, nevertheless, curiously paradoxical that in the discourse of the social history of art, 
art historians have engaged so little with sociology, the so-called science o f society 
in particular when one considers the success with which feminism and other critical 
literary theories have intervened in the various domains of art history over the last two 
decades or so. Such new methodologies have virtually reorganised the landscape of art 
history, or at least, art history in its most manifest institutional form, the university 
curriculum. A recent collection of essays on the methodology of art history, selected by 
Eric Fernie, director of the Courtauld Institute of Art in London,^® appears to reflect 
this trajectory of the success and failure of interdisciplinary approaches . Apar t  from 
its profound Eurocentrism verging on jingoism, the anthology did not include any recent
37
writings illustrating a "valid" sociological approach to the subject, although it does 
contain an article by the feminist art historian Griselda Pollock/®
The Sociology o f Art
This disciplinary apartheid surely is not just a matter of art history’s self-imposed limits. 
For many social scientists, especially sociologists engaged with the so-called "sociology 
of the arts," the discourse articulated by art historians and other art related professionals 
is regarded with equal suspicion. For example, Rosanne Martorella, in her study 
Corporate Art, defines and clarifies what she means by "art" as if the notion of art were 
only art-historically validated: "I have avoided any judgments about aesthetic ‘value’ as 
established by the artistic community of curators, dealers, and critics. Sociology as 
an academic discipline, as it is now, shows a strong tendency toward quantitative data 
gathering, on which grounds it claims legitimacy as a branch of the social sciences.
The application of a quantitative approach to objects of profound symbolic significance 
is bound to be problematic, if not self-defeating. Martorella’s work, despite being 
pioneering in an area directly related to this research, and in many ways informative in 
its classification of social interactions, remains insensitive to the very category of art she 
sets out to study. Other studies written by sociologists, such as Diana Crane’s The 
Transformation o f the Avant-Garde, share a similar indifference, albeit in a varying way, 
to the distinctiveness of art works as o b j e c t s . T h e  great divide between art history on 
the one hand and sociology on the other can be summed up by Raymond Williams’s 
comment in a different situation: "What at least came through, theoretically, in the 
significant new keywords of ‘culture’ and ‘society,’ was the now familiar model: of the 
arts on the one hand, the social structure on the other, with the assumption of significant 
relations between them. Wliat constitutes the significant relations, however, is still 
an open question and a continuing site of contestation.
In contrast to this great divide, the artist Hans Haacke has been engaged in an incisive 
and concerted critique of corporate appropriation of the arts since the mid-’70s. 
Interested in the power which corporations exercise in the art world, Haacke has taken
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a determined stand against the bodies whose intervention in the art world he considers, 
in his own terms, as "social grease" — a public relations exercise to distract attention 
away from their less desirable activities/^ Interestingly enough, in studying the power 
structure in contemporary art world, Haacke uses methods which resemble those of social 
scientists, such as John Weber Gallery Visitors’ Profile 1 in 1972/^ While this is not 
to say that his methods can serve as a model for this study (after all, he did those pieces 
as art works, rather than being consciously engaged with a sociological inquiry), his 
contribution should nevertheless be recognised as valuable and stimulating.
An Interdisciplinary Approach
It is because of my aim "to think the present historically,'"^*  ^ and the questions which 
arise from this, that it has been necessary to employ methods not available to orthodox 
art historians. The choice of an interdisciplinary approach is also necessitated by the 
field covered by the enquiry. As mentioned earlier, there is hardly any research by art 
historians for this study to build upon. Nor are studies carried out by scholars in the 
social sciences such as cultural economists, sociologists and political scientists specifically 
relevant to this research. Although these scholars have developed a sustained interest in 
arts patronage since the mid-’60s, understandably the research undertaken heretofore has 
examined the arts as a whole, rarely differentiating the visual arts from other artistic 
disciplines. Nor have any previous studies investigated the interrelationship between 
public and corporate funding in the context of contemporary art.
Moreover, the field of inquiry is huge. The number of corporate art collections is vast, 
totalling more than 1000 in both countries, not to mention the huge quantity of corporate- 
sponsored art exhibitions in the previous decade, which were generally one-off and are 
particularly difficult to evaluate. As a result of the dearth of primary sources, I have had 
to adopt an empirical approach to this topic, both quantitative and qualitative. I 
conducted two questionnaire surveys, one on corporate art collections and the other on 
corporate sponsorship. Their aim is to allow me to draw up a large statistical data set 
with which to investigate the scale and patterns of corporate art(s) intervention. (For 
information on the questionnaire methodology and details, see Appendices 1 and 2.)
39
In addition, to remedy those aspects of the study which appear to defy simple 
quantification, I conducted detailed and searching interviews with various people involved 
in the corporate art enterprise, including senior managers, corporate curators, art 
consultants, museum professionals and staff from the public funding sector in both 
countries. 1 also paid visits to corporate arts collections, exhibitions and galleries in New 
York and Washington D.C., and in London and the South-East in Britain. (For lists of 
persons interviewed, venues and exhibitions visited, see Appendix 3.) To determine the 
extent to which the observations made in New York and Washington D.C. can be applied 
to other cities in the United States would require further investigation, but 1 believe that 
the phenomenon in these two cities is highly representative, given that New York is a 
metropolitan city and Washington D.C. has a more intimate character. The corporate art 
collections in Britain, except those in Scotland, are fairly concentrated in London and the 
South-East. As 1 visited virtually all of them, except in a few cases where access was 
denied, presenting a comprehensive picture of British companies was somewhat less of 
a problem.
No doubt art historians will be dismayed that statistical data occupy the space they do in 
this study, and specialists in social sciences will find much with which to take issue. 
However, risks have to be taken if the study of art history is to be a dynamic discipline. 
It is towards this end that the present study is offered as a modest contribution to a new 
and essentially unexplored area of enquiry. Whether it is to be art historical or 
sociological is less a concern, for as Janet Wolff puts it:
We are now in an excellent position to pursue the study of culture within 
disciplines and on the margins of disciplines, as well as in the newly cleared space 
of interdisciplinary studies.
The structure of the present study is largely chronological and proceeds, wherever 
possible, from the general to the particular. Chapter 2 sets out some preliminary 
theoretical considerations regarding the relationship between the state and the arts, in 
which the nature of state power in relation to the arts, and the public arts agencies along 
with their bureaucrats, are explored. It also attempts to provide some account of public 
arts funding in America and Britain before the 1980s by examining art museums in terms
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of their public and/or private status and their funding mechanisms; it reviews the cultural 
provision provided by the Arts Council of Great Britain and the National Endowment for 
the Arts as a historical background to an understanding of the changes that took place in 
the ’80s. Chapter 3 examines the shifts in public art funding brought about by the 
Reagan and Thatcher administrations. It gives an account of the changes in public policy 
as a whole before focusing specifically on those within the Arts Council and the Arts 
Endowment. It also draws attention to the two organisations, the Business Committee 
for the Arts in America and the Association of Business Sponsorship of the Arts in 
Britain, established specifically by business to promote and champion their involvement 
in the arts.
The next three chapters discuss at length the way in which corporations intervened in 
contemporary art in the two countries in the course of the ’80s. Chapter 4 concentrates 
on the often delicate interface between art museums and corporations. It analyses firstly 
how and in what ways high-profile corporate businessmen came to serve on the boards 
of art museums, examining in particular the trustee boards of the Whitney Museum of 
American Art in America, and the Tate Gallery in Britain. It then investigates the effects 
that corporate art sponsorship has had on the art institutions, and the extent to which 
these can be seen as having been appropriated by business as public relations agencies. 
Chapter 5 looks at the ways in which corporations attempted to integrate themselves into 
the support-system infrastructure of the art world itself: by emulating what used to be 
the prerogative of art museums, holding art exhibitions, establishing art galleries, and in 
some instances even hosting branches of public art museums within their corporate 
premises.
Chapter 6 investigates the corporate art collections that businesses have built up on both 
sides of the Atlantic, analyses how that ownership is used to serve business interests, the 
extent to which it has affected the reception and interpretation of contemporary art, and 
how it has negotiated a new relationship between corporate patrons and the artists 
themselves.
Attention is drawn to the fact that in Britain in particular, art awards organised and
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sponsored by corporations proliferated in the ’80s, partly as a reaction to intensifying 
competition between sponsors, and partly as a concerted effort to break down the 
resistance of the British media to crediting their sponsorship and giving them the publicity 
they sought. Like sponsorship, arts awards with glittering ceremonies offer the sponsor 
high-profile entertainment opportunities which attract a plethora of social luminaries. The 
Prudential Arts Awards ceremony , for instance, which offers cash prizes amounting to 
£250,000, the largest in the country, was even transmitted live on television. Known in 
the field as "designer sponsorship," art awards guarantee maximum publicity for 
corporate money by inextricably intermeshing the company’s name into the title. It 
becomes, for example, impossible to write about the John Player Portrait Award at the 
National Portrait Gallery without mentioning the name of the tobacco brand.
Unlike sponsorship, however, corporate awards do not function by association, and the 
reputation of arts organisations does not necessarily rub off onto the image of the 
sponsor. They are found to function rather by extending their aggressive tentacles right 
into the heart of the arts reward system. Corporations are no longer "partners" of centres 
of artistic excellence; by placing themselves squarely in the spotlight, they become 
themselves centres of excellence. Taking advantage of the fact that they are in a position 
to reward artistic endeavour, corporations are seen to transform themselves into the taste 
arbiters of contemporary culture in Britain. Limitations of space preclude further analysis 
of this wider and unprecedented cultural phenomenon.
Chapter 7 gives the opportunity of looking both backwards and forwards. It brings 
together the main threads of the arguments advanced in the previous chapters, and by 
reviewing developments in corporate involvement in contemporary art in the ’90s, it 
allows one to anticipate how the momentum acquired by the privatising of culture will 
carry it forward into the next millennium.
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Public Arts Funding in the United States and the United Kingdom: 
Preliminary Theoretical and Historical Considerations
2.1 The S tate and  the A rts
Central to this enquiry is the rôle of the state in relation to the arts in advanced capitalist 
democracies, even though our comparative study is historically located within the specific 
context of British and American governments. To differentiate between state and 
government here may seem to be pedantic in the first instance. The distinction, however, 
is in no sense automatically clear. Nor are the views of scholars on the meaning of these 
terms unanimous. This is tellingly illustrated by the absence of any comprehensive 
theory on the state in relationship to the arts, in stark contrast to the continuous 
popularity of studies pursued in terms of government and the arts.^ While it is not 
feasible to offer any new theory of the state and the arts within the limits of this present 
study, I will attempt, instead, by reviewing the inadequacy of those analyses which have 
been carried out so far in the field, to explain why the state is crucially important to the 
issue in question, and indicate some possible ideas and approaches for future 
investigations.
The majority of the relevant work that has been produced in the past few decades has 
revolved around the topic of what is generally referred to as "arts and politics", or 
around the rôle and the machinery of government, in particular from the perspective of 
the administration of its arts/cultural agencies.^ Much of this, in one way or another, 
has inevitably touched upon, or taken up, some aspects of the rôle and nature of the state 
vis-à-vis the arts. They are, however, inadequate in some crucial ways. The literature 
on arts and politics so far can, at the risk of generalising, be divided into two polarised
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camps. For those writing on art produced in capitalist democracies, unflagging attention 
has been devoted to the issue of censorship and its contrary concern, freedom of speech. 
By contrast, it is customary to place emphasis on the political control and repression of 
artistic production within totalitarian regimes, a term which has come to be applied very 
often, although not exclusively, to communist/socialist states.^
Arguably, this opposition is an ideological construction rooted in the cultural politics of 
the Cold War, especially the anti-communism of the McCarthy period on the domestic 
front in America. The confrontation between the two power blocs was waged not only 
in hard military terms, but also in ideological ones, of which artistic production was, 
inter alia, a part. What matters here is not so much the specificities of how communist 
states control artistic expression, but the set of starry-eyed assumptions on the relations 
between the state and the arts in the non-communist democracies, which the juxtaposition 
itself has revealed and helped to popularise.
It is often assumed that censorship is all-pervasive in totalitarian regimes, a truth too 
obvious to be seriously questioned. This truth, however, is not simply sought as a solid 
fact per se; rather, it is presented in such a way as to serve as a backdrop against which 
the freedom of capitalist democracies, especially in America, can be extolled. Artistic 
freedom is identified not only as the essence of Western democracy, but also as the proof 
of capitalism’s superiority over communism. The problem is, if freedom in a capitalist 
society is no more than the absence of obvious restraint for those with power, then 
artistic freedom is no surer promise for a democratic polity. The promotion of the idea 
of free expression in a capitalist society thus largely obscures the real issue, namely that, 
even in a much vaunted "free society" such as America, the realities of artistic production 
and consumption are far from democratic.
In other words, if democracy is defined in Miliband’s terms as "popular participation in 
the determination of policy and popular control over the conduct of affairs," then neither 
the participation nor the control of artistic endeavour in the countries covered by this 
study has much democratic credibility.^ Regardless of whether they are the producers, 
managers or consumers of arts, the very people who participate in, and control, artistic
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production are drawn mostly from a relatively narrow segment of the country’s 
population. The tendency to advocate artistic freedom in capitalist society as a 
universally desirable public good masks, therefore, a systematic indifference to the 
relation of power in operation within the art world. This neglect, or refusal, to engage 
the question of power has deeply coloured the debate on the arts and politics within the 
capitalist democracies, and this debate tends to focus ^pon the problem of censorship 
instead of re-locating the question within the broader context of the state and the arts.
Certainly, the matter of censorship is of crucial importance in relation to any discussion 
of art. A comprehensive coverage of the topic, however, is not possible here, and is, in 
any case, relatively well documented elsewhere.^ Instead, the intention here is, by 
referring to only one crucial aspect of artistic control, to examine another set of separate 
but inter-related assumptions, intentionally or unintentionally confused in the arts-and- 
politics discourse. To speak of censorship in terms of what is not permissible within the 
law is to refer to just one specific function of the state — the legal monopoly of coercive 
force, through which the state clearly regulates and frames the grounds and rules for 
artistic production, defining what is inside and what is outside the law.
But the state also exercises ideological control in the sense of what Antonio Gramsci calls 
"the ethical state": "Every state is ethical in as much as one of its most important 
functions is to raise the great mass of the population to a particular cultural and moral 
level."® In essence, this ethical function of the state is not always achieved by well- 
defined governmental machinery. Rather, its salient feature is "to rule by consent," a 
crucial element of Gramsci’s conception of hegemony.^ It represents an on-going 
transformative process whereby the dominant section of society establishes its view of the 
world as "all-inclusive and universal," while the subordinate groups accept it as "common 
sense," convention or tradition.® In the cultural field, consent manifests itself in a 
variety of forms and contents, from what constitutes our national heritage to what is art 
and what is kitsch, to the very values which are held to be dear and beyond doubt in 
society. The hegemonic process, paradoxically, needs to look neutral and transparent, 
yet, as a process of "cultural socialisation," it is in reality tightly constructed and opaque.
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Nowhere is this hegemonic process illustrated more clearly than in another juxtaposition 
of the art-and-politics discourse, that in which socialist realism and abstract art are set 
in contrast. Socialist realism, on the one hand, is often referred to as the official style 
of totalitarian regimes, which are portrayed as hostile to, and incompatible with, modern 
art.^ Yet, in contrast, on the other hand, non-objective art after the Second World War 
on the other side of the Atlantic is reified as avant-garde art. In^he United States in 
particular, abstract expressionism was lauded as the official art, and sent abroad for 
exhibitions as the quintessential American cultural a m b a s s a d o r . N o r  is the tendency 
less potent in Britain. For decades, generations of abstract art, in one form or another, 
such as the work of Ben Nicholson or Anish Kapoor, have dominated the prominent art 
galleries throughout the country, and especially so at London’s Tate Gallery.
The issue at stake here is not whether or not one specific style is any more artistically 
competent or original than the other, but, rather, why the canonic position has come to 
be ascribed to one particular style or form instead of the other, and how this hegemonic 
process actually took place, and with what consequences. In other words, the answer is 
not to be found in artistic style itself, or the capacities of any single artist himself or 
herself, but in how power is exercised or combined in capitalist society to define and 
frame what is the legitimate and authentic cultural practice. This is not to suggest that 
any legitimate cultural practice is so dominant as to exclude all the others. To quote 
Miliband’s remarks in a similar context: "... [the] competition should be so unequal as 
to give a crushing advantage to one side against the other."" The irony is this: if the 
dominant culture is seen to be tolerant of other practices, it thereby achieves its most 
effective political purpose of marginalising them at the same time.
With regard to the second relevant area of research literature, this may, for lack of a 
better term, be called the "government-and-the-arts" approach. Among the most typical 
publications are those produced by political scientists such as Kevin Mulcahy and Richard 
Swain, Public Policy and the Art\ Mulcahy and Lawrence Mankin et al. , Government and 
the Arts; Milton Cummings and Richard Katz, The Patron State: Government and the Arts 
in Europe, North America and Japan, and Margaret Wyszomirski, Congress and the Arts, 
to name but a few." There is no gainsaying the fact that government arts agencies are
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the most prominent actors in the formulation and implementation of public arts policies 
within the modern state. Studies of these agencies and their policies, legitimate concerns 
in their own right, have done much to record in historical terms the actual working of the 
institutional apparatus of the state, and to account for the structural frameworks of these 
political systems.
Another cohort of authors who have dealt with the topic are mainly, but not exclusively, 
arts administrators or arts-related professionals who were once part of these arts agencies. 
Drawing on their experience, they either comment on current arts and cultural affairs, 
or publish on the history of these institutions from an insider’s perspective.^^ While the 
government-and-the-arts approach is relatively popular among social scientists in the 
United States, most British input is drawn from this second group. As most of these 
studies are autobiographical in nature, they offer even less conceptual space for 
theoretical engagement than the former approach.
All the same, both approaches, for all their strength in empirical or historical work, are 
prone to become nothing more than case descriptions or explanations. This has much to 
do with the political conditions and social forces which have prompted such studies, 
especially in the United State, as well as the shifting focus and interest of the academic 
domain. It was not until the 1970s that arts (or culture) became a fashionable topic for 
social s c i en t i s t s . The  establishment in 1965 of the National Endowment for the Arts 
as a public arts agency within the state system, and its rapid expansion in the 1970s, 
undoubtedly gave a political edge to the question of how the issue of government and the 
arts should be posed and framed in the United S t a t e s . Y e t  for much of the past few 
decades, the Anglo-American academic marketplace of the social sciences has been 
largely shaped by positivism and empiricism, within whose parameters most work in 
political science and sociology is located. The quest for scientific methodology as the 
mode of inquiry has too often, by definitional fiat, ruled out any rigorous conceptual 
work, privileging science’s "representationality" over its theoretical and conceptual 
formation. Specifically, the concept of the state has received far less attention in political 
analysis than it deserves.^®
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It is therefore not surprising that scholars, in particular those who adopt the ’’government- 
and-the-arts" approach, commonly speak of "government" as the state, as if the two 
terms were interchangeable. But, as Miiiband eloquently argues, government is only one 
aspect of the state system. To equate state with government is to attribute a quite 
misleading meaning to both concepts. Inevitably this approach, as we have seen, centres 
around the administrative aspect of the state system, leaving oth^r key issues either 
unposited or unquestioned. Above all, its marked deficiency is its inability to map out 
satisfactorily the distribution of power in capitalist societies, not the state monopoly of 
physical coercive force in the Weberian sense, but the symbolic and cultural power which 
is formally invested in these state arts institutions.^®
As is often argued in the arts media, public arts agencies such as the National 
Endowment for the Arts or the Arts Council carry with them an "official seal of 
approval," a form of political power which is deemed to be far more effective than their 
limited financial allocations. This is because, as the reassuring platitude would have it, 
this stamp of approval serves, among other various functions, to secure other grants for 
arts organisations.^^ Yet, far from defining and explicating the nature of official 
ratification, most government-and-the-arts analyses have contented themselves merely 
with acknowledging its nebulous existence. It is therefore necessary to account for the 
nature of state power in the cultural sphere, to explore how it is exercised and by whom, 
through what means it is circulated, and over whom it seeks to exert influence. It is also 
indispensable to relate this power to other functions of the state also, and to integrate it 
into the analysis of political power in advanced capitalist societies, an area neglected even 
by those with a sustained interest in the issue of the state. The full potential of the 
relation between the state and the arts can be realised only in studies, be they historical 
or sociological, that are sensitive to other forms of power, and to their relational 
distribution within a given society and its political system.
Alternatively, to put the question in an institutional context, what is proposed here is to 
posit a different set of questions when it comes to analysing public arts agencies and 
other semi-public art institutions. It is not sufficient to characterise these agencies in 
administrative terms, such as their budget growth or changes in grant giving. Nor is it
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analytically useful to de-politicise these agencies, as is generally advocated by the 
adherents of the so-called "arm’s length principle" who argue that these institutions are 
independent of political "interference" and accordingly beyond the remit of political 
analysis. Rather, these agencies, as part of the political structure, not only speak in the 
name of the state, but also are the holders of state power on cultural matters, of which 
their imprimatur is merely a signifier. It is by locating these agencies within the 
configuration of political power — along with normative political theory about such 
notions as state autonomy or capacities — that their relations and interactions with other 
non-state social groups or organisations, whether commercial or non-profit making, can 
be fully accounted for.
Hence, the inter-relationship between these agencies, together with other semi-public 
institutions, and corporate economic power, is of considerable relevance in the context 
of this study. Some accounts have attempted to characterise these relations, but most of 
them remain descriptive and restrict their scope to funding patterns in so-called 
partnership situations, with the majority rarely going beyond political rhetoric to justify 
public arts expenditure.^ Nothing conclusive has yet been suggested in the way of 
analysis.
This proves to be particularly inadequate considering the significant strides that business 
made into the cultural arena during the 1980s.^ The phenomenon can not simply be 
explained away by invoking the euphemistic buzz phrase "the enlightened self-interest" 
of business. Instead, it has to be understood in terms of political power manifested in 
its varied forms within the modern state, of which cultural power is part, and the ways 
through which those manifestations are translated, transferred or transformed. This is 
to say that corporations, like their chief executives on an individual level, are already, 
by virtue of private wealth, in command of considerable power and influence in society. 
Their undertaking of cultural activities, often publicly endorsed by government, is 
unlikely to be anything but a confluence of private economic power and public cultural 
authority, with the prospect that the latter can in due course be transformed, at the right 
juncture, into political power, either explicitly or subtly. It is then relatively easy for 
businesses, especially the giant corporations, to manoeuvre this power to serve their own
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specific economic interests. While more systematic research is necessary in order to 
delineate exactly how these various forms of power are transformed and manipulated, the 
case of Philip Morris best exemplifies the point in question, when it in effect cashed in 
its arts support in 1994 while battling against the anti-smoking laws in New York City, 
a case to which we will return in detail in Chapter 4.
This leads to the related question of how the cultural power and authority of the state 
operate, and through what mechanisms state power and private capital interact and traffic 
back and forth. The prime instrument of state power in this area are public arts agencies. 
On the whole, these agencies are what one may call "the cultural gatekeepers" of the 
state. This certainly does not mean that they are cultural policemen for a monolithic 
official culture, a term very often loaded with derogatory connotations. Nor is this 
particular function of the agencies as monopolistic as those of the state in its use of 
violence and repressive force. But they are in fact the state’s cultural gatekeepers in the 
sense that they are the agents of legitimising processes within, and for, the political 
system. They do not simply legitimise cultural products. They legitimise particular 
cultural products, particular modes of cultural practice, and particular sets of cultural 
assumptions. While the nature and process of legitimisation of any particular cultural 
order remain specific to each agency, nation and historical juncture, much of this is done, 
as often happens, in the name of pursuing "quality" or "excellence" in the arts, so as to 
leave these agencies appearing ideologically "neutral", and above all beyond politics.
Yet, by virtue of their being part of state bureaucracy, as indicated earlier, they are part 
also of the circuit of a political system, from whose framework they draw their authority 
and power. This is so notwithstanding the fact that these agencies have not so far come 
high on the political agenda, and thus arguably their power may not be as politically 
compelling and directly forceful as that of other branches within the state, such as, for 
example, the courts. For all that, their power and authority do in fact exist in two real 
senses. As the single national institution exclusively dedicated to the living arts/culture 
of the country, each is the most visible and authoritative voice in the land. In this 
regard, their authority is unquestioned and widely acknowledged.
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Less easy to quantify is the political influence that these agencies may possess by virtue 
of the situational advantage of being located within a political framework. Their 
influence arises in the social structure of the political organisations themselves; that is to 
say, they are conveniently located and "networked" to have relatively easier access to the 
corridors of power than other institutions outside the governmental machinery. This is 
not to suggest that such bodies have any major impact over other areas of public policies, 
but that their bureaucrats, in common with those who staff all state agencies, are woven 
into an intricate network of social and political life by virtue of their occupation and 
social origins. As a senior manager of a multinational company pointed out, their arts 
sponsorship is not so much targeted toward any particular arts institution as toward other 
governmental agencies:
For example, one of the permanent secretaries of one of the main departments — 
I don’t know if it was him so much as his wife — was very involved in setting up 
a part of the Tate Gallery, down in Cornwall in St. Ives. We contributed a 
reasonable sum of money towards that. So obviously he is bound to be aware that 
we are supporting something his wife was interested in, isn’t he?“
Far from being a trivial matter, this instance illustrates one of the possible channels 
through which different manifestations of power are connected. Precisely how this inner- 
circle networking affects the transformation of power and influence is a subject which 
requires further examination and elaboration, provided always that it is not too politically 
sensitive, or even dangerous, to explore it more closely.
This intermeshing of public authority and political power can be applied with equal force 
to semi-public arts institutions, that is, in this context of this study, to art museums and 
galleries. Obviously it is difficult to claim that American art museums fall within the 
state bureaucracy in anything like the same way as their British counterparts. Strictly 
speaking, as they stand at the moment, they do not. To some extent they are not subject 
to the same rigorous scrutiny of public accountability that state agencies, such as the 
National Endowment for the Arts, are, and not least because most of them are governed 
by self-perpetuating boards of trustees.
Yet, in the sense that they are prominent in the public domain and engaged with issues
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of public import, they do have public authority. Their social position as cultural 
institutions can hence be seen as comparable to other public arts agencies. After all, if 
museums such as the Museum of Modern Art or the Whitney Museum of American Art 
in New York had remained the private art clubs of the wealthy, as they had originally 
been in the late ’20s and early ’30s, they would not have commanded the prestige and 
power that they enjoy today in American society. To quote Carol Duncan: "... to work 
as ideologically effective institutions, they [American public art museums] required the 
status, authority, and prestige of public spaces. And above all, had they not received 
public assistance in one form or another, they would not have expanded as they did — 
an issue to which we shall return later.
Nevertheless, however circuitous the route by which this authority and power travel, and 
however non-political these art institutions would like to claim to be, the political efficacy 
of art, and the arts in general, which is precisely the remit of these institutions, is a 
testimony to the point in question. The functions and influence which these bodies can 
perform and exert, either in their own right, or in the case of public arts agencies, also 
through the arts organisations they fund, are politically useful both within the nation state 
as well as a b r o a d . I t  is these functions, particularly in the context of this study, that 
prove to be most attractive to business. In particular, given the internationalisation of 
capital, multinationals have gone hand in hand with arts organisations on to the global 
stage, or to be more precise, into the global market.
The key link between institutions of art and commerce are arts bureaucrats, especially 
those high-ranking ones, both in state arts agencies and the semi-public institutions. 
Paraphrasing Fred Block, they may be described as "state cultural managers," or the 
"state élite" in Miliband’s terms.^* By virtue of occupying positions of governmental 
power, these administrative élites are the vital agents of state power. Accordingly, it is 
of importance to determine to what extent they act for the collective interests of the social 
"whole," as in the Hegelian view of the state, or merely for one particular interest or 
class, or if they are in fact, as Block argues, "self-interested maximisers, interested in 
maximising their power, prestige, and wealth," or indeed some combination of these.^’ 
In this context, their social origin and composition, as well as ideological inclination, are
58
just as important an issue as their position and authority as formally defined by 
officialdom. Unfortunately, little is known about these people, except from those studies 
working in the élite framework which deals with state bureaucrats as a whole.
To suggest that their social provenance is correlated to the issues in question is, however, 
not to assert that they are necessarily the representatives of the interests of either business 
or the upper class. From what is little known about these administrative elites, they are, 
as far as social classes are concerned, closer to the arts consumers or benefactors than 
to the general population. Although the extent to which this affects their outlook and 
specific operations is a subject for further investigation, it is not too far-fetched to 
propose that these elites tend to be more accommodating to the interest and demands of 
their patrons (in particular those with enormous economic power, whether individuals or 
corporations) than to those of what they often refer to as "the public". Nowhere was this 
tendency more clearly illustrated than in the battle to "reform" the Tax Reform Act of 
1986, a case which will be discussed in detail l a t e r . S u f f i c e  it to say here that these 
administrative elites persistently, and in the event successfully, advocated and lobbied for 
substantial tax benefits for wealthy art donors.
It is beyond question that some of these arts managers have in mind the best interests of 
the institutions they work for. The issue at stake is rather that, on the one hand, they are 
working within the perimeter of the private enterprise system, to whose assumptions and 
sometimes even mode of perception they are susceptible, and on the other, that they can 
only exercise their capacities and autonomy within the limits already prescribed by the 
prevailing political and economic framework, in which what Jean Meynaud calls "the bias 
of the system" is embedded.^^ The "bias" works to ensure that when the state 
intervenes, it will automatically act, to a greater or lesser extent, to the advantage of 
propertied interests. Thus, in the example mentioned above, the ethics of ownership need 
not be addressed. By contrast, it is the proprietorship of art works that is held to be the 
only key to the tax system when it comes to art collecting for the nation. To increase the 
privileges of those who own the art works is a surer means of guaranteeing art for the 
nation than to assert the rights of those who do not.
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It is inevitably so because much of the debate on arts and public policies (or politics in 
general) has been about different ways of sanctifying the status quo, in which the 
established interests of wealthy individuals, or relative newcomers (corporations) to the 
art world, are given precedence over those of the general public; the debate has not been 
about moving beyond this to any radically different way of re-conceptualising, re­
formulating and re-organising the system itself. This may sound like a counsel of 
despair, but unless-we understand how the present system works, we are in the power of 
its mystique, and we will not have the conceptual equipment to analyse it lucidly.
2.2 Public funding for the Arts in the United Kingdom and the United 
States before the 1980s
State intervention in the production, dissemination and consumption of contemporary art 
can take several forms. Firstly, the training of artists through arts education; secondly, 
the subsidies and grants provided by public arts agencies; and finally, the public art 
museums and galleries, either wholly or partially maintained by the state, which exhibit, 
validate and collect contemporary arts w o r k s . T h e  importance of the state art 
education system, the art schools in Britain and university (fine) art departments in 
America, which replaced the function of the nineteenth-century ateliers and academies, 
is beyond doubt of critical consequence in the formation of artists as a socially 
constructed category.^ It is, however, beyond the scope of this study to deal with this 
particular topic, not least because it is an area which has not proved to be attractive to 
corporate sponsors and is therefore deemed to be less relevant.
As a result, the discussion that follows will concentrate on the historical background of 
art museums and public art agencies in both countries. It is certainly not my intention 
to present a comprehensive historical survey of these institutions as such. Their histories 
have already been documented in various s t u d i e s . Y e t ,  in order to understand the 
profound changes that these organisations underwent during the 1980s, it is necessary to 
begin with some fundamental tendencies in the histories of these institutions. My focus 
will be on public patronage within the political formation of the modern state in both
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countries. This is not so much because there was no comparable royal patronage in 
America, but rather because my interest is primarily in the relationship between art and 
collective patronage in Western capitalist democracies.
The section will therefore review firstly the contemporaneous formation of public art 
museums and their social relations in both countries. In particular it is couched in terms 
of the problematics of the public and the private. This is to recognise that art museums, 
as significant segments of the art world, are contested sites in which the state and the 
major actors from business have constantly striven to establish their claim for, and 
display of, legitimacy and hegemony. It is also an arena where conceptual categories 
such as public/private used in the discourse about the whole set of political and socio­
economic relations and processes are rigorously negotiated, framed and reframed.
In the second part, because it is the public art agencies rather than art museums that were 
established by government as state institutions to fulfil public arts policy, where the rôle 
of the state vis-à-vis the arts is most clearly manifested today, I will concentrate on the 
Arts Council of Great Britain and the National Endowment for the Arts for comparison, 
particularly their arts department and visual arts program respectively.^^ These two 
agencies, compared with art museums in general, are more concerned and directly 
involved with contemporary art. They also provide businesses with the public imprimatur 
which helps shape their involvement in the arts.
2.2.1. Art Museums in America and Britain: Private Origin and Public Practice
Your contribution is deductible fo r  tax purposes.
— A slogan for fund raising.^*
It is generally perceived that American art museums are "private enterprises" or in a 
more modified way, "private non-profit" institutions, while their British counterparts are 
"public" ones. Such a presumed contrast has become so widely articulated, particularly 
since the 1980s, that it is invariably presented as an established truth about art museums
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in the two countries. For instance, Perry T. Rathbone, Director Emeritus of the Boston 
Museum of Fine Arts, lamented: "That art museums have been almost exclusively built 
and maintained by the private sector is not sufficiently understood [italic added]. In 
a similar manner, the millionaire developer and ex-chairman of the British Arts Council, 
Peter Palumbo, commented: "Our tax laws do not favour individual donations as much 
as they do in the United States, where the arts are funded 90 per cent by individuals 
[italic a d d e d ] . T h e s e  differences between art museums are also assumed to reflect 
a larger truth about the respective character of arts provision more broadly in Britain and 
the United States.
Without doubt the public-private dichotomy is not as neat as these propositions 
uncritically assume. For one thing, "public" and "private" are constructed categories 
rather than simple facts. Central to the conundrum of public and private is the fact that 
the boundary between the two is by no means a fixed one, but subject to on-going 
political, social, and ideological forces that help shape the discourse. For those advocates 
of enterprise culture, the "public," as far as arts funding is concerned, came to refer to 
one narrowly defined mechanism, namely the annual grants from the Treasury. The rise 
to prominence of this particular ideological construction was largely the product of the 
conservatives’ efforts to privatise culture in the 1980s, in particular in Britain, as we shall 
discuss in detail in Chapter 3.
In Ideology and Modem Culture, Thompson argues that there are at least two basic 
meanings to this dichotomy in modern Western democracies.^^ Rooted in liberal 
political theory, "the public" refers to the domain of institutionalized political power, 
which is increasingly vested in the authority of a sovereign state. "Public" in this sense 
is synonymous with "state" or "state-related." In contrast to this, the private domain 
includes private economic activities and the domestic realm.
But "public" can also be negatively defined by its conventional opposition, "private. " As 
Raymond Williams suggested, the primary sense of "private" in many different uses is 
one of privilege, "the limited access or participation. In this second sense, "public" 
means "open" or "available to the public. " It is this sense of "publicness" that constitutes
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one of the key criteria of Jürgen Habermas’s utopian concept of the public sphere/^ 
In principle the bourgeois public sphere is open to all private autonomous individuals for 
their rational discourse; to quote Habermas: "Access is guaranteed to all citizens."'^ 
In reality, however, entry to the public sphere is restricted to propertied and educated 
men. Although Habermas’s ideal remains historically unattainable, his arguments 
concerning the public sphere have been very influential in discussions of the category of 
the "public" in various disciplines.
These two sets of meanings of public and private, while distinct in themselves, are by no 
means mutually exclusive. With the development of the constitutional state in the 
twentieth century, in tandem with the expanded mechanism of state intervention, 
especially in the post-World War II era, the public sector, as representing the collectivity 
of citizenship in a state, has come to assume a relatively greater degree of public 
accountability within contemporary democracies. By contrast, the private sector, as 
represented by business in a capitalist system, has the power and "right" to make 
hundreds of "private" vital decisions, without even a pretence at democracy.
Between this public/private divide, however, there exists another sector, the so-called 
third or non-profit sector in America, and the charity or the voluntary sector in Britain. 
A substantial element of collective policies and functions, which otherwise would have 
been vested in the authority of the state, have been carried out by those institutions, 
whose existence is closely bound up with the ambiguous nature of their being public and 
private at one and the same time.
Institutionally speaking, the majority of the so-called "private" art museums in America 
are located within this sector, while their British counterparts are organised by means of 
its extreme variant, the quangos (quasi autonomous non-governmental organisations). 
While most of their funds come from the taxpayer, and their staff are hired and paid 
according to civil service assessment criteria, these quangos, whether the Arts Council 
or the trustees of art galleries, claim that their operations are conducted on the "arm’s- 
length principle," that is, they claim to be somehow outside politics because they do not 
have to answer directly to Parliament.^^ Be it in America or in Britain, these
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institutions are generally run by a board of unpaid trustees, who thereby enter the social 
space of the public institutions. It goes without saying that these people are politically 
and socially privileged, but they are presumed and expected to act only in their private 
capacity for the public interest. The Establishment bias of this arrangement is self- 
evident. This institutional system has added a whole level of complexity to the vexed 
question of the public and the private. It is against this background that we now turn to 
a review of art museums in America and Britain.
In general terms, the origin of the oldest established art museums in America and Britain 
lies in private initiatives rather than being the result of a clearly articulated public arts 
policy. The Boston Museum of Fine Art, the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York, 
and Chicago’s Arts Institute in the United States, or the British Museum, the National 
Gallery and the Tate Gallery in Britain, to name but a few, all owe their existence, to a 
large extent, to private funds or donations from the rich. The Boston Museum, for 
instance, was founded in 1870 by the Brahmin élite, while both the collection and the 
building of the Tate Gallery were given to the nation by Henry Tate towards the end of 
the last century.*^ ®
What distinguishes art museums in America from their British cousins, however, is their 
institutional arrangements. In the charters drawn up to establish art museums as 
charitable trusts, for which a board was legally accountable, American museums had 
followed English precedents of common law."*^  But unlike their English counterparts, 
whose boards of trustees have been appointed by higher state officials (earlier by the 
monarch and then by the Prime Minister), American museum boards are autonomous and 
self-perpetuating, regardless how much public support they receive. For instance, 
although the New York City government contributed $500,000 toward its construction 
and was responsible for its maintenance expenses, the Metropolitan Museum was, and 
still is, governed by a board of private citizens, over which the City has no real 
power.^* This pattern of governing authority in American art museums was to become 
the norm in the years to come, except for those specifically funded by government.
This difference was, to a large extent, a reflection of the financial realities of art
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museums across the Atlantic. While the American museums were heavily reliant on 
"private" contributions, the British equivalents were explicitly funded from the public 
purse, once Government overcame the initial reluctance to accept the private gift of art 
collections and/or funds. This historical difference has shaped ever since the way in 
which art museums operate in the two countries. It is also on this ground that the 
contrast between the American "private" and the British "public" systems of arts funding 
is generally assumed to rest.
However, some social scientists have looked at public funding in a very different light. 
With the creation of the notion of "tax expenditure" in the United States in the 1960s, the 
concept and all its ramifications have been applied to the study of public arts funding. 
What this theory helped to highlight is the heretofore unaddressed issue of indirect public 
art subsidies through tax provisions, that is, tax foregone which otherwise would have 
had to be paid to the relevant tax authorities in the country concerned. More specifically, 
various tax rules affect museum funding directly and dramatically, although for the 
coherence of the study, 1 will not be able to discuss each of them in detail.
The major indirect subsidies for art museums in America are charitable contributions and 
gifts of property. The charitable contribution was first introduced for individuals in 
1917^ ^^  and for corporations in 1935. This measure allows the donor to deduct 
contributions from their taxable income and thus reduces their tax liability. While the 
subject will be analysed in the next chapter in connection with tax changes under the 
Reagan and Thatcher governments, it is necessary here to look in some detail at the issue 
of art donations to museums, not least because donated artworks have been such an 
indispensable part of museum life. In fact, it is a perfect illustration of "the bias of the 
system," in which the privilege of a rich and powerful minority, to exhume an 
unfashionable phrase, is protected by law over the rights of the public. It is to bring this 
into focus that the inclusion in this section of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which 
otherwise could have been discussed in Chapter 4, can be justified.
Before the 1986 Act, when a donor gave gifts of appreciated property, art works in this 
case, to museums, he or she had "double tax incentives." In addition to being able to
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deduct its fair market value against personal ordinary income/® the donor paid no 
capital gains tax on the appreciation of the work, for which they would otherwise have 
been liable should they have chosen, instead, to sell it on the market and donate the 
cash/^ For instance, consider the case of a donor in the highest (50 percent) tax rate 
bracket in the early 1980s, who had a painting worth $10,000, which cost him $5,000 
at the time of purchase. To donate the painting to a museum would give him $6,000 tax 
saving ($5,000 from a charitable deduction at a 50 percent rate and further $1,000 from 
the dispensation from of capital gains tax at a 20 percent rate).^^ Therefore in this 
transaction, the donor actually donated $4,000, with the government, or more precisely 
the unknowing taxpayers, footing the bill of $6,000. The ratio between the donor’s and 
public money became even more dramatic when between 1944 and 1963 the top federal 
income rate rose to more than 90 per cent (see Table 1.1).
The ramification of tax benefits is particularly telling, given the fact that gifts of 
property, and charitable contributions to arts/cultural institutions (a theme to which we 
shall return in Chapter 3), are highly concentrated within the higher tax bracket groups 
(see Table 2.1). It is primarily by taking advantage of such tax concessions that wealthy 
individuals, and later corporations, have channelled their art works to museums. It is 
thus not uncommon to think of art gifts to museums as a tax-avoidance strategy for the 
rich and for some corporations.^^ For instance, KPMG Peat Marwick, a New York- 
based accounting firm, recently donated 22 works of contemporary crafts to the Renwick 
Gallery of the National Museum of American Art in Washington D.C. The tax incentive 
was specifically mentioned as one of two reasons for the gift. '^^  The institutionalisation 
of the economic interests of either elites or corporations in the cultural sphere is, of 
course, part and parcel of "the bias of the system." Still, what concerns us here is the 
extent to which a substantial amount of government subsidy, which has always been much 
larger than direct grants, is so subtly disguised.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 not only removed the allowance for the appreciated portion 
of gifts, but also eliminated for some taxpayers the extra tax incentive provided by the 
dispensation from capital gains tax.^  ^ This measure, among others, was intended as a 
way to combat the fiscal crisis, and had nothing to do with the Reagan regime’s
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perception of any unfairness in the tax system. (This is evident insofar as other tax 
changes under this administration had substantially benefited the better off rather than the 
poor.)^® The ensuing "public" debate on the issue is of particular significance in this 
context. Not only does it exemplify particularly well the kind of power transaction that 
takes place between public agents and private interests, but it also demonstrates the way 
in which the hegemonic process operates, in which one particular discourse, framed by 
arts bureaucrats, resoundingly silences the other.
Framing is of course a conscious selection, a process which is both inclusive and 
exclusive. What is inclusive, in this case, is the decrease of arts donations, while what 
is exclusive is the lion’s share of public expense in these gifts. Between 1986 and 1993, 
the year when the "double tax incentives" for art donors were restored, the tax changes 
had become so "politically hot" that even a cursory inspection of the entries in the Art 
Index reveals it: their repeal was the top legislative goal of museums and arts 
professionals a l i k e . D u r i n g  the period concerned, 18 articles out of a total 49 entries 
on the topic of American museum gifts and legacies were devoted to this i s s u e . A l l  
but one were in favour of restoring the pre-1986 tax benefits to donors because, it was 
reported, art museums across the country were as a result experiencing a dramatic 
decrease in art donat i ons . Nowhere  is the issue of the effective subsidies from public 
money in the so-called "donations" ever raised.
The 1986 law was, to quote Edward Able, director of the American Association of 
Museums, "causing a haemorrhage of our cultural and artistic wealth. Certainly the 
situation is not straightforward. As far as tax benefits are concerned, if the donor wished 
to do so, he or she could have sold the artworks and donated the cash to museums 
instead, a process which was, and still is, tax deductible. But in that case, the donor 
could lose some part of those "double tax incentives" given by the pre-1986 tax laws.^^ 
However, to maximise the benefits for the donor, the representative of the Association 
testified before Congress: "Rather than seeking a benefit fo r  the rich, we are seeking to 
induce them to part with wealth" because "[m]useums serve public purposes, not private 
ones [italic added]. By identifying the private agenda as identical to the public 
interest, these arts managers could then set about protecting what they deemed to be the
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treasures of the nation. For whose interests ultimately these people speak is curiously 
a question that remains to be answered.
The Mathematics o f Indirect Public Subsidies
This necessitates some indication of how much public money has actually gone to the 
"private" art museums. But money, in the arts, is never an easy calculation. The 
relevant data available from other research are not a perfect measure, not least because 
they are not collected in terms of the particular focus and ambit of our present study.®  ^
I thus approach the matter on two levels. On the macro level, I attempt to show how 
much and/or what percentage of public money, both direct and indirect, constitutes the 
budgets of art museums in general. On a micro level, I aim to illustrate, through the 
case of the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York (hereafter "the Met"), the range 
of indirect subsidies that have been effectively obscured or hidden from public view. By 
virtue of its high visibility, this museum, perhaps more than any other museum in 
America, is subject to rigorous public scrutiny, and information on its operations is 
therefore comparatively more readily available.
According to the Association of Art Museum Directors survey in 1989, which covered 
the operation of 155 art museums across the country in the previous year, Don Fullerton, 
Professor of Economics at the University of Virginia, reached an approximate figure of 
tax expenditure for art museums.^
$ (million)
Operating revenue (earned income) 122.4 14.0%
Private support (contributed income) 235.0 27.0%
Value of art donated 77.3 8.9%
Total federal support 95.7 11.0%
Total state and local support 168.7 19.3%
Endowment income 173.0 19.8%
Total 872.1 100.0
One third of the 35.9 percent deductible contributions to art museums (27.0 % private 
support and 8.9 % value of art donated combined), in other words, about 12 percent is
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tax expenditure. Another one third of the 19.8 per cent non-taxable endowment income 
(6.6 percent) is also part of taxpayers’ money. Fullerton also mentioned another form 
of tax expenditure, namely the non-taxation of net operating revenues; this unfortunately 
could not be estimated because the costs related to the store, restaurant, parking or 
special events were not available. This part of the calculation aside, the two tax subsidies 
already mentioned alone constitute 18.6 percent of museum income (12 percent plus 6.6 
percent). If we add this amount to other direct federal, state and local support, it brings 
the public subsidies to almost half of the museums’ income.
This estimate is, however, very conservative, but unfortunately no other comparable data 
are available.®  ^ The main problem arises from the fact that the 33 percent top income 
tax rate in 1988 was almost at its lowest in this century (see Table 1.1). In contrast to 
a few decades ago, when the top rate was more than 90 percent (i.e. from 1944 to 1963), 
art gifts, or indeed any charitable contributions, represented a 90 percent tax benefit. 
When the tax rate dropped to 70 percent in the 1970s, the tax benefit for donors 
correspondingly decreased to 70 percent. When the tax rate further reduced to 33 percent 
in 1988, for any gifts the U.S. government contributed only 33 percent of the value. 
What this meant was, to quote the title of an article by Walker: "Generosity will cost 
more, 1RS [Internal Revenue Service] tells donors.
These figures take on added significance if we look at the decade of the establishment of 
art museums (see Table 2.2). More than half of them, or indeed of museums in general, 
were set up over the decades of the 1960s and 1970s, when the tax rates were 
comparatively higher. Certainly other factors might have contributed to this 
phenomenon, but given the close correlation between the wealthy and their preference for 
giving to the arts (culture), there are good reasons to argue that tax incentives would have 
been one of the most significant determinants.®^ Unfortunately, there is no systematic 
evidence to map out any definitive relationship between the two variables. When it 
comes to the issue of tax incentives and charitable giving, the discourse of the relation, 
in both America and Britain, is too often framed in terms of lower income tax inducing 
more giving. Reduction of personal taxation is often deemed to be "of material assistance 
to the arts by leaving more money in private hands."®* The fact remains, ironically.
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that the lower the taxes, the lower the giving, simply because when the tax rate is low, 
it costs the donor so much more to give/^
How does indirect subsidy affect the financial configuration of art museums, in particular 
the Met? A look at its operating income in 1988-89 will show some of the issues 
discussed above in more detail (see Table 2.3). The City of New ^ o rk  contributed a 
substantial amount (21.5 percent) of the Museum’s budget. This is of course not always 
typical for other museums in the City, such as the Museum of Modern Art or the 
Whitney Museum of American Art. But as public charities these museums are exempt 
from local property tax for the properties they own.^° Neither these museums, nor the 
Met, have ever listed tax concessions given by government in their annual reports. As 
art museums hardly ever trade their properties on the market, any attempt to assess the 
real market value of their buildings and what tax expenditure might otherwise have been 
incurred remains hypothetical. An estimate for 1976 is the only figure available.^^ The 
total assessed value for the Met in that year was estimated at $42 million, including $15 
million in land and $27 million in b u i l d i n g s . T h e  estimated property tax, or more 
precisely tax expenditure, for the Met was then $3.69 million.^^
Another significant form of indirect subsidy includes about one third of the endowment 
(14.4 percent) and membership income (14.0 percent), i.e. 9.47 percent. '^* There are 
of course further public subsidies within the categories of Special Exhibitions and Gifts 
and Grants. However, these categories collapse various sources of income, rendering it 
difficult to determine the actual percentage of public money involved. In particular Gifts 
and Grants includes direct grants from federal and state government.
Generally speaking, art museums do not pay taxes on their income from admissions, 
parking lots, restaurants or gift s h o p s . B u t  art museums are liable to Unrelated 
Business Income Taxes (UBIT) for activities not related to their not-for-profit mission. 
I have not been able to find any specific figure or calculations here, because compared 
with other tax incentives, UBIT is not a major one. Nevertheless, William H. Luer, 
President of the Met since 1986, implied, at a conference in 1989, that some changes 
proposed in the House of Representatives regarding UBIT could cost the Met as much
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as $1 million per year/^
Another form of indirect subsidy not listed in the Met’s annual report was the value 
provided by the federal indemnification program (see Table 2.4). Under this program, 
the federal government agrees to act as an insurer for works of art that are loaned, often 
by other governments, as part of special exhibitions. As Charles T. Clotfelter argued, 
"Although there is virtually no budgetary cost of the program. I t  has substantial value to 
art museums in terms of reduced insurance costs. Unfortunately there are no specific 
break-down data for the Met’s share, which is certainly larger than most art museums in 
the United States.
Last but not least, of crucial importance to art museums is the value of donated art. 
Although the museum does list donated gifts in its annual report, understandably, no 
value is given to each individual piece. While no comprehensive data exist on the value 
of these objects, William Luers claimed that in the past "90 percent of our collection has 
come from gifts and bequests. Later, to illustrate the importance of the tax benefits 
re-instituted by Congress, it was reported that $42.8 million worth of works of art were 
donated to the Museum in 1991, according to Ashton Hawkins, executive vice president 
and counsel to the trustees of the Met.^^
Having threaded my way through the minefield of the measured, unmeasured, or even 
the unmeasurable, I do not claim to present a comprehensive or a conclusive portrait of 
the public/private components involved in museum funding. To close the information gap 
would require a study as long again as this one. But contrary to claims that American 
art museums are "private enterprises," I hope that I have at least shown that the hard 
revenue figures fundamentally contradict this assertion. At some juncture, this is of 
course much more than a question of mathematic calculation. The very practice of 
ambiguously positioning American art museums, being public and private at the one and 
same time, or at one time and not at another time, exemplifies the hegemonic process at 
work. Its very indetermination and elasticity allow for a wide range of possible 
manipulation.
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Indeed, the ideological confusion over the nature of American art museums is 
remarkable. Even a national institution such as the National Gallery of Art in 
Washington D.C. cannot avoid such ambiguity. In a moderate vein, J. Carter Brown, 
director of the Gallery, referred to the buildings being "given from the private sector, as 
was and is all the art," despite the fact that the maintenance and all the fundamental 
underlying budget are provided by the federal gover nment . I n  a congratulatory mood, 
the Gallery was applauded as "a gift to the United States from Andrew W. Mellon" in 
1941.*  ^ (The cost of this individual munificence has to be understood in relation to the 
fact that the top income rate in 1941 was 80 percent.)
In truth, the entitlement for tax exemption is not a right, but a privilege given by 
Congress for exempt institutions to serve the public interest. The point is made 
indisputably clear by the litigation involving the Barnes Foundation, a museum whose art 
collection was bequeathed by Albert Coombs Barnes in 1958. The trustees of the 
Foundation ran the collection in such a way as to exclude the general public. The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court required public access to the Foundation collection if it were 
to enjoy its tax exempt status:
If the Barnes Art Gallery is to be open only to a selected restricted few, it is not 
a public institution, and if it is not a public institution, the Foundation is not 
entitled to tax exemption as a public charity. “
As charitable corporations governed by boards of trustees, art museums do not have 
shareholders as such, but the boards are nonetheless responsible to their beneficiaries, 
that is, the public. In the Rowan v. Pasadena Art Museum case, the "shareholders" of 
museums are identified unambiguously:
Members of the board of directors of the corporation [the museum] are 
undoubtedly fiduciaries, and as such are required to act in the highest good faith 
toward the beneficiary, i.e., the public...^
To the extent that American art museums have been publicly subsidised, their raison 
d*etre is predicated on the public terrain where their final accountability inevitably
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resides, regardless of whether or not they are legally or officially part of the public 
sector. To claim that they are "private" institutions is, at best, misleading, not to say 
democratically questionable.
2.2.2. Public Arts Agencies in America and Britain
But democracy, in politics, is a slippery concept; it is no less problematic when it comes 
to be applied to the field of arts and culture. Even within Western democratic societies 
where public arts agencies may confidently be expected to cater for the needs of the 
population, it has not always proved so. As we have seen, these agencies and their 
bureaucrats are not autonomous; they operate inside, not outside, the existing political 
and economical framework of the modern state. These are nevertheless state institutions, 
such as the Arts Council of Great Britain (ACGB) and the National Endowment for the 
Arts (NEA), with a legislative mandate, or a Royal Charter in the case of the Arts 
Council, that have specific remits and objectives "to develop and improve the knowledge, 
understanding and practice of the arts," and "to increase the accessibility of the arts to 
the public..."^
These grand ideals reflect the origins of the Arts Council and the NEA, which historically 
took root in a period of dramatic expansion in the rôle of the state in both countries. The 
Arts Council, established in 1946, was part of the post-war welfare settlement in Britain, 
while the Endowment, set up by Congress in 1965, was the brainchild of the "Great 
Society" of the Lyndon Johnson adminstration in the new optimism of the 1960s. The 
twenty-year lapse between the two institutions, to be accounted for by different historical 
conditions, is less significant when compared to the strong resemblance that the 
Endowment bore to its British precedent.
Indeed, in the context of this study the genesis of the Arts Council is of special 
significance. Strictly speaking, the Arts Council was not the outcome of any clearly 
articulated public arts policy, but simply succeeded its wartime precursor, the Council
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for the Encouragement of Music and the Arts (CEMA), as its first Chairman John 
Maynard Keynes phrased it, "in a very English, informal, unostentatious," and "half- 
baked" way/^ The CEMA, first initiated in 1939 by a grant of £25,000 from a private 
body, the American-based Pilgrim Trust, was also supported by the Board of Education 
which put up twice that amount in order to "prevent cultural deprivation on the home 
front" during the Second World War/^ The driving force was the then secretary of the 
Trust and the vice-chairman of the CEMA, Dr. Thomas Jones, whose vision for the 
organisation was an extension of the "social service" to spread the arts.*"^
Despite its slogan, "the Best for the Most," the CEMA was unashamedly tilted toward 
the latter: the audience. Music travellers were appointed to give concerts in remote parts 
of the country in churches, factory canteens, air-raid shelters, village halls, hostels, army 
camps and rest centres. In the field of visual arts, the CEMA substantially funded the 
travelling exhibitions "Art for the People" in 1940, a series of shows initiated by William 
Emrys Williams in 1935 for touring industrial towns such as Swindon and Barnsley, 
when he was the secretary of the British Institute for Adult Education.®® According to 
the Trust’s annual report, the CEMA’s art exhibitions attracted more than half a million 
visitors in their first two years.®^
In 1942, a scheme called "Art for British Restaurants" was set up to provide paintings, 
lithographs and murals for improvised canteens where meals were served daily to civilian 
populations.^ At an auxiliary level, the programme also served to give some 
employment for artists under wartime conditions. Some of the murals were carried out 
by established artists such as Duncan Grant, Graham Sutherland and John Piper, while 
some were executed under the supervision of Piper and Sutherland, and others were the 
works of local art s t u d e n t s . T h e  CEMA also bought some oil paintings and 
watercolours for exhibits, "not to show supreme examples of art, but rather to give 
illustrations of pleasing and competent contemporary work, which might be bought by 
ordinary people and lived with in ordinary houses [italic added].
The CEMA’s missionary vision for "ordinary people" was, however, quietly dropped 
when, at the same time as the withdrawal of the Trust’s financial support and the
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resignation of Jones, Maynard Keynes took over its chairmanship in 1942.’  ^ He was, 
to quote Sir Kenneth Clark, "not a man for wandering minstrels and amateur theatricals. 
He believed in excellence. The focus of the practice at the CEMA was subsequently 
changed dramatically, with "the Best" now becoming the centre of gravity.
The shift in focus was not only a matter of personalities, but had more profound 
implications for public arts funding because Keynes was hot just one of the most 
influential economists in Britain at the time, who also "happened" to be interested in the 
arts. Not only did he have close ties with the political establishment, but he also was 
well connected in the arts world, in particular with the Bloomsbury Gr o u p . I n d e e d ,  
he was the very epitome,of the British tradition of "the Great and the Good," those 
people who can freely afford to give up substantial private time for public service. He 
belonged to the vaguer category of what Raymond Williams called, "persons of 
experience and goodwill," a British "state’s euphemism for its informal ruling class."’® 
Keynesian emphasis on artistic "quality" and "standards" was later to become dominant 
in the practice of the Arts Council, as it was Keynes’s vision and creation which ensured 
that a reformed version of the CEMA was to continue into peacetime.’^
The conflicting views and practices, personified in Thomas Jones and John Maynard 
Keynes, within the institutional framework of the modern state, epitomise a persistent 
battle between various sectors of society which seek to lay claim to a legitimate culture. 
The contest expresses itself, at different historical Junctures, in various formulations, 
sometimes reinstating itself in the elitism/ populism divide, sometimes declaring itself in 
terms of the contest between the Establishment and the community, as it did in the 1970s, 
and at other times transforming itself, as in the debate between the metropolis and the 
regions in the 1980s. What has ultimately woven these ostensibly different issues 
together is, however, the centrality of the rôle that the structures of power play in these 
relationships. That is to say, it is precisely the structures of power that are the references 
or indicators in mapping out these dissensions.
The work of the CEMA may seem to be an ephemeral episode,’* but for enthusiasts like 
Roy Shaw it was "the most vigorous approach to ‘arts for all’ that had ever been seen in
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Britain. It is only to the extent that the CEMA reflects an intervention in the 
landscape of the dominant culture that, one may recall, with some justification, the more 
profound and extensive experience of the cultural projects of the Works Progress 
Administration (WPA) in the New Deal America of the 1930s. While it is beyond the 
scope of this study to elaborate on this project, not least because it is relatively well 
researched elsewhere, it is of significance to draw attention to the common ground that 
both the CEMA’s and the WPA’s cultural projects share, despite the great disparity in 
scale and impact between the two.
The Federal Art Project (FAP) was one of the four nationwide cultural schemes of the 
WPA set up in 1935. Like the CEMA, established as a result of severe economic and 
political dislocation, it was a relief expedient programme for visual artists. Also like the 
CEMA, the FAP promulgated the vision of "Art for the Millions," as a collection of 
essays about the project was e n t i t l e d . O f  course, the neatly worded catch phrases 
"Art for Millions" and "Art for the People" beg serious questions as to what art is meant 
to be here, and they are rather redolent of the patrician noblesse oblige of the process of 
démocratisation of the arts.^°^
However, the administrators of both the CEMA and the FAP, such as Thomas Jones and 
Holger Cahill, did share the aspiration of what can only be adequately expressed through 
the concept of "cultural democracy. Both programmes sought to achieve its seminal 
element, that is, cultural access for the public, not only by sending exhibits to various 
parts of the country, or installing murals in locations which were more accessible to 
people, but also through the fostering of community participation. This, in particular, 
was Cahill’s approach, influenced by John Dewey’s idea of "art as experience," which 
aimed to make the arts not only physically accessible, but also "intellectually and 
emotionally accessible. It is through the process of redefining art by changing the 
very terms of reference used by the dominant culture that the relationship between the 
public and artists can be re-mediated and re-negotiated, thereby opening up the range of 
possibilities for the rôle of the arts in a democracy. It is also in this sense of maximising 
popular participation, on which cultural democracy primarily depends, that the 
significance of the early CEMA and New Deal projects extends far beyond their brief
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existence.
The kind of idealistic popular participation championed by the early CEMA and the New 
Deal does not in reality occur very often in Western democratic countries. Often it is the 
public arts agencies, such as the Arts Council and the National Endowment, that survive 
by being incorporated into the permanent governmental machinery ("permanent" in the 
sense that they were originally set up on a long-term basis). Like other forms of social 
organisation, they illustrate how reliant the arts are on the political process of institutional 
building if they are to have an active voice within the modern state. In this sense, both 
organisations can confidently be said to symbolise public ownership in the arts, and in 
many respects they are the collective voice for contemporary art in the political arena.
With regard to their operations before the decade of the 1980s, I do not intend to take 
an inventory of all their activities in the field of the visual arts, not least because a mere 
shopping list of events tends to be superficial. I intend rather to focus, for the purposes 
of this study, on one specific aspect of each agency, that is, the Arts Council Collection 
and alternative spaces (which, in the NEA’s administrative jargon, are now called "Visual 
Artists Organizations") supported by the Visual Arts Program at the NEA. This may 
seem to be a surprising choice, but the paradox is deliberate: if these two projects are 
among the least known activities of each of the supporting institution, they nonetheless 
demonstrate the importance of public funding, by the very fact that support was actually 
given to these marginalised schemes, which otherwise would not have survived the play 
of market forces. Their invisibility, or low visibility, in the art world is in sharp contrast 
to the high-profile art establishments of both countries. It then comes as no surprise to 
find that they are by far the least attractive schemes to corporate patrons.
The Arts Council Collection
The Arts Council Collection, like the Council itself, was transferred from the CEMA, 
which, as we have seen, first acquired a collection of some 77 original works, including 
oils and watercolours, in 1941 for the touring exhibitions which it o r g a n i s e d . T h e  
Collection, as it stands at present with more than 7,000 pieces, is the largest loan
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collection of post-war British art, including as it does over 3,000 original paintings and 
drawings, and about 420 sculptures and mixed media, as well as over 3,500 prints and 
p h o t o g r a p h s I n  line with the spirit of the early CEMA, the purpose of the 
Collection, in the words of its current curator Isobel Johnstone, "was to circulate modern 
art in exhibitions around the country."^®® Unlike collections based in museums and art 
galleries, it did not, and still does not, have permanent galleries" to display its 
holdings.
At first, purchases were made annually by different members of the Council’s Art 
Department and Advisory Panel, with the aim of "ensuring that a variety of choice was 
being represented."^®* In 1981, the procedure was changed and formalised. Artists 
living in England could apply for their works to be considered. According to the 
Collection catalogue, this is aimed at "having the benefit of keeping purchasers in touch 
with what is being done outside London and of opening up what may have seemed a 
fairly closed system.""® A group of six purchasers were invited to select works for 
the Collection, first looking at slides and then making the necessary studio visits. These 
purchasers included three members from the Art Council and three outsiders, including 
artists, critics or museum curators — those people presumably with informed knowledge 
of the art world.
Until the end of the 1960s, the purchases were made primarily for touring exhibitions 
organised by the Arts Council, of which contemporary art, along with modern art, has 
been the key but not the sole feature. Before local-authority maintained galleries were 
improved through the Arts Development Strategy in the mid-’80s, these touring exhibits 
were of significance in bringing original works to places where no public collections 
existed."^ To quote Hugh Willat, then Secretary-General of the Arts Council: "No one 
else was tackling this task on this scale, nor could anyone else undertake it.""* This 
was particularly true for contemporary art exhibitions, when at the time few galleries 
were able or willing to offer them on tour. The Council was praised by the Museums 
and Galleries. Commission as "the most productive single originator of travelling 
exhibitions for museums and galleries" in the country,"^ despite the fact that the 
service has been under considerable criticism for being too centralised and for
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perpetuating ”a paternalistic approach" since the late 1970s. 115
Most works not on exhibition loans are lent on a long-term basis to other public 
institutions, where the public have "some" access, places such as art galleries, 
universities and colleges, libraries, hospitals and local and district authority offices. 
Unlike the Tate Gallery which does not collect photographs, the Collection includes some 
2,000 photographs. They are housed in Sheffield University Library where they are 
available for loan or for reference use. At present, about 70 percent of the paintings, and 
some 25 percent of the sculptures and mixed media, are on loan either to exhibitions or 
public institutions.
By virtue of its operations, the Collection has functioned both as "patron and publicist 
for the artist," in that by purchasing contemporary art works, the Council not only 
provides direct financial support to living artists, but through its extensive tours also 
significantly increases the exposure of their work.” * This form of patronage is 
especially important in Britain in two ways. Firstly, whereas in America fellowships for 
individual artists have been the biggest single category of support in the Visual Arts 
Program at the NEA since its inception in 1965, the Arts Council had not succeeded in 
providing similar support to artists.” ® This is crucial for younger artists in particular 
since, because of its very limited budget, the Council tends to buy from them long before 
their reputation in the art world is well established. Its purchasing policy, as 
encapsulated by Tom Lubbock, is: "Buy young, buy cheap! For this reason, the 
Arts Council was, and still is, one of the few sources of support for many artists.
Secondly, the purchase itself as a form of patronage is not only financial, but symbolic 
— symbolic, that is to say, in the sense that the manifest effect of Arts Council purchases 
signifies a stamp of art-world approval. This is clearly reflected in the fact that being 
included in the Arts Council Collection has become one of the standard entries listed in 
artists’ catalogues or resumes. Its imprimatur is beyond dispute. Institutionally, the Arts 
Council is the most influential public agency for contemporary arts in Britain, and 
individually those purchasers who have worked for the Collection include some of the 
best known luminaries from the contemporary art world, such as Alan Bowness, who
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later became the director of the Tate in 1980/^^ In short, it is this Combination of 
institutional power with the authority and political influence of individuals (they are, in 
a way, agents in the same category as arts bureaucrats), that locates the significance of 
the Collection not only in its size, but in its symbolic mapping of the national cultural 
landscape. It is also in this capacity that corporate art collectors look upon the Collection 
as one of the most eloquent barometers of what to purchase.
To recognise the power that the Collection may have is not to contradict the earlier point 
that the Collection is, in fact, relatively unknown if we take into account its huge size and 
its history of collecting over half a century. Writing in 1980, one journalists asked: 
"Yet who has heard of the Arts Council C o l l e c t i o n ? T h e  same question was asked 
again ten years later. The answer to this apparent paradox lies in the fact that for 
most of its history the Collection’s impact has been on the regions rather than on London. 
Its budget was also so limited that it was impossible to have many high-profile star artists 
in its stable. And above all, its ambitious lending policy to "[reach] the parts most other 
collections cannot reach," resulted in exceptional m o b i l i t y . F o r  such a centralised 
country as Britain, to bypass the metropolis is to forego a lot of critical attention. The 
Collection would have remained known only outside London, or accessible to only a very 
small circle of metropolitan art cognoscenti, had it not been for the free-market forces 
released in the 1980s which challenged the social ownership of such a collection, and 
forced it to be run more like a business enterprise with all the publicity seeking strategies 
that this implies.
But, does the Collection, for all that, achieve its proclaimed aim: art fo r  everyone, or is 
it merely "an archive of good intentions "7^ ^^  The commitment to public access may 
be a genuine one; the rub is, however, that the construction of "art" in the neatly phrased 
motto "art for everyone" collapses too many different positions of social and cultural 
power within a capitalist society, and this makes it unlikely to be workable either in 
concept or in practice. To speak of art as if it were a universal category requires a 
persistent negation of the representational needs of the non-gallery going public, who are 
consistently fed by "museumified high culture" as if they have no culture of their own.
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Only occasionally is this sense of cultural dislocation and exclusivity able to surface in 
the now all too familiar debates over what constitutes contemporary art. The furore over 
the Collection’s "fish-tin-in-wash-tub" sculpture by Richard Wentworth (slide 2-1), 
exhibited at the Serpentine Gallery in 1984, for example, is not a t y p i c a l . B u t ,  here, 
after all, it is because of the public profile of a public collection that a forum for 
opposition has been made available, or at least tolerated, however limited this opposition 
may actually be. Or put it another way, if the Collection only partially succeeds in 
achieving its ostensible goal, this has nothing to do with its ownership, but rather with 
the broader structure of different modes of social power within a capitalist democracy that 
largely shapes and constrains its practices. It is the public ownership of the Collection, 
on the other hand, that might possibly bring about a re-definition of what "art" actually 
is.
The National Endowment for the Arts and Alternative Spaces
To begin with, the umbrella term "alternative spaces" requires clarification. Unlike the 
inclusive expression "artist-managed exposure," which encompasses the whole range of 
methods employed by artists themselves to bypass the mediation of dealers, the 
alternative space movement here refers to a historically specific category. It arose 
in the late ’60s and early to mid ’70s in direct response to the support system of museums 
and commercial galleries, to which access was deemed to be very limited by many artists, 
at a time when neither was willing to accommodate the range and diversity of new 
experimental work, in particular performance art and conceptual art.^^*
Like artists’ co-operatives in the ’50s, the alternative space movement was a direct result 
of a desire on the part of artists to take control over the dissemination and distribution 
of their artistic production. But, unlike the co-operatives whose main concern was not 
dissimilar to that of commercial galleries, namely to sell, these spaces were not primarily 
interested in selling. To quote Jock Reynolds, director of the Washington Project for the 
Arts in Washington D. C.: "We’re not in the business of managing careers. On the 
contrary, in some cases these spaces, by exhibiting unsaleable works, challenged the very 
assumption of art as commodity promulgated by the commercial market. It is this sense
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of ideological allegiance and social awareness of being outside the mainstream, and on 
the oppositional periphery, that underpinned the movement and imbued it with the 
idealism of the ’60s’ counter-culture.
The relationship between the establishment and the practices of alternative spaces and the 
National Endowment for the Arts, in particular its Visual Arts Program,* is"a direct and 
close one. Most of the first generation of alternative spaces were created'at a time when 
the federal art budgets rose meteorically, examples including the Kitchen and Artists 
Space in New York, in 1971 and 1973 respectively.^^ Under the influence of the 
directors of the Visual Arts Program, including artists Brain O’Doherty and Jim 
Melchert, alternative spaces received a substantial amount of their annual budgets from 
the NEA as well as from state arts councils. Brian O’Doherty was even credited 
with coining the expression "alternative space.
As early as 1971, the Visual Arts Program gave five grants of $22,600 in total to support 
these embryonic artists’ experiments. The following year a specific category, 
"Workshops," was established to designate this area of funding. With a budget of 
$203,478, it represented 21.6 percent of the Program’s budget as a whole, and received 
42 applications in that year.^^  ^ A decade later, the category, renamed "Artists’ 
Spaces," had a budget of $919,550, with 170 applications in 1980.^^ The statistics 
themselves, of course, give no indication of how much public subsidy these organisations 
received in their earlier days, and with what impact, and unfortunately no systematic data 
are available to help us clarify.
But the importance of public funding for these artist-run galleries is beyond reasonable 
doubt. Not only is the Program the only public program within the federal structure 
devoted to contemporary art, but the timing of its support was particularly decisive. 
Most spaces were started on a shoestring; for instance, the Kitchen was literally begun 
in the kitchen of the Broadway Central Hotel. The now renowned alternative P .S .l in 
New York was once a dilapidated school building, refurbished in the early ’70s under the 
auspices of the New York Institute for Art and Urban Resources, with funds from the 
NEA and the New York State Council for the Arts, in addition to a Chemical Bank loan.
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It cost a mere $150,000, in stark contrast to the City estimate of $1.5 million. The P.S. 1 
opened in 1976, housing some 35 low-rent working studios for artists, as well as spaces 
for exhibitions and other a c t i v i t i e s . T h e  resources that the government channelled 
into these artistic practices in their growing phase were thus of critical importance for 
their survival. Even after some years, the public input was still paramount. According 
to Phil Patton, the Kitchen’s annual budget for 1977 was $200,000, of which 45 percent 
came from the federal and state governments, with the rest paid by the private sector and 
500- 600 paid-up m e m b e r s . T h e  Institute for Art and Urban Resources, which began 
in 1972 as a "social and aesthetic welfare organization for artists," remained heavily 
dependent on public funding.
The staunch support that the NEA gave to this movement had, as 0 ’Doherty put it, "the 
benefit of a favourable historical moment. The NEA guidelines described the 
"Workshop" category in terms of the significance of "artists’ self-determination," and of 
"non-commercial, bare-walled, ripped-out, ‘alternative space,’ run by artists for 
a r t i s t s . . . T h e  image of alternative spaces thus envisaged by the NEA was one of 
the avant-garde organisations which, fed by the "radical energies of the ’60s," expressed 
themselves in terms of counter-cultural values and practices.
The integral rôle that the NEA assigned to the artists in this area of funding cannot be 
overemphasised. Unlike art museums throughout the United States, whose boards of 
trustees usually read like a list of "Who’s Who" in corporate America, the artists’ 
organisations have a "significant portion" of artists serving on their boards and making 
overall programming d e c i s i o n s . T h i s  is sometimes written into their bylaws, as is 
the case with the Washington Project for the Arts, for instance, whose bylaws stipulate 
that half of the board members must be artists. More often, this is particularly advocated 
by the Visual Arts Program through its policy of giving priority to the "integral rôle" 
played by artists in funding decisions. It is in this organisational arrangement that the 
NEA in general, and the Visual Arts Program in particular, nurtured a fundamentally 
new, and in many respects, radical framework for artistic production and distribution in 
the country. In short, before the arrival of the Reagan administration in 1981, the NEA 
"effectively enfranchised" a nationwide network of multi-disciplinary organizations.
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which made available exhibition space, service, or work space to artists "devoted to 
‘alternative,’ non-market oriented artists and art works [italic added].
Unlike the Arts Council Collection, which was intended to cater for the public (this, at 
least, was the theory), the NEA defined the primary purpose of alternative spaces as "to 
serve the needs of, and enhance opportunities for, visual artists." The actual relationship 
between alternative spaces and their audience is therefore left to individual organisations 
to e l a b o r a t e . T h i s  often entails a complicated, and sometimes even conflicting, 
interaction. Since artists’ spaces were established to support work which, to quote two 
longtime figures on the scene, "challenges established sociological, political, and ethnic 
assumptions, work that takes risks and allows the artist to fail, work by new artists with 
new unvalidated approaches.., " there may well exist, at the very least, some kind of 
artistic camaraderie between the artists/administrators of these spaces and their fellow 
a r t i s t s . B u t  the relation between these spaces and "the public" is more problematic. 
As the previous quotation suggests, alternative space existed to support those works and 
artists who were outside the dominant structure of contemporary art world, that is to say, 
it existed to "empower" disenfranchised a r t i s t s . T h i s  aspiration to counter what was 
perceived as a progressive political as well as artistic marginalisation was in fact 
identified by Renny Pritikin, the director of New Langton Arts, an alternative space in 
San Francisco, as the origin of the alternative movement:
... The objective [of the artists space movement] was self-determination. Artists 
took this rhetoric, originally intended to address disenfranchisement from political 
decision-making process, and applied it to the microcosm of an art world that has 
effectively placed artists in a passive and victimized role...^ "^ *^
It is in this sense that alternative space speaks of itself as a representative of the 
disenfranchised (under)class of society, their "imaginary public," so to speak. Their 
intention may be genuine, if naïve. As one administrator of alternative space 
enthusiastically put it: "The egalitarian in me wants to show all points of view, with a 
leaning toward the underdog and the unrecognized. Leaving aside the fact that most 
of the artists who started alternative spaces were white middle-class Americans, the rub 
is that there is a difference between an artistic career which is chosen and requires long
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years of training and cultivation, and a choiceless condition of life of being at the bottom 
of society.
But, without questioning its own practice in terms of its connection with power, both in 
the art world and within society as a whole, the alternative space movement ironically 
helped to re-define and gentrify the derelict urban gb^ttoes where these spaces were 
located in the first place. This is not to say that artists and their practices were the 
only force in gentrifying the downtown areas of many American cities, by, for example, 
making loft living so fashionable. '^*^ But, as Anne Bowler and Blaine McBurney 
observe, when "the avant garde and its ‘spirit of revolt’ itself have become a commodity 
for consumption in the constant search for the ever-new and latest thing" within late 
capitalism in gener a l , t hese  artists’ spaces in fact participate, willingly or unwillingly, 
in an arena of profound social change where the haves and have-nots are in direct conflict 
and struggle, with the latter being ruthlessly evicted and displaced.
The failure rigorously to engage the question of power, in particular their own power and 
their connection with power in the art world after a decade of existence, has meant that 
these spaces, collectively, have not been able to produce an alternative audience or a 
radically different context for artistic careers. Paradoxically, some of them have 
reproduced the very system of institutions and values that they had set out to challenge, 
that is to say, they themselves have became rather museum-like, or like "the 
establishment of the anti-art establishment," while others function as feeders for the 
commercial market, with some of the founders of the movement moving on to open their 
own commercial galleries, and artists similarly leapfrogging from the alternative to the 
commercial. The move of Barbara Kruger, for example, who showed at alternative 
galleries as early as 1974, to the high-powered Mary Boone Gallery in 1987, "an apogee 
of commercialism, " ironically exemplifies the inherent contradictions of alternative spaces 
and their "radical" artists.
To recognise the dilemma and ambiguities implied in alternative space is not to minimise 
the significant role that it might fulfil in the discourse of contemporary culture in 
American society. On the contrary, to lay bare its intricate power relationships is to
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provide a pointer as to where genuine revolt against the patronage system of late 
capitalism may hopefully take place. Nor is this to deny that within the "decadent 
bohemian avant-garde" often associated with the subculture of the alternative, there are 
those who continue to express genuine concern for the underprivileged, and sustain an 
"alternative" force to the dominant existing order, where cultural production and 
consumption do not succumb to the forces of marketplace, such ^s ABC No Rio, or 
Political Art Documentation and Distribution in East Village in New York, and the 
Washington Project for the Arts.
The ABC No Rio, set up in 1980, originated in the exhibition "The Real Estate Show," 
mounted by a group of about thirty-five young artists when East Village was being 
rapidly gentrified. The purpose of the show was unequivocal: "The intention of this 
action is to show that artists are willing and able to place themselves and their work 
squarely in a context that shows solidarity with oppressed p e o p l e . . . A l t h o u g h  it is 
impossible to discuss their activities in detail, suffice it to say, as Rosalyn Deutsche and 
Cara Gendel Ryan pointed out, that ABC No Rio was the only group in the art world, 
including established alternative spaces, to show their awareness of their own cultural and 
economic privilege:
We fall into that area of implication because we’ve got the best deal in town. 
We’ve got a low rent and minimal pressure. And the reason that we’re here is 
because we’re attractive, because we represent an art organization. Whether or 
not that’s a save-face for the city, allowing it to say it’s not involved in gross 
speculation...
Alternative spaces as such may not necessarily be in the majority, but they are 
nonetheless of great significance in maintaining a critical edge of oppositional vanguard 
alternatives. Paul DiMaggio, a sociologist at Yale University with an abiding interest in 
the arts, has pointed out that government is in a potentially strong position to "take fuller 
responsibility for the pursuit of those purposes that neither the market nor private 
philanthropy can be expected to support. It is this position that makes public arts 
funding ever more important, despite its limits and its internal contradictions within a 
capitalist society. However, the privatising policies of the Reagan and Thatcher
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governments during the 1980s transformed these public and semi-public institutions across 
the Atlantic. For the American art museums which had already ventured into the 
complex territory where the private and the public overlap, the coming of age of 
unfettered market forces was in some ways simply a step forward. However, for British 
museums and galleries and public arts institutions alike, and to a lesser extent for federal 
arts agencies in America, the New Right’s promotion of an enterprise culture has been 
at worst devastating, and at best, ethically problematical. While the changes undergone 
by museums will be the subject of Chapter 4, it is to the ’SOs-style public arts agencies 
that we now turn.
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THE CHANGING ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 
IN THE ARTS IN THE 1980s
3.1. Changes in Public Policy:
The Reagan Administration and the Thatcher Government
In this present crisis, government is not the solution to our problem; government is the 
problem. — Ronald Reagan, inaugural address, 1981^
After Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher came to power in 1981 and 1979 
respectively, they continued their successive terms of office under the dual banners of 
reducing public spending and expanding the private sector. The policy of privatisation 
on their political agendas has not only re-defined the role of the state in every aspect of 
economic and social life in contemporary American and British society, but also extended 
into the cultural landscape of both countries. The previous social-democratic/liberal 
assumption, that access to the arts, like that to any other public service provided by the 
state such as education, is a fundamental right of every citizen, has been profoundly 
challenged. This is especially true with regard to the arts in Britain, since the British 
government had directly provided arts organisations with their operating costs since the 
establishment of the Arts Council of Great Britain in 1945.
In the Thatcher years public-funded arts institutions, whether they liked it or not, were 
forced to expose themselves to market forces and adopt the competitive spirit of free 
enterprise. To move the arts world into line with the enterprise culture, both the Reagan 
administration and Thatcher government cut the budget for direct arts subsidies, which 
were perceived not only to have weakened initiative and created a culture of craven
103
dependency among the subsidised bodies, but also to have discouraged or driven out 
potential supporters from the private sector.^
While one can well argue that budget cuts were being exercised across the board rather 
than being specifically targeted at the arts, both Reagan and Thatcher made persistent 
efforts to ensure that sufficient incentives were implemented to lure private rhoney in this 
area. Their efforts can best be illustrated by changes in public policy related to the arts, 
especially tax policy, during their terms of office, and by the associated use of political 
influence and symbolic power which they both commanded as heads of state or 
government. If the former seems to be black-and-white and thus self-explanatory, the 
latter is more than mere speculation. The importance of this political posturing must not 
be underestimated. Exclusive government receptions given in the name of the arts 
provided businessmen with unique occasions to meet leading politicians (and the royal 
family in Britain) in a seemingly non-political ambience and thus, it was hoped, open up 
a pathway to the corridors of power for them. This was both tacitly understood and 
explicitly stated by government and business.
The Arts under the Reagan Adminstration
When he was still Governor of California, Ronald Reagan already preached the gospel 
of less government interference and poured scorn on intellectuals and liberals. He was 
once quoted as saying that he was not "in the business of subsidizing intellectual 
curiosity. In response to American Arts magazine’s questions to presidential candidates 
in 1980, Reagan criticised the "populism" of the Carter administration. While stating that 
federal arts funding might have a steady annual increase under his administration, his 
allegiance to private arts support was unequivocal: "Support of the arts by the private 
sector is very uneven. I would take a personal interest in encouraging individuals and 
corporations to provide support. No sooner had he assumed the presidency of the 
United States in 1981 than his avowed intention to increase federal support evaporated. 
Instead the administration, with unabashed candour, carried out its agenda of corporate 
soliciting.
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What the Reagan administration first proposed for the National Endowment for the Arts, 
along with its sister agency the National Endowment for the Humanities, was a fifty 
percent cut in the fiscal-year 1982 budget of $175 million, as had been requested by the 
Carter administration, paring it down to $88 million, and from the fiscal year 1984 
onwards the Endowment’s budget would be held at $100 m illion/ The Reagan White 
House also requested the abolition of the Institute of Museum Services. There was even 
widespread suspicion that the Administration intended to abolish the two Endowments 
altogether.^ This drastic budget cut represented a sharp reversal of federal policy on 
public funding for the arts, which had been expanding since the Nixon administration. 
The sum involved, compared to an overall federal budget of $700 billion, was minuscule, 
and even abolishing the entire agency would in no way have substantially reduced a 
projected deficit of $40 billion.
The meaning of these draconian cuts has thus to be understood in relation to the 
administration’s own particular ideology. Firstly, Reagan’s political allies claimed that 
the Endowment programs had been "politicalised" under the Carter administration and 
redirected towards developing arts for social rather than for artistic purposes. In 
response, the right-wing think tank the Heritage Foundation came up with a "new" arts 
policy: "The arts that NEA funds must support belong primarily to the area of high 
culture. Such culture is more than mere entertainment... [italic a d d e d ] T h e  
implication was that funding of art for "social purposes" had in the past led to 
expenditure of public funds on unworthy projects — "mere entertainment."
Secondly, the public ownership of the arts provided by the Endowment was deemed to 
be a disincentive to private support, and thus contrary to the free-market driven policies 
of the Reagan administration. To revise the federal arts policy completely, the 
administration had severely to prune the Endowment financially. As the Office of 
Management and Budget (0MB) put it: "This policy [of the NEA and the NEH] has 
resulted in a reduction in the historic role of private individual and corporate 
philanthropic support in these key areas. The reductions would be a first step toward 
reversing this trend."* Declaring federal cultural support to be a "low priority item," 
the 0MB thus decreed that the NEA programs had to suffer the largest single cut.
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proportionately speaking, in any government agency.
Having threatened to halve the 1982 budgets for both Endowments in February 1981, the 
0MB further announced their intention to rescind about $6.6 million from the NEA’s 
existing 1981 fiscal year appropriations in June, a decision which was however 
overturned by Congress.’ Nor did the President succeed in the proposed-50 per cent 
reduction of the Endowments’ 1982 budgets, thanks to the concerted efforts of the arts 
lobby. The Art Endowment’s budget was eventually set at $143 million, representing a 
reduction of only 10 per cent.
The favourable outcome for the Endowments did not induce the administration to abandon 
its ideological battle lines over arts funding. In February 1982, the 0MB proposed a 30 
per cent budget cut for the Arts Endowment, a 27 per cent cut for the Humanities 
Endowment, and, again, the termination of the Institute of Museum Services for the fiscal 
year 1983. The administration stated its message in no uncertain terms: "These reduced 
levels of funding reflect the Administration’s intent to encourage direct beneficiaries and 
the private sector to make larger contributions to cultural activities. The attempts of 
the Reagan White House to reduce the federal arts budgets, despite opposition from 
significant elements in Congress, did not abate throughout Reagan’s two terms in office.
In the wake of the proposed 50 per cent cutback of the two Endowments, Reagan 
established a Presidential Task Force on the Arts and Humanities in May 1981. The 
President charged this Task Force with studying the possibility of restructuring the two 
agencies and recommending ways to "increase the support for the arts and humanities by 
the private sector."" As a result of the Task Force’s report, a President’s Committee 
on the Arts and the Humanities was set up with a similar mandate in the following year. 
The Committee, described as "the President’s troubleshooting team for the arts and 
humanities," had a limited role in the public art funding debate, however." It had a 
small staff and a modest budget. Yet its underlying meaning and political potency are 
not to be found in its formal structure, but in the very fact that, being a president’s 
committee, the Committee had, as its deputy director Malcolm Richardson pointed out: 
"direct access to the political players over in the White House" and was not just "a small
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outlying appendage of the government. «13
This access to the highest office in the land no doubt has its political appeal. On the one 
hand the Committee’s memberships read like a Who*s Who of the American corporate 
community, and included the chairmen or chief executive officers from blue-chip 
companies such as the Mobil Corporation and the Times-Mirror Corporation, in addition 
to celebrities from the arts w o r l d . O n  the other hand, the Committee was a "delightful 
place" for the President to reward his political supporters and give presidential 
recognition to the private-sector contributors.
The significance of presidential recognition was indeed emphasised by the Presidential 
Task Force’s report in 1981.’^  Both as the head of state and as a celebrity at the heart 
of high society, Ronald Reagan commanded enormous political influence and symbolic 
power. The appearance of the President or First Lady could therefore confer kudos on 
any arts event, and provides its participants with a kind of quasi national stamp of 
approval.
This exercise of symbolic presidential power had come to be considered by the 
administration as an effective way of raising money privately, and to give the same sort 
of artistic imprimatur as a NEA grant used formerly to confer. To quote Frank Hodsoll, 
chairman of the Arts Endowment appointed by Reagan and an insider close to the very 
centre of power in his administration: "I think you will see this Administration — the 
White House, the First Lady, and occasionally the President — getting into the act to 
encourage people, whether individuals, corporations, or foundations, to give more."^^
Soon after the proposed cut for the Endowments was announced, for example, the Reagan 
White House hosted a mammoth fund-raising gala for Ford’s Theatre in March 1981. 
The President was reported to have seized every opportunity to plead for corporate 
dollars as he urged on the audience: "We need this private support for the arts to 
continue in years to come."^* These presidential festivities entertained not only an 
impressive list of performers and political movers and shakers, but also nearly 100 major 
companies, ranging from Alcoa to Xerox, with some of them having reportedly paid up
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to $5,000 for a seat.
Not surprisingly, when the corporate giant Philip Morris had an art show opening in 
Washington in June 1981, Reagan also gave a reception in the White House to boost 
m o r a l e . T h e  incessant fanfares at the White House not only deflected criticism of his 
ideological stand against public arts funding, but inevitably helped to legitimise corporate 
intervention in the contemporary culture of American society.
Trivial as this may seem, the truth is that the rôle of government vis-à-vis the arts had 
been re-defined by the Reagan ideology. The government was acting as fund-raiser 
rather than simply as funder, and the federal agency, the Arts Endowment responsible 
for the arts, had effectively been replaced by the personal aura of the President, and 
removed from the arena of open democratic debate.
The grandest of these presidential gestures came when twelve artists and art patrons were 
honoured at a White House luncheon in May 1983, and given The Presidential Award fo r  
Service to the Arts, a new honour devised by the administration.^ The Texaco 
Philanthropic Foundation, the Dayton Hudson Foundation and Philip Morris were among 
those honoured as art patrons. The inclusion of three companies (or their foundations) 
underlined the prominent rôle that the business sector was expected to play in the 
administration. Perhaps to no one’s surprise, it was Philip Morris — the company whose 
slogan for its arts projects is "It takes art to make a company great" — that was honoured 
first by the President (fig. 3-1).^^
To further consolidate presidential endorsement for artists and art patrons (which, as 
Frank Hodsoll put it: "the President is rather good at..."), Reagan then proposed to 
transform this original series of one-off awards into a National Medal of Arts. This was 
approved by Congress and enacted into law in 1984 as an on-going p r o g r a mme . T h e  
significance of these Medals was succinctly summed up by one of their recipients, the 
film director Gordon Parks, in 1988: "We need more medals and less money, as far as 
some artists are concerned.
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To elicit higher levels of corporate donation, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 
raised the deduction ceiling for charitable contributions for companies, either cash or 
benefit-in-kind, from 5 to 10 percent of a firm’s taxable i n c o m e . T h i s  statutory 
limitation, moreover, was not as binding as it appeared to be, since any excess 
contribution of more than 10 percent in a given year could be carried over to each of the 
following five years.
Nor, without reference to the historical context, can these figures in themselves 
demonstrate the full extent of the Administration’s determination to encourage private 
donations. At the time of the legislative amendment in 1981, forty-five years had elapsed 
since the Federal Revenue Act of 1935 first allowed the five percent deduction for 
corporate donations to charitable causes. However, the evidence is that corporate donors 
had always been giving much less than the limits would allow, and that their 
contributions had remained stable at about one percent or less for the previous decades 
(see Table 3.1).^^
There was a modest rise in corporate contributions as a percentage of pre-tax income 
from 1 percent to 2 percent in the 1980s (see Table 3.2). Yet, Michael Useem, a 
sociologist at Boston University, pointed out that "changes in the deductibility elements 
of federal law may or may not alter giving patterns. The extent to which the growth 
that occurred is directly attributable to the change in the law is unclear, and there has not 
been enough research in the area to draw any definitive conclusions. This is because 
there are several different factors that affect corporate giving, and the tax law in question 
is only one of them.^* For instance, according to Useem, corporate income taxes can 
have a direct bearing on corporate art contributions. In 1981 the overall effective 
corporate tax rate was 35 percent on average. While pharmaceutical companies were 
taxed at a rate equalling 36 percent of their income, commercial banks were taxed at only 
2 percent. In that year pharmaceutical companies gave relatively more than the banking 
sector (1.76 versus 1.32 percent of their pre-tax net income), and this may have been 
partly as a result of their relatively higher tax rate.^® The point is of significance in that 
the more a company has to actually contribute in giving, when tax deductions are taken 
into account, the less a company gives, a theme to which we will return later. Thus,
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when the Administration amended the tax law relating to corporate contributions in 1981, 
on the assumption that higher corporate giving would ensue from favourable tax write­
offs, it was actually indulging in wishful thinking.
Margaret Thatcher and her Arts Ministers
Some months before the 1979 election, Margaret Thatcher assured Kenneth Robinson, 
the then Chairman of the Arts Council, that her government would continue to support 
the arts, since she did not believe that "it will make sense for any government to look for 
candle-end economies which will yield a very small saving, whilst causing upset out of 
all proportion to the economies achieved. Despite her pledge, arts expenditure for 
the year 1979-80 was to be reduced by almost £5,000,000, including a drop of 
£1,114,000 in the Arts Council’s annual grant.
To dispel accusations that she would become one of the most philistine Prime Ministers 
of the century, Thatcher pledged her approval of state subsidies in her first speech on the 
arts after she became Prime Minister at a Royal Academy banquet in May 1980. But her 
view of state patronage was categorically clear: "You cannot achieve a renaissance by 
simply substituting state patronage for private patronage. Thus the Prime Minister 
in the same speech praised the historian Hugh Thomas, who not long before had refused 
to accept a sizable prize of £7,500 from the Arts Council "on the grounds that it was a 
matter of principle for him that artists should not take public money.
Thatcher’s view was further articulated and trumpeted through her Ministers for the Arts, 
who changed six times during her eleven and a half years at Downing S t r e e t . T h i s  
is no surprise as one of her famous adages was "one of us," a category open to 
continuous reinterpretation. Her third Arts Minister, Lord Cowrie, for example, was 
reported as saying that he was "an orthodox member of this government in terms of 
economic thinking.
In an interview with Frances Gibb of the Daily Telegraphy the first of Thatcher’s Arts
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Ministers, Norman St John-Stevas, made his stand for commercial sponsorship without 
reservation:
State-side expansion has come to an end. While the public support policy will 
continue, in this economic and political climate it will be totally unrealistic to look 
to the public sector for large sums. We must look to the_private sector for new 
sources of money. That’s where the possibilities for the future lie.^^
The "private sector" referred to here by the Minister includes, of course, both wealthy 
individuals and businesses. But it is to business that the government primarily looked by 
introducing substantial measures to stimulate their support.
The Arts Minister soon launched an aggressive campaign to persuade the business sector 
to invest in the arts. No means of communication were spared as the Minister remarked: 
"Our task will be to explain and clarify, by means of leaflets, conferences, seminars, 
advertisements, newspaper articles, research projects, consultancy sessions, and various 
other devices. The crusade was intended to boost arts sponsorship, estimated at 
around £4 million to £5 million in 1979, to double that figure for the coming year.^^
In its drive to propagate the message, the Government awarded a special grant of £25,000 
to the Association for Business Sponsorship of the Arts (ABSA), a "private" enterprise 
designed to promote arts sponsorship, which we shall consider in more detail later. The 
Arts Minister revealed that this was only the first step in his campaign and promised the 
association "all possible support. As Kenneth Gosling, The Times's correspondent 
pointed out, it is paradoxical that the ABSA, whose aim it was to extract money from 
non-governmental sources, should "procure a cheque from the Government in order to 
maintain itself. The paradox, however, does no more than reveal the fragile base of 
corporate arts sponsorship in the early days of the Thatcher era, in sharp contrast to the 
dominant position that business came to occupy at the end of her period of office.
Another plan of the Thatcher government was to establish a massive City-financed arts 
trust, possibly capitalised at as much as £500 million. The Arts Minister eagerly wrote
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to the chairmen of banks and held meetings with them, only to receive a cool reception. 
What is illuminating in this abortive endeavour is not only the blind enthusiasm of the 
Conservative government, but also the fact that business turned out to have a very 
different agenda when it came to giving money to the arts. To quote one senior banker: 
"We all undertake our own sponsorships and in each case our preferences show 
through.
To raise the profile and recruit captains of business to join the race, a 14-strong unpaid 
sponsorship committee was established and chaired by the Arts Minister. The advisory 
group, like Reagan’s Arts Committee mentioned earlier, was a "Committee of Honour" 
and it served an essentially symbolic function. What really counts is not what a 
committee does, but who is on the committee. It is thus no surprise that such big names 
in commerce as Sir Nevil Macready, managing director of Mobil Oil, Sir Charles Forte, 
executive chairman of Trusthouse Forte, and Colin Knowles, former head of public 
affairs at Imperial Tobacco, were included.'*^
At the same time, as part of the Minister’s campaign, the Office of Arts and Libraries 
(OAL) produced 25,000 copies of a booklet entitled The Arts Are Your Business, extolling 
the benefits of business sponsorship, and these were widely distributed to industry and 
commerce. The Government did not lose sight of the bottom-line concern of the business 
sector, and the booklet spoke in business terms, since the Minister did not wish to 
suggest that "all support of the arts from the private sector is or should be provided on 
a wholly disinterested b a s i s . A m o n g  the many "real and quantifiable commercial" 
benefits listed in the booklet, perhaps the most significant, which the Minister elaborated 
on in his preface as well, was the tax relief for businesses which supported the arts."*^  
The Government stressed in no uncertain terms that it was now making covenanted 
payments "more generous in order to encourage private giving."
St John-Stevas’s initiatives arguably provided the blue print of the Tory programme of 
arts privatisation. However, his immediate successor, Paul Channon, had a rather low 
profile, and Lord Gowrie, given his "mysterious resignation" in 1985, did not stay in
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office long enough to implement any significant change, although it was during his tenure 
that the Business Sponsorship Incentive Scheme was launched in 1984.'^
Lord Cowrie’s successor, Richard Luce, who came into office in 1985 and "knew 
nothing about the job," ironically turned out to be the longest serving of Thatcher’s Arts 
Ministers/^ At the time when he was beginning to grasp his job, he shocked the arts 
world in a 1987 speech outlining the Government’s arts policy for the next five years 
with a quintessential dose of Thatcherism:
There are still too many in the arts world who are yet to be weaned from the 
welfare state mentality/^
Describing his plan as "a new departure in arts funding," the Minister introduced so- 
called "incentive funding," or "challenge funding," alongside a three-year funding system 
for the Arts Council/^ The scheme, which earmarked £5 million from the Arts 
Council’s budget, was directly related to his call for an end to the "mentality of the 1960s 
and 1970s."
What the "new climate" required, according to the published plan, was that arts 
organisations become more "financially enterprising" and "improve their commercial 
management skills, " thereby developing "a sustained and reliable income from the private 
sector."'^* The incentive funding scheme, which was to be administered by the Arts 
Council through two types of funds, the Enterprise Fund and the Progress Fund, was to 
match "one Enterprise pound" for every two pounds raised from private sources.
Although the scheme was hailed as a "new" arts policy, it was neither "new" nor an arts 
policy, since it was designed to put the arts as far as possible at the mercy of the market 
place. The concept of "challenge grant" had been in place in the United States for years, 
with the National Endowment for the Arts setting up a specific challenge grant program 
in 1976.^® Moreover, for all the emphasis the scheme placed on income generation, it 
was the most financially successful companies that would be rewarded generously by
113
public money. The whole plan had more to do with economics than with the arts.
Before turning to a discussion of tax changes relating to the arts under the Conservative 
regime, some account needs to be taken of the ways in which the Thatcher government 
exercised political power in order to create the impetus for private arts funding. In the 
United States Reagan was the head both of the state and of the administration, but in 
Britain, although Margaret Thatcher was the head of government, the" Queen is the 
official head of state. Whereas Ronald Reagan raised funds for the arts by hosting 
extravagant galas at the White House, the corresponding role in Britain would be divided 
between the royal family, the Prime Minster, and to a lesser extent, her Arts Ministers. 
A combination of the presence of the Prime Minister and the Prince of Wales, the future 
king, is the highest symbolic acclaim that any business could hope for in this country.
In 1986, for example, Mrs Thatcher invited the chairmen of 53 of Britain’s leading 
companies to 10 Downing Street to launch a Per Cent Club, an imported American 
practice of corporate giving, in which companies commit themselves to contributing at 
least half of one percent of their pre-tax profits to the community, including the arts.^° 
The approach of the club was very much in line with Government thinking, and by the 
very action of issuing invitations herself the Prime Minister gave it her full support. Not 
surprisingly Prince Charles was invited to give a lecture in the following year to boost 
morale.
As in the United States, this (prime) ministerial symbolic support, coupled with the dark 
art of media manipulation, was exploited by the Conservatives to cultivate arts 
sponsorship. Speculative as this claim may seem to be, it is actually confirmed by a 
government publication on the Business Sponsorship Incentive Scheme (BSIS) which was 
intended to woo business: "Sponsors are presented with commemorative certificates and 
are photographed with the Minister. MPs and the national media are invited to these 
prestigious events. The ceremonial function performed by the Minister was shown 
in its true colours by the former Arts Minister, Timothy Renton, when he said, albeit in 
a bitter moment: "In a way you did your damnedest to fight for all the money you could 
get with the Treasury... for the rest of the year you were rather like minor royalty. You
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were asked to open things, bless statues. There are plaques all over the country that have 
been unveiled by Ministers of the Arts..."^^
On occasions Margaret Thatcher would make the presentation at such receptions, such 
as when she presented Derek Hornby, chairman of Rank Xerox, with a BSIS certificate 
at a reception in Edinburgh Castle in 1987. Her presence not only gave the businessmen 
considerable publicity, but also encouraged them to keep “ the bandwagon of arts 
sponsorship rolling.
Such political symbolism reached its peak towards the end of her term of office when 
Thatcher attended the festivities accompanying British Days in the USSR in Kiev in 1990, 
a £7 million mammoth trade show combined with cultural celebrations such as an English 
National Opera tour, funded by the Conservative government and topped up by 
corporations like Rank X e r o x . T h e  meaning of the presence of Margaret Thatcher and 
the Princess Royal, and indeed the essence of the whole sponsorship deal, was vividly 
summed up by Thatcher’s appointee, Peter Palumbo, the then chairman of the Arts 
Council: "Rank Xerox realizes that with the Prime Minister there to open this month of 
festivities, with the Princess Royal there, and with very few photocopying machines in 
the Soviet Union, they stand an extremely good chance of getting to a market that is 
virtually limitless."^'*
Relaxing Tax Regimes
While specific tax and legal provisions will be dealt with in detail later, the general issue 
of tax policies with respect to the arts must be considered here, in particular those tax 
provisions which affect charitable giving, charitable contributions in America, and deeds 
of covenant and the Gift Aid scheme in B r i t a i n . I t  is not only because, in translating 
the Republican and Tory policies into law, these fiscal measures, more than anything 
else, were central to both governments’ commitment to privatisation, but also because 
using tax-based mechanisms to encourage private support for the arts, or charities in 
general, has far-reaching implications.
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First of all, any donation to charities eligible for tax relief is a form of disguised public 
subsidy, since the government actually contributes part of the donated money by allowing 
the donor (individuals/corporations) to write off the contribution when computing their 
income for tax purposes. In the American system of contribution deductions, for 
instance, the donor channels the entire donation, say $100, to the charity in one payment, 
including the taxes ($50, if the donor’s tax rate is 50%) that would otherwise be payable 
to the Internal Revenue Service (1RS) and the donor’s (net of tax) private contribution 
($50). The donor then deducts $100 from his chargeable income when submitting his tax 
return to the 1RS (see example below). The government’s contribution to charity is thus 
obscured.
Example : Charitable Contribution Deduction. Donor Tax Rate= 50 %
Donor Charity
Donor earns: +$100
Donor pays : - 100 deductible  > +$100 received by charity
contribution
Donor pays : - 50 withheld taxes -----------------
(50% X  100)
—  50
Donor gets: + 50 reduction in annual <----
income tax (5 0% x 10 0)
Government
Gov't receives :+$ 50 withheld < --------------------
taxes
Gov't rebates : - 50 reduction in
donor's income tax
These hidden subsidies, or as Alvin Tofler calls it, "patronage via the backdoor," are by 
no means insignificant.^^ According to a Twentieth-Century Fund report, tax 
expenditure, or in other words revenue lost through various arts-related tax incentives or 
exemptions,^* provides more than twice the amount of direct subsidies to the arts from 
all levels of government in the United S t a t e s . A s  a result of the obscurity of these 
mechanisms, most American art institutions have never been made to recognise the 
degree of their public subsidies, and the extent to which they are a "private" enterprise 
rather than a "public" one is always confusingly ambiguous, a crucial issue to which we 
shall return when we explore art institutions’ relationships with corporations in the next 
chapter.
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Secondly, tax foregone is hidden from any public scrutiny and is beyond government 
control, since it goes to whichever body the donor nominates and endorses. Given the 
graduated rates in American tax law, rich taxpayers have power over many more 
government dollars for each dollar of their own in their charitable contribution than poor 
taxpayers.“  Accordingly tax deductibility in America increases the decision-making 
power that the wealthy already have.
A powerful effect of this, and the most democratically questionable, is the behavioral 
differences that it has brought about. About half of all philanthropic gifts are made by 
poorer people to religious foundations, while the better-off tend to give more to civic, 
cultural and artistic causes.®* While the issue of social fairness involved is a matter of 
concern in its own right, it is of particular relevance to the discussion here in that it 
highlights one of the reasons why businesses have attempted to associate themselves with 
art institutions. In the same way as the upper-middle class has chosen and favoured arts 
institutions, whether they appear as their trustees, donors or visitors, so has business. 
It is this spectrum of people who count in the business mind. Unfortunately I have been 
unable to find any comparable statistics for Britain.
This tax incentive regime, with its private outlook, underpins the bulk of philanthropic 
giving in the United States, distinguishing it from the rest of Western European countries 
in arts funding.®  ^ It was precisely this model of pseudo-private support that the 
Thatcher government and its supporters looked to with envy when struggling to raise 
private money. It stands in stark contrast to what the Conservatives explicitly opposed 
in the 1960s:
We are not in favour of this country following the American example of allowing 
individual citizens to set against their income tax liabilities the money spent on 
buying works of art [for eventual donation]... It enables very rich people to buy 
works of art for their personal enjoyment during their lifetime more or less at the 
taxpayer’s expense. The national collections should be added to by curators, not 
by business tycoons.®^
The major tax incentive device in Britain is the deed of covenant, through which 
companies can give donations to charities, most British arts institutions, including art
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museums and galleries, being legally registered as such. A deed of covenant binds a 
covenantor to make donations to a charity over seven years since the 1922 Finance Act 
introduced this form of legal agreement for the first time.^ This distinctive feature of 
long-term commitment (instead of one-off donation) has provided arts organisations, and 
charities in general, with an assured source of income over several years, and was the 
principle invoked by Lord Goodman in his report arguing for coveriantibility over 
deductibility.^^
In contrast to the American charitable contribution deduction, in the British deed of 
covenant the donor makes a payment to the charity net of the basic-rate income tax and 
pays the tax to the Inland Revenue, which the charity concerned can then reclaim from 
the Inland Revenue (see example below). The British system thus has the advantage of 
clarity as regards the origin of the funds in that it separates the flow of money into two 
streams: the private contribution flowing from the donor to the charity, and the tax 
foregone flowing into government and reclaimed by the c h a r i t y . D e s p i t e  its 
bureaucratic cost, this distinction is significant not only in that the government 
contribution is unmistakable, but also because the charity has control over the taxes which 
it claims back from the Inland Revenue, with none of the donor restrictions that often 
obtain in America.
E x a m p l e ;  C h a r i t a b l e  C o n t r i b u t i o n  D e d u c t i o n .  D o n o r  T a x  R a t e =  30%  ( B a s i c  
r a t e )
D o n o r  e a r n s  
D o n o r  p a y s  : 
D o n o r  p a y s :
D o n o r
+£100
7 0  n e t  c o v e n a n t  
3 0  i n c o m e  t a x e s  
(3 0 %  X 1 0 0 )
G o v e r n m e n t  
G o v ' t  r e c e i v e s  : + £ 3 0  i n c o m e  t a x e s  <  
G o v ' t  p a y s  : -  3 0  t o  c h a r i t y  —
C h a r i t y
>  + £ 7 0  n e t  c o v e n a n t
I—  > + 3 0  r e c l a i m e d  b y
c h a r i t y
+ £ 1 0 0  r e c e i v e d  b y  
c h a r i t y
However, these distinguishing characteristics have been eroded by successive tax changes 
under the Thatcher government, which single-mindedly devoted itself to ’’liberalising" the 
tax regime for private giving. The first Finance Act, introduced in 1980, substantially
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shortened the minimum covenant period from seven to no less than three years. The 
amendment was designed to make the scheme more attractive to the donor, since in a 
world of economic uncertainty, it is reasonable to assume that one does not want to be 
tied down by financial commitment for a long period.^* The 1980 Finance Act was a 
watershed for British charities, since it also re-introduced relief for the higher rate 
taxpayer which had been withdrawn in 1946, with the same effect as the graduated tax 
rates in America, where it costs richer people much less than-poorer people to give to 
charities.
Under the 1986 Finance Act the companies (other than close companies)^® were further 
allowed to deduct charitable contributions up to a limit of 3 percent of dividends paid.^° 
This significant measure, providing an easier alternative to charitable giving than the 
more onerous contractual agreement through deeds of covenant, brought the British 
system into line with American contribution deductions. Given such a historic departure, 
subsequent Finance Acts only served to relax tax law still further.
The Finance Act of 1987 introduced a completely new method of tax-effective giving to 
charity in the workplace, known as the Payroll Giving scheme (or Give As You Earn). 
Taking advantage of the workplace as a convenient collecting point, the scheme allowed 
donations to be deducted from the employee’s income by the employer and passed on to 
a charity of the employee’s choice.^* This change deserves note here insofar as 
corporate giving does not operate in isolation, and one cannot understand the full 
significance of the Thatcher government’s resolution in pursuing private money without 
understanding how its tax reforms related to individuals.
The advent of the decade of 1990s witnessed one further Conservative tax reform as the 
Gift Aid scheme came into effect on 1 October 1990. This scheme, which designated tax 
relief for non-close companies, already introduced in the 1986 Finance Act as Gift Aid, 
is far from being simply an exercise in semantics. By extending relief to close companies 
and individuals, the scheme seeks to lure all private sector businesses with a bait of tax 
redemptions. The statutory limitations, according to which each single cash gift has to 
be at least £600 and the total of gifts in any tax year does not exceed £5 million, was
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soon to be considerably r e l a x e d . T h e  minimum of £600 was reduced to £400 with 
effect from 7th May 1992, and to £250 from 16th March 1993, and the 1991 Finance Act 
furthermore abolished the upper limit of £5 million altogether, an unusually generous tax 
incentive and virtually unprecedented in other European and North American 
c o u n t r i e s . I t  is tempting to see this as the last step in the Conservative government’s 
design to privatise culture. What is uncertain is the effect of the Gift Aid scheme on 
private giving. Wjll it completely replace deeds of covenant? The answer to this 
question will not be known for another decade or two.
As if it were too impatient to wait for the results of tax relaxation to come through, the 
Thatcher government set up a Business Sponsorship Incentive Scheme to hand out cash 
inducements for business sponsors in 1984 beyond those already indirectly provided by 
the tax laws. The scheme, run by the ABSA on behalf of the OAL and the present 
Department of National Heritage, matches sponsors’ money at different ratios, in 
particular favouring first-time sponsors. The maximum sum for any single sponsorship 
can be up to £35,000.
The position of the Government is crystal clear: one of the criteria for assessing 
applications is that the BSIS award should be of some significance in attracting sponsors, 
since the scheme is not intended as a reward for arts groups, but rather to provide 
greater value for corporate m o n e y . T h e  proposed use of the award money should 
therefore provide "greater benefits for the sponsor. The benefits in question include 
such things as an extra event, extra advertising of the sponsored event, or the extension 
of a tour to further venues to "ensure that businesses receive a better value sponsorship. " 
For instance, the TI Group, the engineering conglomerate, was rewarded with £20,000 
for its sponsorship endeavour at the Royal College of Art in 1992. The company in turn 
used the money to mount two annual exhibitions at the College and credited itself as 
sponsor.
Unlike the American matching grant model, on which it was patterned, and in which 
public sources lead, the scheme virtually entrusts business with the power of using 
taxpayers’ money. In other words, the Government is putting public money into the
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corporate purse, and this companies can then avail themselves of for their advertising 
campaigns. What makes the scheme all the more intriguing is its manifest contradiction 
of the Thatcherite logic of the free market. For all its ideology of non-interference, 
government does in fact intervene in ways that massively benefit the corporate order.
The willingness of the Thatcher Government to follow the" American style of arts 
patronage has, I hope, been clearly demonstrated. Its ideological commitment has even 
led to its outstripping the model it sought to emulate. In any case, it is clear that 
corporate power, which is primarily based on financial capital, has been substantially 
strengthened by public policies under both the Reagan Administration and the Thatcher 
Government. To map out the effect of such changes in policy on public art institutions, 
we must now turn to an examination of the Arts Council of Great Britain and the 
National Endowment for the Arts in the United States.
3.2. The Arts Council of Great Britain and the National Endowment for the 
Arts
The predilection for privatisation in the cultural sphere that Reagan and Thatcher shared 
is nowhere more evident than in their policies toward the NEA and the ACGB 
respectively. The transformation of these public arts agencies into paragons of arts 
privatisation was to take place at every level, from the organisational to the ideological. 
Nonetheless any radical changes in public arts funding were likely to run up against 
vigorous resistance, as evidenced by the abortive attempt of Reagan’s administration to 
abolish the NEA. Both the Reagan and the Thatcher administrations therefore decided 
not to opt for major structural re-organisation, but to use existing organisations as 
instruments for their policies.
As the priorities and policies of both agencies are largely shaped by the 
chairman/secretary-general and the senior staff which he or she hires, Reagan and 
Thatcher, to alter their direction, had only to install political placemen in the two
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agencies, who would in turn hire staff that reflected their political orientation. Thus, 
although the formal structure of the agencies remained the same on the surface throughout 
the ’80s, their inner mechanisms and aspirations were undergoing a radical change. 
Apparently in both cases the agencies witnessed an increase in the chairmen’s power. 
The potential for this was already present within the organisational structure, but it had 
not been used in such a blatant way for political reasons before.
During the ’80s both institutions had taken, or more precisely, had been forced to take, 
active steps to advocate private support, especially business sponsorship, both for 
themselves and for the arts bodies they funded. Although there was some rhetoric from 
both agencies about encouraging private support in the pre-1980s period, it was more the 
result of financial restraint than of political ideology. That came later.^^
The thrust of this ideological commitment was not just a matter of extracting more arts 
money from the private sector. Unwavering faith in the marketplace, shared by both the 
Reagan and Thatcher administrations, compelled both agencies to run their affairs in a 
more business-oriented manner. Agency bureaucrats in the ’80s patently spoke in a 
totally different language. Gone were the arguments of money for value, instead came 
monetarist talk of value for money. To quote from the Arts Council’s own statement: 
"The arts are not different; they are competing with everybody else for the consumer’s 
time, interest or money, and an effective marketing programme must be at the core. 
The catch-phrases of the new order of Thatcherism and Reaganism were therefore 
entrepreneurial skill and business acumen. The signal of this transformation of the public 
arts agencies could hardly have been clearer: one of the Arts Council’s publication in 
1987, announcing the £5 million incentive fund, is succinctly entitled Rewarding 
Enterprise.
Thatcherising the Arts Council
The intention of the Thatcher government to impose its ideological template on the Arts 
Council is unmistakably evidenced by the chairmen it appointed: firstly, the replacement
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of Kenneth Robinson with Sir (now Lord) William Rees-Mogg in 1982, and secondly the 
selection of Peter (now Lord) Palumbo in 1989. These appointments were decisive. By 
statutory provision, the Council is composed of unpaid members and is the governing 
body of the Arts Council despite its non-executive role.^ As the head of the Council, 
the Chairman thus has the ultimate authority of overseeing the institution. To the extent 
that the Chairman thinks fit to exercise it, his power can determine the direction of the 
Arts Council and the way in which it works.
Accordingly, without changing its actual structure, the government was able to shape the 
Council, regardless of the notoriously ambiguous principle of "arm’s length." William 
Rees-Mogg, an outspoken supporter of Thatcher’s economic policies, and Peter Palumbo, 
a successful developer well connected in both the art and business worlds, were both 
appointees perfectly attuned to the Thatcherite ethos.** To quote Raymond Williams, 
the true social process of British quangos such as the Arts Council is one of 
"administered consensus by co-option."*^
Once in position as chairman, William Rees-Mogg did not hesitate to use his power. In 
1982-83 he had negotiated privately over a period of months with the then Arts Minister 
Paul Channon about handing over the Hayward Gallery to the British Film Institute for 
its planned Museum of the Moving Image. None of the Council members, the advisory 
group of the Council, were consulted; nor were the Arts Panel or the senior staff at the 
Council. The secret plan was dropped only after Sir Roy Strong, who had just taken 
over the chair of the Arts Council’s arts panel, threatened to resign noisily if the closure 
of the Hayward Gallery went a h e a d . Re e s - Mo g g ’s status as chairman was further 
enhanced by means of a portrait of him by Lawrence Gowing, commissioned by the Arts 
Council, and at the taxpayers’ expense. It entered the Arts Council collection without 
passing through the normal purchasing mechanisms, and so far it is the only 
commissioned portrait of a Council chairman in the collection.*^
It was therefore only logical that Rees-Mogg in turn appointed Luke Rittner as the 
Secretary General in 1983, despite the dissent of the Council members and the bitter 
opposition of its staff.*^ Until his appointment to the Arts Council, Luke Rittner was
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Director of the Association for Business Sponsorship of the Arts (ABSA), a position he 
had held since its formation in 1976. The promotion of Rittner from the head of the then 
obscure corporate sponsorship organisation to that of a national public arts agency with 
a staff of over 300, remarkable not least because of his youth (he was only 34 at the time 
of appointment), signalled the persistent efforts of the government to install the principle 
of sponsorship incentives in arts f und i ng . Ri t t ne r ,  as the founding director of the 
ABSA, was just the^right young man with the necessary business contacts to promote the 
enterprise ethos in the arts.
The energy of this entrepreneurial doublet in the earlier days was, however, absorbed by 
the imminent problem of devolution. This was highlighted in 1984 in their publication 
The Glory o f the Garden, and the take-over of the South Bank Centre from the Greater 
London Council, following the abolition of Metropolitan County Councils by the 
Conservative government in 1986.®’ The result of the pair’s efforts in promoting 
business sponsorship therefore only became clear in the later years of the 1980s, both in 
the operation of the Arts Council as a whole and that of the visual arts department.
In order to establish a systematic approach to enterprise culture, a new Department of 
Marketing and Resources was set up in 1987 to help clients’ organisations as well as the 
Arts Council itself to improve their marketing and fund-raising skills. Tellingly, its first 
controller, Dylan Hammond, was a former account director at the advertising agency 
Saatchi and Saatchi, whose career to date had been spent in "applying standard marketing 
techniques to the likes of Schweppes and Allied Breweries."®® Little wonder that the 
new department was to be a "promoter of enterprise, partnership and efficiency. "®® The 
organisational change signified an important step in the Arts Council’s long crusade for 
corporate money. The Arts Council, for all its class-bound tradition, was used as a 
public resource, but since that time it has allowed itself to become a marketing arm of 
the corporations. Not only have the Arts Council and the business world coalesced in 
the name of advancing the arts, but as the national arts funding agency, the Arts Council 
has urged the subsidised arts organisations in the country to follow suit.
The Arts Council has pursued commercial sponsorship in two ways: firstly through
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publicising and openly endorsing the practice, and secondly by collaborating closely with 
business itself. In its 1987/88 annual report the Arts Council addressed itself directly to 
business people for the first time in its more than forty year history. Subsequently 
business sponsorship has regularly featured in its various publications.^ For instance, 
Ian Rushton, the group chief executive of Royal Insurance, was invited to voice his 
opinions on business and the arts in the Arts Council 1988/89"annual r e p o r t . T h i s  
space, which used to record the activities of the public arts agency, thus became 
"corporatised," a forum for businessmen to advocate enterprise ideology.
Meanwhile the Arts Council began by practising what it preached — to attract 
commercial sponsorship for its projects alongside public m o n e y . Wi t h i n  the first two 
years of the existence of the Marketing Department, the Arts Council had successfully 
attracted sponsorship for its own programmes from a broad spectrum of the business 
world, including companies such as Coopers and Lybrand, National Westminster Bank 
and ICI. That it was able to do so is, of course, not surprising as the Arts Council is the 
single most important definer of contemporary culture in Britain.
When Peter Palumbo arrived as chairman in 1989, he reiterated the need for a concerted 
effort to pursue sponsorship in his first statement in the Arts Council’s annual report: "I 
am convinced that the way forward for the arts in this country must be by means of a 
partnership between public and private sector funding. A specific Sponsorship Unit 
was thus created within the Marketing Department in 1989 "to develop fruitful long-term 
relationships between the Arts Council and businessmen."^ Such was the momentum 
of sponsorship that within a few years the Arts Council had launched several projects 
financed by companies such as the Arts Council/Midland BankArtscard in 1989, the Arts 
Council Award presented in association with Prudential Arts Awards in 1989, and ihtArts  
Council/British Gas Awards — Working fo r  Cities in 1991.*^
Such schemes, especially those awards involving glittering ceremonies, are both news- 
creating and commercially effective, well known in the marketing field as "brand 
sponsorship" or "designer sponsorship." They allow companies’ names to be 
unambiguously associated with the event, and, more often than not, give companies full
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control of it.
A closer look at the specific role that the Arts Council plays in this so-called 
"partnership" is relevant here. For instance, when every Midland Artscard (fig. 3-2) 
holder uses the card for the first time, the bank will contribute £5 to the arts. After that, 
every time a cardholder spends £100 with the card, the bank donates 25 pence to the 
arts.^® For all its talk of supporting the arts in the press, the Artscard is just an 
ingenious marketing strategy designed to enable the bank to break into the oversaturated 
credit card market by attracting an arts audience, which happens, by and large, to be the 
affluent upper-middle class, the most welcome customers of any financial institution. To 
quote its spokeswoman: "At the time we were looking for a new product to appeal to new 
cardholders and... hopefully end up with a profitable card scheme.
Homogenous as it is, the arts audience is perceived to be much more easily targeted than 
general consumers. The most reliable way to reach this group is through the arts 
organisations which such people favour and in which they participate as members. Yet 
to ask arts organisations to "sell" their membership lists is too nakedly commercial and 
ethically dubious to be successful. This is where the intermediary role of the Arts 
Council comes in. When the Arts Council was asked by the bank to write to arts 
organisations on its behalf to promote the s cheme , t he  "own label " marketing device 
of the big corporations not only looked less commercial and ostensibly disinterested, but 
also was legitimised with "state approval." The power relation between the granter (the 
Arts Council) and its grantees (the arts organisations) was cleverly and successfully 
exploited by the bank.
It is precisely because publicly funded arts organisations such as the Arts Council 
function as a branch of the state, in however disguised a way, that business seeks to 
capture it so as to claim for their arts intervention the legitimacy associated with public 
institutions. Without the varnish of public credibility provided by association with the 
Arts Council, this brand marketing could not function so effectively.
Ironically the chairman of the Arts Council actually took pride in this sort of cooperation.
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To quote Peter Palumbo: "I applaud Prudential’s generous and far-sighted commitment 
to the arts especially through the Prudential Awards... We are proud to be associated 
with the Prudential Awards through the Arts Council Award. What should concern 
us in partnerships of this kind is the extent to which the Arts Council has allowed itself 
to become the tool of business. More than rhetoric is at stake here. Not only have the 
concepts o f sponsorship as a marketing exercise and "altruistic’* commitment to the arts 
become blurred, but also the symbolic power of state institutions such as the Arts Council 
has been mobilised to validate corporate power, which actually derives from financial 
capital and is not democratically responsible.
Within the Arts Council, the Visual Arts Department was inevitably infused with the new 
spirit of enterprise.*^ Unlike other departments at the Arts Council, the Department 
was heavily involved in generating its own exhibition programmes instead of responding 
to the initiatives of other organisations through its grant-making mechanisms. Half of its 
budget had been spent on its own activities. In the changed era of the 1980s, the Arts 
Council collection and the galleries that it organised had now to go out and find private 
sponsorship.
For years the Department had directly operated two exhibition spaces in Central London: 
the Serpentine Gallery in Hyde Park, and the Hayward Gallery at the South Bank Centre 
arts complex,**** the latter being at the top of the Arts Council’s gallery pecking order. 
In the mid ’80s, Julia Peyton-Jones, now director of the Serpentine Gallery, was recruited 
on a part-time basis to raise funds for exhibitions at the Hayward Gallery. Subsequently 
the Serpentine Gallery "went independent" in August 1987, and the Hayward Gallery was 
handed over to the management of the South Bank Centre in April 1988, which had also 
taken over responsibility for the Arts Council collection and National Touring 
exhibitions.***  ^ These structural changes indicate quite clearly that the Arts Council 
decided to be consistent with its policy of not being a provider of arts events but a grant- 
making agency.***^  More importantly, these two galleries had now the "complete 
freedom" to find commercial sponsors.***  ^ To quote Antony Thorncroft, the Financial 
Times's arts correspondent: "There may be no reason why the South Bank should not 
prove one of the more conspicuous successes of privatisation."***^
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In the meantime, before the Arts Council collection was handed over to the South Bank 
Centre, the Department was also busily engaged in raising sponsorship for purchases for 
the collection. In 1987 the Department successfully secured sponsorship from English 
Estates for the exhibition organised by the regional touring service "Introducing with 
Pleasure." Although English Estates is strictly speaking a public agency rather than a 
commercial company, it nevertheless markets itself as if it were a commercial one.^ ®^  
Precisely because it is that peculiar creature of Thatcherism, a public institution in the 
private sector, its sponsorship is all the more illuminating for the purposes of this study.
In addition to exhibition sponsorship, English Estates also donated £15,000 to purchase 
paintings by Paula Rego and Thérèse Oulton for the Arts Council’s collection. For the 
first time in its more than 40-year life, the department occupied itself with securing 
"corporate" money to fund purchases for the national collection of contemporary art. For 
the financial difficulties facing the collection, whose budget had been slashed from 
£102,000 in the early ’80s to £70,000 in 1987/88, commercial sponsorship seemed to be 
the only way forward. The message was publicly advertised in a leaflet promoting the 
collection and English Estates’ sponsorship: "Private patrons and public company 
sponsors are now actively sought for such purchases. Sponsors are credited wherever 
and whenever acquisitions made with their funds are on view."*®’
This first sponsorship money is significant, although it was curtailed by default as a result 
of the peculiar and muddled British way of arts funding.*®* Within the new structure 
of the South Bank, the Centre raises sponsorship for the running of all the units which 
form the Centre, which means that the sums of money that it has to raise must be 
considerable. The unit which oversees the Arts Council collection is, therefore, 
discouraged from seeking sponsorship for its own purchase fund because any money 
raised would go into the Centre’s general fund instead of purchasing works for the 
collection. But for the capital-hungry public collection, the need to raise commercial 
money is always present. Commenting on the difficulties inherent in the structure of the 
South Bank Centre, the curator Isobel Johnstone pointed out: "Rather than getting no 
money at all, perhaps we ourselves are becoming more involved to get some small sums 
of money."*®’
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Ironically, while its curator had been seeking funds from the commercial sector to 
maintain the collection, the chairman of the Arts Council, Peter Palumbo, ventured to 
cash in on the collection. With works in the collection by star artists such as Francis 
Bacon, Henry Moore and David Hockney, the developer-chairman did not lose sight of 
its market value; a Bacon could have fetched £3.5 million at the time. He decided either 
to sell it or set it up as collateral against the loan for the Opera House, regardless of his 
earlier praise of the collection: "the Council values its Collection for the enormous 
pleasure the works bring to thousands of people each year [italic added].""® Lord 
Cowrie, the chairman of Sotheby’s, was invited to start a valuation."* In the event the 
sale was terminated not because the public ownership of a contemporary British art 
collection mattered to the entrepreneurs of the ’80s, or because it was an insult to a 40- 
year commitment to public collecting, but simply because Palumbo learnt that he could 
not sell the collection, or even if he could, that the proceeds would have gone to the 
Treasury.
Perhaps the most illuminating example of the commercialisation of public sector arts in 
the ’80s is an internal document from the Visual Arts Department. Writing in 1990, the 
Department was looking for a development consultant: "to develop new retail and 
marketing opportunities, to seek corporate, business and trust fund support for 
programmes of funding and collaborate in new enterprises initiated by the Visual Arts 
department." The ethos of the enterprise era under the Thatcher government could 
hardly be stated more clearly.
The National Endowment for the Arts under Frank HodsoU
The extent of cooperation between the NE A and the business sector in the 1980s is not 
as pathbreaking as that of the ACGB. This is primarily because the NE A does not 
provide operating expenses for arts organisations, and its enabling legislation also 
mandates that it can only provide up to 50 per cent of the cost of any project which it 
f u n d s . I m p l i c i t  in this matching grant is the fact that the NEA has always had some 
sort of partnership with other funding resources, either state arts agencies or the private
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sector. Indeed, Nancy Hanks, who presided over the Endowment in the ’70s, was herself 
an advocate of private initiatives, perhaps partly because of her long-standing association 
with the Rockefeller family and the Rockefeller Foundation."^ As a result, the pursuit 
of corporate dollars in the NEA’s policy during the 1980s was not such a dramatic 
departure as it was in the case of the Arts Council, but more a matter of intensification 
of established policy. Nevertheless, there were definite changes in the Reagan era NEA.
The administration exercised control over the Endowment by choosing a political ally of 
the President to chair it.""  ^ Frank Hodsoll, who under the Reagan administration would 
lead the Endowment for eight years from November 1981 to February 1989, came 
directly from the White House, the first lawyer and the first career government official 
to assume the chairmanship."^ He was a former Foreign Service officer for 16 years, 
had held many positions at the Department of State, and was, before his appointment as 
NEA chairman, deputy to White House Chief of Staff James Baker.
While denying that he was a "political apparatchik," Hodsoll did not conceal his political 
loyalty when he testified before the Senate Committee on his nomination: "Needless to 
say, 1 would not be here if 1 did not fully sympathize with what the President is trying 
to do with regard to that [budget cuts].'"" His reservations about the record of public 
art funding were also revealed in an interview: "It’s not entirely clear to me that there 
is anything vital that’s going to be lost because of the cuts.""* The fact that Frank 
Hodsoll came to head an arts endowment without any previous experience in the arts was 
not apparently of concern to the administration.
Despite insisting that the White House had no political agenda for the arts, Hodsoll 
brought significant changes to the Endowment. Both Reagan and Hodsoll appointed 
conservatives to the key positions at the Endowment, people who had a proven track 
record in their political ideology rather than arts expertise."^ For example, Reagan 
named Samuel Lipman, the publisher of the conservative magazine The New Criterion, 
to the National Council on the Arts, an influential advisory committee to the Endowment, 
and Ruth Berenson whom Hodsoll appointed as the associate deputy chairman for 
programs was an art critic for the conservative National Review and described herself as
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a "Reagan conservative. «120
Once in office, Hodsoll was quick to put his personal stamp on the Endowment, 
centralising the authority within the chairman’s office. By statutory provision the 
chairman had the ultimate authority to make the final decision on all grants, on the 
recommendation of specialised panels and the National Counciroh the Arts. In practice, 
those who had chaired the agency previously had viewed their rôle as nearly automatic 
in relation to the panel-Council’s recommendations and almost never used their power to 
overturn them. Livingston Biddle, Hodsoll’s predecessor, once commented: "I would 
never think of myself as reversing panel-Council decisions," and he did not remember 
one instance of his overruling either a panel or Council recommendation during his entire 
four-year tenure.
Hodsoll did not hesitate to interfere directly in the grant-making process. He took a 
active role in overseeing and questioning the peer review panels, and his deputy, 
Berenson, was said to have read "almost all" grant applications before they went to the 
chairman for approval. In the first year of his tenure at the Endowment, Hodsoll 
exercised a "chairman’s veto" on 20 out of a total 5,727 panel-endorsed applications. 
Not even a small grant could escape his scrutiny. For instance, the grant of $1,800 for 
New York’s Heresies Collective/Political Art Documentation Distribution, to support a 
series of public forums at which prominent radical artists and critics such as Hans 
Haacke, Martha Rosier and Lucy Lippard would participate, was rejected by the chair 
despite the endorsement both by the peer review panel and the National C o u n c i l . H i s  
veto was criticised as an act of "political censorship" by the group, although Hodsoll 
inevitably denied that his action was politically motivated.
In other instances the peer panel’s recommendations did not even reach the National 
Council meeting, because they were "hijacked" by the Chairman’s office, despite the fact 
that this was contrary to the legal provisions governing the Endowment. According 
to Michael Faubion, deputy director at the Visual Arts program, Hodsoll "usually would 
not intercede unless he felt there would be a political problem there.
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Shortly after he became chairman, Hodsoll established an Office for Private Partnership 
in 1982 "as a way of bringing together the arts and businesses in partnership 
ventures."*^® The fact that the deputy chairman for private partnership was given the 
same ranking as the deputy for programs and public partnership demonstrates the 
seriousness of Hodsoll’s aim to strengthen the ties between the Endowment and business. 
The project unexpectedly failed because, according to an insider, the deputy chair 
appointed was a "political appointee" whom Hodsoll did not appreciate, and as a result 
the office lost the high profile it enjoyed at the beginning.
To translate his conservative ideology into the administration of various programs at the 
Endowment, in particular the Visual Arts Program, Frank Hodsoll brought with him a 
sturdy faith in the marketplace: the private economy is the proper arena for arts. 
Speaking at the Conference for the Media Arts in 1983, Hodsoll summed up the NEA’s 
position: "Commercial films are as much art as non-commercial ones... We’ve got to 
bring the two together. He thus urged his audience to look to the film and 
television industries for support.
Interviewed earlier in the same year, he articulated the same agenda for the Visual Arts 
Program. Stating that there was a natural relationship between the Endowment and the 
commercial film and theatre industries, he expressed the view that he would like to see 
a similar relationship established between the visual arts and commercial gallery system:
We need more input at the Endowment from the galleries. In my view, most 
artists would like to have a commercial gallery. We need to help artists get 
gallery representation. For younger artist, peer support... remains the most 
important element. But in the end, over time, an artist’s reputation is made in the 
market.
To implement his ideas, Hodsoll appointed the artist Benny Andrews as the new director 
of the Visual Arts Program in the summer of 1982, a position which had been vacant for 
about a year. Andrews was a firm believer in the market system, and Hodsoll reportedly 
remarked of him: "Benny is a professional painter with gallery affiliation [italic 
added]. It will come as no surprise that Andrews echoed Hodsoll’s sentiment by
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saying: "The people who set up the alternative spaces, they kept a certain attitude, an 
anti-commercial attitude. But most artists don’t see anything wrong with selling. And 
it’s the job of the Endowment to respond to artists’ needs.
Other changes within the program soon followed. The program’s Policy Advisory Panel, 
which makes policy recommendations, changed its name to the" Overview Panel, and as 
a result of the consolidation of the power within the Endowment, its panellists now 
served at the discretion of the program d i r e c t o r . T h e  panel, which had formerly 
consisted entirely of artists, critics and alternative space directors, for the first time 
included an art dealer, Ronald Feldman, who was appointed in 1983 to be a voice for the 
private sector.
Within the program, alternative spaces, later categorised as Visual Artists Organisations 
by the Endowment, came under close s c r u t i n y . T h e  movement to create alternative 
spaces, initially generated by artists in the late ’60s, was conceived as an alternative to 
mainstream art museums and commercial galleries, which at the time were either 
unwilling to take on emerging art forms such as performance art, or were rejected by 
artists on ideological grounds. But for the conservatives, alternative spaces were, to 
quote Hilton Kramer, "licensed rebels at the taxpayers’ expense," a sort of "negative 
cultural luxury" and "the permanent wards of the government patronage system.
With the arrival of Hodsoll and Andrews, there was an attempt to force a market 
orientation on these galleries. Andrews reportedly first sought to provide these 
organisations with mechanisms for selling the works they showed, only to receive 
indifference from the directors of these spaces. He then drew up plans to help these 
organisations to pursue private-sector money. The idea of commercialising these spaces, 
which were founded in the first place to confront the commercialism of the art world, is 
paradoxical to say the least.
But during Benny Andrews’ two-year term as director of the Visual Arts Program, the 
most controversial initiative was the suspension of the funding category of critics’ 
fellowships by H o d s o l l . T h e  fellowships, initiated in 1972 and suspended for three
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years from 1981 to 1983, were meant to be reinstated in 1984 on the Overview Panel’s 
recommendation. As the Hodsoll-initiated "agency-wide exploration of fellowships" got 
underway, John Beardsley, an outside writer, was commissioned to research into the 
critic fellowships.^^®
Basing himself on the market oriented approach of Hodsoll, Beardsley emphasised the 
importance of "promoting a criticism that, while intelligent, is also intelligible to the 
layman," and concluded that the "daily newspapers and mass market periodicals... offer 
the best hope of an independent criticism [italic a d d e d ] . B y  quoting Beardsley’s 
report, Hilton Kramer launched a fierce attack on the program in the New Criterion, 
which Samuel Lipman, who, as mentioned earlier, served at the National Council, in turn 
used as evidence in his attempt to end critics’ funding.*^® Siding with Lipman and 
Kramer, Hodsoll overturned the panel recommendations and put the critics’ fellowships 
on hold indefinitely. Whatever the "merits" of abolishing the critics’ fellowships might 
be, this time Hodsoll did not just overturn an individual grant or two, but the entire 
fellowships program, a testimony to the power of the chairman and of the "well-placed" 
conservatives on the National Council.
The first priority of the Visual Arts Program were the fellowships. But the prospect of 
finding corporate sponsors to match the fellowship money was considered not only 
difficult but ethically questionable, as the predecessor of Benny Andrews, Jim Melchert, 
once admitted: "The idea of Exxon-NEA fellowships makes me very uneasy. Many 
artists would Just turn them down."^^’ The only exception to this rule within the 
program proved to be the model example. Along with the Rockefeller Foundation and 
the Equitable Life Assurance Society in New York, the Visual Arts program co-funded 
the project Awards in the Visual Arts (AVA) from 1982 to 1992. Although conceived 
before Hodsoll’s arrival at the NEA, the AVA was operative under his chairmanship for 
the greater part of its existence. The combination of private and public support for the 
arts could not have been closer to his ideal.
The AVA, organised by the Southeastern Center for Contemporary Art (SECCA) in 
Winston-Salem, North Carolina, was a national annual program to award ten $15,000
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fellowships to artists of "significant artistic achievement" in ten designated regional areas 
encompassing the whole country The awards were unique in concept. Apart from 
the money, AVA also provided a tour of seven to ten works by each of the winning 
artists to three museums across the country, with a well-illustrated catalogue and purchase 
funds of $5,000 available to the participating venues to acquire works from the 
exhibitions for their permanent collections.
Largely because of the former NEA chairwoman Nancy Hanks, who, at the time, sat on 
the boards of both the Equitable and the Rockefeller Foundations, Equitable joined in 
supporting AVA. '^*  ^ According to Miranda McClintic’s report in 1985, AVA was one 
of the Equitable’s major programs of arts sponsorship and "the only instance of its 
support going beyond just giving m o n e y . T o  say that Equitable sponsored AVA for 
the sake of public relations is to state the obvious. Nor did Equitable’s executive, David 
Harris, who was one of the original founders of AVA, deny this: he expressly stated that 
Equitable would like more visibility for the program without affecting its artistic 
i n t e g r i t y . M a n y  AVA exhibitions toured various parts of the country where there 
were Equitable offices. The company sponsored the receptions at each museum opening 
of the exhibitions, and these were, according to an insider, "a tremendous cost" on top 
of the sponsorship money already committed.
More significantly, according to a spokesperson at the Endowment, one of the 
motivations of its involvement was that Equitable used AVA "as an identification 
mechanism, to identify artists around the country" whose reputation perhaps was not 
widespread, but "through the panel and nomination system of AVA, would be identified. " 
Equitable then bought their works to add to its corporate art collection. Understandably 
Equitable’s spokesperson defended Equitable’s involvement by saying that it was "not 
quite as self-serving as that." But the fact remains that between 1979 and December 
1984 (the only years for which data are available) when SECCA advised and helped 
develop its collection. Equitable bought a total of 164 works from 74 artists, which 
included 13 works by 7 AVA winners and 32 pieces by 15 AVA nominees.
If the seriousness of Equitable’s involvement in AVA was in doubt, the company is also
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reported to have provided SECCA with additional money to purchase a computer system 
and software, along with consultants, to set up a database to keep track of all the 
nominated artists. Given the sharp eye it kept on the market as a financial house, it is 
not too far-fetched to suggest that Equitable was anticipating that those artists whose 
works they bought from AVA would be tomorrow’s blue chips. The combination of the 
two highly regarded institutions, an established art gallery, SECCA, ancMhe federal art 
agency, gave AVA an unprecedented credibility, which Equitable would not have secured 
in any other way. The fact that almost none of those AVA-related works in the Equitable 
collection has emerged to be "a great investment," in Ms Stave’s words, by no means 
undermines the hypothesis advanced here concerning the motives behind Equitable’s 
sponsorship.
This of course leads to the question of exactly what is public interest and what is private 
interest, a distinction which had been so blurred in the chase for corporate cash under the 
Reagan administration. Equitable, while contributing about one third of the cost of 
running AVA, not only enhanced its corporate image as a "good citizen," but also 
directly benefited from the award selection, with the taxpayers footing another third of 
the bill each year through the NEA.
While admitting to McClintic in 1985 that the AVA had not been particularly effective 
for the company in terms of public relations. Equitable received considerable "adverse 
publicity" in 1989. One of works in the 7th AVA exhibition, Piss Christ {fig. 3-3), by 
the award artist Andres Serrano, sparked a series of robust attacks from conservatives 
such as Donald Wildmon, a United Methodist minister and executive director of the 
American Family Association, which drew the attention of the national media. Piss 
Christ, a photograph of a plastic crucifix submerged in a jar of Serrano’s own urine, was 
seen by its critics as "morally reprehensive trash" and "blasphemy paid for by 
government." Facing the outcry. Equitable withdrew its support from the museum.
As a touch of irony to the drama surrounding Serrano’s work, we may note that 
conservatives such as Representative Dick Armey (Rep. - Texas) when assailing the Arts 
Endowment in Congress proclaimed: "The arts do serve a role of probing the frontiers, 
but I would say let that be funded from the private sector.
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With the withdrawal of Equitable’s sponsorship from AVA, BMW of North America took 
over its funding role in 1989. In the heyday of corporate intervention in the late ’80s, 
BMW’s agenda for AVA was not a small one. As part of the sponsorship deal, the AVA 
touring exhibitions stopped over at the so-called "BMW Gallery" on Park Avenue in New 
York every year, in addition to travelling to the three museums it used to tour across the 
United S t a t e s . T h i s ,  of course, put the "BMW Gallery" on a par with the well 
established public art museums in the tour, such as the High Museum of American Art 
in Atlanta, Georgia, and the Hirshhorn Museum in Washington D.C., while, in reality, 
the "BMW Gallery" was a show room of luxury cars in d i s g u i s e . I t  is little wonder 
that only selections of the AVA tours were shown at the "BMW Gallery." Any works 
not compatible with car selling were unlikely to be shown in such a commercial space.
As the Arts Council of Great Britain and the National Endowment for the Arts are the 
single most important arbiters of contemporary culture in their respective nations, their 
active promotion of business intervention in the arts, endorsed and prompted by Reagan 
and Thatcher’s cultural policies, have had a spiralling effect on the national cultural 
scenes on both sides of the Atlantic. They have set the model for other arts groups to 
follow and become examples of enterprise. While corporate intervention in the 
contemporary art world will be the subject of the next chapter and beyond, it is necessary 
first to look at the trade associations of the business art sponsors in both countries, since 
these provide businessmen with the forum from which to trumpet their causes.
3.3 The Business Committee for the Arts and the Association of Business 
Sponsorship of the Arts
As the Arts Council of Great Britain is to the National Endowment for the Arts, so the 
Association of Business Sponsorship of the Arts (ABSA) in Britain is to the Business 
Committee for the Arts (BCA) in America. But while the NEA had to model itself on 
its British precedent, ABSA followed its American counterpart. This contrast is of 
significance in that it highlights the differences in the traditions of funding of the arts in
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both countries as they are generally perceived. In the case of the ABSA, seed money had 
to be injected from the government to get the organisation off the ground.
As the trade associations of corporate patrons of the arts, the BCA and ABSA serve 
basically similar functions: both exist to encourage and develop business support for the 
arts. An understanding of how both organisations operate is crucial to this study because 
their very existence has considerably increased the visibility of corporate arts intervention 
in British and American society. This certainly does not imply that they are in the same 
rank as the ACGB and the NEA, either in terms of their size or their rôle in the 
contemporary culture of either country. But it is no coincidence that most of the people 
in the arts world whom I interviewed almost automatically referred to them as the 
ultimate sources of information on business sponsorship.
It is no easy task to gain access to these essentially for-members-only clubs for either 
research purposes or to have first-hand information. Despite the fact that the BCA is 
registered as a non-profit organisation and the ABSA as a charity (with the implication 
that both serve the public interest), both claim to be "private" and access to their records 
is very difficult, if not impossible.’^ ’ Why they see fit to operate under such cloaks of 
secrecy is difficult to ascertain. Moreover, because of the fact that neither association 
is a grant-making agency and hence not newsworthy, there is a dearth of secondary 
material on them, except what they themselves or their associates choose to publish. 
What is presented below must necessarily be considered with this limitation in mind.
The origin of the BCA is significant both in its timing and in its inspiration. Immediately 
following the establishment of the NEA in 1965, it was David Rockefeller who first 
entertained the idea of setting up a businessmen’s council on the arts. As he stated in an 
address at the National Industrial Conference Board in 1966: "I would like to propose 
that we seriously consider the establishment of a comparable organization for the arts — 
a Council on Business and the Arts."’^  ^ It came as a surprise to no one that the two 
Rockefeller brothers each provided $50,000 of the initial seed money for the Business 
Committee for the Arts, which officially opened its doors in January 1968.’^ ^
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In essence, the Committee was, and remains, an exclusive club for the higher echelons 
of business, although this was not Rockefeller’s original intention. This exclusiveness 
is embedded in the structure of the organisation, since membership is by invitation only. 
Not every chief executive officer of a company with an arts program can join in, but only 
the heads of the largest organisations.*^ It is no wonder that by 1990 the BCA had 
only about 130 members nationwide. Neither is an organisation of this kind intended 
to open â genuine dialogue between the arts and business, since no arts representatives 
are included. As G. A. McLellan, its first executive president, remarked:
We will never be able to get a group like the BCA to sit down with comparable 
arts organizations for the type of dialogue that we would all like to see 
happen.^*
The main purpose of the BCA is reflected in its appointment of McLellan, who came 
from a PR background, the chief public relations officer of one of the biggest 
corporations in America. The Committee’s own declared purpose is: "to bring 
information about business support of the arts to businessmen, and to induce them to 
become actively involved in the arts."*^^ This PR function has been central to the 
BCA’s activities since its inception. It represents a conscious and organised effort on the 
part of blue-chip companies to enhance the visibility of business support for the arts, both 
in order to convince the unconvinced of its value to business, and to champion the 
benefactor face of business to the general public. Business concerns are their alpha and 
omega. One of a series of leaflets published by the BCA in 1986 with the revealing title 
Involving the Arts in Advertising proclaimed:
Many companies go beyond underwriting arts programs and shows; they also 
advertise them... By promoting and advertising arts programs, your company not 
only makes them available to a broader audience... you also make sure your 
company is not hiding its light under the bushel... If they appreciate your efforts, 
it may help them decide to do business with you.*^*
Following its American cousin, ABSA was founded by a group of six companies in 1976 
to promote and encourage the concept and practice of business sponsorship of the arts in
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Britain. The leadership, this time, was provided by Tony Garrett, at the time chairman 
of Imperial T o b a c c o , w i t h  a start-up grant of £15,000 from the then Labour 
government. The rôle of Imperial Tobacco in initiating the ABSA is of course highly 
significant, since the tobacco advertising is not only a contentious issue but also severely 
restricted by law. As a prominent arts sponsor of the ’70s, Imperial Tobacco was keen 
to ensure that its image as a public benefactor was fully acknowledged. AFits spokesman 
candidly commented: "We are in the business for generating publicity. It is little 
wonder that Antony Thorncroft, The Financial Times's correspondent pointed out that: 
"ABSA sees itself as a propagandising unit."’^ *
However, unlike the BCA’s closed clubbiness, the ABSA’s membership is open to all 
industrial, commercial or business organisations based or operating in Britain, and by 
1994 the ABSA had over 300 members, which provided the majority of its finance. 
Basically modelled on the activities of the BCA, the ABSA advises its business members 
on sponsorship opportunities, produces publications to champion the practice, lobbies on 
behalf of members for increased tax incentives, improved sponsorship credits in the 
media and other related issues.
And above all since 1978, ABSA has presented corporate sponsors with "prestigious" 
annual awards, in emulation of American practice. The so-called ABSA/Daily Telegraph 
Awards started with 10 awards in four categories and gradually expanded to its present 
ten categories. Despite their self-congratulatory nature, the Awards have always 
been presented with considerable panache. Not only are the awards themselves specially 
commissioned works of art or crafts to ensure the uniqueness of the occasion, but they 
are also presented by a member of the royal family at a dinner at a prestigious venue 
such as the Savoy, the Banqueting House or the Tate Gallery. To maximise publicity, 
the Awards have always been associated with a media sponsor. The Daily Telegraph for 
the fourteen years after their inception, and The Times since 1991.
Newspaper reporting of these events amply testifies to the glory and glamour that is 
associated with these public manifestations of the marriage o f art and commerce, as the 
media are wont to describe them. For example, to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the
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ABSA/Daily Telegraph Awards in 1987, a mammoth party was held at the Victoria & 
Albert Museum. Of this the Financial Times's correspondent wrote: "Over eight hundred 
tongues will be slaked. Business tycoons will be there; artists will be there, some 
performing in tableaux vivants around the museum; the Prince and Princess of Wales will 
be there. The grand occasion will celebrate the coming of age of arts sponsorship in the
U K .  "163
One may simply dismiss these awards as self-congratulatory and not worthy of serious 
consideration, but they work for the people for whom they are intended. For smaller 
companies and sponsorship novices, they function as a stamp of approval and crown their 
efforts. Edwin Shirley, for example, who put £15,000 into the Battersea Arts Centre’s 
production of the Marquis de Sade’s 120 Days o f Sodom, expressed his changed attitude 
towards sponsorship after he was rewarded with an ABSA award: "Two minutes into the 
first night I thought ‘What have I done?’, but I’m proud of it now."^^ For some 
businessmen in particular this is the only opportunity which they get to meet government 
ministers or members of the royal family.
Ever since the Thatcher government actively drummed up arts sponsorship in the 1980s, 
the importance of the ABSA has risen considerably. As we have seen, not only has the 
government injected cash into the organisation, but its own Business Sponsorship 
Incentive Scheme has also been run by ABSA since 1984. This cooperation, for lack of 
a better term, between the Tory government and the ABSA helps promote the ever more 
mixed message of Conservatism. The old distinctions between public and private have 
been broken down and this leaves the position of the ABSA even more ambiguous. As 
J Mark Davidson Schuster, a professor of Urban Studies and Planning at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, pointed out, it was clearly the government’s 
policy that no new programme such as BSIS, that could be managed in the private sector, 
would be allowed to be administered in the public s e c t o r . B u t  the assumption that 
ABSA, being a charity, is a private institution, is open to question. For ABSA to run 
the BSIS on behalf of government, the government has to provide a sizable grant to the 
ABSA in addition to the award money. The BSIS therefore not only has inflated the 
importance of the association, but also given it the flavour of a public institution, which
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paradoxically ABSA is quick to deny.
What this cooperation between the government and the ABSA amounts to is that the 
former exercises state power to promote and further the interests of the business 
sponsors. One of the crusades that ABSA has been vigorously engaged in after its 
inception is media recognition for business sponsors (a theme which will be discussed in 
detail in the next chapter), since publicity is an explicit, if not the top, objective of the 
sponsors. Yet, for years most critics in the arts pages have considered any sort of credit, 
even naming sponsors’ names, in their reviews as "free advertising" for companies, and 
thus resisted the pressure to collaborate and compromise their stance. To change the 
situation, Thatcher’s arts ministers in their aggressive campaigns for business sponsorship 
had to deal with the issue head-on. St John-Stevas was, for example, reported to have 
said: "This is a matter I have taken up with the director-general of the BBC. I have 
drawn a number of particular cases to his attention. The Minister was certainly in 
favour of full acknowledgement of sponsors in any broadcast of a sponsored event, 
despite the fact that the BBC charter unambiguously prohibits "advertising."^®®
So successful is the propaganda machine of the ABSA and BCA that they have become 
part of the "Establishment" in the 1990s. For instance, in an Arts Council publication 
entitled The Arts Funding System Pack, ABSA is listed alongside public institutions such 
as the Arts Council, the Crafts Council and the Museums and Galleries Commission as 
part of the UK arts funding s y s t e m . T h i s  accreditation surely elevates the ABSA, 
a blatant instrument for commercial public relations, to a position which not only 
disguises its ultimate purpose, but also directly helps businesses to advance their private 
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THE CORPORATIONS AND ART MUSEUMS
The engagement between corporations and art museums was by no means a new 
phenomenon of the 1980s. It had been going on for some decades in America, although 
it was, by comparison, less frequent in Britain before the Conservatives came to power 
in 1979, when the government at both local and national levels was still directly funding 
art galleries. Thus, it was still possible in 1980 to speak of visual arts sponsorship in 
Britain as a "new game," with its territory yet to be "firmly d e m a r c a t e d . I n  seeking 
to emulate the American-style enterprise culture, the Conservative government virtually 
closed that gap. Across the Atlantic, Lexus sedans regularly turned up outside museums 
and concert halls, such as the Los Angeles County Museum of Art, the Museum of 
Contemporary Art, and the Lincoln Center in New York, while in Britain both the Royal 
Academy and Royal Festival Hall converted their courtyards into car showrooms for 
corporate sponsors.^ What distinguishes the relationship between the institutions of art 
and commerce in the period under discussion from previous decades, therefore, lies not 
only in the level of intensified practice, but also in the radical transformation of art 
institutions, particularly in the case of British art galleries.
To locate this change within the new alignment of Conservative forces in British and 
American politics is not to discount the fact that there were other social factors at play 
on the cultural scene. The extent to which these factors themselves may have resulted, 
directly or indirectly, from the policy of unfettered market forces under the conservative 
regime is, however, a complex question that can not be fully investigated here. 
Nevertheless, the free enterprise culture of the 1980s championed an ethos of ruthless 
and self-interested individualism, coupled with an unabashed cult of visible wealth. 
According to Lord Young, the longtime ally of Margaret Thatcher, "Without creating the 
wealth first, we cannot invest in the kind of society that we all wish to see. By
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substantially lowering income tax, inter alia, and deregulating the market, the supply-side 
economy initiated under Reagan and Thatcher drastically shifted the balance of wealth in 
society, making the poor poorer and the rich richer, and, above all, creating a league of 
new rich /
The new rich, according to the 1988 Forbes's listing of the 400 richest individuals in 
America, are fundamentally different from the "robber barons" of the late nineteenth 
century in two crucial respects. First, unlike the nineteenth-century industrialists, they 
are detached from productive industry, and have made their fortunes in various white- 
collar service sectors such as finance, real estate and the media.^ The media tycoons in 
particular are singled out by Anthony Sampson as beginning to take the place of the 
railway barons of the previous century.® Second, the new economic elites celebrate their 
wealth in a blatant and ostentatious way, with less guilt and much more publicity. This 
is because an extravagant display of riches, along with the exercise of the purchasing 
power on which conspicuous consumption has always depended, lies at the heart of the 
thrill of ownership, rather than the accumulation of money for its own sake. "Money is 
the hallmark not of wealth alone," wrote de Tocqueville more than a century and half 
ago, "but of power, reputation and glory.
The changed face of the US plutocracy of the 1980s is of relevance to this study in two 
crucial ways. First, as noted in Chapter 1, one cannot talk about corporate involvement 
in contemporary culture without, at the same time, referring to the corporate élite. Their 
class identity and their institutional position within a corporation in late capitalism are 
inevitably interrelated. It is by virtue of these economic elites, the Forbes 400 included, 
occupying a central and commanding position both within corporations and the business 
community that they are able to play a major role in launching corporate arts 
programmes. The massive input of wealth into the service-sector and the high percentage 
of service sector companies participating in the arts is therefore not an accidental 
phenomenon. It is more than a logical development of late capitalism, or what one may 
loosely refer to as post-industrialism.
Second, the unrestrained flaunting of opulence finds no more suitable outlet than in art
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museums. As most American art museums were built as monuments to private wealth, 
they are the ultimate site for a public display of powerful affluence, and all the glamour 
and glitter tliat come with it. On an individual level the museum has become a ‘prime 
party palace’ for the very rich. The Temple of Dendur in the marble precincts of the 
Metropolitan Museum, for example, was the lavish backdrop for the 3 million dollar 
dynasty wedding reception of Laura Steinberg (daughter of Saul Steinberg, chief 
executive officer, thereafter CEO, of Reliance Group Holdings) and Jonathan Tisch 
(nephew of Laurence Tisch, CEO of CBS Inc.) in 1988. "In New York today," 
commented John Taylor, "the sole remaining venue for conspicuous consumption on a 
Pharaonic scale is the Metropolitan Museum."* These extravagant parties, if reduced 
to a moderate level, correspond to what are euphemistically called "corporate hospitality" 
events, where in tlie same ambience businesses entertain their clients and associates, 
invariably in an atmosphere not dissimilar from that enjoyed by the invitees to private 
parties. The new culture of this sort of spectacle can be equally applied to the 
relationship between British business and art galleries, although less frequently in the case 
of individual wealthy families in Britain.
Yet, the popular manifestation of visible wealth within the walls of art museums could 
not possibly take place if the form of commodity structure had not changed in late 
capitalism within whose context the museum operates. That is to say, technological 
advance in the twentieth century, particularly during the second half, has transformed the 
representation of the visual arts and artists in the public consciousness, and the mass 
media in particular have commodified the cultural icons. By "commodified the cultural 
icons" I do not mean that art works themselves are not commodities, which they have 
always been in capitalist society. What I am alluding to is a commodifying process 
which makes art selling dependent not only on the works produced, but also on the 
ultimate promotability and marketability of the personality and lifestyle of the artists 
concerned. The process, of course, was not unique to the 1980s; it was indeed well 
underway in the previous decades. The huge industry that grew up around the myth of 
Van Gogh as a struggling and mad artist-genius is only one, if the most obvious, 
example.
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The case for contemporary art is fundamentally different from the mythologies 
surrounding the canonic masters of modernism: the artist concerned is not dead, but 
living. This statement would be banal except that this very simple fact permits and opens 
up a whole catalogue of possibilities for image manipulation and utilisation of the 
publicity machine, both by the media and, whether tacitly or not, by artists themselves. 
The changed definition of art, from something measured by trained skills to something 
designated as art by artists’ signatures in the art world’s own discourse, had, in part, 
helped this development. Yet ultimately, it is the mass media, to which ordinary 
consumers have access, and presumably for whose imagined insatiable curiosity the 
stories of living artist-legends are entertained, that have given birth to the era of the 
artist-as-celebrity in the 1980s.
The emergence of this idea was discernible as early as October 1977. Accompanying his 
retrospective at the Whitney Museum in New York, Jasper Johns was featured in the 
cover story of Newsweek.^ His photograph on the cover was so large and central as to 
obscure the title of the magazine. The spirit of his legend was encapsulated in the large 
captions: "Super Artist." This kind of treatment can only find a parallel in the way in 
which pop stars and other popular celebrities are glorified in our consumer society. 
Jasper John’s pose is symptomatic of the spread of unrelenting media "hype" to artists 
and their lifestyles in the years that were to follow.
Indeed, the scenario of the marketable artist and his or her status as a society-page figure 
reached its apotheosis in the middle ’80s. The New York Times magazine, for example, 
treated its fashionable readers to a fabulous account of the success of Jean Michel 
Basquiat on 10 February 1985; its cover read: "New Art, New Money: The Marketing 
of An American Artist. Reporting the launching of the Palladium nightclub in New 
York a few months later, it announced triumphantly: "The newest stars of the evening 
were the artists and their entourages. The club incorporated large-scale murals, 
installations and set designs by some of the city’s "hottest" young artists, and, not 
insignificantly,, was overseen by the "club curator," Henry Geldzahler, former curator 
at the Metropolitan Museum and the City’s cultural commissioner. It was the 
marketability of the artists, rather than their art, that made it the essential element of the
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new venture. To quote Steve Rubell, one of the two owners of the club: "Artists are the 
focal points of the ’80s. They’re the celebrities now in tlie same way fashion designers 
were in the ’70s and rock stars in the ’60s."^^
To complete the portfolio of art-world glitterati, the mass media entertained their readers 
with the requisite personal and domestic details of any popular celebrity. Take, for 
example^ Jennifer Bartlett. Nan Robertson in Artnews recounted"her childhood desire to 
become a artist genius; Calvin Tomkins in The New Yorker narrated her encounter with 
film star Mathieu Carrière, who later became her husband, and Joan Juliet Buck in Vanity 
Fair related how movie stars came to visit her in the studio in increasing numbers, while 
Doris Saatchi in House and Garden novelised the couple’s candleless dinner because 
Bartlett could not find any candleholders to her l i k i n g . W i t h  no less excess. Vogue 
paid a visit to Julian and Jacqueline Schnabel’s luxurious Tribeca loft, and its style­
conscious readership were amused by haute-couture outfits from Jacqueline. The new 
focus is not the art of the artists, but their clothes, their life-styles, where they live and 
what their favourite restaurants are. This celebration of living artists is not limited to the 
print media. Even more significantly, the television networks also helped fuel the 
popularity, or sometimes the notoriety, of contemporary artists.
The artist as celebrity so often featured in the mass media helps transfer an effectively 
self-referential discourse of the art world to a popular audience, making art as a public 
display of spectacle and glamour conceptually possible. This both signifies, and itself is 
a signifier of, the larger context of our consumer society, where what is to be consumed 
has increasingly taken on a radically new and qualitatively different character. As art is 
promoted both on the basis of the art work and its producer/artist, so is the marketability 
of today’s consumer goods. Sir Allen Sheppard, the hard-nosed chairman of Grand 
Metropolitan, reportedly said that these days the consumer’s eye passes straight through 
the first-level consumer brand to settle on the "meta-brand" of the company i t s e l f . I t  
is therefore not only the purchasable product that has to be promoted, but also the 
unpurchasable image of the company that has to be aggressively marketed.
If artists themselves serve as a place of cultural appropriation and consumption, a similar
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transformation could be said to be simultaneously taking place in the art museum, where 
the manifest effect of this chic visibility has been the rapid growth and popularity of 
blockbuster exhibitions in the 1980s. It is the success of these blockbusters, measured 
in terms of the numbers of people passing the tills, which can be cleverly exploited for 
marketing purposes, that has attracted corporate art sponsorship.
The discussion that_follows on the "marriage" of art museums and businesses (to adopt 
the widely known metaphor used to describe this particular relationship) will concentrate 
on two major areas where corporate intervention has made a visible impact on the art 
institution. First, according to the dual lines of inquiry set out earlier, the corporate élite 
played an inseparable role in that "marriage" as an increasing number of powerful 
business executives were recruited to sit on the boards of art museums in the 1980s, in 
particular those from tlie service sector. The change is especially noticeable in Britain, 
where the boards of trustees used formerly to be dominated by "the Great and the Good," 
a British euphemism for their hereditary aristocracy and upper classes.
Secondly, the section will deal with corporate art(s) sponsorship, by far the most visible 
and predominant form of corporate involvement in art museums. In some cases, where 
corporate membership of art museums has played a significant part, a discussion of 
membership will be included, which otherwise is too diffuse to make an impact. The 
section will also include a discussion on naming galleries in honour of corporate 
sponsors, a phenomenon which has been in the ascendant in Britain since the late ’80s. 
Not unlike the rich donors heretofore, the companies sought a permanent presence within 
the premises of art museums, where companies’ names would be, so to speak, 
"immortalised."
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4.1 The Corporate Elite and the Boards of Trustees in Art Museums
Did you know ... that at one museum o f modern art in California a sufficiently large 
donation guarantees a place on the board? At least we haven’t reached that stage,
— Alan Bowness, former director (1980-88) of tlie Tate Gallery, London^^
In Amedca, as in Britain, there have been few, if any, published statistical data on 
trustees of art museums compiled from a sociological perspective. In the two otherwise 
fairly comprehensive collections of statistical data on the arts or museums in America 
relevant to the time-frame of this study, for example, the conspicuous absence of the 
topic is puzzling.^* The very few publications on museum trustees have, unfortunately, 
provided a normative description of what an ideal trusteeship should be, rather than what 
it actually was in the 1980s and is at present. Except in some notorious scandals 
where trustees were involved in underhand dealings, the rôle of trustees, whether in term 
of their social composition or the power they exercise, is an area which has been 
significantly omitted.
My recent attempt to find any statistically valid means of comparing the boards of art 
museums in both countries over time, along with their changes in the 1980s, met with 
outright suspicion. Indeed, I was advised by a source in the Museum Trustees 
Association that directors of museums are "very touchy" about the question and that it 
is almost an "impossible task" to pursue the i s s u e . I n  America, the biographies of 
those people who occupy similar roles as trustees in public agencies, such as the National 
Council on the Arts, the organisation which oversees the National Endowment for the 
Arts and Humanities, are available to the public. In stark contrast, the thousands of men 
and women (who usually qualify as the wives or daughters of the socio-economic male 
elite) who serve as trustees of art museums and control invaluable works of art and 
buildings for the nation, are far removed from the gaze of the public, whose interests 
they, presumably, represent.
Here in Britain, while the names of trustees of museums and art galleries, either national 
or witli charity status, are available as public information, their biographies or
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occupations are not always so. The discrepancy, rationalised as being in the interest of 
confidentiality, cannot be more paradoxical. Are those trustees not presumed, on behalf 
of the public, to bring tlie perspectives gained from their individual (working) experience 
to bear on the operation of the institution they serve? On what grounds, then, is the 
public not supposed to know the background from which they come? The unavailability 
of the information is replete with meaning, something invisible that only Hans Haacke’s 
1974 piece, "Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum Board of Trustees" has so far made 
visible.
Boards of Trustees in America
In contrast to the number and variety of art museums in America, the demographic 
composition of their boards proves to be surprisingly homogenous. In a rare cross­
country survey of 156 board members by the Twentieth Century Fund in 1969 
{unpublished, of course), 60 percent were at least sixty years old and had graduated from 
Ivy League or Little Ivy League schools; on average they held three trusteeships in 
different cultural or educational institutions, and 38 percent listed Episcopalianism as their 
religion. Nearly a third were in banking and finance (with many holding law degrees) 
and another fifth worked in law firms.^^ A similar profile was reported a few years 
later. 63 percent of art museum trustees are male, 44 percent are more than 50 years 
old, and 85 percent are white, with 3 percent for other ethnic minorities (12 percent were 
not reported). The business community was by far the single most dominant background 
from which the trustees were drawn: more than one third were business executives (24 
percent), bankers, accountants or other financial experts (7 percent).
These figures, however, say nothing of the close relationship between people on the 
board, who are very often intimately connected to each other. This should come as no 
surprise since most art museums in America were built, it bears repeating, as memorials 
to their donors and benefactors, and by tradition board membership is not only self- 
perpetuating, but also based on lineage and wealth, in which money and power are the 
prerequisites to entry. As explained by Grace Glueck, no less than ten out of the sixteen
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trustees at Cleveland Museum of Art were related to the Museum’s founders, past 
trustees or benefactors either through blood or marriage/'* A similar pattern can be 
found in museums elsewhere, if less extreme than in the case of the Cleveland board
Moreover, these trustee élites, just as they do in business, sometimes serve more tlian one 
museum board, and are related by family or business connections to the trustees of other 
museums. In the early 70s, for example, at the Museum of Modern Art, trustee Mrs C. 
Douglas Dillon was tlie wife of the president of the Metropolitan Museum; trustee Mary 
Lasker was the stepmother of Mrs Leigh B. Block, a trustee of the Chicago Art Institute, 
and of Mrs Sidney Brody, wife of the president of the board of the Los Angeles County 
Museum. Trustee John de Menil was a trustee of the Museum of Fine Arts in Houston, 
the Amon Carter Museum in Fort Worth and the Museum of Primitive Art in New York, 
to name but a few.^^
Serving on museum boards is, tlierefore, quintessentially a "mandatory ‘accoutrement’" 
of an élite social life. As one insider observed: "In our culture, in our way of doing 
things, that is the role of tlie wealthy ... And poor people go to the local church or 
temple, right? Make suppers, cake sales. Not unlike joining a private social club, 
whose exclusivity signifies ultimate social status and power, board membership is part 
of the jigsaw of the upper class’s networks of relationships, friendships and 
acquaintanceships. But art museums, after all, are not private clubs; they operate and 
function in the public sphere, thereby commanding significant public authority and 
respect. For anyone with the status of trustee, it provides an institutional means of 
wielding considerable power within society; it is an avenue of consequence in a capitalist 
democracy.
Of course, museum trustees will not see themselves as running an exclusive social club, 
or at least, not in public. To quote George C Seybolt, president of the board of trustees 
at the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston: "In essence the trustees represent the public ... 
Since a substantial part of every museum’s collections and endowments is derived from 
our method o f tax deductions, they are also responsible to the smallest taxpayer, and by 
extension, to every citizen [italic added]. It would be very difficult to see how these
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trustees can actually achieve the democratic claim they make, with such undemocratic 
representation on an essentially white-dominated, if not WASP-oriented, board.
This is not to say that all art trustees are necessarily businessmen or their associates. To 
seek a charter for non-profit status or financial support from the city, the 
founders/trustees of the museum are usually obliged to include some ex officio members 
or people from the major educational institutions in the city. The Metropolitan Museum, 
for example, have five ex officio members on its board, including the mayor, in exchange 
for the land in Central Park and all the maintenance expenses provided by the City of 
New York taxpayers.
Further, in response to public criticism, and in particular the need to apply for public 
funding in the 1970s, American museum boards have elected some trustees from tlie 
minorities (blacks or other ethnic groups), or people outside the upper echelons of 
American society. The Museum of Modern Art, for example, elected a black trustee. 
Dr Mamie Clark, a psychologist, to its board in 1970, for the first time in its more than 
forty-year history. All the same, whether they are ex officio members or minority 
representatives, they are token members of the board, and seldom exert real power. As 
Karl Meyer pointed out: "[t]his democratization rarely extends to the key decision-making 
committees, whose recommendations the full board normally ratifies.
By the 1980s, the American museum boards were already filled with powerful 
businessmen and their spouses/daughters. Optimistically, in 1971, Grace Glueck, art 
critic of the New York Times, took the view that: "Even Old Guard trustees can see the 
handwriting on the wall — that the cozy, clubby era of museums as private fiefs is over. 
Trustees in the future will have to earn their places on the boards by more than money 
and the magic of family name. Two decades later, Anthony Sampson recalled the 
situation in the 1980s when "the Met began to look more like a playground and cat-walk 
for the rich — the ‘Club Met’ or ‘Rent-a-Palace’..."^^ This telling juxtaposition is not 
contradictory in itself. As money and power remain the sine qua non for American 
trusteeship, the museum boards of the 1980s were simply colonised, alongside the old 
family names, increasingly by the new rich, a generation of businessmen (and few
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businesswomen) whose entrepreneurial ambition was enormously boosted by the de­
regulated market under the Reagan administration. This money-determined ethos is made 
unequivocal by the famous Three Gs, "Give, get, or get off," or as spelt out by Joseph 
V. Noble, Director Emeritus of the Museum of New York;
A trustee is expected to give money. A trustee, by using political and social 
muscle, is expected to get money. If a trustee can’t do one or the other, then it’s 
time to get o ffih t  board and let someone else sit.^^
Given the scope of this study, I shall concentrate discussion on the trustees of the 
Whitney Museum of American Art in New York. There are several reasons for this 
choice: first, although the Whitney was officially established by Gertrude Vanderbilt 
Whitney in 1931, it remained strictly a family affair until its move to the present Marcel 
Breuer fortress in 1961.^  ^ Its expansion and growth in subsequent decades, therefore, 
have more in common with other art museums in America, half of them established in 
the 1960s and 1970s (see Table 2.2). Secondly, given the difficulty of finding 
information on trustees and the limits of our study, I had no choice but to rely, along 
with the standard biographical sources such as Who’s Who in America, on the brief notes 
about tlie trustees provided by the Whitney Museum’s own bulletins published since 
1978. This is of course very limited, as it is not always possible to work out the 
relationships created by marriage or business. Last but not least, the Whitney Museum 
does provide the most illuminating example of how far a "marriage" between art and 
commerce had travelled by the 1980s.
The growth of the Whitney board was noticeably concomitant with the rapid expansion 
of the museum’s activities in the 1970s and 1980s, in particular its increased financial 
needs. When it "went public" in 1961, at a time when the Whitney family could no 
longer single-handedly support the institution they had founded, it added 9 non-family 
trustees to its board, bringing the total up to 16. The next great expansion came when 
Thomas H Armstrong took over its directorship in September 1974. Within the following 
four years, he appointed 14 new trustees, bringing the total to an all-time high of 29.^ 
At the end of the 1980s, the number of the trustees had risen again to a total of 38,
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including the director and three honorary trustees.
An analysis of the Whitney trustees between the late 1970s and late 1980s can 
demonstrate some of the changes in question, although this approach is substantially 
circumscribed by the fact that once a trustee is elected, he or she is likely to be on the 
board for about a decade or more, and the shift in the 1980s was therefore not as drastic 
as it otherwise might have been.^^ According to the museum’s bulletin, on 30 June 
1978 there were 27 t r u s t e e s . Th e  Whitney family were represented by four members: 
the President of the Board and granddaughter of the Museum founder. Flora Miller 
Irving; her mother (F. Whitney Miller as honorary chairman) and her husband, Michael 
H. Irving, and Sandra Payson, who married John Payson, a cousin of Flora Miller 
Irving. There were seven trustees from the world of high finance, and another five 
trustees were top corporate executives, the very people allied to big money and corporate 
power. These included Arthur G. Altschul, a partner in the investment banking firm of 
Goldman, Sachs; Howard Lipman, a senior partner in the brokerage house of Neuberger 
& Berman; Leonard A. Lauder, then president (now CEO) of the cosmetic conglomerate 
Estée Lauder; and Laurence A. Tisch, then CEO of the Loews Corporation, and now also 
CEO of CBS. With the inclusion of two lawyers on the board (Joel Stanley Ehrenkranz 
and David M. Solinger, a lawyer who had married into the Gimbel department-store 
family), approximately 52 percent of the trustees came primarily from the business world.
This number, however, is deceptive, for the six women on the Whitney board are either 
the wives of rich businessmen or wealthy heiresses of big business money. This 
relationship is partly indicated by the fact that these affluent businessmen’s wives were 
often listed in their husband’s names as Mrs so and so, rather than in their own names, 
a trend which, however, was in decline during the ’80s.^  ^ Barbara B. Millhouse, for 
example, is heiress to the huge R. J. Reynolds tobacco fortune in North Carolina, while 
Mrs Charles Gilman is wife of the president of the Gilman Paper Company in New York. 
Although it partially reflected the trend of the growing number of women trustees since 
the 1970s,^* their presence is inseparable from the men who make the money and allow 
their wives the leisime of not having to work, but to be a "career trustee" or as "an 
alternative to ‘doing n o t h i n g . O r  to put it politely, they belong to the category of
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"civic workers," that is to say, the woman is what G. William Domhoff described as "a 
long-time volunteer worker or official in one of the many welfare and civic 
organizations," a blue-blood tradition historically associated with upper-class women in 
America/^ The brief biographical details provided by the museum’s own bulletin on 
Elizabeth Petrie, wife of Donald A. Petrie (then chairman and CEO of Harper’s 
Magazine and chairman of the Monitor Publishing Co.), is t y p i c a l . J o i n i n g  the 
Whitney board in 1980/81, she served at the same time as a trustee for the Philadelphia 
Museum of Art, the Corcoran Gallery of Art in Washington D.C. and the American 
Federation of Arts, and an overseer for the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at the University 
of Pennsylvania."^^
In this sense such women are not unlike "ceremonial consumers," a term which Thorstein 
Veblen used to describe the wives of tlie rich in tlie last century."*  ^ Their conspicuous 
consumption lies not only in the haute couture in which they dress themselves while 
participating in museum functions, but also in the very fact that a seat on the board may 
well have cost a six-figure sum per year in the 1 9 8 0 s . B e i n g  a trustee of art 
museums, therefore, is a way of advertising one’s opulence, a way of gaining social 
status with automatic publicity. Excluding tlie heiresses, the female trustees represent, 
in essence, the social category of "executive’s wife," whose role of participating in social 
and civic affairs is significantly related to their husband’s position in the world of 
bus i nes s . Ye t ,  regardless of whether these women inherit or marry into wealth, it is 
precisely because these female members of the upper class are outside the economic 
domain inhabited by the male élite, on whom they are financially dependent, that they 
can be an extension of the economic power of those businessmen.
Of the 34 trustees on the Whitney board at the end of the 1980s,"‘^  the Whitney family 
were represented only by its chairman, Flora Miller B i d d l e . Wh i l e  the high financiers 
retained their control of seven seats, a substantial proportion of corporate executives were 
now recruited to serve on the board, rising from five to thirteen. The combination of 
these two groups, along with the two lawyers, gave them a majority of nearly 65 percent 
on the board, 13 percent more than that in the late 1970s. And there were, still, no 
blacks or Hispanics represented.
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A close look at these corporate executives further reveals some quintessentially ’80s 
phenomena. It was the first time that entrepreneurs who had made their fortune primarily 
in real estate had made it to the Whitney board (an area of business which produced the 
highest percentage of people listed in the Forbes 400 m  1988). During the decade three 
of the new trustees were from real estate, most noticeably the billionaire Adolph Alfred 
Taubman,'^* Taubman, who set up his construction firm in the 1950s, represents tlie 
1980s generation of tlie rich who made enormous sum of money simply by speculating 
during tlie frantic spree of raids and takeovers tliat took place during that era. They were 
the chief beneficiaries of the American boom during the Reagan decade. For instance, 
Taubman led the Irvine ranch buyout in 1977 and made a profit of $150 million when it 
was resold to D. Bren in 1983. In the same year he bought Sotheby’s, pocketing $47 
million, and keeping 56 percent of it by taking it public in 1 9 8 8 . In the 1984 Forbes 
400 he was listed as a millionaire in the ranks of $500-hundred-million. Within the short 
span of three years, he jumped into the big league of billionaires in 1987. In this respect 
Taubman is not just an isolated case. The fortune of Leslie Herbert Wexner, a trustee 
introduced by Taubman to the board from 1983/84 to 1988/89 and a part-owner of 
Sotheby’s, similarly skyrocketed through playing the stock market. In the 1984 list, his 
net worth was just over $500 million, but in the following year he was in the billionaire 
class as his stock rose over 100 percent.
Another important occurrence is the entry of "corporate trustees" to the Whitney board 
— the kind of businessmen whose trusteeship is unequivocally a quid pro quo for their 
brokerage of an unique deal between the museum and their respective companies. 
George Weissman, then chairman of the Board of Philip Morris Inc. and Benjamin D. 
Holloway, then executive vice president of the Equitable Life Assurance Society and 
Chairman and CEO of the Equitable Real Estate Group, joined the Whitney Board in 
1980 and 1984 respectively. Not only did both companies contribute handsomely to the 
museum, but, more specifically, both men were instrumental in establishing a Whitney 
branch within the headquarters of their respective companies.
While the Whitney branches are a subject for further discussion in Chapter 5, suffice it 
here to say that, being in a position of corporate power, both Weissman and Holloway
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struck the branch deal in order to gain substantial benefits from the presence of the 
museum at their headquarters. Both men represent tlie "cultural managerial capitalists," 
discussed in Chapter 1, whose corporate position derives from their managerial skills. 
But tliey are unlike their nineteenth-century predecessors in one crucial aspect. However 
hypocritically, the nineteenth-century capitalists and their early twentieth-century 
successors still insisted that they philanthropically served the public interest. As Mrs J. 
D. Rockefeller the 3rd reflected on her involvement with the Board at the Museum of 
Modern Art in New York over many years: "I’m not a violent women’s lib person ... 
but I was brought up to believe you should be of service to your community.
By contrast, the ’80s corporate trustees displayed ambition quite nakedly. Neither 
Weissman nor Holloway hid the motivation of their involvement in the Whitney as part 
and parcel of a corporate strategy. To quote Weissman:
Our basic decision as a corporation was not in the development of art; our basic 
decision as a corporation was that we had to be unique and have a personality and 
an identity that was different from the rest of the tradition-bound [tobacco] 
industry.
The fact that they were able to be so frank and had no need for pretence only indicates 
the extent to which they were confident in exercising their political and social influence 
to secure their own commercial interests. Unlike the more consistent and direct effects 
of corporations’ sponsorship of exhibitions, corporate executives’ influence on any 
museum is generally an undercurrent that operates below the visible surface. This is 
therefore a real pointer as to the qualitatively different type of influx of corporate power 
into museums in the ’80s.
The expansion of the board, however, is not the only means by which corporate 
executives exert influence on the governance of art museums. Although a full 
investigation is not possible here, it is worth noting, that while there are limitations on 
the number of trustees that can be appointed, more trust committees, such as the 
Corporate Committee of the Whitney, were formed in the 1980s, while those in existence 
had added new members. By these means more corporate executives have been recruited 
to the museum than the main board could otherwise accommodate. As with board
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members who have to contribute a significant sum of money annually, these people are 
very often recruited for their financial "clout. Even if they may not be individually 
as rich as the trustees (which is why they are not on the main board in the first place), 
their top position in a corporation often ensures unique networking opportunities and 
access to other corporate coffers. According to a source at the Whitney, a Corporate 
Benefit night at the museum raised over a million dollars in 1994 and between $500,000 
and $600,000 in 1995. Not uncharacteristically, it was the chairmen or the CEOs of the 
big corporations sitting on the museum’s Corporate Council who, by writing to their 
business associates or contacts, helped sell the tables, some of which cost as much as 
$ 10,000.
But where are we to locate the reward for a trusteeship? Very often the trustee-museum 
relationship is characterised as "a two-way street. Or as Agnes Gund, now president 
of the board of trustees of the Museum of Modern Art in New York, bluntly put it some 
years ago: "Why should they [the trustees] give something, and get one day of parties 
and a champagne toast and that’s it?"^  ^ To keep this study within limits, the discussion 
that follows will concentrate on corporate executives as individuals, while the return to 
their corporations will be explored in the next section on sponsorship, as both share 
common features.
Social prestige and status are the obvious trophies conferred by membership of an 
exclusive museum board. But the reality of the situation is more significant and delicate: 
most American boards are full of collectors, businessmen included, who are buying 
(contemporary) art. This is not to imply that trustees are necessarily involved in 
something illegal or unethical. Yet the fact is that being a trustee allows them inside 
advantages and benefits, say, over non-trustee collectors, which potentially can result in 
substantial financial gain for themselves. For instance, they know in advance which 
artists’ works will be acquired or exhibited by the museum, thus affecting the reputation 
of the artists and their market. If the trustee-collectors purchase or collect for themselves 
the works by . the same artists, the value or prestige of their collection will be 
automatically enhanced after the museum exhibition, regardless of whether or not any 
works from their collections are exhibited.^®
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At this juncture, however, it must be emphasised, first, that trustees, according to the 
common law trust standard, should act solely for the benefit of the beneficiaries, that is, 
the public. Second, they should have a duty of undivided loyalty both to place the 
interest of the museum first and to avoid self-dealing and conflict of interest, and not to 
use their board position for personal gain.^ "^  The standard of conduct required of a 
trustee has been summarised in the oft-quoted words of Benjamin Cardozo, in the case 
of Meinhard V. Salmon, as follows:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm’s 
length are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to 
something stricter than the morals o f the market place... [italic added]^®
In the light of tliis conception, the reality of the behaviour of museum trustees in America 
is far from uncompromising. Not only have the issues of conflict of interest and public 
accountability never been rigorously observed, but even when they arise, they are easily 
dismissed by the parties involved. For example, when Alfred Taubman bought Sotheby’s 
in 1983, he was not only on the Whitney board, but also on the Museum’s Painting and 
Sculpture Committee (as was Leslie H. Wexner, part-owner of the auction house). Do 
not the acquisitions and exhibitions at the museum affect the reputation of the artists 
whose works, if subsequently auctioned, will fetch a higher price? To what extent did 
Taubman influence the choice of exhibitions and acquisitions made by the museum? 
Questions like these, however, are rarely posed. Taubman was reported to have 
informed his fellow trustees about his business interests in Sotheby’s and they apparently 
decided that "it was not a conflict of interest" and that he should remain on the board. 
In a somewhat contradictory vein. Flora Biddle, chairman of the board, apologetically 
defended Taubman’s position:
I’ve thought a lot about it. W s almost impossible to be a trustee and not have 
conflicts o f interest. The board is full of collectors who are buying contemporary 
art. The problem the Whitney has generally is ±at as soon as we have a show or 
buy a piece, the artist’s dealer raises his prices by 30 percent. What do we do 
about that? [italic added]^
She went on to praise Taubman’s strong values and ethics and to stress that he would not
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become involved in a conflict of interest. But the rub remains that most informal 
transactions between the trustees and the museum take place behind closed doors, and 
there has, tlierefore, never been an effective critique of their roles. When personal 
integrity and self-policing fail, few practical means exist eitlier to expose or correct this 
abuse. Theoretically, it is open to the ordinary citizen to challenge in the law courts any 
trustees who have violated their fiduciary duties. In reality, only the state attorney 
general has the necessary means and expertise to effectively bring the charges. 
Surprisingly, despite the pervasive and compromising situation in American art museums, 
as evidenced by Flora Biddle’s remarks, very few legal actions have been registered. 
This has less to do with self-regulation on the museums’ part and more to do with the 
fact that trustees are very often so-called "blue-ribbon citizens," both economically 
privileged and socially prominent. Rigorously to enforce trustee obligations becomes 
thereby a highly charged political issue. With the exception of extreme cases, the state 
attorney general is understandably reluctant to investigate the dark underside of museum 
operations, nor does he have the staff to undertake such action.
The extent to which these businessman trustees may influence the operation of museums 
is difficult to determine. The precise mechanisms through which they exercise their 
power are not the kind of knowledge that is for public consumption. But their "mogul 
power" is a fact attested to by an incident reported by Grace Glueck, the art 
correspondent for The New York Times. Leonard A Lauder, the vice chairman of the 
Whitney Museum and the CEO of Estée Lauder Inc., was quoted as he recalled a 
glittering acquisition in 1980: "Let’s get a million-doIIar painting! If we’re going to buy 
paintings, we have to make a splash. It is not the particular painting in question but 
its price that dominates the thinking of these magnates. Three Whitney trustees, along 
with an anonymous donor, gave a total of $825,000, with the rest to be met from the 
museum’s general fund. The painting, then suggested by the Director Tom Armstrong, 
was Jasper Johns’ Three Flags, and this realised a record sum for the work of a living 
American artist. Lauder was further reported as saying: "[s]ince then, people have taken 
our collecting efforts seriously."^ To what extent this instance is representative of the 
power of businessmen on museum boards in general needs further exploration, but the 
signs are obvious: flashy pretensions had come to be interpreted as substance and
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seriousness, while the social and personal éclat associated with the extravagant lifestyle 
of the rich was played out by these corporate executives at an inflated level in the 1980s.
Boards of Trustees in Britain
In Britain the intricate network of art museums and galleries can be basically divided into 
three types, according to their funding s our ce s . F i r s t ,  at the top tier are the national 
museums and galleries, such as the National Gallery and the Tate Gallery, which were, 
and primarily still are, funded by central government but run by "independent" boards 
of trustees. Second, there are the dozen or so so-called "independent galleries," such as 
the Whitechapel Art Gallery in London and the Anolfini Gallery in Bristol, which were 
heavily reliant on grants from the Arts Council of Great Britain, supplemented by local 
authorities and other public sources, such as the London Arts Board. Third, local 
authorities have funded a series of art museums and galleries throughout the country, 
such as the Leeds Art Gallery and Museum. These are run directly by the civil 
adminstration, and have no relevance in the context of this study. The discussion which 
follows will focus, accordingly, on the first category of galleries, with occasional 
reference only to the second type of galleries.
The American example of museum trustees is instructive in showing what would have 
been in store for Britain if the Conservative government’s predilection for the free market 
had ever been realised with full force in the museum world. Unlike American trustees, 
whose role has always been directly related to the museum’s financial stability ,B ritish 
trustees, until the Thatcher decade, had virtually no need to pay special attention to the 
financial aspect of the institution they were responsible for, and they had generally played 
a merely advisory role. This is not to say that they were not in a position of power to 
affect the direction of the museum. As a matter of fact, according to the convention of 
English common law, they were, on behalf of the nation as a whole, the "collective 
owners at law of the national treasures entrusted to their charge. In this respect, they 
were not unlike their American counterparts, but only to the extent that their power had 
remained largely dormant throughout most of the history of the public museum in Britain.
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Accordingly the difference between the British and American boards was primarily a 
financially determined one, a result of different art funding systems in the two countries, 
and to a lesser degree, a constitutional one.
This is not to suggest that the British boards in the pre-Thatcher period did not consist 
of men of wealth and social standing. Indeed, the board very often comprised a 
distinguished star-studded cast of the great and good of the land, such as minor royals, 
members of the aristocratic class and knighted captains of industry. These trustee 
museums, like other quangos such as the Arts Council discussed earlier, are a distinct 
brand of British institution, the kind of establishment which operates, in the words of 
Martin Kemp, a former trustee at the Victoria and Albert Museum, "through unwritten 
rules o f consensus and personal constraint [italic added]. Or as Sir Norman Reid, the 
former director at the Tate Gallery, put it: "All this works on a fairly informal basis, but 
there is a clear understanding of what are the duties and rights of the Trustees and what 
of the Director and the staff [italic a d d e d ] . B e c a u s e  of their birth and breeding, 
which often means, at the very least, a "public" school and Oxbridge (Oxford and 
Cambridge) education (of which more later), and a career or otherwise amateur 
commitment in public service, these trustees share certain common values and beliefs. 
This mutual understanding, which does not need to be openly expressed, is precisely what 
Raymond Williams so succinctly described as "administered consensus by co-option," as 
mentioned in the previous chap ter. One feature that British and American boards
share is that in both countries boards of trustees are far from being representative of the 
population at large, but are dominated by a very small segment of the country, which is 
undemocratic to the core.
It is within this traditional establishment mentality that the role of trustees had always 
been vaguely perceived as "trustees for the nation." Through the metaphor of trust, the 
trusteeship is frequently couched in paternalistic terms; they are, to use a ubiquitous term 
of the ’80s, guardians of "national heritage." In contrast to what Martin Kemp rightly 
described as the "more active, partisan, and managerially-minded" trustees of the ’80s, 
what is implied in effect in the cosy rhetoric of guardianship are the so-called "traditional 
ideals of public service," a kind of patrician noblese o b l i g e Apparently the
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assumption, which Kemp himself is also guilty of making, is that trustees of the older 
generation were "men of quality and spirit," who took up trusteeship on behalf of the 
public, and mediated "non-partisan representation of diverse interests. It is, however, 
open to question whether personal integrity and ethics are necessarily inherent in people 
with social standing, although until the 1980s British trustees were never publicly 
involved in tlie endless cases of conflict of interest and abuse of board positions 
experienced by tlieir American cousins. Or at least so I believe, for I have no means of 
accurately assessing the quality of British trusteeship in the past, given the lack of 
extensive research on the topic and the limits of this study.
What definitely sets British boards far apart from American ones is that a comparatively 
high percentage of trustees on British boards was, and still is, composed of people 
professionally involved in the visual arts, including artists, art critics, art historians, and 
to a much lesser extent, ar chi t ec t s . Thi s  is not to suggest that being arts professionals 
necessarily absolves them from being part of the British establishment, or automatically 
disconnects them from positions of power and privilege, despite the fact that some artists 
take on the role of representing marginalised communities.^'* Some artist trustees indeed 
went to the so-called Clarendon school s , as  their fellow business trustees did (Anthony 
Caro went to Charterhouse, while Victor Passmore went to Harrow School; both were 
former trustees at the Tate Gallery), although their artistic training would take them away 
from the well-trodden educational pattern reserved for British elites. These arts trustees 
can certainly have an impact on the way in which galleries operate, and they can be 
politically influential too, but the form of their leverage is at best fragmented and 
unorganised, and of an entirely different order from, say, the institutional power and 
influence exercised by the chairman or chief executive of multinationals, who occupies 
crucial position in the structure of the economy and can mobilise organised capital on a 
global scale.
The arrival of the Thatcher regime, along with the ideology of privatisation, which was 
discussed in the previous chapter, meant that grants-in-aid to national museums and art 
galleries as well as to the Arts Council were severely cut. Consequently the publicly 
funded art institutions, already on strained budgets, were forced to engage in an endless
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chase after corporate money and other alternative sources of income. For instance, the 
Serpentine Gallery in London, which was largely funded by the Arts Council until 1987, 
is now dependent on other sources for more than 50 percent of its operating expenses. 
As far as trustees were concerned, it was tliese financial circumstances that made it 
increasingly imperative to recruit more businessmen (and still predominantly men) to join 
boards throughout tlie Thatcher decade: they themselves became highly "collectible" and 
were expected to exercise their financial "clout" to raise money from the corporate sector 
on behalf of the art institution.
For national museums and art galleries, the overwhelming majority of whose trustees 
were appointed by the Prime Minister, the rise of businessmen on the boards was even 
more conspicuous.^^ Although it is not possible to explore here the change in other 
institutions in detail, it is essential to point out that the trend was so predominant as to 
extend to appointments of virtually all boards in other public arts organisations, such as 
the Royal Opera H o u s e . T h e  board of the Victoria and Albert Museum, for instance, 
which acquired its trustee status only in 1983 and whose members were thus all appointed 
by the Prime Minister is the most illuminating example of the workings of Margaret 
Thatcher’s policies and ideology. While Robert (now Lord) Armstrong, Thatcher’s 
favourite civil servant, was appointed chairman of the museum, more than half of the 
board members came from tlie background of private enterprise, including the chairman 
of the Wimpey construction group. Sir Clifford Chetwood; the former managing director 
of the Mobil Oil company. Sir Nevil Macready; City grandees Ian Hay Davison and Sir 
Michael Butler (a former diplomat) and Maurice (now Lord) Saatchi, then chairman of 
the Saatchi & Saatchi empire, the world’s largest advertising agency in the mid-’80s.
The subsequent introduction of admission charges and the "Laura Ashley of the Eighties" 
style museum shop were part and parcel of the money-spinning strategies that these 
businessmen brought to the m u s e u m . T h e  V & A was to be further restructured in 
1989, in the face of international protest and furore, to remove any remaining obstacle 
to entrepreneurial dynamism, an approach guided not insignificantly by men from Saatchi 
and Saatchi, the same agency which had run Margaret Thatcher’s election campaigns.*® 
According to Martin Kemp,
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The nadir of this approach was reached when one of the smart young men from 
Saatchi and Saatchi was introduced ... to present a series of propositions on 
virtually every aspect of the museum’s operations. Each proposition was written 
on a single sheet of paper in large letters, and the Trustees were taken through 
these like a primary-school reading class. Needless to say, the selling of assets 
and compulsory admission charges featured prominently in the presentation.*^
What concerns us most in this specific context, however, is the unmistakable conflict of 
interest m the position of Maurice Saatchi. As a trustee of the museum, his company 
was apparently at tlie same time selling services to the museum, a practice which ran 
through the ’80s and to which we shall return shortly. To gauge the profound change 
that the Conservative government brought to the museum boards in Britain,, we will have 
to turn to a detailed analysis of the case of the Tate Gallery. This is, in size and status, 
comparable to the Whitney Museum, which we have already analysed earlier in this 
chapter.
Unlike American art museums with their ambiguous public/private status, the Tate 
Gallery is a public institution, funded by central government. Like other national 
museums and art galleries in Britain, the Tate is thus subject to government control, not 
only in terms of its finance, but also to the extent that its essential organisational structure 
is determined by various Treasury minutes and Acts of Parliament. This is despite the 
claim often made for so-called "independent" boards of trustees, which ostensibly 
function under the "arm’s length principle" from government, and are presumably/ree 
from direct political intervention.
Direct intervention, however, was not something that the Thatcher government hesitated 
to indulge in. A definite sign of fundamental change to how the Tate operated during her 
tenure was the way in which the terms of the appointment of trustees were altered. It 
was more than thirty years since a Treasury Minute of 1955 had established the 
convention that the Gallery had ten trustees, of which four were to be practising artists. 
The Thatcher government’s new policy with regard to "the problem of the Tate," to quote 
its Treasury Minute dated 7 November 1987, was to reduce the artist trustees from four 
to three, and to increase the total number of trustees to eleven, with ten to be appointed 
by the Prime Minister and one by the trustees of the National Gallery from amongst their
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own board members (who, of course, were appointed by Mrs Thatcher as well).*^ The 
term of the trusteeship was also reduced from seven to five years, and, again according 
to the Minute, the five-year term might be extended for a furtlier five years or more, 
which in fact resulted in certain trustees remaining on the Board for more than a decade, 
a phenomenon unlieard of in the previous two decades/^ This significant change not 
only weakened tlie representation of artists in the running of the gallery, but also, by 
making tlie terms gf appointment more elastic, it permitted the Government, or to be 
precise the Prime Minister, to take even tighter personal control of board appointments.
The most signal example of her intervention is the appointment of Dennis Stevenson as 
the chairman of the Tate Gallery in 1988, to replace ± e  retiring Richard (now Sir 
Richard) Rogers, "Europe’s [most] prominent architect ever since he won the competition 
for the Centre Pompidou in Paris in 1977."^ The fact that Richard Rogers was serving 
an eight-year term instead of seven before he retired, already broke established 
convention.*^ But the more intriguing development was that the chairman of the Tate 
used to be elected from among the trustees themselves, at least according to the previous 
convention, whereas tlie decision on Stevenson’s chairmanship was, in fact, parachuted 
in from Downing Street just four weeks after he was appointed as a trustee.*®
According to Bernard Levin, the Tate Gallery actually invited Sir John Burgh, who had 
recently retired from the post of director-general of the British Council in 1987, to 
become a trustee with the intention of succeeding Rogers.*^ Despite the fact that Sir 
John was a career civil servant, "precisely the sort of timber from which the old-style 
Great and Good had been hewn, " his outspoken criticism of the budget cuts suffered by 
the British Council since the 1979 election could not have pleased Downing Street.** 
Whereas previous Prime Ministers usually rubber-stamped the choice of the boards of 
national museums,*^ after three weeks’ silence Downing Street instructed the Tate to 
find a substitute for Sir John who was not acceptable to the government. "Are we," 
asked Bernard Levin, "at the court of Henry VIII? Or of Stalin?"^
Whether or not Sir John Burgh would have been an excellent chairman is not the point. 
What this act of outright political censorship meant was that appointments to these high-
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level public positions within an ostensibly democratic state were to be made with less and 
less public accountability. Compared with American museums whose boards are self- 
perpetuating and answer to nobody, the public nature of British galleries had been, at 
least, to some extent preserved by virtue of its constitutional framework. Yet, as we saw 
in the previous chapter, public appointments under Thatcher were dominated by one 
specific ideological criterion, which is encapsulated in her infamous catchphrase, "one 
of us." By overturning convention, whether written or otherwise, when it saw fit for its 
own political purposes and bypassing public consultation, the Conservative government 
was further weakening the bourgeois state’s already weak claim to democracy.
Direct intervention, of course, was not the sole means of shaping the new look of the 
Tate during the Thatcher years. A more profound change still lies in the trustees actually 
appointed, in whom ultimate authority over the institution is after all vested. Precisely 
how the list of potential trustees is drawn up by the incumbent trustees and the director 
before it is delivered to Downing Street is a well kept secret and never subject to public 
debate or investigation. An episode such as that of Sir John Burgh lifting tlie veil of 
"discretion" is a rarity. Yet, even without overt pressure from above, the political 
sensitivity of certain arts bureaucrats would surely guarantee a carefully thought-out list 
which would not go against the grain. As Nick Serota, Director of the Tate, was quoted 
as saying in 1989:
I have the feeling that if I wanted to have Professor Richard Wolheim — who is, 
after all, an outstanding philosopher and art theorist — on the Board of Trustees, 
I think the chances of Number Ten choosing him would be quite slight.
The fact that Serota was appointed by the trustees to replace that firm supporter of state- 
funding Sir Alan Bowness in 1988 makes his position particularly de l i ca t e . Thi s  is not 
to suggest that Serota is in any sense a Thatcherite placeman. He is, nevertheless, by 
inclination or by passive acquiescence, congenial to the political order of the day. Back 
in 1980 when he was still the director of the Whitechapel Art Gallery, what he had to say 
about the appointment of trustees perfectly epitomised the transformations in trusteeship 
that would characterise the Thatcher decade:
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The most immediate need is for those authorities who appoint trustees to 
recognise that one of the best services of any trustee would be to inake contacts 
for the gallery and assist in fund raising, and not just be a guardian of local 
authority money [italic added]
Before looking at the Tate trustees specifically, another important development related 
to the new fund-raising role of trustees deserves consideration. Whereas in America the 
number of trustees "on a board can be increased to some 30 to 50 members, constraints 
imposed by public law make this impossible in British museums and art galleries. To 
circumvent this, trustees in Britain have, willingly or unwillingly, created their own 
version of American-style boards. Instead of adding more corporate executives to their 
boards, which is not always permissible by law or their charters, British galleries 
established separate foundations for fundraising purposes, such as the Tate Gallery 
Foundation established in 1986, and the Whitechapel Art Gallery Foundation set up in 
1984.
Within the structure of the Tate, there are also the Patrons of British Art and Patrons of 
New Art, established in 1986 and 1982 respectively, to assist with acquisitions for the 
gallery’s collection, following the freezing of the government purchase grant at a level 
of about £1.8 million in 1979. '^* These two groups, structurally speaking, are, however, 
more in the category of museum friends organisations since their membership is by 
subscription; nor do they command the same degree of authority and influence as the 
trustees of the Gallery. There are several reasons, on the other hand, why they are to 
be regarded as significant in the context of the present discussion, in particular as far as 
the Patrons of New Art status is concerned. First, although the subscription fee to Join 
these groups is relatively s ma l l , a n d  their membership, at least in theory, is open to 
everyone, the people who do join are not ordinary members of the public, but tend to be 
"dealers, collectors and business or City types" and those connected with a network of 
people in positions of power and influence, such as the wife and daughter of the deputy 
Prime Minister, Michael Heseltine.^® These members thus can mobilise, collectively 
or individually, substantial resources, whether corporate or private. For example, while 
Mrs Jill Ritblat was on various committees of the Patrons of New Art, the company 
which her husband John Ritblat (who in turn is a member of Patrons of British Art)
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chairs, the British Land Company pic, was one of the principal corporate sponsors 97
Second, they work with the Director and curators of the gallery in purchasing works of 
art for the gallery through subscription fees. Such inner workings would be much less 
problematic if the members on the Executive Committee or Acquisitions Sub-Committee 
were not_already professionally involved in commercial art dealing. Apparently there has 
been little if any public discussion of the issues of inside advantage that such involvement 
inevitably generates, except in the cause célèbre of Charles Saatchi (of which more later). 
To the extent tliat their subscription fees are tax deductible, through which mechanism 
these groups indirectly contribute to public art collections, there is little doubt that they 
are in fact acting within the public, not just the private, sector. In this respect, their 
status is not dissimilar to that of a "public trust. "
Third, and more importantly in the present context, some of the members active on these 
groups are closely related to the Tate trustees, such as Penelope Govett, Events Organiser 
for Patrons of New Art, whose husband William Govett was a gallery trustee from 1988 
to 1993. The absolutely central strategic position that such a group of so-called "art 
lovers" occupies in relation to the board of the gallery or Gallery Foundation makes its 
otherwise diffuse and fragmented membership worthy of closer scrutiny here. In this 
respect, such people can, without exaggeration, be described as constituting unofficial 
miniature trustee boards of one sort or another.
Although my intention had been to explore the Tate Gallery Foundation Board along with 
the main board, this proved in reality to be almost impossible. While some trustees of 
the Gallery Foundation overlapped with the main board, the three women on the 
Foundation board were not listed in Who’s Who, nor was the American-born financier, 
John Botts.^* Personal approaches to the Tate invariably ended in my being shunted, 
without success, from spokesperson to spokesperson. Typical of the sorts of answers I 
received was: "Yes, the public have their right to know a lot of things. But we still think 
they are private citizens. I can’t give you information like that." One source, however, 
did agree to provide some information, but this turned out to be, in her own words.
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"rather sketchy. When I further inquired if she could indicate who the trustee Mrs 
Sandra Morrison was, I was told: "I hope you will really appreciate that you have to do 
your own research; I can’t do that for you."^°° The discussion that follows will 
therefore concentrate on the gallery’s main board, with some, alas, only incidental 
reference to the Foundation Board.
In order to map oui the changes that have taken place, I have examined statistically the 
demographic make-up of trustees since the 1960s in terms of gender, education (schooling 
and universities) and occupations. I exclude artist trustees from the data as their 
representation on tlie board is fixed by public act, and any longitudinal comparison would 
accordingly not be meaningful. I include data on the trustees during the ’90s, partly for 
reference purposes and partly because they provide some insight into the Thatcher legacy 
as it survives into the ’90s. It should be noted, of course, that the evidence from the ’90s 
is by definition not yet complete.
It is unequivocal that in the ’60s and ’70s, the Tate Board was quintessentially a male 
club.*®^  The addition of three women to the Board in the ’80s is largely consistent with 
other changes occurring within society at large (see Table 4.1), although the Board still 
consisted predominantly of men (72.7 percent male and 27.3 percent female). Nor is this 
factor, of itself, to be taken as proof of a broader representation on the Tate Board. The 
transatlantic parallel is that some of these female trustees are on tlie Board not because 
they are the representative of the female population at large, but because they themselves 
are part of, or have intimate access to, the network of people of money and power. The 
most illuminating example is tlie Countess of Airlie, one of the few trustees to remain on 
the Board for more than a d e c a d e . Br o u g h t  up in the United States, she is the grand­
daughter of the financier and philanthropist Otto Kahn.^°^ Married to Lord Ogilvey 
(who succeeding Lord Maclean as Lord Chamberlain in 1984), she has been Lady of the 
Queen’s Bedchamber since 1973. Her aristocratic connections are a classic example of 
the intermarrying of inherited wealth and power, and hardly make her a meaningfully 
representative female figure.
The second distinctive characteristic of the Tate trustees is the overwhelmingly similar
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educational background they share. This, of course, is not a surprise, as numerous 
studies of the British élite have already shown, that historically a whole range of British 
national life has been, and still is, dominated by the men who have been to public schools 
and then to Oxford and Cambridge Universities, sometimes derogatorily referred to as 
"Oxbridge mafia." A unique, and indeed peculiar, feature of class distinction in Britain 
is how admittance into the élite circle is determined at such an early age by public-school 
entry, and into such a tiny number of schools, and especially Eton. As an effective 
signifying system of upper to upper-middle class upbringing (whatever these terms might 
mean), the inclusion of schooling in this analysis proves to be anything but arbitrary.
In the ’60s, 90.9 percent of the trustees had gone to public schools, with 45.5 percent 
attending the so-called Clarendon schools, while in the ’70s, the proportion was 70.0 
percent with 40.0 percent having passed through Eton. Although the proportion fell to 
45.5 percent during the ’80s, this was partly because of three trustees having been 
educated overseas, and partly because anotlier three had come from state-funded schools 
(see Tables 4.2.1 and 4.2.2). This percentage decrease is impressive, but by no means 
conclusive. Statistically speaking, the number of trustees appointed in a decade is fairly 
small; a change in one or two individuals is likely to show an exaggerated percentage 
reaction. Whether or not there has been any truly significant shift is far from clear, 
especially in view of the figures so far available for the ’90s, which show that the most 
recent trustee appointments have all been educated at public schools, with as many as 
42.9 percent of them having gone to Eton.
Similarly, the dominant position of Oxford and Cambridge in the makeup of trustees’ 
higher education can still be discerned. Within the time period covered here, the 
percentage of Oxbridge graduates among the trustees remained at its highest in the ’60s 
(66.7 percent) and ’70s (70.0 percent), with a decline to 36.4 percent in the ’80s, before 
a resurgence to 71.4 percent during the ’90s (see Tables 4.3.1 and 4.3.2). While the 
spread of backgrounds might be wider in the ’80s than it was in the previous two 
decades, this does not suggest that any broader representation had been achieved. As 
with the question of gender, education cannot, in and of itself, be an absolute indicator.
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This point is tellingly summed up by one anonymous Tate source when speaking of a 
particular trustee who had no known university education: "It doesn’t make any 
difference. He is a man who comes from a very wealthy family."
What distinguishes ’80s trustees from those of the previous decades is ultimately their 
occupations. In the ’60s, 38.5 percent of trustees were from academia and the arts world 
(including writers, critics and art historians), 46.2 percent from business and 15.4 percent 
from the civil service. The comparable percentage for the ’70s are 30, 40 and 30 percent 
(see Tables 4.4.1 and 4.4.2). In the ’80s, virtually all the trustees are from the business 
sector, with the exception of the Countess of Airlie and Caryl H u b b a r d . I n  particular 
three out of eleven trustees were from the financial sector, clearly signifying the 
increasingly important role given to these high financiers in the operation of the gallery. 
It goes without saying that these men of free enterprise are no ordinary businessmen but 
hold high-level positions within the economic structure of British society. To quote one 
Downing Street source explaining Mrs Thatcher’s public appointments policy: "She goes 
for the millionaire of the moment.
But such statistical data do not tell the whole story, because they say nothing about the 
extensive ties that these trustees have with people in positions of political power in 
Britain, nothing about the labyrinthine nature of the corporate and social network they 
create among themselves, and above all, nothing about the resultant concentration of 
power revolving around a coterie of trustees in a democratic state (with "democratic" the 
critical qualifier). First, most, if not all, of them are Tory sympathizers, and some are 
even major financial backers of the Conservative Party through the companies they 
chair. For example, David Verey, chairman and chief executive of the merchant 
bank Lazard Brothers, which, according to a report of 1994, has given £180,000 to the 
Conservative party since 1986, was appointed by Mrs Thatcher as a trustee of the Tate 
Gallery Foundation in 1989 and as a trustee of the Gallery by John Major in 1992.^°^
This is not necessarily to suggest that Verey, a financier who declares his recreations as 
"stalking, bridge, gardening and travel" in Who’s Who, had been "buying" his trusteeship
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in secret. Whereas it is impossible to substantiate the connection, as information of this 
kind is either classified as confidential or simply ojf the record, it does indicate the 
significant link between the trustees and the Thatcher government, or the Conservative 
Party. It also begs the question of what role, if any, trustees of public art galleries 
should play; are the interests served those of public service, or is it a question either of 
creating personal fiefdoms of of the ruling party repaying ideological or financial debts 
to leading business tycoons?
Second, considerable importance has been attached in media reporting to the 
"entrepreneurial spirit" of these trustees. David Puttnam, Britain’s best-known film 
producer, was not only one of the selected guests at Mrs Thatcher’s Boxing Day 
Luncheon at Chequers in 1983, but he was also perceived to represent the kind of 
"adventurous high-risk enterprise man much favoured and admired by Mrs 
Thatcher. Similarly, Dennis Stevenson was said, in his new rôle as chairman of the 
Tate, "to inject entrepreneurial know-how into the gallery’s funding and 
management. By promoting these "enterprise men" to formal positions within 
public museums and galleries, the Conservative government was not only manoeuvring 
to take over the running of the country’s cultural institutions, but also furthering its 
advocacy of the "enterprise culture" in a strident and ideological way, a process which 
was inevitably to transform the identity of Britain’s art institutions.
The extent of this metamorphosis in identity is plainly seen in the language used in the 
media when dealing with the trustees and the Tate Gallery. Business jargon, which 
would otherwise have been reserved for the business world, has over time come to 
infiltrate into intellectual discourse, as if a public art gallery such as the Tate could itself 
be considered as a corporate enterprise. When Richard Rogers was elected chairman of 
the Board in 1984, for example, the headline was: "Another Tate Takeover.”^ ^^  And, 
more significantly, in the numerous reports on the activities of the Gallery’s chairman 
Dennis Stevenson, the name of the Tate is merely sandwiched in among a long list of 
chairmanships and directorships that he currently holds. In a revealing description, he 
is simply referred to as "a director of the Tate Gallery as well as the Pearson.""^ This 
shift in language that serves to equate a national institution with a multinational company
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speaks for itself. To justify why "some [5/c?] business people" are selected as trustees, 
the Gallery claims: "the Tate Gallery now runs and administers shops, restaurants, and 
is in itself a business [italic added].
Thirdly, what makes these trustees powerful is not only that the majority of them are 
individually very wealthy, but also that they hold high positions in the corporate world. 
At the time of his appointment in 1988, William Govett held 23 concurrent UK and 
overseas directorships, including tliose of the Govett Atlantic Investment Trust pic., John 
Govett Investment Management Inc., and Berkeley Govett and Co. Ltd (Overseas). 
Equally, trustee Gilbert de Botton (1985-92) held a similarly impressive list of UK and 
overseas directorships, such as J. Ro±schild & Co., Global Asset Management UK Ltd., 
and tlie Banque Privée SA (Switzerland).
The combination of personal wealth and positions of economic power within institutions 
allows them privileged access to a wide variety of boards and committees of quangos, 
charities, hospitals, and schools. This means that their power, which derives primarily 
from capital, has permeated widely into national life. For example, Mark (now Sir 
Mark) Weinberg, "a super-salesman of life insurance," who joined the Tate Board in 
1985, was Chairman of Allied Dunbar, Britain’s largest unit-linked life a s s u r e r . H i s  
other public appointments included the chairmanship of the Organising Committee of the 
Marketing of Investments Board (1985-86) and deputy Chairman of the Securities and 
Investment Board (1986-90), the main political body for policing security firms and 
investment companies. At the same time, he was the co-founder and join chairman of 
the Per Cent Club, deputy chairman of Business in the Community, and honorary 
treasurer of the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children.
But what makes the Tate Trustee Board so eminently clubbable in business world terms 
is the fact that certain of the trustees are intimately related to each other either by 
business association or by marriage. At the centre of a web of interlocking directorships 
among these businessmen is their association with Jacob (now Lord) Rothschild, "well 
known as the most ruthless member of the banking dynasty."”  ^ While Rothschild was 
chairing the National Gallery, his business allies were sitting on the board of, and
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running, the Tate.“ * The close knit group includes Mark Weinberg, a long time ally 
of Rothschild; Gilbert de Botton, who left Switzerland to work for him in London in 
1981 and in 1983 set up his own investment house. Global Asset Management, which was 
29 percent owned by Rothschild’s company;”  ^ and Dennis Stevenson, who was 
reported to be "a protégé of Weinberg. Their relationship culminated in the 
summer of 1991 when Rothschild and Weinberg joined forces to launch another life 
assurance company, J Rothschild Assurance, which Stevenson joined as a non-executive 
director some two months later.
Nor do the business links of trustees end there. A similar connection between Dennis 
Stevenson, chairman of the Tate board since 1988, and David Verey and David Gordon 
extends the network well into the 1990s, witli at its centre, this time, the media and 
entertainment conglomerate Pearson pic. While Stevenson has been a non-executive 
director of Pearson since 1986 and became Chairman in May 1996, the merchant bank 
Lazard Brothers, which David Verey has chaired, is 50 percent owned by Pearson, whose 
board Verey later joined as a non-executive director in 1995.^^  ^ Before being appointed 
as a trustee in 1993, David Gordon had been working for The Economist since the late 
’60s, and gradually climbed the corporate ladder until he became the group’s Chief 
Executive in 1981, and then Director of The Financial Times from 1983 to 1993.^^  ^
Both publications are owned by Pearson pic.
But a more incestuous side to this association is revealed by the Tate Gallery’s trustee 
couple of Gilbert de Botton and the Hon. Mrs Janet Green (now Janet de Botton), which 
brings the Tate closer to the American-style board than at any time hitherto. While 
Gilbert de Botton first joined the Tate Board in 1985, he also became a trustee of the 
Foundation when it was established in 1986, and subsequently became its chairman in 
November 1987. In the same month the Hon. Janet Green joined the Foundation Board. 
Both de Botton and Janet Green were also representatives on the International Council 
of the Tate Gallery F o u n d a t i o n . Th e y ,  of course, knew each other before they were 
appointed to the Foundation Board. The couple were married in 1990.^^^
While trustees’ personal lives are, of course, their own affairs, their situation does raise
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wider question of representation and public perception. The fact that Janet de Botton is 
the daughter of Lord Wolfson, chairman until recently of the Great Universal Stores 
empire (he retired in September 1996), connects her to one of the greatest business 
fortunes ever accumulated in Britain, not to mention the close Wolfson connections with 
the Conservative Party, in particular Margaret T h a t c h e r . T h r o u g h  family 
connections, Janet de Botton is a trustee of the Wolfson Family Trust and the Wolfson 
Foundation, which was reported to be one of Britain’s biggest private benefactors since 
Nuffield. This undoubtedly qualifies her as one of the most sought after figures of the 
’80s and, as a matter of fact, she has been deeply involved with the Tate, following an 
uninterrupted upward path from the Tate Gallery Foundation (1987-92) to membership 
of the Tate Gallery Liverpool Advisory Council (1988-92) to the highest honour of a Tate 
Board place since 1992.
There is also a parallel between Janet de Botton and the case of Alfred Taubman in 
America, which we have already discussed. Like Taubman, de Botton occupies an 
extremely sensitive position straddling the worlds of public trusteeship and closely related 
private business interests in so far as she is a non-executive director of Christies at the 
same time as being a Tate trustee. Her appointment to the Tate dates back, as we have 
seen, to 1992, and it was in November of the following year that she accepted the 
Christies’ appointment. It is difficult to see how she could have passed from the status 
of a public trustee to that of a commercial appointee in precisely the same sphere of 
activity without weighing up the charges of conflict of interest to which she could be 
exposing herself. Clearly the public interest and the likely public perception of her 
ambivalent position were not her highest priorities when she took the decision she did.
One should, of course, be wary of constructing any sort of conspiracy theory, but the fact 
remains that the curious emergence of powerful individuals at virtually the same moment 
and at the same institution is too much of a coincidence not to suggest the possibility of 
nepotism of some kind. Their overlapping trusteeships on the various boards of the Tate 
Gallery, and their prolonged tenures of office inevitably raise questions of public interest.
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This picture of self-electing and self-perpetuating power is even more alarming if we take 
into account the broader context of museum boards in Britain. Here trusteeship is run, 
in essence, like musical chairs, with the same coterie of people who retire from one 
board only to assume the trusteeship of another. After serving at the Tate for twelve 
years, for example, the Countess of Airlie retired from the board in December 1994 and, 
as from April 1995, became a trustee for the National Galleries of Scotland, while 
Christopher Le Brun retired from the Tate Board in January 1995 and went on to become 
a trustee of the National Gallery in London. The issue at stake is, of course, not whether 
or not these people are competent to serve the institution in their trust, given the time 
they can afford to devote to such public service; it is rather that undemocratic 
appointments to such positions and the concentration of power in a tightly knit group are 
simply not an acceptable way to run public institutions in a modern democracy.
This also brings clearly to the surface the same range of underlying problems which arise 
in circumstances that we have already discussed above in relation to American boards. 
Trusteeship is, of course, not simply "toiling long hours for no financial reward.
The reward lies first and foremost in tlie social prestige and status that come with it, and 
it goes without saying that the Tate Board is probably the most prestigious contemporary 
art board on which to serve in Britain. To quote Dennis Stevenson:
I have begun to realise that Tate is the most powerful brand name. It wasn’t so 
long ago that the Tates were sugar, yet now Tate has a magical ring because 
millions have come to this rather extraordinary building on the water [italic 
added].
It is no surprise in the scheme of things that these words should come from a past master 
in the professional art of image management and "dream[ing] up ideas for big business," 
such as advising Stanhope Properties to commission a Richard Serra sculpture for its 
Broadgate development in the City of London, or advising Dunhill "how to tap the 
Japanese lust for luxury goods. Dennis Stevenson is more often than not described 
in the media as "chairman of the SRU Group and the Tate Gallery" as if his chairmanship 
of a non-profit- making national institution carries the same weight as his private sector 
money-making venture.
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Moreover, once the needs and the logic of private capital enter and permeate a public 
institution, secretiveness enters also, and turns potential conflict of interest into reality. 
Back in 1985 when the Tate was preparing for a Francis Bacon retrospective, it was well 
known that the Gallery had difficulties in finding sponsorship because sponsors did not 
want to be associated with "that mad flaying Baconesque vision. At the very last 
minute, when the catalogue had already been printed and no other sponsorship material 
prepared. Global Asset Management, the international financial house chaired by Jacob 
Rothschild and run by Gilbert de Botton, came to the rescue.
The timing of the sponsorship and the appointment of de Botton as a Tate trustee are too 
close in time to suggest a mere intriguing coincidence. According to de Botton himself, 
it was "early in 1985" that, "shocked to learn" that no sponsors had come forward for 
the exhibition, he himself decided to sponsor the retrospective, partly because he is "a 
fan of Bacon. De Botton was appointed as a trustee in the middle of April 1985, 
the exhibition was held from 22 May to 18 August 1985.^ "^* According to Alan 
Bowness, the then director of the Gallery, the trustees accepted the sponsorship of Global 
Asset Management Ltd. just before de Botton's a p p o i n t me n t . Wh a t  is unusual about 
the appointment of de Botton is also that he (a Swiss national) was the first non-British 
citizen, non-Commonwealth national to be appointed to the trustee board of a British 
national museum or art gallery.
I have no means of assessing the accuracy of the timing and the connection between the 
two events, since the way in which such appointments are made is always firmly hidden 
from view under the veil of "discretion." But the fact remains, first and foremost, that 
the exhibition would have gone ahead as planned even without the intercession of de 
Botton, because when the sponsorship was offered, the catalogue had already been printed 
and other printed material capable of carrying sponsorship acknowledgement had not been 
planned. Second, the real sequence of the events remains unclear because such 
appointments take many months to come to completion, as the case of Sir John Burgh 
illustrates. While it is not possible to prove that anything improper took place (like 
buying a place on the board), one feels bound to point to what could amount to an
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effective conflict of interest in the constitutional powers and status of the trustees of 
public institutions, which would, of course, be a matter of public interest.
The question of conflict of interest, in so far as de Botton as a trustee of the.Gallery was 
also running the company that was sponsoring the show, was indeed posed to de Botton 
during the conference Sponsorship o f the Arts, coincidentally held at the Tate during the 
exhibition. "The thought had crossed our cautious mind," he explained, "but it had been 
dismissed. But he did not mention the fact that he is himself a collector of Bacon, 
and that three Bacon oils from his own collection (catalogue numbers 79, 89 and 95) 
were on display in the retrospective. What we see here finds a parallel in our earlier 
discussion relative to American boards and their business-trustee-collectors; by virtue of 
tliese Bacon works having been shown at the Tate, the value of de Botton's own 
collection must inadvertently have increased, resulting, potentially at least, in substantial 
financial gain for him personally.
Undeterred by any lingering tliought of conflict of interest, de Botton, acting through 
Global Asset Management, sponsored a second exhibition Late Picasso in 1988. 
Peculiarly enough, there was barely a voice of criticism raised. Unlike Francis Bacon, 
Picasso is one of the most exhibitable and sponsorable artists of the twentieth 
c e n t u r y , s o  Global Asset Management’s sponsorship was unlikely to reap the same 
sort of kudos as that reserved for those who promote art — to use de Botton’s own terms 
— out of the sense of adventure, or "to stir spirits" or to support "comfortably 
unpopular" artists such as B a c o n . W h i l e  three Picassos from de Botton’s own 
collection were again on display (catalogue numbers 28, 49 and 63), his ownership was 
openly acknowledged in the catalogue ("Gilbert de Botton, Switzerland"), thus producing 
an effect of distance and disconnection. Although these extremely rich individuals 
often have several residences across the globe, the fact is that Global Asset Management 
is actually registered in London, and de Botton indeed moved to London in the early 
1980s, according to several a c c o u n t s . A t  the time of the Picasso exhibition, he was 
still sitting on the board of the Tate.
Conflict of interest is, of course, often a delicate matter, and this is why cautious
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individuals may prefer to avoid rather than to "dismiss" it. When advantage is 
immediate, charges are more easy to substantiate, but long-term gain is difficult to 
estimate and in such cases one has to fall back on a hypotheses. If de Botton had had a 
precise estimation of the worth of his Bacons and his Picassos, and if he had then sold 
them on the open market immediately after the two exhibitions in question, it might have 
been possible to quantify the extent of any insider advantage which his position as a Tate 
trustee had given him.
The notorious case of Charles Saatchi provides a further, and perhaps clearer, illustration 
of this sort of insider advantage. Despite Saatchi never having served on the Tate board, 
he was once on the Committee of the Patrons of New Art, a committee of which he was 
the driving force when it was first established in 1982, and whose membership in those 
days included many collectors and nearly all the London art d e a l e r s . I n  the same 
year, the Tate Gallery organised the first exhibition of Julian Schnabel’s work in 
collaboration with the Patrons; nine out of the eleven paintings in the show were owned 
by Charles Saatchi and his tlien wife Doris.
While this and other similar manipulations by Charles Saatchi in the early ’80s do not 
readily lend themselves to investigation, his activities at around the same time at the 
Whitechapel Art Gallery, of which he was a trustee, provide clearer evidence of how he 
was able to take advantage of the various interlocking positions of power which he held. 
During his trusteeship, his advertising company was actually making donations of several 
thousands of pounds to the Whitechapel to supplement their public funding. Shortly after 
the Gallery decided to mount an exhibition of Francis Clemente’s paintings (and the 
actual timing was explicitly confirmed by the Whitechapel’s then director Nicholas 
Serota), Saatchi bought up twelve Clementes for his private collection.
A similar instance of Saatchi apparently benefitting from inside information is provided 
by the case of Malcolm Morley. After learning at a trustees’ meeting that the 
Whitechapel intended to mount a Morley exhibition, Saatchi and his wife added several 
Morleys to their personal collection. It was only in 1984 that Saatchi saw fit to resign 
his Whitechapel trusteeship. As an art collector, Saatchi was reported in 1983 to have
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had an annual turnover of some £3 million, which invites the speculation that his 
purchasing activities may well have included some selling also/"*  ^ Although not strictly 
speaking an art dealer, his approach to art collecting was little different from a dealer’s: 
he did not buy to keep but also to sell. He not only bought in bulk, but sold in bulk also. 
It is inevitable that a businessman of his experience was not going to sell at a loss, and 
it can therefore be assumed that some profits must have come his way following his 
initial purchases. Some at least of tliese were the direct result of insider information. 
In any event, his company is reported to have made at least £15 million profit in selling 
art.'""
The case of Charles Saatchi and the issue of insider advantage have, of course, a wider 
context in that during tlie ’80s his brother Maurice was, and indeed still is, on the board 
of the V & A. A more cautious man than he might have refrained from mixing business 
with such an appointment in order to avoid any charge of conflict of interest, but Saatchi 
and Saatchi, the company which he chaired, was also responsible for running the 
advertising campaign "Ace Cafe" for the V & A.
The Saatchi brothers provide an excellent illustration of the interchangeability of various 
forms of capital and of the resultant problems of concentrated power facilitated, if not 
actually encouraged, by the Conservative Government. Not only was Saatchi & Saatchi 
the world’s biggest advertising agency in the mid ’80s, but also, and closer to home, it 
was they who ran Margaret Thatcher’s election campaigns, thus giving them a powerful 
base for political power. Their connections with the Thatcher Government won their 
company various accounts for public bodies as well as arts institutions, thus allowing 
them to transform their recently won political power back to serve their own economic 
interests. On a personal level, the powerful positions they occupied within public 
institutions further consolidated and extended the two brothers’ power and ambition from 
the economic into the cultural domain. The fact that Charles, and probably also Maurice, 
Saatchi benefited economically from their public offices exemplifies the process of 
transformation of cultural capital into economic capital.
Art, the business world, and politics have entered into an obscure symbiotic relationship
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in which the unelected and the nominated join forces with those entrusted to manage 
public institutions and those elected to govern. Using their many different power bases, 
people like the Saatchis are in a privileged position to transform part of their economic 
capital into cultural capital, which they do, for example, when their personal fortunes and 
influence allow them access to trusteeships of art galleries and museums. This cultural 
capital tliey then transfer back into economic capital by using art as a commodity. What 
makes this circle a vicious one is that it functions free of public scrutiny even though it 
operates through public institutions. Personal fortunes are created, sustained and 
increased by a small number of self-selecting individuals purporting to be acting out of 
selfless public service motives, and endowed witli the enviable gift of being able to turn 
Nelson’s eye to any trace of conflict of interest looming on the horizon.
The existence of interlocking family relationships of the type illustrated by the Saatchi 
brothers and the de Bottons is one of the features that the British trustee system has come 
to share with its American counterpart. But whereas in the latter it is an open secret that 
trusteeships can be, to all intents and purposes, bought, in Britain exploitation of personal 
wealth takes a less blatant, some might say a more hypocritical, form when it comes to 
gaining admittance to the powerful inner circles of trusteeship. A glance at the 
acknowledgements list in the Tate Gallery exhibition catalogues reveals an implicit 
additional qualification for membership, namely the status of benefactor or donor which 
is applied to individual trustee’s n a m e s . B e h i n d  these philanthropic sounding terms 
lurks the fact that some trustees earn their place, so to speak, by virtue of their personally 
supplementing the income that the Gallery continues to derive from the public purse.
It is at this juncture that one may recall what Alan Bowness had to say about the nature 
of American trusteeships and the gap between them and their British equivalents:
At one museum of modern art in California a sufficiently large donation 
guarantees a place on the board. At least we haven’t reached that stage.
Behind the veil of enterprise culture and the rhetoric of public interest, the Thatcher 
government succeeded not only closing this gap, but in taking steps to legitimise and
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protect the interests of the business élite. Rather than broadening representation in the 
public interest as befits a public institution, it acts to channel ostensibly private capital 
into public institutions, a political process which contributes actively to concentrating 
more and more power into smaller and smaller groups of people. It is in the nature of 
this process that it should shape the contours of an originally legitimate public debate: 
while the fact remains that a substantial part of these "private donations" is indirect public 
subsidy raised through tax mechanisms (as we have seen in the previous chapters), the 
Gallery can now confidently deny any public accountability in the name of protecting the 
"private" confidentiality of the individual donors. When asked what the levels of donation 
were which differentiated the status of benefactor from that of donor, the Gallery replied 
that it felt under no obligation to answer such enquiries from the public.
Although under the Thatcher government British trustees moved closer and closer to the 
American model, institutions such as the Tate have remained very much in the public 
domain, with the result that developments here have been more cautious. Standards in 
public life have, in the meantime, become an issue, and under the influence of the Nolan 
Committee of Enquiry, codes of best practice are being drawn up in which certain basic 
ground rules are set out. In the code issued in early 1996 by the Board of Trustees of 
the National Galleries of Scotland, for example, individual board members are reminded 
explicitly of their responsibilities and it is clearly stated that "they should not use 
information gained in the course of tlieir public service for personal gain, nor seek to use 
the opportunity of public service to promote their private interests. In view of the 
past activities of certain trustees of the Tate and the Whitechapel, for instance, this may 
look very much like a case of closing the stable door once the horse has bolted. 
"Trusting the trustees" has not in the recent past proved to be a very successful way of 
ensuring accountability and safeguarding the public interest/^° so one can only look 
forward with hope to the new era of openness and honesty by which Lord Nolan is so 
optimistically attempting to replace the discredited deregulation frenzy of the Thatcher 
decade.
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4.2 Sponsorship of Art Exhibitions
The worthy cause o f the museum purifies tainted money.
— Joseph V. Noble, director emeritus of the Museum of New York^^^
Had he any reservations about taking tobacco money ? He laughed. ‘Ab-so-lute-ly none 
what-so-ever, ’ he said, stressing every syllable.
— Luke Rittner, interviewed by Peter Taylor 
I  will take money for the arts, sir, be it from murderers, rapists or anybody.
— Sir Kenneth Robinson, interviewed by Peter Taylor 153
Corporate sponsorship of art exhibitions seems to have been with us so long that we 
almost take it for granted and tolerate it as a necessary evil in order to ensure the 
continued wellbeing of art museums. But, as we mentioned earlier, although sponsorship 
has been part of the American cultural scene for some time, it is a comparatively recent 
phenomenon in Britain. All the same, by the end of the 1980s, whether in Britain or 
America, art museums had become just another public relations outpost for corporations, 
and this development reached its crescendo in the 1990s. The corporate takeover of what 
Herbert Schiller referred to as sites of public expression was certainly not achieved 
without resistance from both inside and outside m u s e u m s , a n d  this was particularly 
noticeable in Britain where government at various levels had been in the habit of 
providing substantial support for museums and art galleries throughout the country. The 
opposition was, however, ineffectual when faced with the power and influence of 
multinationals, continually enhanced by the free-market policies of the Reagan and 
Thatcher administrations. The transformation of art museums in the ’80s from purveyors 
of a particular élite culture to fun palaces for an ever-increasing number of middle-class 
arts consumers has thus to be seen within the dual perspective of government policies and 
business initiatives, with museums being the sites of these convergent forces. Although 
public policies on the issues in question during the Reagan and Thatcher years have 
already been discussed in the previous chapter, it bears repeating that the relation between 
public policy and business sponsorship in Britain is so intimately related that Colin
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Tweedy, director of the ABSA, went so far to suggest that the sponsorship phenomenon 
was "one of the Thatcher cornerstones.
But why are companies or corporate executives attracted to arts sponsorship business in 
the first place? Notwithstanding all the endeavours to foster private support for the arts 
under the Reagan and Thatcher regimes, corporations were doing much more than simply 
responding to government pressures. It is more a question of the unashamedly pro­
business ambience created by both governments significantly facilitating companies in 
their efforts to push forward tlieir agendas. At an ideological level, business has always 
perceived any government regulation as a potential threat to the free market system of 
capitalism, without which it would not be able to pursue its goal of limitless profit and 
financial domination. As the previous chapter reveals, closely following the inception 
of the NBA by the US federal government in 1965, the business community had to step 
in with an arts support system of its own, the Business Committee for the Arts, set up 
in 1967. Like other business associations such as the Business Roundtable in America, 
the BCA assumed, and has maintained, the undisputed role as the principal spokesman 
for business view on arts issues. They defend and champion their arts intervention 
through regular publications of the speeches of top corporate executives. Here is part of 
one of them by Winton Blount, the chief executive officer (CEO) of Blount Inc. and a 
former chairman of the BCA, at its annual meeting in 1984:
... That environment [of freedom] is being persistently eroded everywhere by ill- 
advised and ill-conceived regulation, taxation, and other forms of government 
control.
So we are engaged in an important work in furthering the arts. We are not 
merely meeting a civic obligation which we can accept or reject as we wish. We 
are helping to keep open those avenues of freedom along which art and commerce 
both travel.
But freedom of artistic expression, in which an individual asserts his or her right to 
advance their art at a personal level, is of an entirely different order from the freedom 
that businesses with vast amount of private capital have to pursue wealth and power 
unchecked within the whole of society. By taking on the persona of a passionate
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champion of liberty and by misleadingly equating creative freedom with free enterprise, 
Blount, far from being an advocate for the arts, is in fact defending American capitalism.
The significance of this offensive can only be fully understood against the background of 
an even larger corporate strategy; that is, to quote Willard C. Butcher, successor to 
David Rockefeller as president and chief executive of Chase Manhattan Bank, to take a 
"visible role in communicating the private enterprise perspective on a variety of critical 
public issues. During the 1980s, it was not only business executives who make 
concerted efforts to speak out through media appearances, as Butcher had urged his 
fellow executives, "[to] take our message directly into American homes, to the people... 
We need nothing less than a major and sustained effort in the marketplace of ideas. 
Companies also spent millions of dollars on issue advertising, not to sell products, but 
openly to propagate company views on contemporary political and social issues. 
Although it is not possible to deal here with the various issues of corporate intervention 
in national politics, it is essential to point out tliat corporate arts sponsorship is not an 
isolated phenomenon. By sponsoring art institutions, corporations present themselves as 
sharing a humanist value system with museums and galleries, thereby concealing their 
own corporate interests.
While "playing safe" is generally perceived to be the trademark of corporate sponsorship, 
contemporary art is certainly much less safe ground than that of the old masters of earlier 
periods which, unlike contemporary art, are unlikely to generate any political and social 
controversy. Why, then, does any company take on this "risky" business at all? Even 
within the category of contemporary art, there are certain artists whose reputation is 
already firmly established in the art world. It is, however, the mythological cult of 
artistic personality and the strong association between avant-garde art and innovation 
within the paradigm of modernism that has provided the business world with a valuable 
tool for the projection of an image of itself as a liberal and progressive corporate force. 
When introducing its sponsored exhibition "When Attitudes Become Form," a survey of 
conceptual art, John Murphy, the then executive vice-president of Philip Morris Inc., 
emphasised:
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We at Philip Morris feel it is appropriate that we participate in bringing these 
works to the attention of the public, for there is a key element in this "new art" 
which has its counterpart in the business world. That element is innovation — 
without which it would be impossible for progress to be made in any segment in 
society [italic added].
By appropriating the concept of innovation, and by mediating and redefining its meaning 
in corporate terms, business seeks to present their intervention in the arts as a great and 
legitimate cause.
To venture into arts sponsorship, however, requires more than an imaginative manoeuvre. 
It is an initiative generally taken not by middle managers, but by the chairman or chief 
executive, or in the case of partnerships, the senior partners. At variance with orthodox 
management theory according to which senior management attention should increase or 
decrease in proportion to the relative scale of expenditure, top managers take a 
disproportionate interest in arts sponsorship, regardless of the small sums involved in 
relation to a company’s annual budget. For example, for a large multinational in 
London, the arts sponsorship manager has to submit any proposal worth more than 
£50,000 for the Board’s approval. A systematic analysis by Michael Useem and Stephen 
I. Kutner in 1984 of corporate contributions among companies in Massachusetts reported 
that the CEO of three-fifths of the firms still reviewed recommendations for specific 
contributions if they exceeded a minimum amount, with the minimum amount for half of 
these firms being a mere $500.^®°
The important role that senior managers, in particular the chairman and the CEO, play 
in corporate arts sponsorship is confirmed by my own survey. When it comes to 
initiating any programme, the single most pivotal figure is the chairman or CEO. A 
significant 43.5 percent of British companies and 72.7 percent of American companies 
reported to this effect (see Tables 4.5.1 and 4.5.2). Combining this figure with other 
senior managers brings the percentage of senior management involvement up to over 58.7 
percent for British companies (81.8 percent for American), compared with 36.3 percent 
of middle managers (18.2 percent for American) such as public affairs managers. 
Another similar response further confirms the validity of these findings. 58.6 percent of 
the British companies consulted consider the initiatives of the chairman and chief
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executive "very/fairly important" for the firm when deciding to undertake sponsorship, 
compared with 21.1 percent who deem them "fairly/very unimportant." The American 
respondents provide an even more sharply contrasted percentage, 80.0 percent (important) 
compared with 4.4 percent (unimportant) (see Tables 4.6.1. and 4.6.2).
Senior managers certainly do not simply initiate an arts sponsorship programme within 
the companies that-they oversee. They look after it as well. 68.9 percent of British 
respondents reported that the chairman/chief executive/senior managers are involved in 
decision-making in one way or another (see Table 4.7.2). While 47 firms reported that 
top executives make arts sponsorship decisions on their own, only 31 firms leave the 
decision to the public relations staff, with 40.4 percent reporting a combined decision 
with chairman or chief executive involvement (see Table 4.7.2A). American companies 
reported an even sharper contrast between 52.8 percent for senior management and 28.3 
percent for the public relations department (see Table 4.7.1). Within the report for joint 
decision making, the CEO and chairman are involved in 49.1 percent of firms, compared 
with their non-involvement in 5.7 percent of the firms (see Table 4.7. lA).
These figures show the indisputable role that senior corporate executives play in arts 
sponsorship, and indeed corporate arts intervention in general, the evidence for which we 
shall discuss again in Chapter 6. Such persons, an élite within an élite and occupying the 
uppermost echelon of corporations, are in a position of enormous power and influence. 
Despite the pressing demands of their job and outside directorships on their time, they 
also manage to serve on a bewildering list of non-profit charitable and cultural 
institutions. As we have seen in Chapter 1, these businessmen are the "cultural 
managerial capitalists" — the sort of professional managers who rise to the top of the 
corporate ladder mostly through a managerial career, and for whom involvement in the 
arts is a locus of social distinction to which their élite status and class aspirations are 
anchored.
The engagement of this corporate élite in the arts can thus be interpreted both on the 
individual and corporate levels. Despite all the media attention given to self-made 
entrepreneurs during the Thatcher and Reagan years, top corporate management was, and
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still is, dominated by an economically privileged, and thereby socially and educationally 
prominent, class in botli c o u n t r i e s B y  virtue of their social background and 
corporate location, they are participants in an intricate and complicated web of 
economical/social networks of acquaintanceship, friendship and inter-marriage, as the 
previous section of this chapter reveals. However, inherited wealth or a high status 
occupation, as Thor stein Veblen argued in the last century, does not of itself constituted 
a sufficient credential for membership of the dominant section of the class. It also 
depends upon the adoption and display of a particular set of values and life styles.
In other words, to be seen as a patron of the arts is part and parcel of a distinct style of 
life required and sanctioned within this "sophisticated" stratum of society. It is no 
surprise that the names of executives often crop up in arts sponsorship in media 
reporting. To put it bluntly, there is more than a grain of truth in Thomas Hoving’s 
cynical comment: "Art is sexy! Art is money-sexy! Art is money-sexy-social-climbing- 
fantastic!
The issues involved are, however, complicated, insofar as they touch the sensitive nerves 
of personal ego and social respectability. Accordingly, it is no easy task to approach 
them empirically. At best, I have attempted to quantify these points in terms of personal 
preference, peer pressure and informal networks when it comes to deciding which 
organisations to sponsor. 65.3 percent of American companies (53.3 percent for British) 
reported that personal preference of senior management was important, compared with 
16.3 percent (21.5 percent for British) who regard it as unimportant (see Tables 4.8.1 
and 4.8.2). This is largely consistent with the previous questions as to the rôle of senior 
managers. However, while American companies considered "appeals from directors by 
other firms" (45.6 percent) and "support by other firms" (56.3 percent) important in their 
decisions, British concerns are less pronounced in this respect (16.8 percent and 14.6 
percent respectively) (see Table 4.8.1. and 4.8.2). Given the relatively low American 
response rate, it is difficult to reach a conclusion as to whether or not this is a real 
difference, and if so, how it might be accounted for. The survey findings are therefore 
indicative; further research and refinement will be required fully to validate the results.
There is, however, at least one empirical study of the economy of corporate donation in
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the U.S., that of Joseph Galaskiewicz in relation to Minneapolis/St. Paul. His contention 
is tliat arts sponsorship serves not only to enliance corporate image, but also to create and 
sustain executives’ positions within their élite c i r c l e s . A  similar qualitative analysis 
was reported in Michael Useem’s study of the business inner circle in Britain and 
America. He gave an account of an American company abruptly entering tlie leading 
league of corporate sponsors of the visual arts:
You couldn’t get [the chief executive] to look at a picture, period. Then 
somebody persuaded him to sponsor something at the Whitney Museum, and 
suddenly everybody in his company was interested. They went to a formal 
cocktail party and dinner at this [exhibit] they had sponsored. He got very 
excited about the whole scene, being invited to the Whitney and having the 
company sponsor it. And now, the next thing, Christ, he’s calling up people 
including myself: "Say, would you host a little party of artists that are coming 
together." ... It’s catapulted him as a person into an interest in the arts.i*^
Even if the conversion was precipitate, tlie essence of the episode is unambiguous. The 
chief executive in question, on a personal level, had reaped, so to speak, "the glory of 
the sponsorship," and did not hesitate to marshal his corporate connections to solicit 
funds. It is this social networking that prompted Americans to coin the term 
"incorporated pocketbook," an expression that eloquently testifies to the pervasiveness 
of the phenomenon.
A similar tendency can be discerned among the corporate sponsors of the Whitechapel 
Art Gallery in London, although the British might very well find the parallel distasteful. 
When Stuart Lip ton, chairman of the Stanhope Properties and the millionaire developer 
of the Broadgate development in the City, was its chairman, some 30-40 percent of the 
Gallery’s sponsors were in one way or another related to the property sector or to the 
construction industry. When questioned, one or two of the companies even explicitly 
admitted that its membership was directly related to Lipton’s business.
It is at this juncture of our analysis that we may confidently recall the theory of "cultural
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capital" as developed by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu.^^* By participating in 
arts sponsorship, these corporate élites are utilising their corporate location to advance 
their personal interest and social status. Slightly modifying Bourdieu’s theory, one could 
argue, with equal persuasion, that tliese business elites are in fact transforming the 
economical capital of the corporations that they oversee into cultural capital for their own 
personal purposes, at the same time as acting in the corporate interest. We shall return 
to this topic in more detail in Chapter 6 when it will be seen that the relation between 
corporate élites and corporate art collections is even more pronounced. It is sufficient, 
for our present purposes, to point out, following Paul DiMaggio’s elaboration of 
Bourdieu’s concept, that cultural capital can in turn be transformed into the social capital 
of acquaintances and connections, and that this in turn can be put to use for the 
accumulation of economical c a p i t a l . I t  is the fluidity and flexibility of private capital 
that has made the confluence of its variants conceptually conceivable and in reality 
attainable in the very locale of these top businessmen. The interchangeability of these 
different forms of capital is likewise intelligible on the corporate level, something which 
will become evident over the course of the following discussion.
If the essence of the top executives’ involvement in arts sponsorship requires further 
refinement, the importance of arts sponsorship functioning as a public relations tool does 
not. Indeed, it used to be an open secret, but now it is openly discussed on both sides 
of the Atlantic. The true nature of this marketing exercise can best be seen in the 
relevant tax concessions granted in both countries. While tax advantages are rarely 
mentioned by American arts sponsors, it had long been a prime item on the ABSA’s 
campaign agenda for tax reforms in Britain. The difference lies partly in the fact 
that the sums involved are minuscule in relation to any company’s budget, but it is also 
because in America sponsorship is in any case already tax deductible, whether the 
sponsorship dollars (the majority of them) come from the marketing/public relations 
department, or from the so-called corporate philanthropic budget.
In Britain, however, sponsorship and patronage are differentiated for tax purposes, even 
though in the perception of the general public the two terms are sometimes used 
interchangeably. To encourage arts sponsorship and sidestep what is seen as the
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cumbersome process of qualifying for tax deductions by making instead convenanted 
payments, both the Thatcher government and the ABSA advocated a specific definition 
of sponsorship; arts sponsorship is:
a commercial undertaking, i.e. a payment by a business to an arts organisation for 
the purpose of promoting the business name, products or services. This is a 
commercial deal between the parties concerned, rather than a philanthropic 
gift;''
By contrast, patronage via the tax route of deeds of convenant is deemed a "philanthropic 
gift" or "pure" donation, however arbitrary the distinction between the two categories 
actually is. Accordingly, the bias in the tax structure is geared toward the self-interest 
of sponsors; presumably by locating sponsorship within the gamut of public relations 
campaigns, more corporate money would be fortlicoming. This is, of course, not just a 
matter of shift in corporate priority. It meant, in effect, that the Thatcher government, 
along with organisations with substantial vested interest in sponsorship such as the ABSA, 
openly defined sponsorship as a form of commercial promotion, with arts organisations 
acting as PR agencies for corporate sponsors . I roni cal ly,  only 9.7 percent of British 
respondents to my survey, compared to 39.6 percent of American companies, considered 
the tax incentives of any importance at all (see Tables 4.6.1 and 4.6.2).^"*
The primacy of public relations elements in sponsorship is also confirmed by my own 
questionnaire survey. Both British and American companies gave paramount importance 
to this aspect of sponsorship. When asked their reasons for launching arts sponsorship, 
92.7 percent of British companies (78.2 percent of American companies) considered it 
a means of improving corporate image, and 90.6 percent (78.2 percent for American) 
saw it as a public relations exercise, compared with only 35.1 percent (52.5 percent for 
American companies) who maintained that they undertook sponsorship for employee 
benefits (see Tables 4.6.1 and 4.6.2). The highest percentage by far was recorded when 
it came to measuring their perception of the success of their sponsorship as a PR 
exercise. 90.5 percent of British companies (90.0 percent for American companies) were 
satisfied that it constituted a successful and effective public relations exercise, and 97.2 
percent of British companies (88 percent for American companies) reported improved
208
corporate image, while only 52.5 percent (75.0 percent for American companies) thought 
that it successfully advanced employee benifits (see Tables 4.9.1 and 4.9.2).^^^
Essentia] to arts sponsorship is, therefore, the concept of the publicity campaign. The 
need for publicity varies according to the products or service that the companies are 
marketing, but arts sponsorship is particularly effective for those companies, such as 
petroleum, tobacco and weapons industries, whose tarnished image is in urgent need of 
polishing. In 23 national polls comparing the public profiles of various industries since 
1976 in America, for instance, the oil industry was the last in 15 of them, and ahead only 
of tobacco and chemicals in the otliers.^ "^  ^ It is therefore no coincidence that petroleum 
companies such as Exxoa and Mobil provide the largest amount of money for arts and 
culture in America, according to the Conference Bo a r d . L i k e wi s e ,  in Britain, British 
Petroleum (BP), fully privatised in 1987, is one of the biggest arts sponsors in the 
country, on a par with British Telecom. The rehanging of the Tate Gallery collection, 
of which only 20 percent was on display at any one time, has been sponsored by BP since 
1990. For an amount of some £150,000 each year, a sum which can buy only two-and-a- 
half minutes’ commercial advertising on prime-time television in 1990, the unmistakeable 
BP logo is to appear all the year round on the Gallery’s large banners outside advertising 
the New Dispalys and on the front cover of publications (fig. 4-1).^^*
This publicity machine is run even more cost-effectively in the case of the tobacco 
industries. Although it is not possible to discuss tobacco sport sponsorship in detail here, 
it is essential to understand that both forms of sponsorship are interrelated, and have to 
do with the fact that tobacco advertising is severely restricted by law.^^  ^ To get round 
these prohibitions, the tobacco industries spend many millions on arts and sports 
sponsorship each year. For sports sponsorship, where cigarette advertising is completely 
banned on television, the TV camera sends directly into people’s homes images of 
stadium hoardings plastered with brand names such as Marlboro, Silk Cut and John 
Player. The exposure is massive but the costs next to nothing, compared to actually 
placing commercials on t e l e v i s i o n . T h e  BBC, for example, is well aware of the 
dilemma which tobacco sponsorship presents. One of its executives was quoted as 
saying: "There’s no doubt we’re being used," but because of the wonders that tobacco
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sponsored sport events do for its ratings, the BBC is, in his words, "hooked.
While there is some, albeit ineffective, form of regulation for sports sponsorship, there 
are no restrictions whatsoever for arts sponsorship. For arts sponsorship, however, 
tobacco companies are not buying television coverage, but a different kind of publicity 
associated with public presitage, status, and access to the people of influence in the 
country. In America, the Philip Morris Companies, including household brands such as 
Marlboro, Benson & Hedges and Virgin Slims, are the world’s largest tobacco 
conglomerate. Holding 42 percent of the U.S. cigarette market in 1990, Philip Morris 
produced $45 billion in revenue in 1989.^*  ^ Since the 1960s the company has also 
become one of the leading specialists in capitalising on arts sponsorship, in particular the 
visual arts. It gave an estimated $15 million to arts organisations throughout the country 
in 1990.'*"
In sharp contrast to its other dubious contributions, which it would prefer to protect from 
the public gaze, the company is proud of its arts support and from time to time produces 
glossy publications to champion its high-minded achievement.'*^ To celebrate its 35 
years of arts sponsorship, for example, Philip Morris published a 130-page catalogue 
listing of each and every contribution it has made since 1958, including almost every 
artistic discipline, running alphebetically from event to event, containing virtually every 
established arts institution throughout the United States and across the globe.'*® Despite 
all the grand talk of commitment to the arts, its real motive is abundantly clear. To 
quote George Weissman, its then vice-chairman:
We are in an unpopular industry. [While] our support of the arts is not directed 
toward that [problem], it has given us a better image in the financial and general 
community than had we not done this.'*’'
This carefully crafted image of a unique corporate personality has won the company 
eulogistic comments from the media. The well-known art critic Barbara Rose paid Philip 
Morris this compliment: "One can only be grateful to a corporation farsighted enough to 
deflect PR budgets into public service rather than pouring it down the Madison Avenue 
drain."'** J. Carter Brown, director emeritus of the National Gallery of Art, also
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praises the company for providing a "bedrock of support to cultural organizations around 
the world" and for their "unwavering support" and "enlightened and far-reaching
«189Vision.
The concentrated strength of Philip Morris in arts sponsorship finds no equivalent in 
Britain, where tlie lion’s share of corporate money has gone to supporting music. Still, 
in Britain the tobacco companies remain one of the trail-blazing pioneers in this area. 
Although it is now defunct, it is worth mentioning that the Peter Stuyvesant Foundation, 
funded by Carreras Rothman, began, inter alia, to fund New Generation shows at the 
Whitechapel Gallery in tlie 1960s.^ ^® The most prominent tobacco-industry player in 
visual arts sponsorship in the ’80s was Imperial Tobacco. In 1980 Imperial launched its 
annual Portrait Award at the National Portrait Gallery under its brand name, John Player, 
significantly at a time when the company’s sales of cigarettes had dropped to 120 billion 
from a peak of over 137 billion in 1973. By incorporating the cigarette brand name into 
the award, the John Player Portrait Award achieved the brand’s maximum promotion for 
a decade. In relation to its arts sponsorship, Peter Sanguinetti, its then external affairs 
executive, explicitly emphasised, in a Sunday Times interview, that
We want the arts people we pick to work hard to give us publicity. We don’t talk 
about "giving" money on sponsorship — the recipient gets the money, we get the 
publicity.
Although it lies beyond the scope of our present study, it has to be pointed out that the 
magnitude of tobacco sponsorship in Britain was such that in the early ’80s three of 
London’s main orchestras were supported by tobacco largesse at one time, with the 
London Philharmonic being dubbed "the du Maurier Band."^®  ^ Thus, the discrepancies 
lie not in different corporate strategies, but in what is vaguely described as the "national 
tradition. " While museums in America have always been the favourite beneficiary of 
corporate money, British businessmen have preferred classical music and opera. 
According to the Conference Board, nearly 20 per cent of corporate arts support in 
America goes to museums of all kinds every year, far ahead of the 12.0 per cent given 
to music (see Table 4.10).^ '^* In Britain, the comparable figures for music, opera and
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museums are 18.9 percent, 17.76 percent, and 11.96 percent r e s p e c t i v e l y . T h e  
figures for museums, however, are not a precise guide for sponsorship given to 
contemporary art since they include museums of all different kinds. Although the 
category of "visual arts/crafts" could be significant for understanding the whole picture, 
tliere has not, to date, been any means of calculating the levels of contemporary art 
sponsorship which has taken place both within art museums and outside.
To minimise this discrepancy, I differentiate art museums from museums of other types 
in my own s u r v e y . T h e  findings are not insignificant: art museums are far more 
popular among corporate sponsors than museums of other types such as history or science 
museums. The results of my survey are largely consistent with those obtained by other 
researchers. Companies prefer sponsoring symphonies, theatres and museums rather than 
literature, dance or film/video (see Table 4.11.1) But 82.7 percent of American 
companies are more likely to sponsor art museums, compared with 68.7 percent willing 
to sponsor museums of other types. The equivalent figures for British companies are 
58.5 percent and 32.4 percent respectively (see Table 4.11.2).
The significance of these figures can only be understood in relation to other aspects of 
museum operations. While the attendance figures of museums of other types, be it in 
America or Britain, are by and large higher than those of art museums, art museum 
visitors rank higher in socio-economic terms than those visiting museums of other types. 
For example, 4,733,000 people visited the Science Museum in London in 1987, 
compared with 1,399,000 visitors for the Victoria and Albert Museum. Stat i s t i ca l ly 
speaking, despite all the claims made for the démocratisation of both the production and 
appreciation of the arts since the Second World War, art museum audiences are far more 
educated, of higher occupational status, and more affluent than visitors to other museums, 
even though arts audiences in general are already disproportionately privileged in socio­
economic terms compared to the population as a whole. For instance, 48.0 percent 
of art museum visitors had at least University education, compared with 34.4 percent of 
visitors of other museums, whereas only 13.9 percent of the population in the United 
States had similar educational qualifications in 1975 (see Table 4.12.1). A similar 
disproportion can be seen in occupation and income levels (see Tables 4.12.2 and
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4.12.3).
In these circumstances, it is the demographic features of these art museum consumers that 
largely explain why art museums are particularly appealing to corporate America and 
Britain. This is despite the fact that companies often claim that "the general public" are 
tlieir target audience, as if this public were a homogeneous group; in my survey the 
general public as a target group is ranked as high as 96.1 percent in America and 68.6 
percent in Britain (see Tables 4.13.1. and 4.13.2). Questions like this, however, tend 
to elicit a public relations type response. Accordingly, companies often advertise their 
benevolent attitude in similar terms; to take one example: "Manufacturers Hanover is 
pleased to carry on the tradition of private sponsorship of the arts for the benefit of the 
public [italic a d d e d ] . C o n s i s t e n t l y  negating the underlying socio-economic 
inequalities in arts participation, corporate rhetoric such as this serves above all to mask 
the capital interests of sponsors, and to create a false image of what is referred to as 
"corporate philanthropy."
The meaning of this public-spirited corporate face has to be understood with reference 
to other groups targeted by businesses. While American businesses focus on their 
customers (71.1 percent) and the general public (96.1 percent) — this at least is the 
impression they would like to give — British businesses clearly attach greater importance 
to opinion-formers/journalists (79.2 percent) and to senior civil servants/politicians (59.8 
percent) than their American counterparts (see Tables 4.13.1. and 4.13.2). Given the 
relatively low American response rate, it is difficult to draw any conclusion as to what 
the causes of the difference might be.^°°
The results for British companies are, however, in agreement with the interviews that I 
conducted with people in charge of arts sponsorship in this country. They can be roughly 
divided into two (not entirely mutually exclusive) groups. First, for companies whose 
products or service can make a "right" connection with the sponsored show or the 
institution, the sponsored event is a sales promotion, however well disguised it may be. 
In this instance, it is people within the ABCl groups that are directly targeted. Over the 
last ten years the imported German Beck’s Bier has been, so to speak, the "vm ordinaire"
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of the official British a v a n t - g a r d e . I t  made its début conventionally enough 
sponsoring the exhibition "German Art in the Twentieth Century" at the Royal Academy 
in 1985, at a time when its British distributor, Scottish and Newcastle Breweries (S & 
N), were about to launch a nationwide marketing offensive targeting the under-30, style­
conscious generation in an already overcrowded lager market,
Beck’s programme soon made a splash when it sponsored the retrospective of the newly- 
crowned Turner Prize winners Gilbert and George at the Hayward Gallery in 1987, with 
the brewers producing a limited edition of 2,000 bottles carrying a label designed by the 
two artists in question (fig. 4-2). The success of this "innovative art sponsorship" is 
obvious: not only did it catch media attention, but the bottle itself became a collector’s 
item, with one of them actually being admitted to the Tate Gallery’s c o l l e c t i o n . T o  
date, special edition bottles include, inter alia, labels by Tim Head, Richard Long, 
George Wyllie, Bruce McLean and the 1993 Turner Prize winner, Rachel Whiteread. 
Compared with 20,000 barrels in 1984, S & N were importing 350,000 barrels ten years 
later. This spectacular sales growth is underscored by an equally impressive sponsorship 
budget of more than £350,000 in 1994, compared with £20,000 in 1985.^°  ^ This is, 
of course, nowhere near the big league of arts sponsors such as British Telecom (£1.8 
million in 1994) or BP (£1.25 m in 1991), or even S & N ’s competitors such as 
Guinness. But the potential of its relationship with the arts is abundantly clear; as James 
Odling-Smee pointed out: "... bear in mind that Beck’s is just one beer, just one 
brand.
For companies whose products lack a direct link to exploit the sponsored event, 
association with the arts is more geared toward advertising their so-called "enlightened" 
corporate image. In this case, politicians, senior civil servants and opinion- 
formers/journalists figure among the most frequently mentioned target audience in my 
interviews. To quote from one of the top brewers in Britain:
Our target audience is very easy and very simple, and it’s probably no more than 
a thousand people. It would be the MPs ... broker analysts, relevant journalists 
... and civil servants. Again these are all people relevant to our business.
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The same company is even more specific when it comes to defining its actual criteria. 
As far as geographical location is concerned, the spokesperson specified: "We would 
tend to sponsor things within a one-mile radius of the Houses of Parliament because we 
want to reach MPs."^°* The significance of this corporate "schmoozing" cannot be 
overestimated. Even if the Conservative Government is credible in its denials that access 
to ministers can be bought, it is certain that there are ways of negotiating this sort of 
access. When attempting to dismiss charges of political lobbying, the Company Secretary 
of one manufacturing multinational in London candidly revealed their real motive:
It’s not just the City, but you want a long-term relationship with Government... 
I stress "a long-term relationship" because we certainly do not use sponsorship or 
any other external affairs activity to try and specifically influence such people 
[civil servants and politicians] because we’ve got some issue at the time, which 
it would be helpful if we changed their views about ... If you can invite to events 
the senior politicians, not necessarily just the ones in Government but the ones in 
Opposition as well, because you know, in so many years’ time they might change, 
so you can meet them socially, so they get to know you a bit more than just a 
name or a face in a formal situation. Yes, it just means [that] if some issue does 
come up, they won’t dismiss something out of hand
One is left to wonder: when is political lobbying not political lobbying? This is, in 
effect, political massaging via the back door, even if it is done in an indirect, informal 
and sophisticated way. Similarly, the public affairs manager for an unnamed brewery 
pointed out that they already knew their target audience so well that they sponsored not 
only art exhibitions, but also concerts and theatres in order to appeal to the specific 
interests of particular individuals.
After all, arts sponsorship, with its attraction of tax relief and with the British 
Government’s handout of public money to endorse it, is more than mere advertising for 
an "enlightened" corporate image. As we have discussed in Chapter 2, ultimately, the 
significance of this corporate intervention has to be understood in political terms. By 
virtue of their being within the public sector or, in the case of American museums, in the 
domain of public prestige and authority, art museums have such a privileged position that 
association with them is a conspicuous signal of social prestige and power. This is
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further reinforced by the claim, widely made in the name of "art for art’s sake" in 
bourgeois culture, that art, by its very nature, is above the sordid world of politics and 
commerce; in the words of a senior officer in one prominent museum in New York: "We 
are non-political. Precisely because the ambience of art museums ostensibly 
absolves them from participating ideologically in the political process, they paradoxically 
provide the most discreet of venues where top politicians or government officials are 
invited to rub shoulders with equally prominent business leaders.
What we lack, however, is a precise mechanism to map out the informal transactions that 
take place among these people, and to investigate the ways in which the power of 
corporate capital is transferred into political action. To some, this is an "unquantified 
field. As the previously quoted company secretary put it: "I’m sure it works as long 
as you do it over a long period of time; for the sort of audience we are talking about, it 
gets to be a long, slow, quiet process. For others, on the other hand, the success 
of sponsorship can be measured in hard statistical terms. Quantification has been 
particularly popular among corporate sponsors since the late ’80s, at least in Britain, 
where many companies have utilised market research methods to assess the effectiveness 
of their sponsorship. For instance, BP carried out a series of surveys on their 
sponsorship in the early ’90s, where the awareness of opinion-formers (referred to as 
"people in pretty senior positions," not just the "broad-brush ‘ABCl’") was 
m o n i t o r e d . Wh a t  this shows is that, unlike sponsors in the earlier decades who were 
occasionally thought of as "cash cows," ’80s style sponsorship is definitely an aggressive 
marketing tool, in which value for money is clearly judged on the returns to corporate 
capital.
To gauge the influence that corporate capital has on the practice of contemporary art, we 
must now turn to examine specifically art museums. This is not to say that contemporary 
art exists only inside art museums and galleries, but rather that their institutional structure 
provides the most visible site for any attempt at corporate influence or takeover. First 
of all, art museums in the late twentieth century seem increasingly to have taken the place 
of churches, insofar as they have become, to all intents and purposes, secular shrines. 
They are one of the most visible "public" institutions in America, and, to a lesser extent
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in Britain, a mainstay of civic pride for each city. The very people who serve on their 
boards of trustees or donate their art works are invariably those people of power and 
influence with whom corporations are eager to communicate.
Furthermore, as we have alread seen, affluent museum visitors definitely constitute a 
niche market of substantial purchasing power for business to capture. As one of the 
visual arts sponsors pointed out, sponsoring art exhibitions with carefully vetted invitation 
lists is more practical than sponsoring, say, the performing arts; exhibitions, with their 
attendant Champagne and canapés, provide an unrivalled context for sponsors to entertain 
their clients and to communicate with them. This is especially so in Britain, where 
corporate hospitality has been reported to be very important in both my surveys and in 
the interviews I have conducted. In addition, it has been standard practice since the late 
’80s for the benevolence of the sponsor to be permanently documented in the chairman’s 
statement in exhibition catalogues, and widely distributed thereafter.
Nowhere is the transformed role that art museums came to play in the 1980s more clearly 
visible than in the immense popularity of "blockbuster" exhibitions. According to 
Victoria Alexander, who studied the impact of public and corporate funding on art 
museums in America, the most significant effect of the shift in funding from public to 
corporate is tlie new emphasis being placed on "blockbuster shows. Ironically 
captured in the metaphor of the "blockbuster, this kind of exhibition, designed to 
attract the largest number of people possible to the museum, has become a kind of 
yardstick whereby to judge the success, or otherwise, of the museum. As J Carter 
Brown, director emeritus of the National Gallery of Art in Washington D.C. put it: 
"because it got into the corporate mentality that there’s no point in spending money on 
a show unless you can guarantee that it’s going to be another Tut."^^®
The popularity of blockbuster exhibitions, however, signified a more profound change 
in museum operations brought about by corporate capital in the 1980s, namely its over­
expansion. The extent to which this also had its origins in a conscious policy on the part 
of the institution within the museum is a complicated question that lies beyond the scope 
of this study. But, as we have discussed in Chapter 2, the most important link between
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the world of art and that of commerce is the art bureaucrat who occupies the most senior 
position in the museum. Museum expansion policy is thus closely bound up with tlie 
ambition of the director. In this respect, the directorship of Thomas Moving at the 
Metropolitan Museum from 1966 to 1977 gives a foretaste of the ethos that would come 
to dominate the art world of the ’80s. With a "big business background" as well as a 
training in medieval art,^^  ^ Moving deliberately ventured into costly undertakings — 
new wings, blockbuster exhibitions and expensive acquisitions, thus forcing the museum 
into a desperate search for new sources of income. Moving’s regime at the Met 
successfully transformed the traditional operation of the art museum as a warehouse of 
art artifacts into that of an entrepreneurial undertaking by marketing the Met as a 
magnificent mansion providing a never-ending feast of blockbuster shows. In short, as 
the conservative critic Milton Kramer put it. Moving made "the Museum bigger in almost 
every respect," on a scale that can only be described as " i m p e r i a l . A r g u a b l y  the 
most influential museum in the United States, the Met consequently left a far-reaching 
and lasting imprint on art museums elsewhere.
The Moving equivalent of showmanship in the 1980s would be Tom Armstrong of the 
Whitney Museum of American Art. When he became the museum director in 1974, 
Armstrong claimed that the Whitney could no longer afford to mount major exhibitions 
without corporate or government funding, despite the fact that, until Marcia Tucker was 
dismissed in 1976, none of her exhibitions actually had outside f u n d i n g . T h e  17-year 
directorship of Armstrong at the Whitney hence witnessed, inter alia, a succession of 
blockbuster exhibitions, of which the earliest was the Jasper Johns in 1977.^^° Within 
one decade, attendance figures at the museum more than doubled from 231,654 in 1974- 
75 to 532,333 in 1983-84.
It was the same Armstrong who, with breathtaking audacity, was responsible for opening 
four Whitney branches at the headquarters of multinationals in the ’80s, with the result 
that the Museum was dubbed "the McDonald’s of the museum world" (a subject to which 
we shall return in the next chapter). This brand of maverick commercialism became even 
more obvious with the appointment of Margery Rubin Cohen as the museum’s public 
relations officer in 1988, with her "extensive background in marketing and publicity for
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the fashion and cosmetics industries," including being the marketing director of tlie 
exclusive department store Bloomingdales’s.^ ^^  The cult of limitless expansion with 
escalating costs forced the Whitney, and American art museums in general, to rely more 
and more on corporate money, and on commercial marketing and promotion skills to 
generate income and draw under their roofs the ever-increasing crowds which are 
presumed to befit grand art institutions.^-^
In Thatcherite Britain there emerged a new breed of museum director, what Antony 
Thorncroft referred to as "scholarly business managers. They include Neil Cossons 
at the Science Museum with a background of running a commercial museum (Ironbridge), 
Elizabeth Esteve-Coll at the Victoria and Albert Museum, who was seen as a particularly 
efficient administrator, and, specially important for our purposes, Nick Serota at the Tate 
Gallery, They are, like their American counterparts, entrepreneurial, if somewhat less 
ruthless. This is not to say that they are necessarily Thatcherite in a political sense, but 
they are nonetheless ready to market the institution in their care aggressively and 
efficiently. Belated as it was, the change at the Tate Gallery, with Serota replacing Sir 
Alan Bowness in 1988, was clearly a sign of the times. It was perhaps no surprise that 
the tenure of Bowness at the Tate should have been cut s h o r t . A l t h o u g h  he played 
his part in courting sponsors, Bowness openly declared that "to think the American 
system is the panacea" was "sheer nonsense." "My colleagues in the United States often 
envied me — even in these straitened times," says Bowness. "/ believe in state funding. 
I don’t think it’s possible — I don’t think it’s desirable, for the arts to be left to the 
private sector [italic a d d e d ] . T h i s  is hardly something that Number Ten would be 
prepared to countenance.
While Bowness’s Tate, which Lord Gowrie once described as "a bit of a maiden aunt," 
was not being seen as "a hit," Serota’s task at the Tate was to make it "the biggest art 
fun-palace in Europe. Prior to becoming director of the Tate, Serota was director 
of the Whitechapel Art Gallery from 1976 to 1988. Young and enthusiastic, Serota is 
known as an adventurous exhibition-organiser. For example, the "New Spirit In 
Painting" extravaganza which he co-organised at the Royal Academy was acclaimed as 
"the seminal art show of the Eighties. But equally impressive was his skill in
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establishing a portfolio of corporate sponsors when he was director at Whitechapel. 
Serota was quoted as complaining in 1980 that "the amount of my time spent on fund­
raising certainly affects the quality of our exhibitions, because I can spend far less time 
on the actual show, on ideas, on artists. One works very hard fo r  peanuts ... [italic 
added]," but by the time he left Whitechapel, he had already acquired substantial 
corporate money from a list of over 80 c o m p a n i e s . I n  particular his track record of 
fund-raising and political manoeuvring was brilliantly demonstrated in his negotiating of 
the Whitechapel’s £2.2 million renovation in 1985, with one of the senior managers 
whom 1 interviewed remembering him fondly as "quiet and patient."
Although Serota’s Tate in the 1990s does not, strictly speaking, fall into the time frame 
of this study, it is revealing in this context precisely because it elucidates how far 
corporate capital, along with its particular brand of commercialism, have affected British 
art galleries. Interviewed just after he arrived at the Tate, Serota indicated his fear that 
the primary museum activities of scholarship, conservation, and education, as well as 
"academic shows," might be "squeezed out" in circumstances of cash crisis. 
Occasional blockbusters, on the other hand, are regarded as essential insofar as they 
generate high income.
The new vision of the Tate thus produced a series of big art shows, each bigger than the 
previous one: John Constable in 1991 (169,412 visitors), Piccaso: Sculptor/Painter in 
1994 (313,659 visitors) and the recent Cézanne extravaganza (408,688 v i s i t o r s ) . N o t  
only was the ticket to the Cezanne’s exhibition the "hottest" in town, with its ticket 
agency taking some 5,250 bookings a day (at a cost of £8.60);^^^ but the Tate also 
mounted an extensive merchandising campaign, with its shop stocking everything from 
vases, tea towels, CD ROMs to £45 Cézanne scarves, not forgetting the ‘Cézannewich’ 
offered at the London branches of Prêt à Manger and a specially bottled ‘Cuvée Cézanne 
at the Tate’ wine.^^  ^ Back in 1989, it was Serota also who was quoted as saying: "1 
don’t want the Tate to be a shopping mall. But if people want to buy something, they 
should be able to [italic added].
Nowhere is the "expansionist" ambition of the Gallery more clearly shown than in the
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grand scheme of tlie Tate Gallery of Modern Art, scheduled to open in the year 2000 at 
the disused Bankside Power Station south of the Thames River. To realise the estimated 
£106 million plan, the Tate launched a mammoth fund-raising campaign with a target of 
£56 million to match the £50 million already awarded by the Millennium 
Commission.^^"  ^ According to Antony Thorncroft, the Financial Times's correspondent, 
for around £10m, benefactors of the new Tate can buy "immortality" by having galleries 
named after them.^^^
In this ambitious enterprise, Serota was backed by an equally impressive team of 
professional fund raisers. While there was no Development Office at the Tate in the 
1980s, soon after Serota took over the directorship, one was established with six staff in 
1990, "development" being the vague but impressive sounding term for such transatlantic 
notions as fundraising and networking. The Office is so well organised as to be able to 
cover virtually every conceivable aspect of private sector funding, such as the Charitable 
Giving Programme, the Corporate Sponsorship Programme, the Events Section and the 
Friends of the Tate G a l l e r y . B y  1991 a specific post for Corporate Sponsorship 
Manager was in place, concomitant with the launching of a Corporate Membership 
Programme. To date, with the planned new Tate in process, the Development Office has 
an army of some 26 staff members, far outnumbering those at the incomparably larger 
Metropolitan Museum and closer perhaps to the Museum of Modern Art in New 
York.^ ^^
For our specific purposes, the Corporate Membership Programme offers a glimpse of the 
quintessential Thatcherite mentality. Imitating similar American schemes before it, the 
Programme offers its corporate members conventional benefits such as private views or 
tours for employees and the hire of the gallery space for corporate entertainment.^^* 
While American museums generally have a broad-church approach to their corporate 
membership (and much lower subscription fees), the Tate plays the exclusivity card by 
raising its subscription to £10,000 per year for Associate Members and £25,000 for 
Partner status, and, above all, by limiting its memberships to under 50.^ ^® The reason 
why the Gallery is able effectively to market itself is because it is at the top of the 
pecking order of contemporary public art galleries in Britain, and as such functions as
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a branch of the state, enjoying an artistic aura of authority and acceptability in the public 
consciousness. This is why Antony Thorncroft remarked: "Companies feel safe at the 
T ate ."^
The meaning of this exclusive membership restriction (and the Tate is probably the only 
gallery in the Western world to have it) may not be immediately clear, not least because 
it is ultimately in contradiction witli its professed claim to raise as much money as it can. 
Certainly, its intention is not to price the Galllery completely out of market, but rather 
to price itself into a specific niche market. As the Tate spokesperson put it, the 
membership "allows them [corporate members] to ‘belong’ to an exclusive 'club' which 
primarily gives them the exclusive opportunity to entertain in the Gallery [italic 
a d d e d ] . R e s t r i c t e d  access is thus designed to ensure that the Gallery can "deliver 
real and exclusive benefits." As Cross puts it: "there are only so many entertaining 
opportunities available in the year!"^ *^^
The operative word is "exclusive." But exclusive from whom, and for whom? Although 
"employee benefits" is one of the categories listed among the benefits of membership, 
most of the exclusive access and services are reserved for a very small number of people, 
with some benefits being exclusively earmarked for the Chairman and the Chief Executive 
and a guest of their choice, such as attending the annual Tate Gallery Foundation 
Reception, the Annual Partners Dinner, and the most sought-after event of the 
contemporary art calendar, the Turner Prize Dinner, to name but a few. Restricted 
corporate membership is thus intended to make the Tate another powerful high-society 
club — The Club par excellence of the British art w o r l d . T h i s  is inevitably so 
because the people who hold the key to the corporate coffers are the most prominent 
businessmen.
In exchange for corporate money, art museums in America and Britain have, therefore, 
become high-class venues for corporate sponsors to host dinner parties, and in America 
sometimes even extravagant wedding parties for the offsprings of wealthy businessmen 
to entertain their highly select guests. For example, one of the benefits of striking a deal 
of a quarter of a million pounds with the Tate Gallery, as the sponsorship manager of a
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High Street British Bank remarked, is to have "a real top class corporate entertainment 
opportunity where you can have hundreds of people on an evening [italic added]. 
The guests of honour at a private dinner party are, of course, the ruling élite in society, 
according to the same source, including the chairmen of the top 200 companies, major 
investment clients of the bank. Government ministers and Members of Parliament. More 
specifically, in exchange for £500,000 from the accountants, Ernst & Young, for the 
Cézanne blockbuster, the Tate hosted more \h2Ji forty evening receptions for the purposes 
of entertaining its clients and potential clients, which, along with other sponsorship 
promotions, reportedly cost the accountants another £500,000.
Likewise, Frank Saunders, the vice president of Philip Morris, admitted, in a conference 
on business and the arts, that one of the benefits of sponsoring exhibitions was that ”[i]f 
we have an opening in Washington, for example, we go to the White House, we will 
have the leaders of Congress to a black-tie opening. It is ironical to recall the 
words of Thomas M. Messer, the former director of Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum 
in New York, in 1980: "We would never rent out the museum [italic added].
Like the public art agencies discussed in the previous chapter, the "PR-ization of art 
museums" by corporate capital is clearly articulated in the language they now speak. 
The Metropolitan Museum in its brochure to lure corporate sponsorship tells it all: 
"Many public relations opportunities are available through the sponsorship of programs, 
special exhibitions and services. These can often provide a creative and cost effective 
answer to a specific marketing objective, particularly where international, governmental 
or consumer relations may be a fundamental concern. The Tate markets itself in 
a similar indirect and low-key fashion:
The Tate Gallery’s central location, on the Thames close to Westminster, makes 
it especially attractive to businesses located in London, or seeking a central 
London venue in which to entertain ... The Tate Gallery’s fine building offer a 
range of unique settings in which to entertain clients, shareholders and other 
business guests. These facilities are available exclusively to corporate members 
and current sponsors; the Tate Gallery does not hire its buildings to other 
commercial organisations [italic added].
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The meaning of the subtle appeal of "close to Westminster" lies, as mentioned earlier, 
in the importance that corporate sponsors attach to the specific geographical location (that 
is, within the easy reach for MPs). In other words, like other restaurants equipped with 
division bells which MPs and politicians patronise around Westminster, the Tate urges 
its potential sponsor to take advantages of this locational a d v a n t a g e . I n  a recent 
publication, the Tate even boasts that it has "a reputation for developing imaginative 
fund-raising initiatives," and that it works "closely with sponsors to ensure that their 
business interests are well served [italic added].
The mercenary mentality, of course, is not only compartmentalised within the 
Development Office; it moves by osmosis into other aspects of the museum operations. 
For instance, at a conference on its purchase policy, ironically captured in the title "New 
Directions for a National Collection [italic added]," Jeremy Lewison, deputy keeper of 
Modern Collection at the Gallery, not only referred to art dealers as "allies" ("We 
collaborate with the dealers"), but also remarked: "You can look for packages — buy two 
works and receive one as a gift, for example. " It is difficult not to see this as a variation 
on the theme of the well-tried supermarket gimmick "Buy any two and get the third 
free."^^  ^ To the extent that identity is based in the structure of language, the mercenary 
transformation of the Tate, and art museums in general, cannot be more spectacularly 
expressed. How, then, is the Tate to prove that it is still a public gallery, belonging to 
the whole nation, and not simply an agent for big business bent on advancing its capital 
interests?
But, flooding the grand halls of art museums with PR budgets does not bring about any 
chemical change in the nature of public relations functions. The struggle over the media 
credit of sponsorship, especially in Britain, amply proves the point, with those on the 
sponsors’ side coming perilously close to blackmail. Because public relations is the 
primary goal for sponsors, to have their names credited in the press is of paramount 
importance. However, the media, the BBC and the so-called "quality papers" in 
particular, which have long seen themselves as the custodians of "good taste" in British 
culture, have resisted naming sponsors in editorial columns; to do so is to give business 
sponsors, so to speak, free advertising, and to run the risk of making newspapers
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" advertis ing broadsheets «254
It is no surprise that the ABSA has fought a consistent battle on this issue over tlie last 
15 years, and, from time to time proudly announces "success at last."^^^ More 
surprisingly, both arts ministers and the Arts Council join forces to "cook up" ways and 
means for sponsors. In the early ’80s, through the personal intervention of Norman St 
John-Steyas, the then arts minister, the BBC made the concession of announcing the 
sponsors’ names on broadcasts of concerts and o p e r a s . A c c o r d i n g  to Waldemar 
Janusczak, the Guardian's arts correspondent, the Arts Council was becoming 
"increasingly aggressive in demanding the complicity of critics," by distributing special 
notices informing tliem, at the Renoir exhibition held at the Hayward Gallery in 1985, 
that "they were expected to thank the sponsors in their copy [italic added]. No one 
could miss the irony that in the early ’80s, the Arts Council had been complaining 
seriously about the arts bodies it subsidised, maintaining that companies obtained 
unjustified publicity, whereas it was, and still is, the primary supporter of the arts in 
B r i t a i n . T h e  shift, of course, was due to the fact that, whatever reservations one 
may have about his Council tenure, Roy Shaw was in charge of the Arts Council in the 
early ’80s, whereas since 1983 the Council was in the hands of Luke Rittner, the 
sponsorship-broker-turned-Secretary-General.
Taking offense at the "lack of co-operation" by some arts journalists, the sponsors 
threatened to withdraw their support. "If those writers in newspapers purporting to 
support the arts cannot come to terms with nourishing new arts sponsorship through valid 
editorial references," says Brian Angel, one of the sponsors’ supporters, "they should not 
be surprised if such sponsors go back to the football terraces, and Britain’s arts projects 
become even more penurious.
Penurious or not, arts organisations, be it in America or Britain, have adopted the same 
tactic of promoting the causes of their sponsors and monitoring the "mileage" obtained 
in the press. One of the development officers in a prominent New York museum 
revealed that there was resistance from journalists, but that they "lobb[ied] hard for it," 
which, in effect, means "We call them all the time. All our press officers will talk to
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the journalists and say please remember that such and such companies sponsor the 
exhibition. A similar view was expressed by a development officer in a London art 
gallery:
We monitor it [press coverage]. We send sponsors every bit of the press ... We 
work very hard; I spend a lot of time on telephone to critics and art editors that 
I know are covering the show. On the whole, as long as I get through to them, 
they do it; sometimes it’s a bit of an argument we have on the telephone, each 
time ... And until recently the newspapers took the line that, you know, if BP 
wants to have their names on our newspapers, they can buy an advert. We have 
to persuade the journalists and editors,... if the newspapers don’t help us to 
provide the kind of benefit which is available potentially to the sponsors, then 
they are not helping us in gaining sponsorship, and they are not helping to ensure 
that art activities continue in the way they can.^^^
The development officer commented on one or two journalists who said "absolutely no" 
to her: "they’re just stubborn about it, because that doesn’t do them any harm to put the 
name of the sponsor at the end of the review at all." If some journalists or art critics 
tried to take a firm stand against corporate power, after the decades of concerted joint 
action by business sponsors, arts administrators and governments dedicated to market 
principles, such opposition is being voiced less and less.
What has made corporate power so menacing, however, is the fact that, even if they 
cannot succeed in the battleground of print media, they certainly can buy their way 
through one means or another. Built-in to sponsorship money to art museums is, 
therefore, an equally large promotional budget to publicise art exhibitions, a development 
which is even more pronounced in the ’90s Britain. For an annual arts budget of £1.8 
million in 1995, for example, the BT spent another £800,000 in back-up costs, or as 
mentioned earlier, Ernst & Young spent an equal amount of £500,000 on its sponsorship 
and promotion/entertainment of the Cézanne exhibition at the Tate.^^^ By offering the 
"impoverished" art museum a gift of publicity which it otherwise cannot afford, sponsors 
utilise the opportunity to trumpet their generosity and high-minded "corporate 
citizenship." As a result, they maintain control over both the promotional dollars and 
eventual outcome because, as the United Technologies Corporation, the arms 
manufacturer, declared: they wanted "to be guaranteed that the final products have a
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unified look and meet their standard of quality. "263
But more menacing still is the metamorphosis in identity that arts organisations have 
undergone, partly as their sponsors’ imperative, inter alia, to gain access to the editorial 
pages of "quality" papers has intensified. By incorporating the sponsor’s name into the 
title of the event or organisation it sponsors, thereby making them inseparable, the 
sponsors are certain tliat maximum publicity will be given to them. In the ’80s, this kind 
of "title sponsorship," even though popular, was largely confined to events such as BT 
New Contemporaries or Barclays Young Artist Awards. In the ’90s the aggressive 
corporation tentacles have further extended into the very heart of the institutions 
themselves. With its huge £1.8 million arts budget (not forgetting, however, that this 
equals a mere 5 hours of BT profits, at a rate of £100 a second), BT now demands its 
name be incorporated into any sponsorship deal. So now we do not have a "Scottish 
Ensemble," but a "BT Scottish Ensemble." Rodger Broad, the company’s head of 
sponsorship and advertising, was reported as saying that arts organisations have never 
objected to this contractual obligation.
In the field of visual arts, the most notorious title sponsorship deal has been that between 
the Institute of Contemporary Art (ICA) and Toshiba Information Systems since April 
1994. Although it is not exactly called "Toshiba ICA," but more discreetly, 
"ICA/Toshiba," with the added phrase "sponsored by," the new sponsorship logo was so 
designed that the Toshiba presence is conspicuous and unmistakable (fig. 4-3). Toshiba 
paid some £300,000 for the status of "Primary Sponsor" for three years, with another 
£75,000 cash handout from the Conservative Government through its Pairing Scheme (the 
National Heritage Arts Sponsorship Scheme) to pay for publicizing and marketing the 
sponsorship, as well as contributing to the "Innovation Commission," which itself is 
designed to raise the profile of the sponsor.
But what made the deal a "new departure," so to speak, for sponsorship is more than the 
ubiquitous appearance of the sponsor’s logo, which itself amounted to upwards of one 
million Toshiba logos in the first year.^ ^® Not only do the ICA bulletins and catalogues 
now carry an editorial statement from the sponsor, sometimes called "Toshiba Mission
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Statement," at other times stressing its slogan, "Toshiba — In Touch with Tomorrow," 
but the premises of the ICA itself have been turned into a commercial showroom for the 
company. A purpose-built showcase of Toshiba products, entitled "Toshiba Centre of 
Excellence," had been prominently on display in the entrance hall of the ICA since the 
start of tlie sponsorship, and the company’s TVs and videos are extensively used in its 
exhibitions.-^'^ All the many changes, according to its director, Mik Flood, were due 
ultimately to the shortage of money. "[Lack of funds] can make you become a tick-over 
organisation with programming that’s dull and bland," say Flood, "because you have 
nothing to finance your ambitions with [italic added].
With this perspective in mind, it is only fitting that Flood should applaud the largesse of 
Toshiba’s money, writing in the biannual report: "... we are particularly grateful for 
Toshiba’s involvement in the ICA. The dilemma is: how can the ICA reconcile the 
bold position of proclaiming its mission to "stimulate, educate and astonish," and 
"challenge orthodoxy in the arts," on the one hand, while in reality pandering, on the 
other, to a corporate giant which wields enormous power and influence both in the British 
Isles and globally?
In fact, given the permanent presence that Toshiba already occupies at the Victoria and 
Albert Museum, "immortalised" in the Toshiba Gallery of Japanese Art,^ "^ ° Toshiba is 
the very embodiment of cultural domination exercised by the financial entities which are 
the multinationals. In other words, their ambitions are so great that the way in which 
they dispense their cash can only be described in commercial terms, that is with the 
buzzwords of the ’80s, raids and takeovers, with the aim of capturing one institution after 
another.
What, then, does Flood mean precisely when he so proudly announces that the ICA 
"continually challenges its own assumptions?" That image is, perhaps, always something 
of an illusion, or at most, simply not concrete enough, when the Institute cannot even 
critically question its very own practice of serving corporate interests, and assess what 
impact that association might have. Like the Tate Gallery, the ICA is set to expand its 
premises for the next millennium (moving into a new purpose-built building) and is
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determined to acquire yet more corporate money 271
Over and above the large sums of corporate money invested, it is difficult to quantify the 
extent of the actual involvement in policy that sponsorship brings with it. This is partly 
because questions of this kind require qualitative judgements rather than quantitative ones, 
and partly because most of the "wheeling and dealing" goes on behind closed doors. In 
my survey, however, 30.7 percent of the British respondents (33.3 percent for American) 
admitted that tliey had been actively involved in the programmes of the art institutions 
they sponsored (see Tables 4.14.1 and 4.14.2). Among the 13 American respondents 
who specified the kind of involvement they had, five mentioned serving on the boards of 
trustees of the arts organisations (a topic already discussed in the previous section of this 
chapter), with one answering somewhat evasively that: "We do work with selected 
museums."
32 British companies out of 40 which were involved in the arts organisations they 
sponsored specified their involvement: ranging from the general ("All our sponsorships 
are mutually beneficial partnerships") to the more specific, such as "consulted on aspects 
of programming and publicity" or "corporate entertaining, advertising in publicity. 
However, one foreign company wrote: "Extensive involvement in all aspects of X 
exhibition. National Gallery and UK tour of X Philharmonic Orchestra" while another 
British utility remarked: "Yes, ... we commissioned a dance: Act 1 Water, Act 2 
Electricity to be performed by primary school kids for local community."
Given the earlier discussion and the survey results, it is very difficult to imagine what 
point Richard Luce, the longest-serving Arts Minister under Mrs Thatcher, might have 
been attempting to make when he maintained that there was "no artistic interference" 
from sponsors. To quote Luce: "Lord Goodman, who is president of the Association of 
Business Sponsorship Awards [sic], has been involved in the arts for 17 years and has 
never once come across a firm wishing to take over the artistic side of a venture [italic 
a d d e d ] . T h i s  and other similar contentions are, however, predicated on the 
assumption that there is in fact a clear distinction to be made between the so called 
"artistic side" and "anything else," such as its financial sources or ideological profile.
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Assertions like this are simply unsustainable, not least because of the way in which 
contemporary art has developed to the point where its very identity and reception depend, 
to a large extent, on art works being framed within a specific context. For example. 
House, Rachel Whiteread’s notorious creation which won her the £20,000 Turner Prize 
in 1993, and, paradoxically, £40,000 from the K Foundation for the worst body of art 
produced in the previous year, was "brewed" by Artangel, and paid for by Beck’s beer. 
The House, situated in a derelict part of East London, involved casting the interiors of 
an entire terraced house, witli the positive side facing out and the doors and windows cast 
shut (figs. 4-4 and 4-5). The House might have been original, and even radical in its 
approach to sculptural space and in the way in which it exploited the paradox of our 
notion of the house, but its sister product, the House label on Beck’s beer bottles, also 
designed by Whiteread, is not (fig. 4-6). On the contrary, the House label is what 
Frederic Jameson referred to as "pastiche," a "blank parody ... that has lost its sense of 
humour," casting ridicule on the "normal" House}''^ The irony is that the House is the 
house you cannot walk into, and Beck’s is "the beer you buy not to drink, ... when the 
label is more valuable than the contents [italic added].
When it comes to the ethical aspect of art museums, and to the question of how, through 
its mediation, power in its various forms is transferred and transformed in a capitalist 
democracy, the problem with sponsorship money becomes even more acute. Art 
museums, along with other arts organisations, have been struggling over the years with 
the ethical implication of accepting money from tobacco industries, and in Britain the 
blacklist also includes the armaments industry and certain political regimes, such as South 
Africa under apartheid. The issue remained, however, latent and academic until The New 
York Times ran a front-page story on 5 October 1994 entitled, "Philip Morris Calls In
I.O.U.’s in the Arts," at a time when the New York City Council was considering a 
severe bill that would ban smoking in virtually all public places in the city.^ ^® Fighting 
back, the world’s largest tobacco company blackmailed the City, threatening to move its 
headquarters elsewhere if the bill passed, taking with them some 2,000 employees, and, 
in our specific context, presumably all its arts support. "If the level of such corporate 
support, for whatever reason, were to decline," the statement of the company declared 
intimidatingly on 28 September, "the quality and quantity of the dance, theater, music
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and art exhibitions offered here might be diminished.
In its desperation, Philip Morris further solicited lobbying efforts from arts organisations 
that they had, until then, helped to fund, to "put a good word with Peter F. Vallone, the 
City Council Speaker," the main sponsor of the bill. According to Jeffrey Hogrefe, 
Stephanie French, the vice president in charge of the company’s cultural programme, 
personally visited Vallone to appeal to have the bill stopped, apparently spelling out its 
implications for Philip Morris’ funding of the arts.^ ^® Despite all the multi-million 
dollar advertising campaign from the tobacco industry, tlie City Council and Mayor 
Rudolph Giuliani managed finally to turn the bill into a law which came into effect on 
1st January 1995.^^^
So powerful is Philip Morris in the arts world that none of the museum people whom I 
interviewed in May 1995 would dare to speak out about it. Some of them simply denied 
the obvious, stating what is evidently not the case ("No, we wouldn’t do that. No."), 
with others simply being evasive ("No, 1 don’t know."). By dispensing tobacco money 
as widely as Philip Morris had been doing, the tobacco companies were buying, 
metaphorically speaking, the critical "silence" of arts bureaucrats and their institutions. 
Ironically, it is the interviewee from Philip Morris who admitted that there was some 
"conversation" between the company and the major art museums in New York. Their 
version of the story was, however, different from that reported in the media: it was 
Karen Hopkins from the Brooklyn Academy of Music, "crazy, wonderful fundraiser, but 
wacky," who first came up with the idea of calling up the City Council and suggested it 
to the company:
Yes, Stephanie [French] went to, maybe, the Guggenheim, the Met, four or five 
of our friends, our friends, called them and said: "This is what’s happening. If 
you want to call the City Council and we are important to you, do it." That’s it, 
you know, very low key, with four or five major institutions we are on the board 
of, or have funded it for many years. And it was all really in reaction to what 
was initiated by arts organisations themselves. And you know, that was i t ... But 
there’s never no pressure [jzc]... 1 don’t think it’s pressure tactics. I think it’s a
fair way to say: this is what’s happening. If you want to say something, you can
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This is the moment, I would argue, at which the "cultural capital" accumulated by the 
corporation is transformed, in its most naked sense, into political power, and at which 
it is, in turn, to be further transformed into economic capital, to advance the corporate 
interests. The fact that Philip Morris did not entirely succeed in this particular instance 
does not discredit my larger hypothesis. Nor is the power of Philip Morris in the arts 
world so easily circumscribed. Although cigarette smoking as such is prohibited in 
museums, tlie Metropolitan Museum permitted the company to hand out cigarettes at the 
opening night of Origins o f Impressionism, to which Philip Morris donated $1 million. 
Even after the new law took effect in 1995, a sign at the reception of the company’s 
headquarters announced, symbolising its ultimate power, "Smokers and Non-Smokers are 
Welcome. " Indeed, for the size of tlie company and the power it wields, the building is 
exempt from the law; the spokesperson stressed that "we never do anything illegal," but 
just "we are exempt from the law [italic added]."
Although art museums are hardly places where radical politics are played out, they have 
always portrayed themselves, at least in the bourgeois culture of late capitalism, as the 
custodians of humanistic values, and have advocated a spiritual enrichment role for the 
art works housed under their roof. But, by accepting tobacco money, by not speaking 
out against the dangers of smoking, and, on the contrary, by lobbying for the tobacco 
cause, the museums are selling out their mission, which they always paradoxically 
proclaim as "life enhancing." So the triumph of corporate power over American art 
museums, from the largest to the smallest, is as nearly complete as one can contemplate. 
The unmistakable signal is that even the nation’s largest museum in New York cannot 
afford to indulge in ethical judgements of any kind when it comes to issues of money.
As one of its senior officer apologetically remarked:
When you are a charitable institution, you can’t say, certainly you could, but we 
are not lucky enough to have the money to say, "No, we can’t take your money 
because of what you do. " We don’t do that; we don’t do that with anyone.
By comparison, in Britain that public art museums and galleries still maintain, to some 
extent, a sense of public accountability for the public funds they receive every year. For 
instance, the Tate Gallery does have a formal policy regarding sponsorship, according
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to the gallery:
It does not accept sponsorship from tobacco companies or companies dealing in 
armaments. Sponsorship from drinks companies is not accepted for youth 
projects. In the past, the gallery did not allow association with companies 
involved with South Africa, but this was revoked in 1994 after the constitutional 
changes there.
To what extent this is a principle strictly adhered to, however, is open to question. After 
all, the nature of corporate capital in the late twentieth century is so internationally 
mobile, and business interests are so diversified after the frenetic spree of takeovers, 
mergers and demergers over the past fifteen years, that it requires systematic and 
consistent efforts to track down any change or possible overseas operations. Moreover, 
the policy is so defined as to allow a wide scope of interpretation. Apparently the Tate 
has in the past been lenient in defining what business association literally meant: was BP 
not heavily involved in South African oil and coal industries at a time when the gallery 
was in receipt of its largesse?^*^
The problem of sponsorship involved with multinationals has even more profound 
implications in a democratic state, in addition to the problems discussed earlier. Given 
their enormous corporate capital, multinationals can easily manoeuvre art exhibitions or 
indeed arts organisations across national frontiers to wherever their markets dictate. 
Further, the origins and backgrounds of gift-givers may not always be immediately clear. 
The case of the Nomura Room at the Tate and Nomura Securities, the world’s largest 
stockbroking company, tellingly illuminates the point in question. Through the 
International Council of the Tate Gallery, and indeed the Council’s chairman and the 
Gallery’s trustee, Gilbert de Botton, according to Mary Brandenberg, Nomura Securities 
donated a magnanimous sum of £1.5 million, to the Gallery to refurnish one of its rooms, 
named the Nomura Room in honour of the company.
Given the Tate’s policy of wooing corporate sponsors, "to ensure that their business 
interests are well served," it is far from clear how, in this particular instance, the 
business interests of Nomura were actually served. What is certain, however, is that this
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rare magnificence did reach the ears of the Prime Minister of the time. Margaret 
Thatcher was reported as praising tlie company: "I am delighted that Nomura Securities 
are giving this money to build a new gallery and I hope that other firms will follow their 
lead. While the Nomura Room was reportedly scheduled to open in the early 
months of 1990, Nomura International, its new European headquarters, "the largest 
façade-retention scheme in Europe," occupying an entire City block, was opened on 31 
December 1990 by John Major on his last day as Chancellor of the E x c h e q u e r . T h e  
timing of the two events can hardly be a mere coincidence. And the European tour of 
the Royal National Theatre productions of Richard III and King Lear, sponsored by 
Nomura in early 1991 to mark the opening of its Prague and Budapest offices in the new 
free-enterprise East Europe, casts further suspicion on the motives of the Nomura 
donation. At a seminar held at Nomura headquarters in February 1992, Keith Clarke, 
then director of Corporate Communications at N o m u r a , m e n t i o n e d  how his 
company’s arrival in the former Czechoslovakia was helped by their meeting its 
playwright-president Vaclav Havel at a dinner, which was only made possible by the 
sponsorship of the tour to P r a g u e . A s  a result, Nomura Securities, according to 
Antony Thorncroft, also won important commissions from the Czech and Hungarian 
governments.^** The "imaginative coup," so to speak, in sponsorship was succinctly 
summed up by Colin Tweedie, director general of ABSA: "If you are a Japanese business 
trying to break into Europe, you want to do everything as ‘unJapanese’ as you can. What 
could fit the bill better than staging Shakespearean English theatre? "^ *^
As no "public" record exists, it is not possible to prove definitely what "mysterious" 
access the Nomura donation to the Tate was meant to "buy. " But judging from what can 
be gathered, it is fair to say that, as in the case of the National Theatre’s European tour 
and other similar multinational arts ventures, it revolved around similar influence-buying 
activities and the gaining of access to overseas {i.e. British) politicians and business 
contacts.
The Nomura case also illustrates one of the most remarkable and questionable aspects of 
recent sponsorship development, that is, the veil of secrecy that is drawn over so many 
deals. Along with the great influx of private capital, particularly foreign, into British
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public art museums and galleries since the Thatcher days, the secretiveness that the 
receiving institutions are obliged to observe is growing at an alarming rate. Nomura’s 
ultra generous donation was hardly reported at all in the media, in sharp contrast to the 
attention given to, say, the three-year £500,000 ICA/Toshiba deal, or Beck’s gift of 
£350,000. So elusive did the spokesperson at the Company prove to be that "no" became 
almost the standard reply to all of my inquiries, except that on my insistence, they did 
confirm that the donation was a one-off, decided in Japan, and that Gilbert de Botton 
was, in their words, "related" to the deal (de Botton’s own multinational finance 
company. Global Asset Management, is one of Nomura’s clients).
Nor has the Gallery been forthcoming in providing i n f o r m a t i o n . A t  first, the Tate 
issued a general statement: "Naming opportunities are seen as major benefits as they give 
long-term exposure to a company, and therefore is only possible with substantial support 
which provides the Gallery with an endowment for the future. " When I further inquired 
specifically about the Nomura case, and asked if the company does indeed provide any 
endowment for the Gallery, I was told that no further details were available since the 
arrangement was "confidential information. " Moreover, the person who provided me 
with this information on Gallery sponsorship went so far as to "request" me to send them 
"any part of [my] thesis referring to the Tate before submitting it, so that it can be 
approved or corrected if necessary [italic added]. "
I am not necessarily suggesting that the traditionally secretive ethos of the Japanese 
business world has been imported into Britain along with its powerful yen; Britain 
certainly has a code of secrecy of its own. But this sorry state of affairs is, as Raymond 
Williams eloquently put it when commenting on the rise of advertising in a capitalist 
economy, part of a different but relevant context:
It is the result of allowing control of the means of production and distribution to 
remain in minority hands, and one might add, for it is o f increasing importance 
in the British economy, into foreign hands, so that some o f the minority decisions 
are not even taken inside the society which they affect [italic added].
The increasing "colonisation" of public art museums and galleries in Britain by foreign
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capital might be less pernicious if it were no more than a disguised political lubricant to 
open the pathway to the corridors of p o w e r . A t  the same time that the Nomura 
Room at the Tate was about to be o p e n e d i t  was revealed, in late June, that Nomura 
Securities in Japan, along with the other three biggest securities houses, was disgracefully 
involved in one of the biggest financial scandals since the Second World War. The 
extent of the scandal was such that it eventually led, amongst other things, to the 
resignation of Japan’s finance minister, Ryutaro Hashimoto, in October, with the 
American and British regulators (Securities and Exchange Commissions and Securities 
and Futures Authority respectively) investigating the company’s practices in each of their 
c o u n t r i e s . T h e  malpractice for which Nomura was convicted included illicit 
compensation for favoured clients, t o  evasion, and above all, extensive secret dealing 
with Japan’s second largest organised crime syndicate, Inagawa-Kai.^^® Public 
consternation in Japan may not be a concern in Britain, except, perhaps, within financial 
circles, but the question inevitably arises: when is tainted money not tainted? And what 
greater irony could there be than that the Nomura Room, originally designed to elevate 
the company, on the global stage, into the corporate Pantheon, should in fact now turn 
out to be a permanent memorial of embarrassing indiscretion for the Tate?^ "^^
In Britain, as in the United States, the 1980s wrought a profound change in art museums, 
a change whose impact is only now becoming visible as the 1990s unfold. Crucially, 
British art galleries were, and still are, exposed to a climate of chronic financial 
insecurity without the vital support which used to be provided by government at various 
levels, and which has been progressively eroded by the relentless demands of market 
principles under the Conservative Government. As Fay Ballard, head of the 
Development at the Tate, put it, "The Tate is like a hungry animal. It needs continuous 
feeding."^®* Straitened financial circumstances and the rise of arts sponsorship do 
indeed go hand in hand. But to view the dominant corporate presence in art museums 
(and in the arts world in general) as primarily an issue that only concerns us financially 
is a fundamental mistake. That dominance, a logical consequence of companies’ 
economic power, has had a profound impact on the cultural landscape of both British and 
American society.
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One of the manifest effects of this corporate-processed message is on the public 
perception of the art museum. Encoded all over exhibition leaflets and banners is always 
the epigraph of gratitude such as "The exhibition is made possible by a generous grant 
from Corporation X. " Or as BP’s aggressive advertising campaign has it: "Thanks to BP, 
throughout the year the Tate is able to re-hang each of its galleries with New Displays 
and so bring you more of its masterpieces [italic a d d e d ] . ( f i g .  4-7) These 
oversaturated messages, combined with the legacy of blockbusters, help to create in the 
visitor’s mind the illusion of today’s art museums being a series of megashows sustained 
by corporate largesse. However, while there are no precise figures available for 
American art museums showing a distinction between public and corporate money, at 
least in Britain the fact is that the public sector still provides the majority of funding for 
art museums and galleries throughout the country.
It is also at this juncture that one has to ask how corporate sponsorship has affected the 
artists and their artistic careers, an issue that Victoria Alexander tried to measure 
statistically in her thesis, but without s u c c e s s . N o  artist’s career has been more 
closely linked with corporate sponsorship than that of the avant-garde star, Damien Hirst. 
As Robert Hewison pointed out. Hirst’s career has prospered all the way along thanks 
to sponsorship, from Olympia & York and the London Docklands Development 
Corporation, who supported his banal student show Freeze, to the BT New 
Contemporaries in 1989, Haagen-Dazs at tlie Serpentine Gallery in 1994, and the 
commission of designing the sets for the contemporary opera Agongo, sponsored last year 
by Beck’s , a  glittering career which reached its climax with the winning of the 
Turner Prize in 1995. Hirst, whose manipulation of sheep, cows and sharks preserved 
in formaldehyde has put him at the centre of controversy in London avant-garde circles, 
is perhaps most qualified to speak on the topic:
If art is about life, you can’t avoid that side of life. At Goldsmiths’ College they 
really encouraged breaking down barriers and finding new ways to do things, and 
sponsorship is all part of it. Undoubtedly it affects the reception of the work but 
that is something to work with. I don’t see myself approaching the Meat 
Marketing Board, but you could make a political point by doing something really 
gruesome with animals, and getting sponsorship from Friends of the Earth.
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Hirst’s amazing career, which combines the "shock" value of cutting-edge art with 
sponsorship from the bourgeois world that the avant-garde traditionally set out to 
challenge, is very much a paradox. It is precisely the outrage and publicity that avant- 
garde art generally generates, insofar as it is "contained," that have made it even more 
attractive to sponsors who are looking for a specific market, and have the stomach for 
an "avant-garde shock. " As Hewison put it: "So sponsorship can become just one more 
piece of artist’s material. Yet in the process the artist becomes one more piece of 
advertising.
It has long been argued and advocated by conservatives on botli sides of the Atlantic that 
the arts should be funded from a variety of sources in order to guarantee choice in a 
democracy. In America, this often means that the role of federal government should be 
restricted and indirect, "lest it become a state-imposed culture at odds with the American 
pluralist tradition. A similar rhetoric has often been expressed in Britain in the 
concept of plural funding, as the former Arts Minister Richard Luce put it: "This 
plurality of funding means that arts organisations can spread their risks, and become less 
dependent on one source of funding. Plural funding adds to the vitality of the arts and 
acts as a safeguard against any restrictions on artistic expression. Such democratic 
appeal, however, simply cannot be substantiated. So called "plural funding," as 
demonstrated in this chapter, is only another piece of privatisation by the Conservatives 
in order to move art museums and galleries from the public domain into corporate hands. 
It does nothing but reinforce tlie underlying economic relationships in society. To quote 
the Trade Union Congress’ report: "It is important to remember that the activities of the 
private sponsor of the arts, unlike his public counterpart, are not subject to any degree 
of democratic control [italic a d d e d ] , T h e  increasing takeover of non-economic 
domains by corporations, one of the most remarkable features of late capitalism, must 
open our eyes to the fact that the rise of arts sponsorship is as much as to be lamented 
as it is to be celebrated.
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SHOWCASES OF CONTEMPORARY ART 
WITHIN CORPORATE PREMISES
The business world’s exploitation of the arts in both Britain and America does not stop 
at the increasing appropriation of art museums and galleries as their public relations 
agencies. Not content with passively waiting to be solicited to make contributions to art 
museums, the corporations of the ’80s strenuously strove to become legitimate and active 
participants in the contemporary art world.
The modern corporations, armed with their own curators and art departments, have 
vigorously emulated what was formerly the prerogative of art museums. They hold 
exhibitions, establish new art galleries, and their corporate premises are sometimes even 
hosts to a branch of a "public" museum. Over the last decade corporate art collections 
have been established with ever increasing frequency, following an initial surge in the 
1970s. To champion the grand image of art patrons, these corporations have also 
organised and toured their art collections throughout the country and abroad. Last but 
not least, they have actually themselves organised, as well as sponsored, art awards, 
extending their aggressive tentacles right into the art reward system. Central to these 
ventures is the assumption that corporations can and should act as if they were part of the 
cultural establishment. Though these awards are often particularly important, as in the 
case of the Barclays Young Artists Award and the Prudential Arts Awards in Britain, 
space does not permit us to analyse them further here. While the next chapter will deal 
with corporate art collections in Britain and America, the present chapter will consider 
principally the galleries which have been established and the exhibitions that have taken 
place within corporate premises.
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5.1. Branches of Public Museums within Corporate Premises
Unlike the sponsorship of exhibitions organised by art institutions, where the sponsor’s 
presence is temporary and their rôle limited, a corporation gains substantial control of an 
art institution when it incorporates a branch of it as a tenant. Nor does the corporation 
have to strive for publicity and recognition as it does in other arts ventures. Maximum 
publicity is automatically generated as the name of the company and that of the 
institution, for example, "the Whitney Museum of American Art at Philip Morris," 
become inseparable.
This phenomenon, for various reasons, is a peculiarly American style of corporate 
intervention, confined to heavily built-up metropolitan centres such as New York City. 
Nothing entirely comparable yet exists in Britain.* This is primarily because the sheer 
scale of the financial commitment necessary for this form of arts sponsorship has ruled 
most players out of the game.^ Also, the built environment of New York is much more 
conducive to this sort of corporate adventure than that of London, primarily because of 
the considerable tax gains offered to real estate entrepreneurs by federal and state 
governments, not to mention the substantial planning incentives granted by city 
authorities. As the practice of using art as a common currency pushes the alliance of art 
and commerce to the ultimate level of intimacy, this phenomenon is all the more 
significant despite its limited application.
No art museum has identified itself so thoroughly with corporate America than the 
Whitney Museum of American Art in New York.^ The first branch of the Whitney was 
opened in 1973 in the Wall Street district, supported by the Lower Manhattan business 
community. The rationale was then, according to its education officer David Rupert, "to 
reach out to more people with more exhibitions.
However, the, Whitney branches mushroomed so vigorously that by the end of the 1980s 
it already owned four branches, notoriously nicknamed by the New York Times "the 
McDonalds of the museum world. In addition to the one in lower Manhattan 
mentioned earlier, the Whitney opened a branch in Fairfield County, Connecticut, in
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1981, supported by the Champion International Corporation. Then, in 1983 and 1986, 
it opened another two in mid-town Manhattan, sponsored by Philip Morris (figs. 5-1 and 
5-2) and the Equitable Life Assurance Society (figs. 5-3, 5-4 and 5-5) respectively. In 
1988, the Whitney also relocated its first branch to the Federal Reserve Plaza, where it 
was hosted by the developers of the Plaza, Park Tower Realty and IBM.
Initially, this conspicuous and ostensibly disinterested hospitality extended to an art 
museum within commercial premises may seem difficult to explain. Actually, however, 
it serves the material interests of the businesses concerned who are able fully to capitalise 
on the social status and value which come with the continuous presence of the "high art" 
institution within its territorial confines. Moreover, what underlies this symbiotic 
relationship between the Whitney and its corporate landlords is a real-estate strategy. 
Without wishing to digress, one has only to look briefly at how the zoning resolutions 
regulate the construction of skyscrapers in New York City,
The three Whitney branches in New York were located at the base of office towers within 
special districts of high-density commercial zones, namely Midtown and Downtown 
Manhattan, areas in which the City planning authorities sought to encourage development 
through special zoning concessions.^ One of the "bonus zoning" concessions is that, as 
long as the builder agrees to provide "public amenities" at the site containing the 
building, the developer is allowed up to 20 percent extra floor area to increase the height 
of the building.^ If the developer sets aside 1,(KX) square feet for "public space" in a 
tower, for example, he could add an extra 10,0(X) square feet or more to his building, 
depending on the ratios of bonus floor area and the basic floor area allowed.® This 
substantial zoning bonus, more than anything else, helped to shape the elaborate corporate 
atrium and the lobbies of Manhattan skyscrapers as we know them today. To quote Paul 
Goldberger, the New York Times architecture columnist: "So these plazas are not really 
a gift to the people from the buildings’ owners — they are much more a gift from the city 
itself."’
Should the zoning bonus be an insufficient inducement, companies can gain various tax 
benefits from federal, state and city governments. A real-estate benefit may be provided
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indirectly, according to Marisa Lago, General Counsel at the Economic Development 
Corporation in New York, "since creating such a public space could reduce the assessed 
value of the building, thereby resulting in lower real-estate taxes."*® And above all, 
companies can write off the expenses incurred in operating the branches by counting them 
as corporate contributions when computing tax returns to the Internal Revenue Service 
for corporation tax purposes.** This direct tax benefit from the federal coffers results 
in a further tax deduction from the New York state government, since the state’s entire 
income is based on taxpayers’ federal taxable income.*^
To incorporate a branch of an art museum within this bonus-yielding public space is 
arguably a logical development from what these corporatised indoor plazas came to 
represent in the early ’80s. As Suzanne Stephens pointed out, what the arts programme 
was to Equitable in the 1980s parallels what up-scale restaurants and cafés were to 
Citicorp in 1970s.*  ^ While the public amenities provided by the shops within the 
Citicorp tower did indeed attract people, they also drew in a growing number of New 
York’s ever-present homeless. This would be even more problematic for the Equitable 
headquarters, since it is located on 7th Avenue and intrudes upon a derelict area of the 
city only a few blocks north of the squalor of Times Square. At the same time as 
obtaining substantial extra floor area from the City, corporations can best safeguard their 
so-called "public space" (figs. 5-6 and 5-7) against undesirable intruders and wayfarers 
by the means of the grand hall of an art museum.
The phenomenon of the Whitney branches is illuminating in indicating the extent to which 
an art institution can be a comfortable bedfellow with corporate America. The Whitney’s 
courtship with the Equitable was the most glamorous and highly publicized event of its 
kind, if for no other reason than the Equitable’s $7.5 million expenditure on its art 
enterprise. In addition to establishing the largest of its branches in the Equitable 
building, the Whitney also lent its curators to the company as consultants on the 
commissioning of works for its public spaces (figs. 5-8,5-9 and 5-10) and the purchasing 
of paintings for the exclusive executive dining rooms in its headquarters (fig. 5-11).
Until the construction of its new headquarters, the Equitable, the nation’s third largest
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life-insurance company with assets at that time of $77 billion, had not been a household 
name in the art world. Their motivation for venturing into fashionable art patronage in 
1986, apart from its being a highroad to the refurbishment of its corporate image, was 
first and foremost a real-estate investment.
According to Benjamin D. Holloway, the key figure behind the Equitable venture, in 
order to lease out two-thirds of the space of the Equitable building, the Whitney branch 
itself and the art works displayed in the building, along with other amenities, was "a way 
of attracting the kind of tenant we want, at the rental prices we are asking. Vividly 
catching the essential motivation of the Equitable’s marketing strategy, the New York 
Times headlined its article "Equitable Seeking Park Avenue Rents on Seventh 
Avenue.
Both sides involved in these deals were fully aware of what they had to sell. As Thomas 
Armstrong, the then director of the Whitney Museum, put it: "We represent 
contemporary art," and it is a "product that most museums don’t have." Conscious of 
the value of the Whitney card, he revealed in the same interview: "The prestige that we 
bring to them [the corporation] is significant, and we want to be compensated for 
that."*® If his corporate patrons have any serious doubts about the value of what is 
being offered, he is quick to remind them that the prestige of the Whitney can be easily 
measured in dollar and cent terms by comparing it with commissioning advertisements 
from Madison Avenue. With the same, or even much less, money, the Whitney puts the 
corporation in an editorial context which endows it with a non-commercial and benign 
image while at the same time disguising its profit-oriented business nature. None of the 
Madison Avenue super agencies can achieve such a magical effect.
Despite all its efforts to sell the prestige of its name, all the Whitney gets in return is 
simply money and space. But the ultimate question is: what use can be made of this 
additional space maintained by corporate funds? And crucially, is curatorial 
independence up for sale when a museum is willing to let itself be so exploited? The 
Museum is quick to deny the possibility of censorship being exercised by its corporate 
patrons. To quote Tom Armstrong: "Contractually we will not let the corporate sponsor
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in any way determine our program."*’ While stating that the Whitney is "entitled to do 
whatever they want to do," Mr Holloway does not hesitate to define the Equitable’s 
position: "I would be the last person in the world to censor them. But I’m responsible 
for what I do, and they’re responsible for what they do, and if they do something 
irresponsible, they have to take the consequences."** If censorship there is, then it is 
more a question, perhaps, of self-censorship.
Censorship, of course, works both from without and within. This is not to say that the 
Whitney branches would not mount any exhibitions touching on anything controversial. 
Once, for instance, the Whitney branch at Philip Morris held a travelling show of the 
early twentieth-century radical magazine The Masses. Within the boundary of the 
corporate environment, however, curatorial autonomy is very circumscribed, if it has 
ever existed at all in a meaningful way. Can the Whitney mount an exhibition, say, of 
Hans Haacke’s exposure of the speculation and manipulation of the real-estate market by 
the Equitable Real Estate Group, similar to the one he created in 1971 on Manhattan real- 
estate holdings and which was cancelled by the Guggenheim Museum? Or can the 
Whitney present a show exposing how Philip Morris is exporting life-threatening high-tar 
cigarettes to the Third World at a time when their domestic sales are declining as a result 
of the continuing anti-smoking campaign in the United States?*’ Josephine Gear, a 
former director at the Philip Morris branch, while making clear that Philip Morris did 
give her a free hand generally, commented: "Philip Morris wouldn’t tour any exhibitions 
touching on smoking. However liberal the corporation would like to project itself 
as being, exhibitions which confront the host company in any way would be kept out of 
corporate premises. The exhibition (un)Making o f Nature, for instance, which was 
scheduled to tour to the Champion International branch in addition to the Philip Morris 
and Downtown branches, was cancelled. This was primarily because the paper box in 
the work by the artist Michael Paha, Drawing fo r  Timeline, a work concerned to show 
how technology disrupts natural processes, happened to have been produced by Champion 
International and had the company label on it.^ * Critical comment on the environmental 
issue in the exhibition offended the corporate sponsor. To suggest that as a corporate 
tenant the Museum can maintain its curatorial independence without sanitizing its 
exhibitions either politically or socially is simply improbable.
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5.2 . Art Exhibitions and Galleries within Corporate Premises
We [must] demonstrate... that patronage is just another aspect o f the marketplace, 
another move you make there to sell your products and services and enlarge your 
share. — Herbert Schmertz, director, Mobil Corporation^^
Given the enormous amount of money involved, only big multinationals such as 
Equitable, Philip Morris or IBM could afford to play the branch game. Without being 
left behind, more and more firms are on a smaller scale devoting part of their precious 
office space to art exhibitions, or establishing art galleries of their own within their 
premises. While some firms are still striving to obtain recognition for their efforts, the 
more adventurous are already able to permeate through the art network to be listed as art 
venues alongside gallery listings in the m e d i a . I f  corporate names sandwiched between 
those of art galleries may seem to be out of place and an anomaly, they show how eager 
companies have become to be identified as patrons of the arts.
What distinguishes these exhibitions from those organised by the so-called corporate 
museums of earlier decades is their c o n t e n t . W h i l e  a corporate museum displays 
exhibits obviously related to the history or operations of the company, such as Harvey’s 
Wine Museum in Bristol in Britain, owned by the wine merchants John Harvey & Sons, 
those exhibitions held within commercial space in the ’80s were mainly of arts or culture 
in its broad sociological s e n s e . T h e y  were almost entirely devoid of any overt 
reference to the business dealings of the host companies. Even corporate galleries such 
as the BMW Gallery on Park Avenue in New York could conveniently mount exhibitions 
of paintings, centred around subjects such as driving, alongside its display of automobiles 
and motorcycles.^®
Most of the corporate exhibitions or "galleries" in New York, Washington D.C. and 
London were established during the past decade. PaineWebber, IBM, Joseph E. 
Seagram, Lintas Worldwide in New York, Arnold & Porter, Covington & Burling in 
Washington D.C., Arthur Andersen, Freshfield and the Economist in London. If we use 
the way in which the exhibition space is organised as a guide, these companies can be 
divided into three groups. Those best qualified for the "gallery" title are the IBM Gallery
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of Art and Science, the PaineWebber Art Gallery (figs. 5-12, 5-13 and 5-14) and the 
Equitable Gallery in New York (fig. 5-15), which, after the departure of the Whitney 
Museum branch in 1992, was renamed as such and is now organised by the Equitable in- 
house curator.
What these galleries have in common is not only their properly designated and well 
maintained space, but also their generous size compared with other operations. The 
PaineWebber Gallery, consisting of 4,000 square feet, occupies almost the entire ground 
floor of the PaineWebber Group headquarters on the Avenue of the Americas, while the 
IBM Gallery, until its recent closure in August 1994, was an 11,000 square-foot 
exhibition space on the lower level of the then IBM 42-story skyscraper in New York.^^ 
Given the limited space in central London, no British companies could ever have rivalled 
these American style corporate projects.
However, the sub-text of the New York headquartered companies’ agenda is that, in 
order to gain extra floor space from the New York City government, the ground floor 
of the buildings has to be kept open to the public by any means. Both the PaineWebber 
and the Equitable Galleries, among others, were established as a direct result of the 
zoning regulations of New York City.^* Moreover, the expenses incurred in these 
galleries are tax deductible either as business expenses or as charitable contributions. 
Built into this corporate engagement, again, is the ambiguous relationship between 
corporate and public interests. While the corporations own the galleries and keep them 
open to "the public," under the pretext of corporate social responsibility, the ordinary 
taxpayers are obliged, unwittingly, to "chip in" to endorse the private decisions of big 
business.
Important as these galleries may be, their exhibition programs are too catholic and 
diverse to merit attention from art critics. Exhibitions at the PaineWebber Gallery, for 
instance, have ranged from Gertrude Jekyll: A Vision o f Garden and Wood, Living Maya: 
The Art o f Ancient Dreams, to contemporary art works drawn from its own art 
collection.^’ The fact that none of these galleries is exclusively committed to exhibitions 
of contemporary art does not place them outside the scope of our study. With their
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strategic location in mid-town Manhattan, these galleries offer cultural institutions a 
longed-for opportunity to showcase their collections or activities, while at the same time 
installing the company name as a significant focal point on the cultural map of 
contemporary American society. In the case of the IBM Gallery, with a staff of seven 
in its heyday, the ambition was a global one. Its exhibitions were drawn from different 
continents, making it one of the itinerary stops on the international cultural circuit.
The majority of art-minded companies, such as Arnold & Porter, Covington & Burling 
in Washington D.C., or Freshfield in London, fall within the second category (figs. 5-16,
5-17, 5-18 and 5-19). They hold rotating exhibitions in their office building without 
necessarily publicising the space as a "gallery" per se. The spaces thus allocated are 
smaller than those in the previous category, ranging from an atrium to a hallway on 
premises. Modest as it may be physically, the space is generally separated from the 
working office, apart from the traffic of everyday office life. The distinction is of 
significance in that these exhibitions are potentially more accessible to the "public" than 
the next group of exhibitions which actually take place within the office. Companies can 
thereby lay a legitimate claim to benefiting the artistic community by holding the 
exhibitions.
Professional organisations such as law firms are among the most active organisers of 
changing exhibits in office space within this group, given their specific business needs 
of direct contact with clients.^ In addition to having an art collection, the law firm 
Arnold & Porter in Washington D.C., for example, was also the first firm in the state 
to start hosting rotating exhibits in office space in the early ’80s. It was intended, 
according to Jim Dobkin, chair of the firm’s art committee, to "complement our 
permanent collection by adding a certain freshness to it.
The third group of companies are those that hold exhibitions in the working office. As 
a result, art works are mingled with the hurly-burly of office life, inseparable from the 
interior decor. This group of companies are the most difficult to generalise about, as the 
rationale for holding exhibitions in this way is very varied.
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For some, exhibitions of this kind are a way of decorating the office, with the advantage 
that the "decoration" can be changed regularly without making any substantial financial 
commitment. The advertising agency Lintas Worldwide in New York was a case in point. 
The company placed exhibits along the side corridors of its 42nd floor executive offices 
at its headquarters in the late ’80s. The motivation, according to its curator Margaret 
Mathews-Berenson, was "to live with the works for a while before deciding to make 
purchases for the collection" during the period when the company decided to replace its 
19th-century paintings and antiques with contemporary art which was considered to be 
more appropriate for its image.
To a lesser extent this is the case with Arthur Andersen in London. As one of the top 
accountancy firms in the City, Arthur Andersen not only has a corporate collection of 
works on paper but also holds four exhibitions a year in the staff restaurant, two drawing 
on works in the collection and the others from outside loans.
Despite these companies habitually publicising rotating exhibits as part of their portfolio 
as patrons of art, access to such shows is highly restricted. As might be expected, 
outsiders will not under normal conditions be allowed to wander freely around a working 
office. At the other end of the spectrum, the changing exhibits at BMW’s showroom on 
Park Avenue in New York were open to the public, or more precisely, potential car 
buyers. Calling the showroom the "BMW Gallery," the company attempted to add a 
psycholinguistic twist to its marketing strategy, energetically using the art works as 
hidden persuaders to enhance the emotional overtones and social status of their products. 
In the leaflet for the exhibition Drivel, for instance, the company announced (fig. 5-20): 
"Here, changing exhibits of the products, technology and heritage of Bavarian Motor 
Works will be displayed in the atmosphere of an art gallery beside equally stimulating 
exhibits from various artistic disciplines [italic added]. Central to the successful 
switch from a gallery of art to one of automobiles is the fact that BMW does not just sell 
over-priced expensive vehicles; more importantly, it sells distinctiveness and style, which 
art has always suggested and been associated with. It thus blurs the distinction between 
art and consumer durables, between what is supposed to be above commodification and 
that which is first and foremost commodity.
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Because of the number of companies involved, the organisation of the exhibitions varies 
from company to company. Nevertheless they operate in a broadly similar way. 
Typically companies mount several exhibitions a year, either curated by in-house curators 
or by outside art consultants on a contractual basis. The exhibits are sometimes drawn 
from the company’s own collection, or more often are on loan from artists, museums or 
commercial galleries. What characterises these exhibitions above all is their emulation 
of the practices of art institutions. Companies are not only organising exhibitions, but 
complementing them with press releases, opening receptions and sometimes even with 
exhibition leaflets or catalogues to give the show an aura of permanence and scholarship. 
What for art museums and galleries is an established practice has become for businesses, 
firstly, the source of corporate entertainment, and, secondly, a device for validating their 
intervention in the art world.
This is because these exhibitions are operated for the purposes of exploiting the status and 
social function of contemporary art, as places of social gathering for the firm to entertain 
its cherished clients in a setting of "high art" instead of inviting them to a chic restaurant. 
When asked whether there were outside visitors to the corporate gallery, one of the 
administrators in a Washington D.C. law firm admitted: "I would say no. We don’t have 
a lot of people who just walk up from the street. It’s not that kind of thing. It’s more 
a type of targeted group, invitations we send out and certain invitations for each 
artist.
To promote the image of being an enlightened art patron to their target audience in a 
suitably lavish way, companies very often invite the artist on show to give a talk on his 
or her exhibits at the private opening reception, where clients are invited as well as 
employees. As a matter of fact, the attention paid to the exhibition itself is often brief, 
at most half an hour before a dinner party. One of the administrators interviewed 
commented that some of the employees came for the dinner, not for the opening view.^^
At first sight the corporate gallery seems to provide a new art venue for the public. It 
is true that galleries like the IBM Gallery or the PaineWebber Art Gallery in New York 
and the display at the Economist building in London (figs. 5-21, 5-22 and 5-23) are open
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to the public. However, the majority of corporate galleries are not readily accessible, 
with some seen only by employees and clients of the firms. The audience of the 
exhibition is therefore highly selective.
From the artists’ point of view, to exhibit their works at corporate premises is an 
opportunity that most corporate-favoured artists are unlikely to refuse. In some cases 
they obtain payment and a degree of public exposure. Yet the extent to which artists can 
be helped financially by the resulting sales from the solo or group shows on corporate 
premises is difficult to calculate. What is certain is that exhibitions of this kind are never 
intended to be an experimental space or one for articulating any dissenting voice. Nor 
are they meant to provide an aesthetic experience for the people involved, or at least only 
incidentally.
The game is pushed to its extremes by the Chase Manhattan Bank, whose hegemonic 
position in the art world over the past decades has unquestionably been built on its 
financial power. In order to woo its local artistic community following a period of low 
profits. Chase utilised the facilities at its Soho branch in New York as an art gallery, 
reopening with a wide, whitewashed look in March 1985 (fig. 5-24). It was reported that 
the branch’s profit ranking jumped from 185th to fourth. At the opening of the 
refurbished branch, one attendee was overheard asking: "Is this a bank having a show 
called ‘Art Gallery’ or an art gallery having a show called ‘Bank’?"^^
The confusion over the bank-as-gallery or vice versa is not just a question of ideological 
purity. It is precisely the degree of ambiguity which is at issue here, be it in America 
or Britain. By emulating the practice of an art museum, the business redefines the 
boundaries between cultural and commercial institutions and thereby the values that they 
stand for. By appropriating art that seems to distinguish them from the otherwise 
mundane profit-making concerns of the business world, companies are recontextualising 
the works of art housed under their roof and making them their own. No wonder that 
one of the insiders, William B. Renner, president of Alcoa, could say: "Business could 
hold art exhibitions to tell its own story.
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NOTES
1. The closest parallel is, perhaps, Sir Ernest Hall’s Dean Clough Centre in Halifax, 
which affords free residence and facilities to selected sculptors and artists and which is 
administered by the Henry Moore Trust. Dean Clough^which also serves as a business 
centre, has a series of galleries as well as an art collection of its own of over 600 items; 
see Rachel Barnes, "Dream Factory," The Guardian, 3 June 1994, and Stuart Rock, "The 
Importance of Being Ernest," Director, December 1988, pp. 95-98.
2. Speaking in 1986 on the financial arrangements for branches of the Whitney Museum 
of American Art, the then director, Tom Armstrong, pointed out in an interview: "We’re 
being courted all over the country... And if someone calls me and says, ‘Mr Armstrong, 
I’m developing a building and I want a branch,’ then I say, ‘Have you got $400,000 a 
year to spend, plus start-up costs?’ That usually stops the conversation;" see William 
Keens, "Serving Up Culture: The Whitney and its Branch Museums (Interview)," 
Museum News, 64(4), 1986, p. 26.
3. The High Museum of Art in Atlanta, for example, had a branch at the Georgia-Pacific 
Center, Atlanta, Georgia; see Douglas Brenner, "The Framer’s Art," Architectural 
Record, November 1986, pp. 124-31. The Museum of Fine Arts in Boston had a branch 
in Faneuil Hall Marketplace, which belonged to the Rouse Company; see the museum’s 
annual reports The Museum Year 1978-79, pp. 4, 6; The Museum Year 1979-80, p. 5, and 
The Museum Year 1980-81, pp. 8-9.
4. William Keens, "Serving Up Culture," art, cit., p. 22.
5. Quoted in Lorraine Glennon, "The Museum and the Corporation: New Realities," 
Museum News, January/February 1988, p. 42.
6. Downtown Manhattan refers to the Wall Street area where the downtown Whitney 
branch was located. The Midtown Manhattan district is the area between 3rd and 8th 
Avenues and 34th and 60th Streets where the Philip Morris branch is located, and where 
the Equitable branch was; interview with Tony Levy, Deputy Director, Zoning Study 
Group, Department of City Planning, New York City, on 3 May 1995.
7. Bonusable public space includes "open plazas", "through block arcades" or "covered 
pedestrian spaces. " As pointed out by Marilyn Mammano, Director of Zoning and Urban 
Design, Department of City Planning, New York City: "A branch of an art or science 
museum is permitted to occupy a frontage along the perimeter of a bonusable public 
space if it is kept open to the public for the same hours as the covered public space. In 
most cases, the floor space occupied by such museums is exempted from the floor area 
computation of these buildings." Personal correspondence with Mammano, on 14 
December 1992.
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8. The bonus which a developer receives is very substantial: for x square feet of bonus 
floor area of every square foot of bonus amenities, he can get up to a maximum of 20 
percent of the floor ratio. For example, if the developer puts in 1,000 square feet, and 
the bonus ratio is 10:1, then he will have 10,000 extra square feet of floor area that he 
can add to his building, provided that is not more than 20 percent beyond what he is 
allowed for the bonus; Tony Levy, as in note 6 above.
9. Paul Goldberger, "Plazas, like Computers, are Best if User-Friendly," The New York 
Times, 22 March 1987.
10. Personal correspondence with Marisa Lago, General Counsel, Economic 
Development Corporation, New York City, on 22 April 1993.
11. Interview with Pamela Gruninger Perkins, Head of Branch Museums and 
Coordinator, Whitney Museum of American Art, New York, on 13 August 1990.
12. Personal correspondence with Mark R. Husted, Corporation Tax Technician II, New 
York State Department of Taxation and Finance, Albany, New York, on 12 April 1993.
13. Suzanne Stephens, "An Equitable relationship?," Art in America, 74, May 1986, p. 
118.
14. Deborah Gimelson, "The Tower of Art: Art, the Handmaiden to Real Estate," Art 
& Auction, October 1985, p. 152. See also Grace Glueck, "What Big Business Sees in 
Fine Art," The New York Times, 26 May 1985.
15. Quoted in Roger Kimball, "Art and Architecture at the Equitable Center," The New 
Criterion, 5, November 1986, p. 31.
16. William Keens, "Serving up Culture," art. cit., p. 24.
17. Michael Brenson, "Museum and Corporation — A Delicate Balance," The New York 
Times, 23 February 1986, p.28.
18. Ibid.
19. For example, it was reported that domestic consumption of cigarettes in America 
dropped 4 per cent in 1989 but that U.S. tobacco exports grew dramatically in the mid- 
’80s. They leapt 25 per cent in 1988; see Pat Widder, "Tobacco Firms’ Profits Healthy 
Despite Anti-smoking Movement," The Washington Post, 4 September 1990. According 
to Bill McAllister, Philip Morris held 42 per cent of the U.S. cigarette market in 1990; 
see "Philip Morris’s Hometown Lobbyists," The Washington Post, 9 August 1990.
20. Interview with Josephine Gear, former director at the Whitney Museum of American 




22. Herbert Schmertz, Patronage that Pays (New York: Business Committee for the Arts, 
Inc., 1987), p. 7.
23. For example, "Washington Square," an office building on Connecticut Avenue in 
Washington D.C. which regularly holds exhibitions of sculpture, is listed in the local 
newspaper Washington City Paper, or "The Economist" in the bi-monthly listing of 
galleries in London New Exhibitions o f Contemporary Art.
24. Corporate museums are a category of museums which have attracted attention from 
the museum professionals. According to Victor J. Danilov, corporate museums are "a 
corporate facility with tangible objects and/or exhibits, displayed in a museum-like 
environment, that communicates the history, operations or interests of a company to 
employees, customers and/or the public" The Corning Museum of Glass, which is 
dedicated to the history, art and science of glass, is one example in America; see "The 
New Thrust of Corporate Museums," Museum News, 64, June 1986, pp. 36-47.
25. Visit to the Harvey Wine Museum and interview with Margaret B. Pigott, Curator, 
Harveys Wine Museum, Bristol, on 17 August 1993. The fact that Margaret Pigott has 
a public relations background clearly illustrates the nature of the corporate museum.
26. Interview with Margaret Mathews-Berenson on 5 May 1995, an independent art 
consultant who organised exhibitions for BMW, New York.
27. IBM no longer owns the building; it was sold for an undisclosed sum to the developer 
Edward J. Minskoff in 1994.
28. The IBM Gallery was an exception. As it was located in the cellar level of the IBM 
building, it did not receive any floor area bonus or floor area exemption, as it did for the 
garden plaza on its ground floor; personal correspondence with Marilyn Mammano, 
Director, Department of City Planning, New York City, on 22 December 1993.
29. Interview with Susan Gyorgy, Curator, PaineWebber Group, Inc., New York, on 9 
August 1990.
30. There is no information available to draw any definite conclusion as to which sector 
of business is the most active organiser of exhibitions in office space.
31. Mary C. Hickey, "Area Law Firms Host Exhibits of Fine Art," The Washington 
Lawyer, 1989, pp. 18-20.
32. Corporate Artnews, 3(10), February 1987, and Corporate Artnews, 8(8), December 
1991.
33. Interview with Nigel Frank, assistant for curator Glenn Sujo, Arts Guidelines, on 3 
April 1995, and personal correspondence with him on 25 August 1995.
34. See the leaflet for the exhibition Drive!, published by the company. It was held 
between October 1988 and March 1989.
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35. Interview with Josselyn Neukom, Legal Assistant, Arnold & Porter, Washington D. 
C., on 31 August 1990.
36. Interview with Melissa Busby Fernlund, Manager of Space Planning and Programs, 
Covington & Burling, Washington D.C. on 5 September 1990, and my personal 
observations made while attending the lecture by the photographer Steve Gottieb at the 
opening view of the exhibition at the firm on 27 September 1990.
37. Lorraine Glennon, "The New Patrons," Art & Antiques, MayU986, p. 108. With 
the success of converting the SoHo space into a bank-as-gallery, the bank further 
relocated the branch to Broadway in 1990. It occupies 5,000 square feet of renovated 
warehouse space, specially designed to showcase new acquisitions of Chase’s art 
collection, which changes three times a year; see BCA News, May/June 1990, p. 5.
38. This sentence was quoted in one of Hans Haacke works, Alcoa: We can't wait for  
tomorrow, in Brian Wallis, ed., Hans Haacke: Unfinished Business (New York: The New 
Museum of Contemporary Art, and Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1986), p. 197.
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CORPORATE ART COLLECTIONS
The Reagan-Thatcher decade witnessed a burgeoning of corporate art collections in the 
United States and the United Kingdom. Not only did the number of corporate patrons 
from across the whole spectrum of business increase over the decade, but also the 
magnitude of corporate collecting was such that it brought about a sea change in the kind 
of artworks being collected and the way in which they functioned in the business context. 
Nowhere are the changes more apparent than in the phenomenon of business patrons who 
collect contemporary art in a deliberate and calculated way hitherto unknown. To quote 
a lawyer who was actively engaged in collecting for his law firm in Washington D.C.:
We were really looking to create a collection that was very much a contemporary 
collection, that would reflect the fact that our law firm was not only on the cutting 
edge of legal development, but also on the cutting edge of the art world itself.^
What has the business of contemporary art to do with that of a law firm and why is a law 
firm motivated to be "on the cutting edge of the art world itself"? This uncanny alliance 
of two unconnected worlds is, however, entirely characteristic of corporate intervention 
in contemporary art during the Reagan and Thatcher decade. At the end of the Reagan 
administration, American corporate collectors were running their own art departments and 
organising exhibitions from their collections for touring both in the country and around 
the world, as if they actually rivalled art museums in importance in the contemporary art 
world. Comparatively speaking, the British counterpart was a more modest operation, 
no doubt as a result of the disparity between the different sizes of the companies
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concerned in the two countries and the different sizes of their two economies. 
Nevertheless British businesses did play a significant role in their own right in the 
development of contemporary art.
But in precisely what way is this corporate art intervention related to the broader context 
of political, economic and social transformation in American and British society brought 
about by the conservative governments in the ’80s? This is a question to which there is 
no ready or easy answer, since it is far from clear how a general political ethos can 
directly affect specific cultural development. The radical programme of economic and 
institutional reform of both the Reagan and Thatcher governments had been modelled on 
an ideology of commercial enterprise, in which the overriding principle of the free 
market takes precedence over any other concerns. A wide range of activities previously 
conducted on different principles, or protected from competitive market forces by means 
of public funding were relocated within the domain of the marketplace, with these goods 
or services becoming purchasable commodities. Although starting out as economic 
reconstruction, this political project increasingly spread into other spheres of 
contemporary American and British society as the phrase "enterprise culture" became the 
buzz word of the day.
The case of the British legal services best illustrates how the transformation of British 
society into an enterprising collective relates to the issue in question, since professional 
firms are among the most vigorous patrons to have emerged since the 1980s. The legal 
profession, traditionally regarded as the custodian of the law, is governed by long- 
established ethical principles; to quote, for instance, the United States Supreme Court on 
the other side of the Atlantic: "[E]arly lawyers in Great Britain viewed the law as a form 
of public service rather than as a way of earning a living and they looked down on ‘trade’ 
as unseemly. Tradition-bound as it is, the profession with its patrician air and sense 
of professional noblesse oblige has not been able to resist the impact of the Thatcherite 
Revolution. In 1989 the Conservative Government in its proposal for the future of the 
legal profession championed the competitive spirit of the enterprise culture in no 
uncertain terms:
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The [G]overnment believes that free competition between the providers of legal 
services will, through the discipline o f the market, ensure that the public is 
provided with the most effective network of legal services at the most economic 
price [italic added].^
The- commodification of legal services brought about during the course of the decade 
resulted in the provision of legal advice and skill being seen "in terms of its marketability 
as opposed to being a device in the negotiation of justice [italic added].'"* In response 
to increasing competition in the market, law firms have had to adopt the previously alien 
practices of marketing and advertising, practices which, even though they are the 
mainstay of consumerism in a capitalist economy, are traditionally closed to certain 
professions in Britain because of the public interest involved. In explaining why his law 
firm embarked on the project which they named City Life Art Commissions, Stephen 
Whybrow, senior partner at the solicitors McKenna & Co, commented:
Increased exposure to market forces and competition during the 1980s have 
resulted in enormous changes for solicitors... Like it or not the practice of law 
is moving from being a profession to a service business. In 1980 any form of 
promotion or advertising a solicitor’s practice was not only prohibited but 
considered to be "fundamentally inconsistent with the interests of the public and 
with the honour of the profession.
The Commissions, in which graduates from London art colleges were invited to 
participate in an art competition, were launched by the firm "to form a backdrop" to a 
reception to mark its return to the City of London and ensure that its clients and others 
in the City were aware of its presence.® The event, not by any means the most 
glamorous of its kind, was not untypical of the way in which art collections, together 
with arts sponsorship, came to be appropriated by business as a marketing tool in the 
’80s. The imperative of marketability in the Thatcherite enterprise culture is such that 
it draws almost every sector of business into its gravitational field, and professional 
firms, with their traditional practices, are perhaps to be seen as reluctant latecomers as 
far as jumping on the bandwagon of art patronage is concerned.
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6.1 Corporate Art Collections and Tax Issues
But more concrete than this generalised encouragement to enterprise are the tax policies 
under both governments which, by directly helping business, inadvertently make it easier 
for businesses to collect art too. These issues, however, are among the greyest and most 
sensitive areas of corporate art buying. Greyest because there are discrepancies between 
legal definitions and actual practice; most sensitive because of the actual sums of money 
involved, and what could amount to frauds involving serious legal and tax complications 
for the companies concerned. For these very reasons, the discussion that follows can not 
be as definitive and conclusive as it otherwise might be.
During the course of the Reagan administration, the most relevant tax breaks to 
encourage companies to invest in works of art were accelerated depreciation^ and 
investment tax credit.® It was reported in the media that both, in fact, "have provided 
economic incentives for building company collections."’ To what extent this is the case, 
however, is an open question. From the legal perspective, according to an anonymous 
accountant from the London Office of one of the top international accountancy firms, in 
order to qualify for these tax concessions, the taxpayer (corporation) must fulfil the 
following requirements for the property they purchase:
1. The property is used in a trade or business or for the production of income;
' 2. The property is subject to wear and tear, or decay or decline from natural
causes, to exhaustion, and to obsolescence;
3. The property has a determinable useful life and salvage value.10
This position is further clarified by the Internal Revenue Service (1RS). To quote 
Michael D. Finley, Chief of the Branch 3 at the 1RS in Washington D.C.:
Tax benefits such as depreciation, investment tax credit,... are generally available 
only if the taxpayer purchases property that has a limited or determinable useful 
life. A work of art (as contrasted with a mere wall decoration) would not 
generally have a limited or determinable useful life [italic added]."
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To what extent these legal definitions are actually applied or enforced in real life is, 
however, not altogether clear. When further questioned, the accountancy firm mentioned 
earlier stated that "... although it is generally very difficult to meet the criteria for 
investment tax credit and depreciation, it is possible to do so [italic added]. Further 
asked specifically about the actual or theoretical circumstances under which works of art 
could be depreciated, the firm refused to provide any further information, and especially 
significantly this time, the correspondence had to be "approved by" a presumably more 
senior member of staff than the one who first replied to my inquires.
The evidence both from my interviews with the companies and the questionnaire surveys 
provide further contradictory evidence as to what can be defined as legal. One 
accountant who worked for a law firm in Washington D.C. admitted that her firm was 
in the habit of depreciating their art works for some years in the ’80s before she arrived 
in 1989. However, she was not sure if that was the normal practice at the time or an 
oversight on the part of the person in charge of accounting at the firm. A different law 
firm in Washington D.C. also provided the following tax information regarding their art 
collecting:
... Pieces of art are capitalized if they cost more than $500. Pieces that cost less 
than $500 are not capitalized and are considered simply yearly expenditures. 
Some capitalized items are depreciated and some are not. Antique furnishings are 
not depreciated because they are expected to increase in value, as we hope the art 
will. There is no investment tax credit since 1986. All depreciation is 
accelerated (7 years for art work).^^
In my own survey, none of 72 valid replies admitted that tax concessions were important 
factors for companies in initiating art collecting, as compared with 70.8 percent which 
did not think it important (see Table 6.1.1). In reply to questions regarding actual tax 
benefits, 2 and 3 companies respectively out of 72 respondents confirmed that their 
companies indeed claimed investment tax credit and accelerated depreciation for their art 
works, while another two of them confirmed that they obtained tax benefits by donating 
works of art to museums (see Table 6.2.1). Another 3 companies stated that they had 
included the art purchases as part of business expenses in computing the trading profits
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for tax purposes (see Table 6.3). Small as the percentage is, the confirmation of the tax 
benefits for corporate art collecting in the United States during the ’80s is nevertheless 
illuminating and significant. Respondents are, of course, likely to be more reticent as 
far as answering questions which raise complicated legal problems, and to react more 
readily to suggestions that their art collections might be socially, rather than financially, 
motivated. Moreover, the nature of the federal system in the United States means that, 
in the absence of a uniform law code, different states may well have different laws.
The test of these issues, of course, lies ultimately in cases brought before the courts. 
While providing me with some general information, Michael D. Finley also pointed out 
that more detailed information could only be provided "if a particular taxpayer were to 
request a formal ruling on these issues in connection with a specific transaction. But 
court cases involving such issues are understandably rare. In the unusual case of 
Associated Obstetricians and Gynaecologists P.C. v. Commissioner in 1983, the 
commissioner of the 1RS determined that the taxpayer. Associated Obstetricians and 
Gynaecologists P.C. (AGO), was deficient in the payment of their federal corporate 
income taxes for 1976 and 1977 because the Tax Court determined that the taxpayer, 
AGO, could not sustain its claim that the works of art displayed in its medical offices 
were depreciable property and therefore entitled AGO to depreciation deductions and 
investment tax credits for the tax years in question.
A similar discrepancy exists between the legal position of the Inland Revenue and the 
actual practice of corporate collectors in Britain. As in the case of the 1RS, there is no 
working definition for works of art in determining tax liabilities in Britain. Rather, 
works of art collected by companies are considered to have "the status of an asset in the 
particular business, rather than with [regard to] its significance as a work of art."^^ The 
tax benefits relevant to corporate collectors in Britain are; (a) if the expenditure for art 
works is revenue in nature, then a deduction may be available when computing the 
taxable income, and (b) if the expenditure is capital in nature, and incurred on "plant and 
machinery," a deduction is allowed against taxable profits over a period of time, that is, 
through capital allowances.*^
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However, according to two sources at the Inland Revenue, in strict law, art works do not 
qualify for either revenue expenditure or capital allowances except in the following 
specific c a s e s T o  qualify for the former, the company concerned has to be an art 
dealer, where works of art are held as trading stock, which is of course not relevant to 
the kind of companies with which this study is concerned.*’ Moreover, only in certain 
instances where art works are used to create an ‘atmosphere’ in order to attract 
customers, are capital allowances available for companies such as hotels or the 
restaurants trade or stately h o m e s . N o n e  of the companies in this study is in this kind 
of business.
Although none of the companies in my survey admitted that tax concessions were at all 
important in their decision to start a corporate art collection (see Table 6.1.2), five 
companies out of 38 respondents stated that their works of art qualified as revenue 
expenditure, one of them admitted to obtaining capital allowances for their art works, and 
one to claiming capital depreciation. Six of them reclaimed the VAT (value added tax) 
on their art purchases (see Table 6.2.2). Like those in America, these percentages are 
small, but they nevertheless indicate the same sort of discrepancies between legal 
requirements and actual practice among British corporate collectors.
To double-check these replies, I interviewed an accountant at the London office of an 
international bank. There are some 1,300 pieces of art which the bank regards as 
appreciating assets, and another 1,200 pieces with some worth, but not as valuable. 
While the Bank does not depreciate the former, it does in the case of the latter as it 
would with office furniture, and it claims capital allowances for both categories of art 
works. To quote the accountant concerned, whose comment is confirmed by the staff at 
the tax department in the bank:
For tax purposes, ... they [works of art] are treated like any other asset. 
Whatever our accounting treatment is, they are treated as normal asset purchases, 
and we get capital allowances, 25 % written down.^*
How universal the practice of claiming capital allowances for art purchases is it is not
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possible to determine at this stage, but if companies are allowed to claim capital 
allowances for art works, the tax benefits accruing to them are without question 
substantial. If companies choose to sell their art holdings in due course, they are still 
much better off even if they do it legally and subject their sale to capital gains tax. What 
this means is that in a capitalist market system money is worth more today than it is 
tomorrow, and companies are always better off if they claim any tax benefit first. To 
quote the same accountant:
If the tax rules allow you a tax benefit in giving you written down allowances, 
then you would always choose to go the most tax-efficient route, and claim those 
allowances. Which may in the future year give you an inflated taxable profit, but 
it is better paying an inflated taxable profit in the year of disposal than not 
claiming any capital allowances and pay tax on a smaller profit by the time of 
disposal. If you took the net present value of both scenarios, you’d be better off 
claiming the tax today and paying a bigger profit in the year of disposal.
At this stage of the research, I have no means of precisely assessing the discrepancies 
between legal definitions and actual practices when it comes to corporate art collecting, 
as the issues involved are simply too complex and unclear to investigate further. 
Statements from chairmen as frank as the following from the pen of Robert Hiscox, are 
rare:
When business started to prosper under the penal tax rates of the 1970s it seemed 
a bit daft to pay high salaries and donate up to 83 % to the government, or worse 
still pay dividends and donate up 98% to be spent by politicians. Leaving hard- 
earned after-tax profits in the company gave me the perfect opportunity to 
persuade my fellow directors to let me buy paintings and sculpture...“
Understandably companies do not buy art on the sole basis of acquiring tax benefits, but 
under the Reagan-Thatcher administrations their privileged and dominant position in the 
contemporary art world is unequivocally reinforced by tax policies, whether or not these 
happen to be specifically geared toward art investment. Though this is a matter of 
considerable public interest, barely any criticism of prevailing practices has been voiced.
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6.2 The New Art Patrons o f the 1980s^^
It is by no means untrodden territory for American or British companies to "collect art. " 
A history of corporate art collecting, however, depends very much on our notion of what 
actually constitutes "a corporate art collection." For those who have been involved in 
corporate art patronage, particularly those with vested interests in this area, there is a 
tendency to claim a much earlier starting date, as though a particular historical pedigree 
could endow current practice with some much desired legitimacy. Accordingly, the 
history of corporate art collecting in America is often dated to the turn of the century 
when the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway first commissioned painters to depict 
the landscape and people of the American West for use in the railroad’s advertising 
calendars and p o s t e r s . I n  subsequent decades companies such as the Container 
Corporation of America^^ and De Beers Consolidated Mines embarked on similar 
ventures to add polish to their company’s publications.
The earliest example of corporate art collecting, in the sense of the term adopted in this 
study, is, however, that established by International Business Machines Corporation 
(IBM) in the late ’30s and mid-’40s, a practice in which a commercial institution took on 
the ambition of a public art museum by emulating the artistic activities of the latter. 
During this period, IBM formed two collections of contemporary art, "Contemporary Art 
of 79 Countries," featuring art works by artists from the countries in which IBM did 
business at that time, and "Contemporary Art of the United States," featuring American 
artists with two works from each state and t e r r i t o r y . The  former was displayed at the 
New York World’s Fair and at the Golden Gate International Exposition in San Francisco 
in 1939, while the latter toured North and South America between 1941 and 1945. 
Pioneering as it might be, the historical significance of this isolated undertaking should 
not be overstated.
Similarly, it has for centuries been the policy, albeit sporadic, of many British banks to 
"collect" portraits of their distinguished chairmen or members of the boards, or to 
commission silver or other precious materials to commemorate specific events (figs. 6-1 
and 6-2). Even when they incidentally ventured into landscape paintings, their tastes
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were very much confined to those of a much earlier era, or, for example, to traditional 
views of the Thames or St. Paul’s (figs. 6-3 and 6-4).^® In the case of certain industries 
such as oil and construction, companies have for years commissioned artists to portray 
their business operations or design posters for use in advertising.^^ Collections of this 
type, be it in Britain or America, either self-celebratory or business-related in nature, if 
they can be taken seriously as a "collection" in their own right, dominated, with few 
exceptions, corporate premises, in particular the interior of the boardroom and executive 
floor before the ’70s in America and ’80s in Britain.
Standing apart from this time-honoured tradition, the new breed of business patrons who 
have emerged since the beginning of the ’80s (in Britain this phenomenon gathered 
momentum in the second half of the decade), however, have a very different outlook. 
Unlike earlier collectors, they collect contemporary art works, works bearing no direct 
relationship whatsoever with their commercial day-to-day dealings. And in America (to 
a lesser degree in Britain), they have taken a more professional attitude to collecting than 
the earlier collectors, who used to purchase bits and pieces in an ad hoc fashion. Still 
hidden from public gaze, the works in their hands have been put to work to the best 
advantage in various publications and sometimes have even been organised into 
catalogues and exhibitions, in order to generate much needed publicity. The earlier 
collectors, not wishing to be left out of this trend, invariably had to assume a similar 
style of art buying. It is this cohort of patrons of a more adventurous type that has 
constituted a compelling force in the contemporary art world since the ’80s.
As the material under consideration for the purpose of this study dates only from the 
immediate past, there has as yet been no substantial research in this area except for few 
isolated cases and some journalistic w r i t i n g . T h e  primary source for a listing of 
corporate art collections in both countries is the International Directory o f Corporate Art 
Collections.^^ At the end of the ’80s, more than 1,000 American and 79 British firms 
had come to be listed therein. While the majority of the firms listed claim to own 
contemporary art, unfortunately no reliable statistics are available at this stage as to the 
significant part contemporary art plays in their collections as the listing is necessarily 
incomplete and lacking in detail. Nor is the information in the Directory necessarily
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accurate^^ and appropriate to this study. The approach of the Directory is so broad as 
to include virtually any company even if it had only a few works, such as, for instance, 
the Alexander Howden Group in London which boasted no more than six works in their 
so-called "collection. From a historical perspective, an art collection such as this is 
not historically significant or sufficient to warrant inclusion in this study.
Partly due to the dearth of secondary sources, and partly in order to exploit the wealth 
of primary sources, I have had to adopt an empirical approach to this topic, both 
qualitative and quantitative. For American corporate collections, I visited 25 of them and 
conducted 23 interviews in New York and Washington D.C. from August to November 
1990. For the British counterpart, I visited 41 collections and conducted 33 interviews 
in London mainly from March to November 1992.^ To observe the change of the ’90s, 
I returned to visit 4 collections and interviewed 7 people in 1995 in New York and 
Washington D.C. (see Appendix 3).
To determine the extent to which my conclusions from these inquiries can be applied to 
other cities in the two countries would require further investigation, but I believe that the 
phenomenon observable in these cities is more or less representative. While in America 
New York is a metropolitan city and Washington D.C. has a more intimate character, 
London, especially the City of London, has the largest concentration of corporate 
headquarters and thus corporate art collections, given that Britain itself is a very 
centralised country. To improve the representation, I conducted a questionnaire survey 
with 289 firms in America and 110 in Britain (for details of the survey methodology and 
results, see Appendix 2).
As I have visited virtually all the art collections in London except for those few to which 
access is not available, I am able to refine the definition of what constitutes a "corporate 
art collection" for the purpose of my survey to make it historically meaningful as a 
cultural phenomenon. In America, an art collection would qualify as such if the number 
of art works is not less than 100 pieces or if there is a full-time curator in charge of the 
collection. The different size of the British economy means that the criteria have to be 
modified for U.K. companies; here I lower the limit to 50 works provided that the
291
collection contains a certain number of substantial works. And at the time of my survey, 
unlike their American cousins, none of the British companies had a full-time curator, with 
the result that this particular criterion cannot be valid for British companies. The 
discussion that follows will be based on observations from my visits, from (mostly taped) 
interviews and from the survey. For reasons of confidentiality, no names of the 
companies or the individuals concerned can be mentioned.
Visits to corporate art collections provide a preliminary but crucial archaeology of how 
the art works actually function within the corporate ambience. Entering a sleek modern 
corporate office, the observer is likely to be overwhelmed by the grandeur of the 
magnificent pieces hung on the wall in the reception area, a practice especially favoured 
by American companies whose buildings with their enormous (three or four floor high) 
atriums make it possible to display and valorise art on such a grand scale and use it to 
overawe the impressionable visitor. The concentration of so many and varied economic 
activities within the square mile of the City of London, and the fact that buildings do not 
enjoy the same possibilities of vertical extension of space that the skyscrapers in a 
metropolis such as New York City confer on corporate headquarters, mean that most 
British companies have to be satisfied with relatively modest office space and thus 
correspondingly modest art works in their entrances and reception areas. An exception 
must, however, be made for those giant multinationals whose operations far transcend 
national boundaries and geographical limitations. The practice of up-marketing the look 
of corporate offices is not limited to art works in the accepted sense of the term. Off 
the reception-area coffee tables have come trade Journals such as Forbes or Fortune, and 
on have come the glossy monographs of fashionable blue-chip artists or those in the 
company’s own art collection. This phenomenon was particularly noticeable and popular 
among the law firms which I visited in Washington D.C. in 1990, but somewhat less so 
in London.
In New York, the corporate hierarchy is encoded architecturally. The chief executive’s 
suites are typically situated on the uppermost floor of a commanding tower, where 
spacious windows reveal a spectacular view of the Manhattan cityscape and Hudson 
River. Enveloped within this privileged space, art works, having no more aesthetic
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presence than wallpaper, are appropriated to the task of reinforcing the ultimate hierarchy 
of the corporate ladder, displayed in places where they are meant to be glimpsed by busy 
executives and their wealthy clients who come there to conduct business. Whereas in 
London the corporate hierarchy is not expressed through physical verticality, it is still the 
case that the chairman’s office and the executive floor have the best, which is to say the 
most expensive, pieces in their immediate physical environment.
By the 1980s self-styled financial institutions such as banks or insurance brokers were 
believed to be the most active corporate buyers of art (figs. 6-5, 6-6, 6-7, 6-8, 6-9, 6-10, 
6-11 and 6-12). While financial institutions represented 66.7 percent of the British 
companies in my survey who started their collections before 1980, the corresponding 
percentage for American companies is 41.0 percent (see Tables 6.4.1 and 6.4.2). 
However, these percentages, like those presented by others before, are relative and not 
absolute. Statistically speaking, we know very little about the real percentage of 
corporate buyers from financial houses in relation to the strength of their position in the 
economy as a whole, as compared to other industries, especially since the comparison is 
often made by collapsing a huge variety of different industries within the single category 
of manufacturing. Nor do we have any precise measure of the extent of the participation 
of any specific sector in the art market, a line of enquiry which remains to be quantified, 
always assuming that it is possible to do so.
The high percentage of financial firms engaged in art collecting should, however, come 
as no surprise. Whether we see it in terms of a post-industrial economy or late 
capitalism, one of the most marked characteristics of Western economies in the postwar 
period is the rise in importance of the so-called service sector, in which financial houses 
occupy the most central position in regard to the overall economic structure. This can 
be explained in at least two ways. Firstly, in contrast to the earlier period of capitalism 
when propertied enterprise families played an important, if not the most important, rôle 
in the economic structure, accumulating capital either individually or as a family, the 
dominant trend has been the increased concentration of share ownership in institutional 
investors, that is financial houses including insurance companies, pension funds, 
investment companies and bank trust departments. As of 1979, for instance, about 70
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percent of the stock traded on the New York Stock Exchange was owned by institutional 
i n v e s t o r s . I n  Britain, the concentration is even more marked. According to John 
Scott, these financial intermediaries owned about two-thirds of the shares of British 
companies in the late ’80s.^^
Secondly, by virtue of occupying a central position in the control and circulation of 
capital in the economy, financial firms are the locus of economic power in the 
contemporary British and American economies. Through controlling money and credit 
in their lending policies to other businesses, they are in the hegemonic position of being 
able to exercise power over other individual firms, industrial sectors and even national 
ec onomi es . I n  other words, they are not only the big creditors of other corporations, 
but they also own and administer those companies either through share ownership, or 
through the business ties established by interlocking directorships between the financial 
institutions and the top management of other industries. By virtue of this position of 
centrality within the contemporary capitalist economy, financial firms (and those who lead 
them) are in a position to make choices that not only impinge directly on the national 
economy, but also, though less visibly, impact on national culture.
But the centrality of financial firms in the British and American economies cannot of 
itself explain the important role that they played in art buying during the ’80s. With their 
sharp eyes on speculation, it is only reasonable to assume that the financial houses did 
not lose sight of the unprecedented and sometimes erratically increasing growth in art 
prices. The longest bull market in art for the last three centuries stretched from 1940 
until 1986 or so,^* culminating, as it did, in the astronomical sum of £24.75 million paid 
for Van Gogh’s Sunflowers at Christie’s in London in 1987, and the $53.9 million paid 
for his Irises at Sotheby’s in New York in November of the same year. The inflation of 
prices on the art market was such that in the late ’80s Salomon Brothers placed Old 
Masters paintings (with a staggering one-year return of 51 %) at the top of their annual 
compilation of rates of return for thirteen different asset categories.^®
This is not to suggest, however, that the rates of return on art investment are so 
uniformly high that financial firms are in fact buying art purely for investment. As a
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matter of fact, the rate of return on art varies according to a whole set of variables such 
as the reputation of the artists or the year in which it is sold.'*® What sort of return a 
collection of contemporary art can bring for financial houses is, however, a difficult issue 
to determine, especially as the period under consideration is the immediate past, which 
the very few studies carried out by economists on art investment have not yet been able 
properly to cover.'** The fact remains that, according to William N. Goetzmann, there 
has been a high correlation between art and the stock and bond markets in the twentieth 
century, and returns from the sale of paintings have rivalled the stock market in the 
second half of the century.'*^ The extent to which the art collections held by financial 
firms can be seen as investments will be ultimately put to the test if and when they 
actually sell off their collections.'*^ The chances of this happening, however, are 
remote, not only because of the high transaction costs that would be involved, but also 
because it is clear that art in their hands does indeed serve other purposes than 
straightforward investment, an issue we shall return below.
Accordingly, the financial sector remained, and has always been so since, the main force 
in corporate collecting in the 1980s. In Britain, this represented 45.7 percent of 
companies in my survey, and 36.4 percent in America, with the percentage remaining 
fairly constant over the last few decades (see Tables 6.4.1 and 6.4.2). Publications on 
the topic inevitably mention this group of buyers.'*^ In The New Patrons for instance, 
a catalogue to commemorate the exhibition on corporate collecting of the same title in 
Britain in 1992, half of the contributing lenders were from the financial sector.'*  ^ More 
precisely, almost all of these companies have their headquarters within the square mile 
of the City of London, the financial heartland of Britain with its enormous wealth and 
unique financial dominance.'*®
These financial "high-flyers” actually share the stage with three different groups of "new- 
style" patrons. Most notable among these are professional businesses, such as legal and 
accounting firms (figs. 6-13, 6-14, 6-15, 6-16, 6-17, 6-18, 6-19 and 6-20). This group 
of British patrons represents 20.0 percent in my survey and 19.7 percent for American 
companies (see Tables 6.4.1. and 6.4.2). The seriousness with which these firms took 
to art collecting was such that one of them in Washington D.C. went as far as to
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proclaim in its press release announcing an art exhibition at its head office: "Art at 
Arnold and Porter is part o f the practice [italic a d d e d ] . A n d  the extent of their 
holding was such that one journalist could pun by interchanging the names of lawyers and 
artists as if the law firm were indeed an art museum. To quote Nancy Zeldis: "It is easy 
to mistake the 23rd through 28th floors at One New York Plaza for the Fried, Frank, 
Harris, Shriver & Jacobson Museum of Contemporary Art. That title may seem as 
unlikely as a law firm called Rauschenberg, Motherwell, Lichtenstein & Schnabel. 
Similarly, in Britain, it was reported that, for professional firms in the mid-'80s, "getting 
into art was as easy as bringing out a new glossy brochure. Every self-respecting firm 
with a fashionable client list to impress was at it."** It is no wonder that, by the end 
of the ’80s, such household-name accountancy firms in London as Coopers & Lybrand, 
KPMG Peat Marwick, Ernst & Young, Arthur Andersen and Price Waterhouse had all 
jumped on the bandwagon of art collecting.^®
As we have seen, the competitive edge of the deregulated free market unleashed in the 
’80s altered the practice and the nature of these professions, in particular in Britain. 
Although one can argue that the degree of competitiveness in this particular sector is 
probably no more severe than that in others, the fact remains that lawyers and 
accountants, the producers of services, have a direct and close contact with their clients 
in a way that, for example, a company producing household goods will never enjoy.
Intimate contact of this kind with clients has made these professions particularly 
conscious of the image of the firm, especially the physical impression made on clients 
when they first visit the office. When asked to explain the purpose of the collection, an 
office services supervisor of a law firm in London stated:
I would say the purpose is for the public image of the firm,... They want to get 
away from the old-fashioned image of the lawyer. Do you know what I mean? 
Sitting there in his office, with old prints on his wall, that’s finished. Now it’s 
the corporate, big business, big deal... We have a lot a lot of people coming in... 
It’s very important that they come in and they are always very impressed.
Moreover, most law and accountancy firms are owned by partners, as opposed to a
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corporation’s faceless shareholders. Since they have to dig into their own pockets to pay 
for art purchases, and since their personal fortune is thus more at stake in the 
appreciation or depreciation of art works, their decision to enter the circle of collectors 
is all the more impressive and r evea l i ng . Two  highly publicised collections in London 
are, for example, those owned by the accountancy firms Arthur Andersen and Cooper 
Lybrand Deloitte, both among the top five accountancy firms in Britain.^^ Although the 
Andersen collection was started in the late ’60s, it was when the firm employed its first 
curator in 1984 that an aggressive streak was added to its collecting policy and the 
collection itself took on a new significance. As its then curator Glenn Sujo boasted: "It 
is a museum standard collection and is not just there to beautify the building.
The second group of art buyers is formed by the manufacturing sector, including 
retailers, producers of food products and petroleum companies (figs. 6-21, 6-22, 6-23, 
6-24, 6-25, 6-26 and 6-27). Unlike the service sector where companies have direct 
contact with clients, manufacturing industries face a multitude of "anonymous" 
consumers. In some cases they even have captive customers. For instance, the products 
of the pharmaceuticals giant Glaxo in Britain are available only on prescription.^ Lack 
of direct consumer/provider contact also categorises the conglomerates that dominated the 
corporate landscape in the ’80s. This corporate structure, which fed on the ’80s 
deregulated market of mergers and acquisitions, could, as in the case of Pearson in 
Britain, for example, combine such diverse business interests as publications, the tourist 
trade and fine china. In America, the Philip Morris Companies, for instance, not only 
make their huge profits on tobacco, but also own companies which produce a wide range 
of consumer goods such as Maxwell House coffee, Philadelphia cheese and Milka and 
Toblerone chocolates. No ordinary customer, either in the UK or America, is likely to 
be aware of this sort of conglomerate m arketing.N evertheless the need to keep the 
company’s name in the minds of the major markets cannot be underestimated. As 
consumers grow more sophisticated, so they are able to interpret consumer brands as part 
of a wider complex of company ownership, and it cannot be long before they become 
aware of what insiders refer to as the "meta-brand" of the parent company sheltering 
behind the multiplicity of different brand names.
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Although manufacturing companies as a whole may not be as active on the art market as 
financial houses, the collections owned by the giants in this sector, such as Joseph E. 
Seagram & Sons and the Gilman Paper Company in New York, and ICI, BOC and 
Unilever in Britain, are widely known and acclaimed. This is of course more a reflection 
of the financial strength of these companies than anything else. In particular those 
collections in New York are on a much larger scale and more sophisticated in type than 
those in other cities in America, and they provide an important rôle model for latecomers 
to the art market to emulate. First of all, the corporations headquartered in New York 
are generally the leading companies in their respective sectors. By virtue of their 
economic superpower, it was these companies that pioneered art collecting at a time when 
the price for the artists of the ’50s and ’60s was relatively low. Today these collections, 
which often comprise thousands of works, have a more intensive holding of works by 
"blue-chip" artists than those formed in the ’70s and ’80s.
What qualifies them for inclusion in the league of what I refer to as "the new patrons" 
is, however, not the sheer size of their collection, but the concerted way in which they 
utilised their collections to emulate the practice of art museums during the ’80s. For 
instance, Joseph E. Seagram, having started collecting in 1957 and having by the ’70s 
established an art department staffed by full-time curators, organised art exhibitions at 
what they call the "Fourth-floor Gallery" at their New York headquarters, and exhibited 
sculpture on the wide plaza of their landmark building designed by Ludwig Mies van der 
Rohe (fig. 6-28). Acting as if it had become a museum in its own right, the company 
also toured part of their collection to several cities in Canada, completing the exercise 
by publishing a catalogue, a theme to which we shall return later.
Similarly, Unilever, ICI and BOC are all industrial blue-chip companies in Britain, and 
their art collections, while nowhere as big as those of comparable companies in the US, 
are well located on the exclusive art circuit with their contingents of professional 
cognoscenti. The Unilever collection, which had started to purchase contemporary 
British art in 1980, had over 300 works by 1991,^* culminating in a catalogue with the 
grand-sounding historical title of Unilever House London Contemporary Art Collection: 
the First Twelve Years. In the introduction to this catalogue, Unilever was praised for
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"[keeping] abreast of the changing climate of the 1980s" in the development of British
art/^
Although the TI Group art collection was not actually initiated in the ’80s, it does provide 
an insight into the ultimate relationship that corporate art collections sometimes have with 
the Conservative government. "Recognising the importance of supporting young artists 
and strengthening the link between industry and the arts,"^ TI sponsored their own 
Group Scholarships at the Royal College of Art in late 1992, a scheme which won it a 
£20,000 cash award from the Business Sponsorship Incentive Scheme (BSIS), which, as 
we have seen in Chapter 3, had originally been established by the Thatcher Government. 
As part and parcel of their association with the Royal College, TI started its own art 
collection, with the aim of "selecting paintings by promising young artists, either 
graduating or past students from the Royal College of Art, and following their work as 
they develop over the years. The significance of the BSIS for the Group art 
collection is explicitly recognised by their inclusion of a reference, on their collection 
postcard pack, not only to the award as such, but also to the fact that "The BSIS is a 
Government Scheme" (fig. 6-29). This is in some ways tantamount to claiming political 
validation for the Company’s decision to enter the art collecting market.
The third group of patrons consists of property developers (figs. 6-30, 6-31, 6-32, 6-33,
6-34 and 6-35).^^ As one American writer boldly proclaimed in 1987: "Art has become 
a hot commodity in development projects, and many developers now perceive it as a 
necessity. While the trend in Britain is not as pervasive as it is in America, where 
the National Endowment for the Arts has been in the forefront of advocating "art in 
public places" since the 1960s,^ there are many reasons for making developers into a 
special category of art consumers in both countries. First of all, whether it be in 
America or in Britain, the motivation of developers to enter the field of art patronage is 
first and foremost for sales purposes, a motivation that the title of a The New York Times 
article tellingly spells out: "Marketing real estate with a r t . T h i s  is despite the fact 
that, as a recent empirical study has pointed out, art provision in property development 
does not actually add short-term value to the buildings in terms of an immediate increase 
in rental income, but is perceived to be connected to the incremental marketability of a
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development, the rewards from which are seen in terms of "ease of promotion, and a 
greater speed of letting or disposal. Unlike other social facilities, such as health 
clubs, shopping centres or restaurants which have a measurably functional impact on a 
development, art displays, however peripheral they may be, are part of a wider strategy 
of what could be termed "quality" enhancement for a development. By displaying what 
seem to be functionless objects in an apparently disinterested way, real estate 
entrepreneurs are actually capitalising on the high social status that comes with the 
possession of ‘art.’ The value of the art objects that they are exploiting comes from a 
socially constructed perception in which judgements of utility play no part.
This is particularly true of the two outstanding speculative office developments launched 
in the decade of the 1980s on each side of the Atlantic, that is, the Equitable headquarters 
in New York and the 29-acre Broadgate Development near Liverpool Street Station in 
London (figs. 6-36, 6-37, 6-38, 6-39 and 6-40). The construction of the latter, described 
by Margaret Thatcher, when she inaugurated the Broadgate complex in 1985, as the 
largest development in the City of London since the Great Fire of 1666,^^ was only 
made possible for the developers, Rosehaugh and Stanhope, by the easing of planning 
restrictions in the City of London in the mid 1980s. This coincided with the prospect of 
a large increase in tenant demand following the deregulation of the financial markets, and 
with the easy availability of credit to finance new building p r o j e c t s . D e s p i t e  
differences in scale. Equitable and Broadgate share many common features, one of which 
is their both being situated in socially diverse areas of the metropolis where affluence and 
poverty are only a few streets a p a r t . T o  rescue their properties from the undesirable 
associations of their environments and to raise the status of the neighbourhood, the 
developers had to do everything in their power to present a new up-market image, and 
here art works naturally had an important rôle to play (figs. 6-41, 6-42, 6-43 and 6-44). 
The success of Broadgate invites parallels with the Rockefeller Centre in New York.^°
The majority of works invested in by developers for siting in commercial and industrial 
developments are sculptures, an art form not favoured by most business collectors. 
Despite the fact that the number of works owned by these developer patrons is much
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smaller than those in company collections, their monetary value is immense. The dozen 
or so sculptures in the Broadgate Development, for instance, are reported to have cost 
the developers one million pounds, far exceeding the initial budget that any British 
company has spent on art purchases .Simi lar ly ,  as we have already seen, the art 
commission at the Equitable Life Assurance Society in New York was reported to have 
cost the company $7.5 million.
"Big money" is not, of course, the only point that matters here. It is the visual impact 
that these sculptures, along with their architectural settings, have made on the fabric of 
the urban landscape, that constitutes their true and lasting value. As a function of the 
need to make a "quality" statement on the location where they are sited, these sculptures 
are, more often than not, striking above all by their scale, by their sheer physicality and 
high visibility in such an unlikely setting as an urban centre. Their vast physical 
presence holds office commuters as captive spectators, and deprives them of any choice 
as to whether or not they actually wish to look at them. For instance, one cannot 
possibly pass Richard Serra’s overwhelming "Fulcrum" without being forcibly struck by 
its five huge rusty sheets of steel, each 60 feet high, straddling one of the exits from 
Liverpool Street Station (fig. 6-45).
Last but not least, the art objects purchased by developers, unlike those in corporate 
collections where works are privately displayed in offices, are on "public" display. But, 
unlike the sort of public art advocated by public art agencies, art works in real estate 
developments are not "public" in the true sense of the word. Despite the claim made for 
them that they are "accessible for public viewing," not everyone has equal access to 
them. In some instances only privileged individuals prove to have access, as in the case 
of Howard Hodgkin’s "Wave" mural displayed in the Broadgate Club at the Broadgate 
Development. Moreover, public access is often illusory insofar as the objects are 
actually displayed on "corporatised" public spaces where round-the-clock surveillance 
operates through hidden electronic systems and the constant presence of security guards 
throughout the complex.
Beyond these three groups of patrons, there is another phenomenon that is worthy of
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passing note in the present context. As metropolitan cities, London and New York have 
a large number of resident foreign companies. These subsidiaries or branches very often 
possess an art collection if their parent companies back home are themselves active in art 
collecting. The question that then arises is how such collections are to be categorised. 
The way in which they operate is a function not of their locus but of their origin. This 
is especially true in the case of American firms with branches in London. Their 
collections are determined less by any British context than by policies originating from 
their parent companies, all the more so in the case of American multinationals which first 
started the trend of art buying in the United S t a t e s . A s  American multinationals 
globalise the world market, so they export their concept of corporate art collecting. 
Collections of overseas companies originating from America will reflect above all their 
own country of origin, with the result that such art collections take on an additional 
cultural dimension, that of expressing and displaying national pride and identity in foreign 
environments. Business art, though often self-serving, can also find itself playing an 
ambassadorial rôle.
6.3 Why do Companies Buy Contemporary Art?
The Role o f the Corporate Elite
Among the companies which I personally visited, the chief executive or chairman, or, in 
the case of professional firms, the senior partner(s), is the pivotal figure when it comes 
to the initiation of art collections. In my survey, the personal interest of these top 
management executives in launching a corporate art collection is confirmed by the 
exceptionally high ranking given to executive personal initiatives: 85.7 percent of 
American companies and 89.3 percent of their British counterparts grading this particular 
consideration as "fairly/very important" (see Tables 6.1.1 and 6.1.2).^^ The significant 
rôle that the corporate élite plays in corporate collections is further confirmed by the fact 
that it is they who often take the initiative of starting a corporate art collection. More 
than half of the collections in both the American and British surveys were reported to 
have been started by the CEO, chairman or managing director of the company (see
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Tables 6.5.1 and 6.5.2). It is also they who are often the decision-makers when it comes 
to actually purchasing the works. 62.3 percent of American companies in the survey and 
65.7 percent of British companies reported to this effect (see Tables 6.6.1, 6.6. lA, 6.6.2 
and 6.6.2A). These individuals in the top echelons of the company are often reported, 
in both the press and in the interviews which I conducted with the company staff, as 
having a great personal passion for art. Despite the many demands and pressures of their 
administrative timetables, they find time to visit galleries, artists’ studios and the 
principal auction houses, where they sometimes personally make their company’s 
purchases. To quote two of them:
I say "we" started to buy works of art; I mean that I did, since I was appointed 
to a one-man committee to do it."^ '*
I do enjoy contemporary art and have great fun with it. It’s rather pleasant relief 
from the other activities one gets up to here.^^
Similarly, a managing partner of a law firm in Washington D.C., who is enthusiastic 
about his own efforts at creating the firm’s art collection described his involvement as 
being due not only to his position, but also to his "love of art":
If I don’t enjoy doing it, I probably will delegate someone else to do it. You 
have to put yourself into it. I enjoyed meeting Ms X [their art consultant] and 
talking to her."^ ^
It may seem surprising, at least on the surface, that a senior manager should be so 
personally involved in collecting, especially if we compare his five-figure art budget with 
his duties of overseeing a business venture worth, in some cases, billions on the stock 
market.
The advocacy of these high-powered grey-suited men in a company’s foray into art 
collecting has, however, to be considered within a wider context, that of the way in 
which, as capitalism develops, high culture functions in society. The "alliance between 
class and culture," as Paul DiMaggio described it, still, of course, continues,^ with the
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modification that, in recent decades, especially the 1980s, this alliance has increasingly 
become one between business and culture, with corporations replacing the upper classes 
as high culture’s leading patrons/^ The archetype of the nineteenth-century magnate- 
collector has ceased to have validity as a result of the gradual decline of family capitalism 
in the twentieth century. The new company patrons of the 1980s occupy a curiously 
intermediate position within the development and transformation of family capitalism into 
institutional capitalism, and find a somewhat anomalous place in the uneasy coexistence 
of the two within the business community today.
No better example of the transitional phase of this transformation can be found than in 
individuals such as David Rockefeller. Being in charge of the Chase Manhattan Bank for 
almost three decades until he retired in 1981, he was at the centre of the financial arm 
of the Rockefeller empire, a family fortune made by his grandfather John D. Rockefeller 
in the Standard Oil Company in the last century, which by the 1880s controlled nearly 
90 percent of the nation’s oil p r od uc t io n . Whi l e  David Rockefeller epitomises the 
grand persona of the tycoon of a bygone era, he was, at the same time, able to initiate 
a corporate art collection for the bank in 1959 by virtue of his position at the top of the 
corporate structure of Chase Manhattan Bank. Many critics see this as a decisive turning 
point in the history of corporate art.
The majority of the chairmen/chief executives who figure in this study are, however, 
essentially different from Rockefeller in not having the benefit of inherited wealth behind 
them. They are professional managers, or what John Kenneth Galbraith calls "industrial 
bureaucrats," the product of what is commonly referred to as the "managerial 
revolution," and their aspirations for the companies under their control to become art 
patrons are therefore realised more through their corporate position than through family 
lineage. This is not necessarily to suggest that they are not the dominant class in British 
or American society, or that their interests are always distinct from those of the 
capitalists, as the theory of managerialism posits." As we have seen in our 
Introduction, the top managerial world is, and has continued to be, peopled by an 
economically privileged class whose wealth gives them also social and educational 
prominence in both countries. A classic example of this is Sir Nicholas Goodison, who
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single-handedly started an art collection at the former TSB, the sixth-largest UK bank, 
when he became its chairman in 1989.*  ^ Sir Nicholas is, of course, not an up-from- 
nowhere achiever. Born into a banking family, he had worked at the family firm, Quilter 
Goodison, between 1958 and 1988*  ^while at the same time holding several directorships 
of other prominent concerns, including the top prize of the chairmanship of the London 
Stock Exchange (1976 to 1988) before he joined the bank.^
What makes the case of Nicholas Goodison particularly interesting are the several other 
hats he wears in the art world, showing a rare versatility which the arts correspondent 
Antony Thorncroft encapsulated when he described him as "an unregenerate arts 
committee man."®  ^ His other hats include the chairmanship of the Courtauld Institute 
of Art (since 1982), that of the National Art Collections Fund (since 1986), and the 
directorship of the English National Opera (since 1977, and vice chairman since 1980). 
Writing about his company’s art collection, he chose to entitle his article "Art is Life. " 
Such grandiloquence may well, of course, accurately reflect Sir Nicholas’s personal 
philosophy of life, but it succeeds at the same time in masking a remarkable conflation 
of the private and the corporate, an appropriation by an individual of the sort of high- 
sounding rhetoric that no collective corporate body would dare to use to justify its 
ambitions in the art world.
On the institutional level, a corporate art collection represents a desire on the part of a 
company to claim an active part, as a distinct and recognisable entity, in the cultural life 
of contemporary society. Alex Bernstein, chairman of the Granada Group in Britain, 
acknowledged as much when he said: "I believe that companies have some obligation to 
take over the role of private patronage. Just as importantly, if more subtly, these 
chairmen/chief executives, being on an individual level the guiding hands behind their 
company collections, have also been able to appropriate the social status and value which 
come with being the head of a company which invests seriously in art, what Bourdieu 
refers to as the "cultural capital." The parallel relationship between a corporate art 
collection and the company, and its chairman, highlights the fact that it takes more than 
the mere whim of the chairman to initiate a corporate collection. The cultural edge that 
their corporate position earns them means that, in some cases, as these highly mobile and
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powerful chief executives move from company to company, they start collecting art 
wherever they preside/^
Relocation of Firms
Beyond initiatives from top management, the most determining factor that induces 
companies to venture into art collecting is the relocation or renovation of their 
headquarters. In my survey, 79.4 percent of American companies and 62.1 percent of 
British firms cited this as a "fairly/very important reason" for their launching their art 
collection (see Tables 6.1.1 and 6.1.2). The building spree of the 1980s property boom, 
especially in Britain at the end of the decade when there was an over-supply of offices, 
saw more and more companies moving into new purpose-built office developments. In 
terms of physical space, there is a fundamental difference between New York and 
London. London has the highest concentration of company headquarters or head offices 
of foreign firms, despite the fact that space in London, unlike the rational rectangular 
sites of New York or Washington D.C. is determined and limited by historical accident, 
and can neither expand horizontally for physical reasons,*® nor vertically because of the 
constrains imposed by planning requirements. The lack of space is particularly severe 
within the square mile of the City of London, which boasts by far the largest number of 
domestic and foreign banks of any city of the world. What this means is that whereas 
the New York collections can afford to go in for exceptionally large canvasses, in 
keeping with the trend of contemporary art, the scale of works bought by their British 
counterparts tends to be considerably smaller. Only high-profile office buildings, such 
as the Broadgate complex, built during the ’80s property boom have the sort of large 
atrium and office space which lends itself particularly well to the display of impressive, 
large-scale art.
Moving office is an infrequent but significant decision for any company and provides a 
fitting opportunity to refurbish the firm’s corporate image, which can only be enhanced 
by its choice of a prestigious building.*^ Relocation always entails a huge budget for 
the purposes of decorating the new offices and here art is considered as an essential 
component of space furbishment. Out go the fusty architectural prints and legal cartoons;
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in come the large bright paintings. As Harry Anderson, the partner responsible for the 
art collection at the London law firm Herbert Smith when it moved to Broadgate, is 
reported to have observed:
We were trying to produce an uplifting environment. It sounds a bit pompous, 
but that’s what we were trying to do.^
Enhancing the Working Environment
The most often cited purpose of art collections is to enhance the working environment, 
for the benefit of the staff as well as of the clients. To quote different companies’ own 
words:
Windlesham houses an art collection to enhance the visual quality of the building 
for those who work in it.®*
Give staff, customers and visitors an opportunity to experience art in a business 
environment...
... by displaying work from our collection, we bring enjoyment to our clients and 
employees, and we enrich our corporate life.®^
However, these statements of objectives, often made with public consumption in mind, 
say nothing about how the staff really perceive the collection. There has not been, and 
will probably never be, any independent survey to examine whether the collection has 
indeed achieved all its proclaimed aims.®^
Nor did any real evidence to support these claims come to light during my sixty-five or 
so visits to company premises in the two countries. The casual conversations which I had 
with employees lower down the corporate hierarchy more often than not showed the 
contrary, despite the fact that senior managers who initiated the collections were more 
than enthusiastic to show me around. The staff, buried beneath piles of papers, were 
much surprised to see an outside visitor busy taking notes and photographs of art works
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to which, despite their daily contacts, they themselves felt indifferent. Not being self- 
conscious and therefore uninhibited by the presence of a tape-recorder, they expressed 
their opinions more freely than they would have done in structured interviews.
The fact that contemporary art has been removed from the white and blank walls of art 
museums and placed in the more "congenial" surroundings of corgorate space does not 
necessarily make it any the less difficult to appreciate, or even demystify it, for people 
who are not at home in the art world. One secretary commented that she could put up 
with the work in front of her only because she could see her boss approaching from his 
reflection in the painting’s glass (fig. 6-46). Another, commenting on a series of 
minimalistic works in front of her, ventured the opinion that she could have done just as 
well herself (fig. 6-47). In some cases the view of the works is actually obscured by 
filing boxes (figs. 6-48 and 6-49). Lack of appreciation is not limited, of course, to 
secretaries. A London banker, whom one might not have expected to have had such 
outspoken views, gave the following appreciation of his firm’s collection:
The money which we have spent on our many pictures has been largely wasted 
for the tastes of the more conservative employees (myself included). Modern art 
abounds and it does not really say anything to us and certainly does not cheer us 
up! Many of us have taken to pinning up our own pictures which we like, to give 
us something aesthetically pleasing.®^
As a matter of fact, art in offices can be said only to reinforce the corporate hierarchy; 
the higher one is on the corporate ladder, the more expensive pieces one gets in one’s 
office, except for more public areas such as the reception lobby where the choicest 
pictures are naturally hung. Not every company will rehang paintings elsewhere if an 
employee happens to dislike them. One office manager observed: "If they don’t like it, 
tough!", while the chief executive of a financial firm stated: "It’s [the painting] where it 
looks best. No. It stays there." From an employee’s point of view, artworks in the 
office serve at best as "conversation pieces" for casual chats. Works by Georg Baselitz 
in one London bank, for example, always invite comments from visitors stich as, "Oh, 
your pictures are hung upside down" (fig. 6-50).
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Art as Investment
Considering that financial houses with their keen eyes on speculation are the predominant 
buyers on the corporate art market, it seems surprising that so few companies actually 
agree that investment is an important factor in launching an art collection. In the survey, 
only 14.3 percent of American companies and 10.7 of British companies admitted that 
investment is a "fairly/very important" factor (see T ÿ les 6.1.1 and 6.1.2). It is, 
however, paradoxical in a world of profit-making that firms should be so keen to 
disassociate their collecting from the money-making process to which they are 
professionally devoted. One of the firms in Washington D.C. was ready to deny that 
their collecting had any investment incentive behind it: "We’ve never purchased art as 
an investment, but rather for the beauty and interest it adds to our workplace. Half 
of the firms visited in Washington D.C. admitted investment as being one of the purposes 
of their collections. But they were quick to qualify it as one factor, and not the only or 
the primary reason for their collecting art works.
However, inflated prices in the art markets of the ’80s were certainly not lost on 
corporate art buyers. An article in Fortune succinctly entitled: "The big payoff in 
corporate art" quotes the example of a Gilbert & George photo-collage bought by the 
First Bank System in Minneapolis for $10,000 in the early ’80s and which had 
appreciated in value to an estimated $35,000 a few years later.^ It is true that dealing 
in contemporary art is a much more risky undertaking than trading in old masters, and 
the British Rail Pension Fund’s collection, the only collection in Britain set up purely for 
investment, has not been willing to take the risk of buying contemporary w o r k s . B u t  
the other side of the coin is that when rates of inflation are running high, art does indeed 
provide "reasonable prospects for long-term capital appreciation, at least equal to 
inflation. In fact senior managers often express their views on art as investment in 
somewhat defensive terms:
They [works of art] were not intended as an investment, although they have 
turned out to be rather a good one.^°°
If you ask me personally whether or not I think in ten years it [the collection] will 
be worth more money than we paid for it, I think it will. But if you start thinking 
of paintings as an investment, well, I don’t.
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The utility of art as investment is also underscored by the fact that, while the sort of 
"decorative" prints that businesses such as hotels or motels used to purchase will not 
retain their purchase value, a collection of fine art certainly will. Frank Carioti, curator 
of Standard Oil of Indiana’s collection, put it when explaining why their collection turned 
out to be a "wise investment" :
So-called "decorator" art is virtually worthless from the moment it’s hung on the 
wall. Fine art has immediate resale value and will probably appreciate in value 
in time.^°^
Image Making
Even if art were ever to underperform on the market, its attraction as a status-conferring 
object is perennial. The connection between art, power and social status has been 
consistent since the Renaissance, and it would be naïve to suppose that the rôle of art in 
commercial and business environments could be other than status-enhancing. As Paul 
DiMaggio explains: "[cultural goods] are consumed for what they say about their 
consumers to themselves and to others, as inputs into the production of social relations 
and identities. The title of an article on corporate art in The New York Times makes 
the point even more clearly: "Projecting an image — you are what you buy."^^ When 
ICI, the world chemical giant, completed the renovation of its London headquarters in 
1988, it proudly drew attention to its art collection, and the company’s glossy brochure 
boasted:
We might have chosen safe traditional paintings for this purpose, but we decided
instead to capture some of the diversity, challenge and vitality of contemporary
British painting, so as to parallel ICI’s approach to modern business life.^°^
Marketing the image of an art patron is clearly not the same as a conventional product 
promotion, which comprises straightforward selling strategies. In a global market of 
sharp competition where products and services are becoming less and less distinguishable, 
for a company the only effective means of differentiating themselves from other 
competitors is to have an "enlightened" corporate image. And art, or the arts in general.
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is something which is ultimately promotable. As John Hoole states in Capital Painting, 
the catalogue for an exhibition devoted to the City’s art-buying companies, in a message 
directed at corporate non-collectors:
To those other companies that are not represented here the gallery would like to 
append a note both of reprobation and encouragement. Some of your competitors 
have had the insight and flair to recognise the importance of art in the creation of 
their business image. As Max Bialystock said, ‘You’ve got to have style.
Even if art collecting can elevate companies above the shabby cut-and-thrust of the 
business world, collecting contemporary art is no automatic choice. Not every company 
is willing to take a risk with contemporary art. Contemporary art does, however, have 
undeniable appeal insofar as it gives access to the fashionable cult of artistic personality 
as well as enabling a company to project an image of itself as progressive and innovative. 
As Roy Chapman, managing partner of the Arthur Andersen London office comments: 
"We have pictures to enhance and enliven the working environment. We are attempting 
to convey an image that is contemporary and progressive [italic a d d e d ] . I n  London 
the overall picture is a mixed one. There is, however, a strong bias towards 
contemporary art, with contemporary art works taking over the boardroom (figs. 6-51, 
6-52, 6-53 and 6-54), which used to feature antique furniture and decor (figs. 6-55 and 
6-56). Some established merchant banks, of course, inevitably resist the change, seeing 
in it no doubt as creeping Americanism. In particular in the City of London the old style 
of business was, and in some quarters still is, conducted on the principle of a relaxed 
milieu within the old-boy network and the world of gentlemen’s agreements.
The essence of this "brand differentiation," so to speak, is similarly observable in 
American companies, although by and large they are less concerned with traditions and 
historical associations than their British cousins. While in some instances long- 
established (which is to say, more than a century old) law firms continue to display 
antiques and old prints either to reinforce, or project an image of, their sense of history 
and stability (figs. 6-57 and 6-58), collecting contemporary art works is more generally 
perceived as progressive and forward-looking. To quote a lawyer in Washington D.C.:
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We want to have art that is in some way consistent with our vision of the time we 
are living and the future. We did not want nineteenth-century art; we did not 
want old prints from England... Many Washington law firms have old prints of 
horses in England on their walls. Well, my own view is that’s boring. No one 
in our firms, to my knowledge, wants to do that. I think it’s a mistake for us to 
do that.'°®
Nowhere are these "bankable images" realised more effectively than in the case of First 
Bank System in Minneapol i s ,whose contemporary art collection, started in 1980, 
generated more media attention than any collection of comparable size. It, for example, 
made the headlines when it overrode the objections of the American Legion and the local 
police, and refused to remove an Andy Warhol print of Mao Tse-tung which it was 
e x h i b i t i n g . T h e  master patron of the programme was Dennis Evans, known as a 
bond-market "whiz-kid" (he was former president and chief operating officer of First 
Bank and had also served on the board of Minneapolis’s Walker Art C e n t e r ) , a n d  it 
was he who declared that the programme was started as one of "several ways to help the 
ship to deregulate," and "as symbolic of the bank’s aggressive leadership in the newly 
deregulated banking industry [italic a d d e d ] . O v e r  the decade, the Bank launched 
a series of art programs such as TalkBack, Controversy Corridor and You Be the Curator 
to "flatten and democratize the power dynamics of people’s relationship to art and to each 
other in the corporate context.""^ According to the Bank’s own Visual Arts Program 
Manifesto [sic], the Program is:
... an organizational transformation tool, an agent of change which acts as a 
catalyst for the ongoing examination of this corporate culture... We are involved 
with some of the most provocative artists working today because we believe that 
only through active engagement with innovative, critical cultural practices can we 
progress as an organization and a community in the flux of a changing world... 
We are committed to forging new, more democratic relationships between people 
and the art of our time."'^
In the absence of any first-hand knowledge of the bank, it is difficult to judge what this 
might really have meant for the bank’s eniployees, for example. The fact remains that 
the bank thrived on an image of being "controversial" and "progressive," as a company 
"deeply involved in social change. " This policy of espousing the avant-garde no doubt
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had a certain shock value, but only as long as the phenomenon itself could be contained 
and was not allowed to offend prevailing susceptibilities. This danger is well illustrated 
by what happened to the bank’s scheduled exhibition Artside Out, which it held in 
conjunction with Film in the Cities, a Minneapolis/St. Paul’s arts organisation. Though 
the information was censored out of the bank’s own publications, the second of the two 
billboard art shows which it sponsored was turned into diJuried competition, because the 
bank "balked" at being associated with three of the artists presented in the show, whose 
works it considered to be "too controversial.""^
Part and parcel of image making is the need to impress the public and to cultivate some 
sort of perception of business aspiring to provide Renaissance-type patronage and it is 
within this perspective that most companies claim to buy art in order to support living 
American and British artists. It is true in a sense that most British companies have a 
British-only buying policy, with companies based in Scotland purchasing only Scottish 
art or works representing Scottish subjects. The high-profile Robert Fleming collection, 
for example, is reportedly the largest collection of Scottish art in private hands: "Our real 
idea is not just to build up a collection but in some way to foster Scottish art and to try 
to help some of the younger artists," remarked Bill Smith, a retired director acting as the 
keeper of the collection."®
Similarly in America, because of the federal system, companies are anxious not only 
demonstrate national, but also civic, pride. The fourteen collections which I visited in 
Washington D.C. afford a typical insight into the situation. With only two exceptions, 
they were formed in the ’80s. Most of the works included are not only contemporary 
American, but they also have a large percentage of works by local artists, with between 
50 to 80 percent of works originating from the ’80s. F. David Fowler, managing partner 
of the Washington office of the accounting firm KPMG Peat Marwick, and the driving 
force behind its art collection, made it clear why one of its purchasing criteria had to be 
that of the artists concerned working in the greater Washington area:
For over 80 years. Peat Marwick has been an active partner in the Greater
Washington business community... Now we are partners in the arts, as well.
Our collection honours the creativity and vitality of the Greater Washington arts
community and demonstrates our commitment to the community we serve.
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By supporting local artists, businesses are also able to appropriate to themselves historical 
precedents, claiming, for example, that they are emulating Renaissance patrons and 
seeing themselves thereby as late twentieth-century Medicis. While British businessmen 
are, because of different national sensitivities, somewhat more modest, American 
businessmen do not hesitate to make use of this sort of historical precedent, not only in 
the case of top managers on an individual level, but also as regards the corporation as a 
whole. The frequency of such historical references in the media is extraordinary: 
"Business Brief: Medicis of the Corporate World," "The Medici and the Multinationals," 
"The Modern-Day Medicis," and "Modern Medicis," to name but a few of many similar 
eye-catching article titles (fig. 6-59)."* Carrying this grand idea to the extreme, the 
Equitable in New York named its fourteen private dining rooms after artists such as Alex 
Katz, Lee Krasner and Milton Avery, to whose work each room is individually 
devoted."^
This is, of course, so because the significance and achievement of the Renaissance in 
Western civilisation as a historico-cultural phenomenon have always been somewhat 
mysteriously canonised in the public perception. More obviously exploitable is the 
Medicis’ joint rôle as bankers and art patrons, with which modern business indulging in 
the art market can so easily and facilely identify. To persuade other CEOs to emulate 
the grand style of the Medicis, Herbert Schmertz, director and vice president of the 
Mobil Oil Corporation, not only drew the parallel but even up-dated it:
The Medici were continually under competitive and sometimes military — 
pressure from four other superpowers in Italy itself. Our situation is different 
only in that it’s on a broader worldwide scale. The Medici were in a tough 
business — cloth-trading and banking — something like Wall Street and the New 
York Garment District combined. And that sort of commerce was so novel they 
had to make up the rules as they went along.
Yet, unless we bear in mind the fact that the economic conditions of the artist and his or 
her artistic production are not necessarily in a cause-and-effect relationship, and if we fail 
to take into account the extent to which the economic and political ambitions of present-
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day corporations differ so fundamentally from those that characterised the Italian 
Renaissance, we might be liable to mistake corporate rhetoric for aspirational truth. 
American business, according to Jerry C. Welsh, an executive of American Express, is 
"a logical inheritor of America’s social and cultural conscience,... With our size and 
power comes the responsibility to seek new avenues to unleash the power of American 
business in ways which contribute to the general welfare of our country.
To give preference to local and younger artists is, nevertheless, not just a matter of social 
altruism, but one of pragmatism also. It is not because American or British executives 
do not wish to play lavishly on the international art market in the same way as the 
Japanese, for example, do. The exorbitant prices for blue-chip artists are such that only 
very few companies have the resources to play with such high stakes. When asked the 
reason why his company decided to collect contemporary British art, William Backhouse, 
chief operating officer at Baring Asset Management, explained: "Old masters were out 
of our price bracket, very modern would not have appealed to my colleagues, so we 
narrowed the field to contemporary British. By buying the works of young artists, 
businesses can aim to get "quality art at reasonable prices while demonstrating civic 
pride, and at the same time hope that the artists they have in stock may become 
tomorrow’s Van Goghs or Picassos.
The dynamics of this image-making machinery are certainly not limited to merely 
displaying art works on company premises. Not only has the conventional method of 
producing a catalogue been exploited to give an aura of permanence and scholarship to 
the collection, but increasingly art works have been reproduced to enliven the look and 
enhance the appearance of annual reports and other company brochures. Those dull 
monochrome annual reports, full of photographs of dark-suited male directors (figs. 6-60 
and 6-62), have been replaced by ones, still of course portraying predominantly men, 
decorated with splashes of bright colour and abstract shapes (figs. 6-61 and 6-63). And 
in one case, a full page in a recruitment brochure is devoted to explaining the ten art 
works that are lavishly reproduced in it (fig. 6-64).^^
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6.4 Legitimising Corporate Art
Yet, the mere ownership of art, however much it may contribute to an "enlightened" 
corporate image, is not automatically an indication of any particular cultural sensitivity, 
especially for more sophisticated audiences. However lucrative the art market may be 
seen as being, few companies venture into art buying without taking the precaution of 
enlisting the guidance of art consultants of some kind. The increase in business buyers 
during the ’80s (in America, since the ’70s) has spawned an equal surge of consultants 
of varied calibre catering for this specific market, what a New York Times journalist 
called "a cottage industry of art counsellors. These range from one-man/woman 
enterprises to companies like Art for Offices [5/c] in London, whose large warehouse 
showroom in Wapping displays works from a collective stable of some 600 artists. In 
America, the scale of the phenomenon is even larger and more institutionalised, with 
trade associations such as the Association of Corporate Art Curators, and the National 
Association for Corporate Art Management established in the early ’SOs.^ ®^ Both in 
America and Britain, the intensity of corporate collecting is such that the subject has 
received the accolade of academia and now forms part of some university courses of the 
’90s.
These art advice industries and individuals who work professionally within the corporate 
sector are of great significance to this study in that, whether they act as in-house curators 
or outside art consultants for corporations, they function as gatekeepers, as it were, for 
business buyers, or what Jack Boulton, former art purchaser for Chase Manhattan Bank, 
called "art traffic controllers."^^® It is a position for which Frances Chaves, curator for 
the Reader’s Digest’s collection claims a privileged status: "A museum curator has to 
stand back and wait for the die to be cast. A corporate curator can go out and make art 
history. While day-to-day administrative structures vary from firm to firm, the 
backgrounds of these curators or consultants are surprisingly homogenous. Like museum 
curators, they share both academic credentials in art history, very often with advanced 
degrees, along with equally impressive museum experience. In a report from the mid- 
’80s, for example, one discovers four corporate curators in Manhattan who received 
master’s degrees from the Institute of Fine Arts at the New York Univers ity While
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academic credentials may not of themselves be a professional qualification, additional on- 
the-job museum experience certaihly is. Jack Boulton, for example, who has a master’s 
degree in Media Studies, not only boasts five years’ museum experience as director of 
Cincinnati’s Contemporary Art Center, but he was also a founding trustee of New York’s 
pioneering New Museum, and an adviser to the National Endowment for the Arts.
These arbiters of taste, in particular those who have held prominent positions in public 
art museums, have, by virtue of moving freely between the museum and corporate 
sectors, transferred to corporate collections the authenticating prestige that they had 
enjoyed in their positions in public institutions, thereby legitimising corporate collections 
and giving corporate America a passport to participation in the art world. The original 
Chase Manhattan art committee, for example, was filled with art historical luminaries 
such as Alfred Barr and Dorothy Miller from the Museum of Modern Art in New York, 
James Sweeney from the Museum of Fine Arts in Houston, and Robert Hale from the 
Metropolitan Museum.
Carefully distinguishing itself from other "up-market wallpaper salesmen or saleswomen, " 
the Contemporary Art Society (CAS) in Britain plays a similarly special rôle in mediating 
between business and artists, though this is a somewhat peculiar British phenomenon. 
For a commission fee, the CAS, in addition to its other functions, advises companies on 
their art purchases in the same way as other consultancies. The CAS’s Corporate Art 
Advisory Service is offered by the Tate Gallery as one of the "exclusive accesses and 
services" provided as part of their corporate Partner package, and the Gallery, in its 
Corporate Membership Programme brochure, praises it as "giv[ing] impartial and 
objective advice on the acquisition, commissioning, installation and maintenance of works 
of art for the office environment."*^’ But unlike other consultancies, the CAS runs as 
a non-profit charity, where all the profits from advising companies go back into the 
organisation to purchase contemporary art for public museums and art galleries in Britain, 
a position of which its former honourary treasurer, Nancy Balfour, boasted, by saying 
that the CAS has "a reputation for choosing first-class work for museums. This 
semi-public character, as well as the fact of its working in collaboration with the Tate 
Gallery, to which it is also physically close, gives the CAS political "clout" and clear
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advantages over other commercial consultancies,’^  ^ or as Balfour put it, "gives prestige 
to a business collection [italic added].
This position of privilege, even if unarticulated, is ethically problematic. But it is not 
exclusively a matter of individuals; American art museums, whose boards of trustees 
consist predominately of corporate figures, rarely deny corporate Arnerica the opportunity 
of showcasing their collections under the museum’s roof, something which has not 
happened with any frequency in Britain except for such charities as the CAS or the 
NACF. There is nothing new in a joint venture of art museums and business in America. 
As early as 1960, the Whitney Museum mounted a show called "Business Buys American 
Art;" similar types of exhibitions followed regularly over the subsequent decades.
What distinguished the ’80s-style venture is, however, the active participation of the 
corporation in the actual organisation of the exhibitions, and an equally uncritical 
acceptance and willingness on the part of art museums to dance to the corporate tune. 
Some museums even went as far as presenting wall plaques developed by their host 
companies for employee education as part of the shows. The title of a New York Times's 
article sums up what is really at stake here: "Seeking exposure, companies take their 
shows on the road."’^ ® The Laguna Gloria Art Museum in Texas (a museum funded 
in part by the City of Austin and the Texas Commission on the Arts), for example, 
mounted a corporate show called "Collecting on the Cutting Edge: The Frito-Lay, Inc." 
in January 1988, and boasted in the press release that the exhibition was "a fine example 
of what a progressive and enlightened corporate collector can accomplish.
The Frito-Lay collection, started in 1985, and including by the time of the exhibition 
some 900 objects, was, according to the company’s own publication, a "provocative 
collection" centring around the theme "Contemporary International Humanism."’^ ® Not 
only was the exhibition drawn exclusively from the company’s own collection, but many 
of the wall plaques and other explanatory material developed by the corporation were 
used at the Museum. The curator of the show, Monica Kindraka, was quoted as saying: 
"We wanted to do an exhibition of exciting and difficult contemporary art, something that 
would be I^ge in impact as well as in size [italic a d d e d ] . C a n  an art museum
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possibly achieve the aim of being "large in impact and in size" in an exhibition of 39 
pieces by 21 artists, even if size were in fact a virtue and even if the collection did, as 
the museum’s overinflated press release maintains, "read as a veritable ‘who’s who’ of 
the masters of contemporary art"?*'^ It is problematic when art museums present 
corporate collections as possessing a coherent theme, since to do so inevitably involves 
compromising scholarship and giving a stamp of authenticating approval to works in 
collections whose commercial value is thereby increased. More problematic still is the 
fact that museums are increasingly abandoning their traditional rôle of "neutral" 
interpretation and presenting instead corporate collections packaged in the corporations’ 
own t e r m s . T h e s e  practices, in which art circulates as a common currency for the 
b e n ^ t  of museum and corporate capital, have brought the convergence of art and 
commerce to a new level of intimacy.
6.5 The Impact of Corporate Patrons
By winning consent from museums and taste-makers in the art world, corporations have 
found it that much easier to gain entrance to the space of contemporary art, where their 
presence appears both legitimate and natural. Its legitimation can be demonstrated by the 
curriculum vitae of artists, who will not omit to list their works in corporate collections, 
and it seems that being collected by a prominent corporation is equally as prestigious as 
being shown in a public art museum. The power of corporate patronage derives from 
the simple fact that corporate America has become such a major buyer in the art market 
since ’70s, and to a lesser extent in the case of British companies, in the ’80s. While no 
systematically collected data on corporate shares on the art market have yet become 
available, according to Rosanne Martorella’s study Corporate Art in 1990, its share was 
well over fifty percent of the market outside New York, and about twenty to thirty 
percent of that in New York. '^*  ^ No equivalent figure is available for British 
companies.
What sort of contemporary art, then, has this new breed of corporate patrons been 
collecting? At the time of writing, there are no statistics available on the content of the
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collections themselves. The questions incorporated into my own survey aimed at trying 
to establish which styles of works were actually preferred seemed to be too demanding 
for men and women engaged in the hectic world of b u s i n e s s . G i v e n  the scarce 
information to hand, the following discussion is primarily based on my visits to corporate 
art collections.
In terms of medium, sculptures or other three-dimensional works are the least collectable 
among corporate buyers, both because of their cost and because of the space required to 
display them. This is suggested by the remark of Jim Dobkin, a lawyer with the firm 
Arnold and Porter in Washington D.C.: "contemporary sculpture requires airiness and 
spacial ity, which makes sculpture inconsistent with office efficiency. Similarly, 
when asked why their companies do not purchase sculpture, a British chief executive 
remarked: "We don’t, no, partially because of financial reasons... Secondly, these rooms 
don’t lend themselves to sculpture. This is not an untypical response. A high 
percentage of British collections are concentrated in the South East of the country. In 
the City of London in particular, where space is at such a premium, few companies can 
afford the American-style atrium and spacious corridors, except in the case of outdoor 
sculptures owned by the property companies mentioned earlier and those who happen to 
own outdoor grounds or grand stairways. The issue is further complicated by security 
concerns in the City. As one director noted, sculptures were impractical, getting in 
people’s way at times when thousands of people may have to be evacuated from the 
building.
Sculpture apart, there are some subjects of art which are consciously excluded from the 
corporate pantheon for reasons of so-called "taste. " There is nothing new in referring 
to the conservatism of corporate taste. Except for a few companies which specifically 
exploit the image of collecting at the cutting edge of art, such as First Bank System in 
Minneapolis, not all works are deemed acceptable for corporate display. As high as 70 
percent of American companies and 40.0 percent of British companies in the survey 
acknowledged this (see Tables 6.7.1 and 6.7.2). When asked to specify what kind of 
works they considered inappropriate, the range of answers was surprisingly unanimous, 
in particular those from American companies. In a society as sexually prim, and
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perhaps, alas, as politically correct, as America, "naked images" (as one respondent put 
it) of ladies or gentlemen are definitely denied the privilege of entering the sacred walls 
of corporate America. Except for a few general statements such as "anything that does 
not meet the goals of the specific corporation," in 34 out of the 39 American companies 
which specified what was inappropriate, nudity was listed as objectionable.
Among the American companies visited, the only collection which had any sort of images 
representing some hint of female breasts and buttocks was tellingly, a European bank, 
and they had been selected by its European president, despite the fact that female staff 
found them offensive. To quote some companies’ written responses:
We are first in the business of banking so there are no/any works which are 
controversial such as nudes (from an American bank).
morbid, extremely depressing, and overly erotic artworks, especially any 
depicting male or female genitalia or incorporating slanderous images or texts 
(from a American manufacturing company).
But any works which may be politically, socially, and in America racially and 
religiously, controversial are considered inappropriate for display in corporate 
environments. In the words of some American respondents such works include 
"paintings by artist with a ‘cause’" or "anything that might ‘offend customers,’" and it 
is for this reason that "decorative works are preferred. " To elaborate further on this, one 
company remarked:
The corporation prefer to avoid explicit nudity or works which take an exclusive 
stance on social or political issues, although this is not a written or iron-clad rule 
(from an American manufacturing company).
British patrons, unlike their American counterparts, seem to be able to endure nudes as 
long as there is no "explicit nudity" or providing they are not "overly sexual," as they 
put it. Even when some nudes cause controversy, senior managers are able to justify 
their choice by referring to the precedents of public art collections (figs. 6-65 and 6-66).
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To quote one senior executive:
I believe that most good galleries in this world have paintings of nudes... To say 
you are not going to have nudes is just as stupid as saying you are not going to 
have seascapes or landscapes or still lives.
And perhaps not surprisingly, female nudes are perceived and treated differently from 
male ones, not least in the City of London where the whole ambience is aggressively 
masculine. The company referred to above decided not to purchase a drawing of male 
nudes by Elizabeth Frink because one of its executives "absolutely refused to have male 
nudes. "
Nudity is, however, certainly not a focus of controversy in British corporate collections. 
There is a higher degree of sentiment, and occasionally resentment, against abstract 
paintings than against those representing nudity. This is not to say that British 
businessmen do not buy abstract works at all; a few of them do. Indeed, in one instance, 
the reason for opting for abstraction was to avoid stepping into any politically 
controversial areas, as if abstract works were in some way ideologically value-free.
The fact remains, however, that British companies tend to buy figurative works. The 
profound feeling of unease towards, and sometimes even of being threatened by, 
abstraction in people who do not possess what Pierre Bourdieu calls "the code" to 
decipher splashes of colours and lines is pervasive.^'*’ Among the responses to 
"inappropriate" works for a corporate environment in the survey, abstracts figured rarely, 
and only two respondents, both British, referred to them as undesirable. One specified 
"abstract" as equally inappropriate as "nudity," and the other euphemistically referred to 
abstract as undesirable in the sense of its being "ultra modern." During my visits to 
corporate premises, one accountant in a bank referred to William Scott’s works as "pots 
and pans," which, he said, could not hang as paintings anywhere but in the staff 
restaurant (fig. 6-67).^^ Another member of staff in the same bank, a security person, 
called a set of Barbara Hepworth’s prints "fried eggs, lemon and the moon," and did not 
consider them to be pictures at all (figs. 6-68 and 6-69). And even a banker, whom one 
might expect to have more sophisticated tastes, had this to say about his company’s
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collection:
... facing my desk, I have four differently coloured pictures — part of a series — 
which consist of vertical lines. This fits the modern style of the building along 
with the computers, but is overly simple with no overt message. Perhaps they 
have been chosen to keep us concentrating on our work!^^^
Corporate collections, as we have already seen, are primarily shaped by senior managers. 
The collecting patterns that I am describing inevitably result from the "tastes" of such 
people. Thus Edward Adeane, the director responsible for assembling the art collection 
at Hambros Bank, observed:
By and large the Hambros collection is representational. I’m not particularly keen 
on abstract work myself. Also, I suspect that everybody tends to come along and 
say, "Why did you buy that?"'^^
But, the red tape of corporations can censor anything which fails to perform its public- 
relations function. For example, when Cola Wall, a commissioned collage of metal 
signage by William Christenberry, was delivered to the law firm Arnold & Porter in 
Washington D.C., the content of the work caused serious concern to its corporate 
patron. While there are Coca Cola and Pepsi signs on the work, those of the rival 
brand 7-Up are not represented, and 7-Up happened to be one of the clients of the firm. 
The firm was so anxious that it even thought of "pulling a drape" to cover the painting 
if their 7-Up client came. Trivial indeed, but, if pushed to its extreme, this attitude 
shows how corporate custom-made art can inevitably become part of the corporate ethos. 
A Washington D.C. law firm, for example, commissioned a watercolour. Table with 
Correspondence, (figs. 6-70 and 6-71) It features the dishes, pencils and headed note 
paper used in the firm itself, six postcards depicting images of cities where the firm has 
offices, and a book showing Daumier images of lawyers. In another instance, while not 
a commissioned piece, a painting called. Portrait o f Two Accountants (fig. 6-72), was 
hung in the corridor of an accountancy firm in Washington D.C. This, of course, does 
not exemplify the best of corporate art or even what is typical of it. What it does, 
however, show is that such art, whether specifically commissioned or not, can be not
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only self-serving but ultimately subversive of values hitherto taken for granted by the 
majority of art critics.
Can art itself suffer or be depleted within the corporate environment? With the great 
expansion of corporate art collecting in the United States in the 1980s, minimal art, for 
example, such as Donald Judd’s sculpture, has become, somewhat surprisingly, highly 
collectable. The reception and identity of minimal art, more than any other kind of art, 
depends to a large extent on the objects being framed within a specific context. Without 
the highly controlled space of the modernist gallery — the "white cube,"'^'^ so to speak, 
from which the outside world is rigorously sealed off — minimal art, once installed on 
corporate premises and lost in the hurly-burly of everyday business life, cannot be easily 
identified as art at all, and the "aesthetic experience" that it offers as an object "in a 
si tuat ionconfront ing the spectator cannot be realised.
Above all, what minimal art loses most in this corporate setting is its "objecthood," the 
appearance of being non-art.*^® Gallery space transforms objects which resemble utility 
objects into vehicles of expression; corporate space has ironically reversed this process. 
Thus one of Donald Judd’s wall sculptures of wall-bound rows of boxes could almost be 
seen by uninformed business people as a piece of furniture on which to rest glasses of 
wine at reception parties (figs. 6-73 and 6-74). "When we had cocktail parties, people 
used to leave their glasses on it," admitted Laura Perrotti, director of Marketing at the 
law firm Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson in New York, a law firm renowned 
for its collection of minimal and abstract art.’^ ^
By negating representational conventions and by pushing abstraction to its logical 
extremes, the concept and practice of minimal art might have been radical, but once it 
is enveloped within corporate space, minimal art is neither "minimal" nor truly "art." 
By displaying a work of art whose readable content is minimalized to near nothingness, 
the business patron seems to be projecting, albeit unwittingly, an image which is 
ideologically neutral and value-free. But the irony is that if minimal art is indeed a 
comment about nothing, it is as corporate art, within the corporate environment, that it 
is able to make it political statement most effectively.
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Yet, the most far-reaching threat which corporate collecting poses to the production of 
contemporary art is its neutralizing and sanitizing power. Avant-garde art, whose aim 
is allegedly to confront and challenge the dominant culture and the status quo, once it has 
been recruited into the corporate camp, can soon become nothing more than expensive 
wall decoration; it loses its critical capacity and is assimilated to reinforce the prevailing 
business ethos and its values. This has to do with the fapt that corporate buyers do not 
capitalise on the aesthetic quality of their art works but on the fame and status of their 
artists. Even when they purchase works by the most critical artists, the works bought 
will be those which do not, or do not appear to, confront and offend their employees or 
clients. The highly charged sexual, racial, social and political tensions and overtones 
characteristic of Bruce Nauman’s art are prominent in such works as his neon piece, 
Welcome Shaking Hands (1985) (fig. 6-75) and his installation. Room With My Soul 
L ^/R oom  That Does Not Care (1984). They are, on the other hand, visibly downplayed 
in his Double Poke in the Eye II (figs. 6-76 and 6-77), a neon work which one is 
surprised to find is owned by a Washington D.C. law firm which boasts that its art 
collection is "controversial" in the context of an otherwise conservative and stuffy legal 
profession. The work is described in the firm’s collection catalogue as follows: "Nauman 
likes to expose the extremes of our human natures, those potent impulses we try hard to 
conceal. In Double Poke, two figures... seem poised to shake hands, but in one blink, 
civility fades, hostility rises, and the two go at it once again." The work, in which the 
blinking images actually do perform what the title describes within a second, invites a 
very different reading once it is realised that the context is that of two men poised to 
shake hands as lights go on, and that the piece is hung in the firm’s litigation department. 
Double Poke is, as the staff member who showed me around explained, an ironic visual 
pun on the life of the legal profession, in which the time-lapse between shaking hands 
and, metaphorically speaking, "poking eyes" is, according to legal mythology, no more 
than a split second.
An even greater irony for critical artists and their work is, however, to be seen in the 
case of Hans Haacke. Since the early ’70s, Haacke has been the quintessential critical 
voice against the power of business not only in the art world, but in contemporary society 
'also. One of his works. On Social Grease, is, surprisingly, part of the collection of the
325
Gilmar Paper Company in New York. The work, whose title ironically equates social 
grace and vacuous PR business "grease,” consists of six plaques of commentaries from 
business spokespersons and politicians on corporate involvement in the arts. Robert 
Kingsley, spokesman at the Exxon Corporation, for example, is quoted in the work as 
saying (apparently without any humorous intention): "Exxon’s support of the arts serves 
the arts as a social lubricant. And if business is to continue in big cities, it needs a more 
lubricated environment."*^*
How does corporate ownership affect the reception and interpretation of Haacke’s works, 
and how, in turn, does the critical edge in his work serve the owner’s interests? Sam 
Hunter, professor of art history at Princeton University, provides the following 
interpretation:
... the very presence of the work [On Social Grease] in a well-known corporate 
collection can be viewed as a promising sign of the concern of at least one 
member of the corporate community to examine its own motives. Such 
enlightened gestures do much to ventilate an important social issue, and to deflect 
criticism of the corporate tendency to aggrandize and flaunt charitable acts...*^’
Apparently, therefore, the Gilman Paper’s ownership of Haacke’s work has not only 
minimised the critique which the artist was attempting to make in his works, but has 
actually, and radically, re-defined the very meaning of the piece: a work which set out 
to criticise the corporation has ironically ended up standing for the so-called liberal and 
"enlightened" face of business.
But is this enormous corporate purchasing power as liberal and as purely beneficial to 
artists as Sam Hunter would have us to believe? Or is it rather how the media tycoon 
Malcolm S. Forbes describes it: "They [businessmen] don’t determine the direction of 
the arts, they only determine which artists mak[e] a living."*^ It is here that one 
recalls the grand historical appropriation of Medici patronage that American businessmen 
contrive in order to dress up their cultural ambitions. Peter McColough, then chairman 
of Xerox Corporation, summed it up when he declared:
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It is our hope that, by choosing the work of relatively unknown artists, we will 
continue in some small way the direction set by the catalysts of the Renaissance. 
Whether or not there is a modern day Michelangelo represented here is relatively 
unimportant. What is important is that many young artists be given support.
Unlike American buyers, who tend to be flamboyant in their collectmg, British 
businessmen are largely unwilling to talk about their influence on contemporary art. 
When Sir Nicholas Goodison, for example, spoke out, he did so more in order to boost 
the egos of other business patrons:
I believe that being bought by a corporate patron can make a difference to self- 
confidence and therefore to the development of a younger artist’s career. That 
sounds a bit patronising, which, in the true sense of the word, it is.‘®^
The corporate ownership of contemporary art has thus not only affected the reception and 
interpretation of art works, but actually contributed to redefining and altering the relation 
between patrons and artists. As artist Jon Kessler put it: "The role of the artist used to 
be as outsider. You didn’t want to meet your collectors — and you dressed that way. 
Now, we all eat at the same restaurants, [and] have our apartments photographed for the 
same magazines. It would seem that artists are unwilling to bite the hand that feeds 
them. It is not just corporate art that is coming of age, but also a new and apparently 
uncomplicated relationship between corporate patrons and those artists who are happy to 
create objects congenial to the corporate ethos. One such is Bruce McLean, a particular 
favourite among corporate buyers. Among other corporate pieces, he created Pestle and 
Mortar for the Glaxo House atrium, the centrepiece for its British art collection. The 
artist said of this work: "It is a reflection of the company. Glaxo make things that make 
you feel better and healthier."*^ The question is: is this incontrovertibly true of this 
giant drugs multinational? A recent £7 million settlement between Glaxo and over 400 
users of its drug Myodil shows the McLean’s confident view is not necessarily widely 
shared.
Cindy Sherman, the vangarde artist who has been such a popular star for feminist art 
historians, not only dresses herself up and poses to create her famous artistic film stills,
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but also does precisely the same thing for Calvin Klein houndstooth sweaters, for 
Shamask shirts and for Mizrahi evening wearJ®^ And when she appeared on the BBC2 
television programme "Relative Values" in 1 9 9 1 , she cheerfully admitted that it was 
"just great" to have her works collected by the Chase Manhattan Bank. But have the full 
consequences of this seemingly natural development been fully and critically understood 
by the art world or British and American publics? Corporate America provides an 
answer for us through its magazine Across the Board:
To those who still worry about the power of the corporate purse... there is one 
simple response: If not the corporation, who else?^ ®*
The issue at stake in relation to corporate patronage is not that of the use of art by the 
powerful; there is nothing new in that. It is rather that of the different meanings which 
art takes on in the social milieu of commercial space. And here lies a fundamental 
contradiction. Since the eighteenth century it has been widely claimed in bourgeois 
culture that art is, by its very nature, above the sordid world of individual interests, as 
represented, quintessentially, by commerce. Indeed its very capacity to confer status on 
corporate patrons depends on this. Yet as Bruce McLean’s comment illustrates, 
corporate collecting is anything but disinterested. So the question is: can art bought by 
corporate capital and housed in commercial spaces be anything more than advertising and 
high-style decoration?
The exercise of economic power in art can, as we see, be converted ultimately into status 
and legitimacy, or into what Bourdieu terms "cultural capital." Conversely, the control 
of cultural capital can be converted back into monetary capital. Here lies the most 
attractive quality of corporate art collecting, both as a valuable investment in itself and 
as a PR tool. As a corporate art "guru," Manuel Gonzalez, head of the Chase Art 
Program, once put it with alarming frankness:
A corporation’s obligation is to its community. Art is the cheapest — by that I 
mean most reasonably priced — decorative element available, with a larger 
margin of profitability than any other commodity in history. It gives you a great 
cachet among the sophisticated individuals with a high net worth who are usually 
targeted by most businesses.*®^
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The art critic Robert Hughes brings an even wider perspective to the problem and its 
attendant dangers:
The idea of an American public culture wholly dependent on corporate promotion 
budgets of white CEOs, reflecting the concerted interests of one class, one race, 
one mentality, is unthinkable — if you think about itJ^°
This raises the broader and more theoretical question of cultural hegemony. By virtue 
of the position it occupies in the world of production, the commercial sector is able to 
take on, in artistic matters, the rôle of the dominant group and can come to enjoy the 
prestige and confidence associated with economic predominance. It needs only the tacit 
consent of the public at large to this new power group, and their acceptance of the new 
general direction which it imposes on social and artistic life, to create a set of 
circumstances that correspond to Gramsci’s concept of cultural h e g e m o n y . B y  
institutionalising itself, corporate art assumes moral authority, appropriates legitimising 
symbols to itself and is able to set artistic trends. In this sense one social group acquires 
the power of hegemony over one of the few sectors of society supposedly above the profit 
and loss principle, which becomes thereby the unwitting accomplice of a new cultural 
movement. The origins of this new power, whether it is a potential or a real power, lie 
in the purchasing power to which corporate capital gives its owners access.
329
NOTES
1. Interview, September 1990, Washington D.C.
2. Bates v. State Bar o f Arizona, quoted in Philip A. Thomas, éd.. Law in the Balance: 
Legal Services in the Eighties (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1982), p. 146.
3. Lord Chancellor’s Department, The Work and Organisation o f the Legal Profession 
(London: HMSO, 1989), Cm. 570.
4. Christopher Stanley, "Justice Enters the Marketplace: Enterprise Culture and the 
Provision of Legal Service," in Russell Keat and Nicholas Abercrombie, eds.. Enterprise 
Culture (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), pp. 206-215.
5. Stephen Whybrow, "A Toe in the Sponsorship Water," Arts Review, 14 June 1991,
p. 18.
6. This marketing exercise included a lunch for the students and their tutors to explain 
"straightforwardly the commercial rationale for the sponsorship"; producing a catalogue 
of the works to mail to the invitees for the receptions; the sale of commissioned works 
offered to those attending the receptions with the proceeds amounting to £10,000 being 
donated to charities (Foundation for Young Musicians and London Cartoon Centre); and 
an exhibition of the works at the Berkeley Square Gallery. See Stephen Whybrow, ibid.
7. Accelerated depreciation is "a method of cost recovery which allows a deduction for 
the wear and tear of property used in a trade or business, or of property held for the 
production of income." Personal correspondence dated 15 July 1991 from the London 
office of one of the top international chartered accountancy firms.
8. Investment tax credit (valid for the years 1980-1985) "permitted a reduction in tax 
liability based upon a taxpayer’s qualified investment in certain kinds of property. Thus, 
investment tax credit was an incentive device intended to stimulate the purchase or 
modernisation of certain kinds of productive assets. Its purpose was achieved by 
permitting a reduction in income tax liability by a percentage (generally 10 %) of the 
amount the taxpayer (corporation) spends for the assets. " Same personal correspondence 
as in note 7 above.
9. Daniel Grant, "Corporate Collecting," Art & Auction, October 1985, p. 168.
10. See note 7 above.
11. Personal correspondence dated 9 February 1993 with Michael D. Finley, Chief, 
Branch 3, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel (Income Tax and Accounting), Internal 
Revenue Service, Department of the Treasury, Washington D.C.
12. Personal correspondence dated 13 April 1992 with another accountant at the same 
firm as in note 7 above.
330
13. Personal correspondence dated 16 May 1991 with an international law firm in 
Washington D. C.
14. Personal correspondence with Michael D. Finley, as in note 11 above.
15. The case was further taken to the United States Court of Appeal, but the original Tax 
Court’s ruling was affirmed; see Federal Reporter, 2d, 6th Cir. 1985, pp. 38-40.
16. Personal correspondence dated 24 January 1994 with^usanna Waterhouse, Technical 
Adviser, Business Profits Division 4 (Schedule D), Inland Revenue, London.
17. An example was given by a chartered accountant at one of the top international 
accountancy firm in the London Office, who is deeply involved in the art collecting of 
his firm and sits on the trustee board of one of the leading independent galleries in 
Britain: "if a painting is ‘plant and machinery,’ the amount spent on its acquisition can 
be offset against taxable profits at a rate of 25 % on a reducing balance. If the painting 
cost £100, a deduction of £25 would be available in the first year, £18.75 in the second 
year (being 25% of 75% of £1(X)), £14.06 in the third year (being 25% of 75% of 75% 
of £100), and so on." Personal correspondence dated 15 December 1993.
18. Personal correspondence with Susanna Waterhouse, as in note 16 above, and 
interview with Nick Hagan, Tax Inspector, Moorgate, Inland Revenue, London, 20 
November 1992.
19. According to Susanna Waterhouse, "In general, a company can claim a deduction 
only for an expense which is incurred ‘wholly and exclusively for the purpose of its 
trade’... If, therefore, a company operated as an art dealer, the cost of buying works of 
art for sale by way of trade would be deductible in computing trading income... In the 
case where a work of art was bought for its investment potential, it would not be a 
deductible expense because it would be capital, and there would be no allowance for 
depreciation." Same personal correspondence as in note 16 above.
20. To qualify for capital allowances, works of art have to be classified as "plant and 
machinery," which is "actually being used to carry on the trade of the company. It is not 
sufficient for the asset to be used in the trade. The distinction may not be immediately 
obvious, but works of art are a particularly good example. A company may have 
paintings in its offices, for example. Although these are being used in the company’s 
trade, they are not used to carry on the trade. Paintings in a restaurant perform both 
purposes — they are used to carry on the trade as they create an ‘atmosphere’ in order 
to attract customers." Sources the same as note 17. "Another situation in which works 
of art might qualify as ‘plant,’ would be the pictures on the walls of a stately home which 
has a trade of opening to members of the public in return for admission fees, or a 
privately run art gallery. " Personal correspondence with Susanna Waterhouse, as in note 
16 above.
21. Interview with the accountant on 13 June 1994, London.
331
22. Here is an example given by the accountant referred to above to illustrate the point: 
If you purchase a work of art for £100, for tax purposes, you are allowed, say 25% 
written down allowances against your expenses in tax computation, which means the tax 
written down value of that purchase is now £75 {£100 — (£100 x 25%)}. If you keep 
it for a year and then sell it, say, for £125, you have made a real profit of £25. But for 
tax purposes, you already have £25 allowances, which brought down the value to £75 and 
for tax purposes, you made a profit of £50. So in a year of acquisition, you being 
allowed-£25, and in the following year when you dispose o f  it, you pay tax on a"£50 
profit. If you did not obtain any tax allowances, you buy in year one for £100 and you 
sell it in year two for £125. You would pay tax on £25. As far as the net present value 
is concerned, it is therefore better to get the allowances today and pay a higher profit tax 
tomorrow, because, according to him, "your net present value of this £100 investment 
has diluted in a year time. "
(1) claiming capital allowances
€
original cost 10 0
(25% written down - 25
allowances)
value in year two _____
if sold for £125, profit: 
Then pay tax on £50.
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CONCLUSION
The 1980s witnessed the unprecedented phenomenon of business in America and Britain 
making art its business, not only at the individual level of the corporate executive 
(businessmen are as much entitled to taste in art as anyone else) but, more surprisingly 
and significantly, at the level of the corporations themselves. While corporate 
involvement in arts and culture obviously pre-dated the 1980s, it was this decade more 
than any other that witnessed the harnessing of the power of corporate money for active 
participation in the cultural arena. What is also new is the deliberate pursuit of art not 
only as financial investment, but also as an image-enhancing tool, within a sector of 
society which had previously been regarded as, if not philistine, then at least largely 
ignorant of and indifferent to art. The entry of the private corporate sector into what had 
hitherto been, especially in Britain, an almost exclusively public domain is the most 
intriguing aspect of the new artistic consciousness of the ’80s. This at first sight 
incongruous social development has a multiplicity of causes, foremost among which was 
a politically inspired change of policy in public arts funding. And it is here that we may 
be justified in discerning a direct political connection with what, for want of a better 
term, we may call Thatcherism/Reaganism.
This study sets out to plot a small but important part of a trajectory whose impetus lay 
in the free-market policies and ethos of the Reagan and Thatcher decade, and which saw 
the displacement of public art provision in America and Britain from its former position 
of privilege into the open market place. Neither Thatcherism nor Reaganism is, of 
course, simply a political or economic project, but a mixture of what Mrs Thatcher’s 
former Chancellor of the Exchequer, Nigel Lawson, described as, "free markets, 
financial discipline, firm control over public expenditure, tax cuts, nationalism, ‘Victorian
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values’ (of the Samuel Smiles self-help variety), privatisation and a dash of populism."* 
It was a combination of a determination to "roll back the frontiers of the state" through 
consecutive privatising projects of Britain’s nationalised industries in particular, and an 
ideological commitment to the free-market economy, that succeeded in changing the face 
of the national life during the ’80s, as Britain under Thatcher strove to keep pace with 
the Reaganite model of enterprise culture that had already prepared the ground for these 
radical changes in America.
Underpinning our approach is the conviction that developments in the arts during the ’80s 
are intimately related to political, economic and social transformations. In order to 
understand these, we began, in Chapter 2, by investigating the rôle of the state in 
relationship to the arts. While it is not possible within the limited space of this study to 
construct a theoretical model of what that relationship might be, we have been able, by 
exploring some of the theoretical considerations regarding the fundamental difference 
between the concepts of the state and government, to highlight some of the shortcomings 
in the approaches used up until now in debating the issue.
More significantly, by investigating the concept of the state, it is possible to understand 
how public discussion of the differences between the British and American arts funding 
systems has been pursued in terms that are misleading and ideologically constructed so 
as to serve specific interests and purposes. While it may be accurate to describe Britain 
as a country with an established public arts funding provision, it would be politically 
naïve to see America as a country where the arts are primarily funded by "private 
individuals." It was, however, this dominant discourse that Conservative governments 
adopted and advocated as their central dogma for the Thatcherite version of the enterprise 
culture over the past fifteen years or so. By exploring the financing of American art 
museums in terms of the concept of the public and the private, and by showing that the 
so-called "private" money used to support art museums in America is, in the final 
analysis, largely public (taxpayers’) money, one begins to discern a hegemonic process 
whereby a dominant sector of society, by framing the discourse on issues of public 
import, has established its own views and self-interests as being universally in the public 
interest. It is at this juncture that one may recall what Antonio Gramsci terms "the
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ethical state," and his contention that the state not only has the monopoly over the use 
of force, but also acquires its legitimacy by virtue of its "ruling by consent. This 
paradoxical state of affairs is one that few have been able to question effectively, not least 
in Britain, with the result that, by default, it commands public consent and therefore 
legitimacy.
It is against this concept of the state that public arts agencies such as the Arts Council of 
Great Britain and the National Endowment for the Arts are examined in Chapter 2. To 
the extent that they are located within a capitalist economy, in which the economically 
and therefore socially privileged few already have a dominant voice and a 
disproportionate share of public resources, these agencies inevitably reflect the culture 
of the élite group. But, by virtue of being part of the government machinery, they are 
clearly the providers of public arts provision at the heart of a democracy, and are 
therefore at least more accountable than, for example, American art museums. By 
exploring some aspects of their arts provision prior to the ’80s, it is possible to discern 
the ambivalent position that these agencies occupy. The Arts Council collection funded 
by the British Arts Council, and the support that the Arts Endowment has given to the 
alternative spaces movement in America, thus exemplify the gulf between the ambition 
of these agencies and what they can actually achieve within a contemporary capitalist 
society. To recognise their dilemma is not to minimise the significant role that these 
public arts agencies might fulfil in the discourse of contemporary culture in the two 
countries, but rather to demarcate the area for which they can legitimately assume 
responsibility, that is, in our specific context, an area which neither the market nor 
private philanthropy could be expected to support.
The radical nature of the ideological re-alignment that took place during the Reagan and 
Thatcher decade, and the host of measures implemented within the institutional 
framework of the state to "reform" the alleged "welfare state mentality" in the public arts 
sector, are explored in Chapter 3. By examining the public arts policies of these two 
administrations, we are able to map out the changes directly brought about by the New 
Right. This is to be seen in particular in the conservatives’ policies of "liberalising" tax 
regimes. To use tax deduction as a means of soliciting private or corporate money for
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the arts is in effect a disguised method of giving public subsidy. It transfers a substantial 
part of the choices and decisions which would otherwise have been subject to public 
debate in a democratic polity into the private hands of the most affluent section, if not 
the richest members, of society. The resultant blurring of the distinction between the 
public and the private thus masks what is in reality a deliberate process of privatising 
culture. ^
This process is further explicitly illustrated in the strenuous efforts made by the Reagan 
and Thatcher administrations to transform public arts institutions into paragons of arts 
privatisation. The injection of the principle and ethos of the marketplace, for example, 
into the Arts Council and the Arts Endowment is one of the most tangible effects of this 
policy. By virtue of their function as grant-making intermediaries, they pass on their 
entrepreneurial vision to the arts organisations that they fund throughout the country. 
The new order of value for money, replacing that of money for value, thus becomes cast 
in stone. To complete the background material necessary before we can discuss the detail 
of corporate art intervention. Chapter 3 ended with a consideration of the two business 
organs set up specifically in order to champion the corporate cause.
The actual mechanisms whereby corporations intervened and infiltrated into the world of 
contemporary art were the subjects of Chapters 4, 5 and 6. While these chapters are 
organised according to the various types of intervention undertaken by the corporations, 
the central thread running through them is the rôle that senior executives play in 
corporate art ventures. Individualism being one of the cornerstones of the enterprise 
culture of the Reagan and Thatcher decade, it should come as no surprise to find a 
particular group of individuals (especially those "wheeler-dealers" who made their fortune 
by speculating in the ’80s deregulated market) transferring to the art world the same sort 
of entrepreneurial initiatives that they so successfully used in business. By virtue of the 
position they occupy in the business world, these chief executives/chairmen, an élite 
within an élite, are able to commit the companies which they oversee to far-reaching art 
ventures. Their economic position, in other words, enables them to accumulate 
substantial "cultural capital" — to use the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s term, and 
their intimate involvement in corporate art intervention has, accordingly, to be understood
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against the background of the social distinction to which their élite status and class 
aspirations are anchored.
Within the same social perspective, Chapter 4 investigated a much neglected but crucial 
aspect of the corporate takeover of art museums, that is, the existence of a particular 
group of the corporate élite who sought for themselves, and who were in turn much 
sought after by the Thatcher government (in the case of American art museums, by their 
fellow trustees), places of influence on museum and gallery boards of trustees. It was 
here, at these unaccountable centres of local power, that corporate power began to 
consolidate and build up. Our analysis shows how, once this toe-hold had been 
established, the great influx of corporate capital into art museums in the ’80s profoundly 
transformed the identity of these institutions. By taking over the function, and by 
exploiting the social status, that cultural institutions have in our society, businesses 
successfully transformed them into their own public relations vehicles.
In seeking to establish themselves as a legitimate force within the art world, corporations 
had to integrate themselves into the infrastructure of its support system. The way in 
which businesses came to achieve this, by emulating what used to be the prerogative of 
art museums, is explained in Chapter 5. By analysing why and how public art museums 
came to establish branches or offshoots within corporate premises, we are able to 
understand how far-reaching the ambition of corporate sector was. To move art 
institutions physically and to make them thereby corporate tenants is not simply to 
consolidate further the links between art and corporations, but to appropriate to the 
private sector the status not only of landlord but also of guardian of national culture. The 
extent of their ambition is even more clearly illustrated by the art exhibitions which they 
held and by the art galleries that they established within their corporate premises, as if 
art had in fact become part and parcel of their everyday business practices.
An analysis of the corporate art collections themselves forms the subject of Chapter 6. 
Here what comes to the fore is the extent to which the potential of art, both as a 
commodity of substantial material value and as an object of grand symbolic worth, is 
consciously and deliberately exploited. By downplaying the material interest of art works
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as capital assets with (potentially) huge margins of speculative appreciation, businesses 
utilise the ownership and display of art as a means of strategically projecting whatever 
corporate image suits their needs in the marketplace. This strategy is particularly 
successful in the case of those companies which are keen to capitalise on the image of 
being progressive, forward-looking and "at the cutting edge." The ’80s-style of avant- 
garde marketing, so to speak, thus testifies to the ever increasing sophistication of 
corporations in "incorporat[ing] critical culture into the management of capitalism."^
By directly intervening in the art market itself, corporate art collecting becomes the most 
influential of all forms of corporate art intervention. By their policy of active buying in 
the ’80s, and in particular in the United States where they institutionalised themselves by 
appointing their own curators and establishing their own art departments, corporations 
achieved validation and legitimisation from within, via the infrastructure of the art 
world’s support systems into which they themselves had been assimilated, thereby 
appearing as both legitimate and authentic participators. Their hegemonic position in the 
art world thus significantly re-structured the meaning of cultural production. So-called 
critical artists, by allowing themselves to be embraced by the corporate power which they 
ostensibly set out to criticise in the first place, are led to betray their own artistic 
consciences. As Barbara Kruger, Justifying her selling in commercial galleries, so 
revealingly put it: "I began to understand that outside the market there is nothing. The 
meaning of the art thus produced, and its integrity, are inevitably compromised, and the 
profound irony is that those works critical of the marketplace become in turn objects of 
capital not only generated by the marketplace but also validated by it.
By way of summing up developments in the ’80s, and looking towards the future, I will 
examine briefly two particularly significant events, one from the recent past in America, 
the other from the present in Britain. These may serve as bridges to bring us forward 
to the end of the century and enable us to suggest the sort of direction that corporate 
intervention in the arts could take in the coming decades. What has been aptly called the 
"casino economy" of the ’80s, in which rapid and easy profits flowed effortlessly into 
corporate coffers, has proved to be short-lived. If the bubble has yet to burst, there are 
clear signs that it is beginning to deflate. During the recession in the early ’90s, the
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world’s largest computer manufacturer, IBM, popularly known as the Big Blue, suffered 
the worst financial losses in its history. Like other companies across the United States, 
IBM undertook a large-scale downsizing, or, to use the current euphemism, "right- 
sizing."^ As part and parcel of their cost-cutting efforts, IBM not only closed its Gallery 
of Science and Arts in its New York headquarters in August 1994, but, more 
significantly, sold off a substantial part of its art collection (estimated at 90 percent of its 
total value) through a series of auctions at Sotheby’s in New York in 1995.
This collection, started by IBM’s founder Thomas Watson in the late ’30s and since 
heralded as "one of the most important American corporate collections," had, from its 
very beginning, fulfilled a major public relations function.^ In the new climate of 
financial stringency during the early ’90s, however, it came to be considered as an 
"unnecessary asset" and the decision was taken to dispose of it.^ To quote the company 
spokesman: "We are not in the art business; we’re in the information technology 
business."* This is in stark and ironic contrast to what IBM described, in its exhibition 
catalogue of 1989, 50 Years o f Collecting: Art At IBM, as "the solid commitment of the 
IBM Corporation worldwide to support art... [italic added]."’ (fig. 7-1) The case of 
IBM is, of course, not isolated. In its heyday during the ’80s, corporate intervention 
took on a zeal and a pace which can be seen, in retrospect, to have been both over- 
ambitious and over-confident. Like an Icarus rising on the wings of its own economic 
power, its steep climb brought it perilously close to the sun. The plumes which it 
borrowed on the strength of its financial profiteering are already showing signs of 
becoming bedraggled, and it could well be that the very power that, by its ready 
availability in times of economic boom, enabled its rise, will eventually, by its lack under 
different historical conditions, bring about its decline.
Meanwhile in Britain, art sponsorship continues to go from strength to strength, and 
shows no sign of the sort of decline that is beginning to be discernible on the other side 
of the Atlantic. The unprincipled Jettisoning of an art institution’s integrity, and its 
willingness to find a home under its roof for a sponsor’s advertising campaign 
masquerading as an exhibition, can be seen in the current practice of the Museum of 
Modern Art (MOMA) in Oxford (fig. 7-2). Boastfully labelling itself as "one of
351
Europe’s most influential museums" and taking pride in having been "Britain’s leading 
alternative space in the ’60s and early ’70s,"'° the Museum is currently holding an 
exhibition with the truly "pioneering" sounding title of A b so lu t Vision and subtitled 
New British Painting in the 79905." Playing on the words "absolute" "Absolut" (a 
brand of vodka) and "about" and their sounds and visual graphics ("s" and "1" have a 
different type-face), the title can be read innocently as "Absolut[el^Vision" or "Absolut 
Vision." If and when the penny drops, one might or might not (as I myself did not) 
begin to see that the title of the exhibition could also be read as "About Vision" (figs. 7-3 
and 7-4). Though this interpretation is, of course, not absoluttly clear.
Not content with being pioneers in intrusive advertising, Absolut Vodka have also broken 
new ground in actively seeking to integrate themselves into the very heart of the 
exhibition with an audacity hitherto unknown among sponsors in Britain. Included in 
"their" exhibition is a Chris Ofili painting featuring their famous vodka bottle, which they 
specifically commissioned for the purpose (figs. 7-5 and 7-6). No less subtle as a 
sponsor’s advertising message is the title of the work. Imported (fig. 7-7), which echoes 
the prominent wording at the foot of the actual vodka bottle as sold on the market (fig. 
7-8). The painting, bearing Ofili’s favoured trademark of oil paint, glitter and elephant 
dung, is praised by the departing director of the Museum, David Elliott, as an "exciting 
new work," which is destined to be added to Absolut’s own corporate art collection."
The question that arises is: if the show truly is a celebration of a vision into the next 
millennium, whose vision is it? Absolut Vodka’s, MOMA’s, or perhaps that of the 
multinationals — Vin & Sprit in Sweden, owners of the brand, or Seagram which 
distributes it? As a success story, the intervention into art of the Swedish-born brand 
Absolut Vodka has a history that can be called proud and at the same time tainted. Their 
thrusting commercial ambition to position their brand in the fashionable upmarket reaches 
of the international advertising world has been pursued at the same time as a laudable 
policy of associating itself with experimental and avant-garde art. Starting in 1985 when 
Absolut Vodka first commissioned Andy Warhol, "the godfather of pop art," to do a 
painting of its bottle (fig. 7-9), over 600 artists to date have been deployed in the creation 
of its "artful ads." The scale of the operation has been such that the firm can boast, in
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its own publicity material, that "Absolut Vodka has become a kind of global art gallery 
[italic added]. By capitalising on the status of the avant-garde artists responsible for 
their advertisements, lithographic editions of which were sold at a huge profit by their 
former distributors. Carillon Importers of Teaneck, New Jersey, in the late ’80s,^  ^ the 
owners and distributors of Absolut Vodka succeeded in transforming the spirit from a 
consumer commodity into an art form. As they themselves now proudly proclaim: "Art 
has become an important medium to express the basic values and magic of Absolut 
Vodka."'"
So the ultimate question is: what sort of vision can Absolut Vodka possibly provide for 
us? Perhaps, as the company itself suggests, it is that "[w]hen Absolut Vodka is involved 
in an event, the borders between art, fashion, PR and marketing blur long before the first 
drink is poured."'^ Whoever's vision it is, and for whatever audience it is intended, it 
certainly is a new vision that has radically and irreversibly changed the way in which we 
look at the world of art and commerce. While the Museum of Modern Art itself is in 
fact funded on a long-term basis by a distinguished list of public bodies,'”' it is to the 
private corporate sponsor of this one-off event that the credit goes for defining for us the 
present direction that art is taking, and for dictating our vision of its likely future.
No one is likely to mistake the Absolut style of avant-garde marketing for a recent 
American import, even if the brand does happen now to be distributed in Britain by an 
American firm. After a decade and more of Conservative governments’ promotion of 
the enterprise culture, entrepreneurial visions and practices in the art world are by now 
fully home-grown products in Britain. When Janet Minihan made her study of public 
funding of the arts in Britain in the mid ’70s, she chose to entitle it The Nationalization 
o f Culture?^ The Conservatives’ successive terms of office have certainly succeeded 
in reversing this process.
Although the developments that I have been describing had begun to emerge before 1980, 
it was the Reagan and Thatcher governments’ pro-business ideology and their deliberate 
policy of encouraging corporate patronage that created the pervasive interlocking of the 
corporate and the artistic which so characterised both the American and British cultural
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landscapes of the ’80s. By taking over art museums, corporations have significantly 
changed the ways in which these institutions function, as well as the ways in which we 
perceive them and the art works housed under their roofs. By enclosing art works within 
their premises, they have reframed the space and redefined the discourse on
contemporary art. While public art funding in a capitalist democracy certainly has its
-  '  *
limitations and its weaknesses, it is at least a forum, and one tha^is arguably open to 
public debate and criticism. Few corporations, on the other hand, could be made socially 
and politically accountable, not to say aesthetically responsible, to the same degree as the 
National Endowment for the Arts (and to a lesser degree the Arts Council of Great 
Britain) potentially can. No one can ever challenge effectively the ways in which 
corporations choose to utilise their numerous contemporary art collections, which give 
the appearance of having been bought with private money, and access to which has been 
restricted to an inner circle of business associates and social elites while being totally 
denied to the general public. But can one challenge the force behind the establishment 
of such corporate art empires when their privileged and dominant position in the art 
world has been so clearly and loudly endorsed by the public policies of the Reagan and 
Thatcher decade and given official legitimacy? Where does the corporate end and the 
public begin? Without being made more accountable to the public interest, corporate 
America and Britain can never transform its pursuit of power and wealth into anything 
more than a public-relations display, whatever temporary impact this may have on the art 
world.
To the extent that the privatising of art and culture has given rise to a host of 
developments — not all of them welcome or necessarily positive — which no one in the 
art world, particularly in Britain, could have anticipated, it is not unlike the opening of 
Pandora’s box. But however many blessings may eventually be lost, there is perhaps 
comfort in the knowledge that hope will not be one of them. While the process of 
privatising culture in Britain and America has gone from strength to strength, there are 
other countries, France for example, which are more reluctant to follow down the path 
of this particular privatisation, and which continue to provide substantial state funding for 
the arts. Moreover, a hegemonic position is never absolute, depending as it does on an 
equilibrium of a whole set of different factors, and subject as it is to a never-ending
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process of negotiation and re-negotiation. In the context of the present study, the current 
dominant position of corporations in the art world is, at least, dependent on public policy, 
on their own economic power, and to some extent, on the ambitions and aspirations of 
arts institutions and their bureaucrats. The collapse of the IBM art empire may well 
serve as a sign of impending strain and rupture within the system, and it may well be that 
one day other sites of resistance can form to question and challenge what for the present 
remains the dominant order.
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Questionnaire Survey on Arts Sponsorship in America and Britain
(Methodology, List of Companies Completing Questionnaire; 
Copy of Questionnaire and Cover Letter)
I. Methodology (American survey)
1. The Sampling Population
No single directory is readily available for the population of companies which give money 
to the arts. For the purpose of this survey the population of American companies has 
been compiled from the following two directories:
Corporate Giving to the Arts 4 (New York: American Council for the Arts, 1987) 
(hereafter referred to as Corporate Giving)
National Guide to Funding in the Arts and Culture (New York: Foundation Center, 
April 1992) (hereafter National Guide)
The National Guide is used as the main source of information for establishing the 
population of the project because, published in early 1992, it is thought to be more 
comprehensive than the other directory. It covers 396 direct corporate giving programs 
and 4,257 grantmaking foundations, including those funded by companies for the purpose 
of distributing their philanthropic grants.
Efforts have been made to examine through the National Guide page by page in order to 
distinguish foundations funded by business from those funded by individuals, because the 
National Guide provides no index of this kind suitable for the purpose of this survey. 
As a result, 740 company-sponsored foundations and 386 direct corporate giving 
programs in the National Guide are found to be relevant to this study and form the basis 
of the population.
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Using the population thus established in the National Guide as a basis, a further 168 
companies, not included in the National Guide, are identified from Corporate Giving. 
Given the severe recession of early 1990s, those companies are further doubled-checked 
as to their continued existence by consulting such standard business directories as the 
Million Dollar Directory.
The whole population is found to comprise 1,294 companies.
The following directories, which may have similar or more comprehensive listings, are 
unfortunately impossible to find in Britain. (Enquiries have been made at the following 
libraries without success: The British Library, including those held by the British Library 
Documentary Centre; City Business Library; City University Business School Library; 
Export Market Information Centre, Department of Trade and Industry; Directory of 
Social Change; London Business School; London School of Economics; Science 
Reference Information Centre; United States Information Centre, United States Embassy; 
Westminster Public Reference Library.) The directories concerned are: Corporate 500: 
The Directory o f Corporate Philanthropy, 10th edition (San Francisco: Public 
Management Institute); Corporate Foundation Profile, 7th edition (New York: Foundation 
Center); Directory of International Corporate Giving in America and Abroad (Detroit: 
Taft Group, 1992); Suzanne Haile, ed., The National Directory o f Corporate Giving, 2nd 
edition (New York: the Foundation Center, October 1991); S. David Hicks, ed.. The Taft 
Corporate Giving Directory (Detroit: Taft Group, 1993).
2. Stratification o f the Universe
Stratification divides the population into sub-populations (or strata) based on additional 
information. Selecting samples from each stratum allows sample size within the stratum 
to be controlled rather than randomly determined by the sampling process, and thus 
increases the representativeness of the survey. The two variables concerned in this 
context were region and the means through which companies chose to give their 
contributions. For the purposes of the survey, the population is divided into six discrete
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geographical areas (see Exhibit 1 at the end of this Appendix).
About two thirds of the population chose to establish company foundations in order to 
distribute their money, and the rest of them did so either through corporate affairs or 
public relations departments within the company (what is referred to in the National 
Guide as "corporate giving or contribution programs"). Although there are companies 
which operate in both ways, a company-sponsored foundation is legally a separate entity 
from its sponsoring company, and thus distinguished from the direct corporate giving 
program structured and administered within the company.
Two possible variables which may have effects on the survey are the business type of the 
company and the budget size of specific arts sponsorship programmes. Because no 
information on them was readily available, it was not included in the process of 
stratification. First, there are no indications as to the business type of the company in 
the National Guide. Second, there is no information readily available on the distribution 
of the various sizes of arts sponsorship programmes within each geographical area. The 
population is simply too large to allow each company to be separately examined, given 
the limited time and labour at my disposal (for example, it took some ten hours to check 
forty addresses for the entries in Corporate Giving.) Accordingly the business type of 
the companies and their budget sizes were as part of the results of the survey.
3. Sample Size and Selection
The method of random sampling is adopted for this questionnaire, but the relative 
proportion of the distribution of foundations and direct corporate giving programs within 
each geographical area is taken into consideration. 303 companies from among the 
population were selected to be sent the questionnaire. (For detailed information on the 
number of questionnaires sent to each state and stratified area, see Exhibit 2).
4. Survey Operations (Mailing and Non-response Follow-up) and Response Rate
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303 copies were mailed out locally in America in January 1993. It included a cover 
letter and a copy of the questionnaire. A follow-up mailing to the non-respondents of 233 
companies was carried out between 31 March 1993 and 2 April 1993. The final number 
of responses was 123 (including the ineligible, refused, irrelevant, or invalid). 14 of the 
companies in the mailing were found to be irrelevant to our study, and the population was 
accordingly reduced to 289. The final valid responses were from 54 companies, 
representing a 19.69 percent.
n. Methodology (British Survey)
The primary source for the population for arts sponsorship in Britain is the corporate 
members of the Association of Business Sponsorship for the Arts, including its patrons 
and members as listed in the 1991/92 ABSA Annual Report, with a total of 232. Based 
on this, I included a further 102 corporate sponsors listed in Anne-Marie Doulton, ed.. 
The Arts Funding Guide, 1992 edition (published by Directory of Social Change in 
London), which are not ABSA members.
To obtain a complete picture of visual arts sponsors, I also included in the sampling 
population corporate members of the Tate Gallery, Royal Academy, Serpentine Gallery, 
Institute of Contemporary Arts, Whitechapel Art Gallery, Barbican Art Gallery and South 
Bank Centre. The inclusion of the South Bank Centre is because the Hayward Gallery 
does not have corporate membership separate from the Art Centre of which it is part.
The sampling population thus represents 506 in total.
To pre-test the questionnaire, I sent a copy of the questionnaire to three companies in the 
sample. Because of the relatively easier access to British companies, and their smaller 
number, compared with American companies, I sent the questionnaire to almost all of the 
companies in the population between 20 May 1993 and 17 June 1993, with the mailing 
of some 14 companies whose addresses were difficult to obtain being carried out later in 
October and November of 1993.
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A follow-up mailing to 246 non-respondent companies was carried out between 5 August 
1993 and 20 December 1993, with the mailing of some further 11 companies being 
mailed in January and April 1994.
The final number of responses was 365 (including the ineligible, refused, irrelevant, or 
invalid). 109 of the companies which did not have arts sponsorship programmes as 
such, but one-off donations to art institutions, were as a result excluded from the 
sampling population. The population in the survey thus is 397 in total. The valid 
responses are those from 169 companies, thus representing 42.57 percent response rate.
m .  U.S. Respondents
54 American companies responded to the questionnaire. Two companies preferred to 
remain anonymous, and accordingly do not figure in the following list:
3 M (MN); Allied Signal, Inc (NJ); American Brands, Inc. (CT); American Express 
(NY); American Family Insurance (WI); BankAmerica Foundation (CA); BHP Petroleum 
Americas Foundation (HI); Byers Choice Ltd (PA); Centerior Energy (OH); Chesapeake 
Corporation Foundation (VA); Chevron (CA); Chicago Sun-Times (IL); Comerica 
Incorporated (MI); Consumer Power Co. Foundation (MI); Crune & Co. (MA); Cyprus 
Minerals Company (CO); Dominion Bankshares Corp. (VA); Donaldson Company (MN); 
Dr Pepper/7-Up Companies (TX); Ecolab Inc. (MN); First Interstate Bank of California 
Foundation (CA); First Interstate Bank of Oregon Foundation (OR); Fortis Foundation 
(NY); GenCorp (OH); Hoechst Cecanese Corporation (NJ); Huntington Bancshares Inc. 
(OH); Ingersoll Milling Machine (IL); J C Penny Company (TX); Jacobson Stores 
Foundation (MI); Kohler Co. (WI); Martin Marietta Corp. (MD); Maxon Corporation 
(IN); McDermont International (LA); Miles Kimball Company (WI); Mississippi Power 
& Light (MS); National Life Insurance (VT); Nestle USA (CA); Pennzoil Company 
(TX); Physician Mutual Ins Co. Foundation (NE); Pioneer Hi-Bred International (lA); 
Portland General Corporation (OR); PPC Inc. (WI); Quantum Chemical Corporation 
(NY); Sara Lee Corporation (IL); Shaklee Corporation (CA); Spring Industries Inc. (SC);
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The Kroger Co. Foundation (OH); Transamer lea Foundation (CA); Trinova Corporation 
(OH); Tyler Corporation (TX); United Services Life (ND); Yellow Freight System Inc 
(KS).
IV. U. K. Respondents
169 British companies responded to the questionnaire. Two of them preferred to remain 
anonymous, and accordingly do not figure in the following list:
3i pic.; A. Schmied UK Ltd.; Agnew’s (Thos Angew & Sons Ltd.); AIB Bank (First 
Trust Bank); Arthur Andersen & Co.; ASW Holdings PLC; Baillie Gifford & Co.; Bang 
& Olufsen UK Ltd; Bank of Boston; Bankers Trust International pic.; Barclays Bank pic.; 
Barclays de Zoete Wedd Ltd; Bass Brewers; Bass Ireland Limited; Bayer pic; BASF pic.; 
Belfast Telegraph Newspapers Ltd.; Bisley Properties (Tobacco Dock); Booker pic.; 
Botts & Company Ltd.; Bourlet Martin; BP Chemical; BP International pic.; British 
Aerospace; pic.; British Airways pic.; British Alcan Aluminium pic.; British Telecom 
pic.; Broadway Malyan (Chartered Architects); Burmah Castrol pic.; C & J Clark Ltd.; 
Capital Radio pic.; Caterpillar (UK) Ltd.; Central Independent Television pic.; Chelsea 
Building Society; Chesterton International Ltd.; Chevron UK Ltd.; Christian Salvesen 
pic.; Citibank; Clerical Medical Investment Group; Clifford Chance; Clydesdale Bank 
pic.; Crown Buckley pic.; Daily Telegraph pic.; Datastream International Ltd.; Dean 
Clough Industrial Park Ltd.; Debenham Tewson & Chinnocks Holdings pic.; Denton Hall 
Burgin & Warrens; Digital Equipment Company Ltd.; Eastern Electricity pic.; English 
Estates; Eurotunnel pic.; Falcoon Construction; Ferguson International Holding pic.; 
Flack & Kurtz (UK) Ltd.; Fountains (Vienna Group of Hotels); Friends Provident Life 
Office; Gartmore Investment Management Ltd.; General Accident pic.; General 
Electricity Co. pic.; General Utilities pic.(Générale des Eaux); Gestetner Holdings pic.; 
Glaxo Holdings pic.; Glynwed International pic.; Grand Metropolitan Estates Ltd.; 
Greene King & Sons pic.; Guinness pic.; Halecrest Ltd.; Hay Management Consultants 
Ltd.; Herring Baker Harris; Hickson International pic.; Hill Samuel Bank Ltd.; Hiram 
Walker International Liqueurs; Honeywell Control Systems Ltd.; Hydro-Electric; Ibstock
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Johnsen pic.; IBM UK Ltd.; Imperial Tobacco Ltd.; IMI pic.; Inchcape pic.; J Bibby & 
Sons pic.; J P Morgan; J T Group Ltd.; J. Sainsbury pic.; Jaguar Cars Ltd.; Jazz fm; 
John Good Holbrook Ltd.; Knight, Frank & Rutley; Korn/Ferry International Ltd.; 
KPMG Management Consulting; Legal & General Group pic.; Lloyds Bank pic.; London 
Life Ltd.; Loot (UK) Ltd.; Lucas Industries pic.; Maclay Murray & Spens; Manweb 
pic.; Martini & Ross Ltd.; McDonald’s Restaurants Ltd.; Mercedes-Benz (UK) Ltd.; 
Midland Bank pic.; Mobil Holdings pic.; Morgan Stanley International; Morgan, Lewis 
& Bockius; MOMART pic.; National Grid Company pic.; National Power pic.; NCC 
Developments Ltd.; NCR Ltd.; Newcastle Breweries Ltd.; Nicholson & Bass Ltd.; Norsk 
Hydro (UK) Ltd.; Northern Electric pic.; Northern Ireland Electricity pic.; Northern 
Telecom Europe Ltd.; Northumbrian Water Group pic.; Norwich Union Insurance 
Group; OMV UK Ltd.; Pearson pic.; Phillips Fine Art Auctioneers & Valuers; Powergen 
pic.; Price Waterhouse & Co.; Prudential Corporation pic.; Radio Clyde Holdings pic.; 
Reed International pic.; Reg Vardy (Bavaria) Ltd.; Regalian Properties pic.; Royal Bank 
of Scotland pic.; RTZ Corporation pic.; Rudolf Wolff & Co. Ltd.; S C Johnson Wax 
Ltd.; Scottish & Newcastle Breweries pic.; Scottish Brewers Ltd.; Scottish Nuclear Ltd.; 
Seeboard pic.; Shandwick pic.; Sheppard Robson Architects; Slough Estates pic.; Sony 
(UK) Ltd.; South Wales Electricity pic.; Southern Water pic.; Spero Communications 
Ltd.; Statoil (UK) Ltd.; Tarmac Construction Ltd.; Tate & Lyle pic.; Taylor Johnson 
Garrett; Texaco Ltd.; The "Old Bushmills" Distillery Co. Ltd.; The Times (News 
International pic); The Times Supplements Ltd.; Time Out Group Ltd.; Toyota (GB) 
Ltd.; Troughton McAslan Architects; TSB Group pic.; Tyne Tees Television Ltd.; Ulster 
Television pic.; Unisys Ltd.; VAG (UK) Ltd.; Visa International; Whitbread pic.; Whyte 
& Mackay Group pic.; William Teacher & Sons Ltd.; Wolff 01 ins Ltd.; Woolwich 
Building Society; Yorkshire Bank pic.; Yorkshire Electricity Group pic.; Yorkshire 
Television Ltd.; Yorkshire Water pic.
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ARTS SPONSORSHIP
A survey undertaken by Chin-tao Wu as part of the research project for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy at the University of London (in the Department of History of Art, University College 
London, Gower Street, WCIE 6BT, United Kingdom)
Tel: +44 71 387 9594 Fax:+44 71 387 8057
Name of the firm:___________________________
Name of the person completing this questionnaire:
Position in the firm:_________________________
Date:__________ _______
Where the following questions ask you to make a choice, PLEASE TICK THE APPROPRIATE 
BOX(ES). When asked to specify, please print your answers legibly in
the space provided. However you may write in additional comments whenever you wish to do so.
1. When did the firm start its arts sponsorship program?
2. Name of person(s) who initiated the program?
3. What position did (s)he hold in the firm?
4. Why did the firm start its arts sponsorship program?
Ntither
Very Fairly Important nor Fairly Very
Important Important Unimportant Unimportant Unimportant
To keep up with business trends.
Better corporate image.
Chief Executive Officer’s/Chairman’s initiatives.
Encouraged by tax concessions.
Employee benefits.
As a public relations practice.
Social networking.
Others (please specify)_________________________ .
5. If you are the person in charge of administering the program, how long have you been in this 
position?
6. If you are not the person in charge of administering the program, what position does this person 
hold in the firm?
7. How long has he or she been acting in this capacity?




Who makes the decisions for the sponsorship program? Please tick all that apply.
J Chief Executive Officer/Chairman/Senior manager(s).
] Sponsorship committee.
] Marketing/Public relations/Corporate affairs department.
] Company foundation.
] Others (please specify)  __________________________________________________ _




10. Which kind of arts organizations/activities are you most likely to sponsor?
Art centers.
Arts councils/united arts funds. 
Community arts groups.
Art museums.











Very Fairly Likely Fairly Very
Likely Likely Nor Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely
11. Which of the following is most important in deciding which organizations/institutions to sponsor?
Geographic location (headquarters)
Geographic location (branch offices and plants) 
Publicity value.
Personal preference of senior management. 
Facilities for corporate entertainment.
Employee involvement.
Support by other firms.
Appeals from directors by other firms. 
Contribution to local community.
Support by the National Endowment of Arts. 
Support by state arts councils.
Status and reputation of the arts organization. 
Size of potential audience.
Quality of application.
Artistic merit.





Fairly Important Nor Fairly Very
Important Unimportant Unimportant Unimportant
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12. Approximately how much is your annual budget for arts sponsorship?
13. What percentage of this annual budget do you give for sponsorship to art museums/visual arts 
organizations?
[ ] 0 - 5  %
[ ] 6 - 10 %
[ ] 11 - 15 %
[ ] 16 - 20 %
[ ] 21 - 25 %
[ ] 26 - 50 %
[ ] Above 50 %
14. Have you been involved in the program of the art institution to which you have given the 
sponsorship?
[ ] Yes, (please specify)
[ INo.
15. Who are the targeted audience for your arts sponsorship?
Senior civil servants/politicians. 
Opinion formers/journalists. 






Fairly Important Nor Fairly Very
Important Unimportant Unimportant Unimportant





Fairly Successrul Nor Fairly Very
Successful Unsuccessful Unsuccessful Unsuccessful




Improved corporate image. 
Others (please specify)____
17. Does your firm have corporate membership of any art museums?
[ ] Yes, (please specify)_______________________________________
I ]No.
18. Have you ever sponsored or initiated any arts awards?
[ ] Yes.
a. Please specify______________________________
b. In what discipline(s) of the arts (eg. theater, dance, music, visual arts etc.)
[ ]No.
PLEASE TURN TO PAGE 4
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19. Have you operated matching-gift programs for art museums?
[ ] Yes, (please specify)____________________________________
[ INo.
20. Does your firm have membership of any of the following organizations? Please tick all 
that apply.
[ ] Arts and Business Council.
[ ] Business Committee for the Arts.
[ ] The National Association for Corporate Art Management.
[ ] None.
21. Has your Chief Executive Officer/Chairman or any of your senior manager(s) ever served on the 
board of trustees of art museums or art-related organizations?
[ ] Yes, (please specify)____________________________________________________________________
[ ] ]^
22. Have there been any major changes in your sponsorship program during the decade of the 1980s?
[ ] Yes, (please specify)____________________________________________________________________
[ ]No.
23. Please list any local or national awards your firm has received for its support of the arts: 
Award Date Description
24. Please write down the names of the major art museums/visual arts organizations to which your 
firm has given support during the years 1985 to 1990:
Art museums/visual arts organizations Years
Please return the questionnaire to: Chin-tao Wu, 5 Gun Street, Bishopsgate, London, E l 6AH, 
United Kingdom. Please also remember to enclose your annual report/accounts and other 
pertinent material on your arts sponsorship program.
THANK YOU VERY MUCH!
® 1993 Chin-tao Wu
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University College London 
Gower Street
|[J((^]L London WCIE 6BT
' Tel: 071-387 7050 Ex.4597/6
Direct Line 071-387 9594 
Department of History of Art Fax: 071-387 8057
Please reply to: 5 Gun Street. Bishopsgate. London El 6AH. United Kingdom
4 January 1993
Dear
I am a Ph.D. student in the Department of History of Art at University College London. 
My research is a comparative Anglo-American study of the relationship between the 
State, corporations and contemporary art during the 1980s.
In order to present a more comprehensive picture of corporate giving to the arts, I need 
concrete statistical data to support my findings. Your firm has been listed in the National 
Guide to Funding in Arts and Culture and seems to be a very interesting case. I would 
be very grateful if you could help me to complete the questionnaire. Even if not all the 
questions are relevant to your corporate giving program, your response will still be of 
interest to me.
Some of the questions require detailed information and if you find it inconvenient to find 
o u t  the exact answers, I would be very grateful if you can give an approximate 
indication.
Any information you kindly give me will be treated as strictly confidential and will be 
used for research purposes only. No names of persons or references to the budget and 
policies of specific firms will be made in the thesis. If you do not wish the name to be 
listed as a source of information in any respect, please indicate in your reply.
I hope the result of the research will be of interest to you and I will send a summary to 
you in due course. When the research is published in the future, its details will be sent 
to you as well.
Is it possible for you to send me the company annual report and accounts, and other 
pertinent material on your arts sponsorship program?
I would very much appreciate a reply within the next four weeks, even if it is only to 
inform me that you can not participate in this project. Thank you very much for the 





Regions Used for Stratification
Region States and Territories Included
East coast - north 
East coast - south
Lake district areas 
Mid - north 
Mid - south 
West coast
CT, ME, MA, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT
AL, DC, DE, PL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, NC, SC, TN,
VA, WV
lA, IL, IN, MI, MN, OH, WI
AR, AZ, CO, KS, MO, NM, OK, TX, UT
MT, ND, NE, SD, WY
AK, CA, HI, ID, NV, OR, WA
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CT 16 4 20 3 11 3 10
ME 5 1 1 0 0 0 1
MA 28 5 16 3 5 0 8
NH 0 0 0 0 4 1 1
NJ 13 1 17 5 10 2 8
NY 90 24 49 16 24 9 49
PA 52 12 24 5 11 0 17
RI 6 1 1 0 2 1 2
VT 2 0 1 1 0 0 1
Sub-Toul 212 48 129 33 67 16 97
AL 6 1 3 0 1 0 1
DC 8 2 4 1 3 0 3
DE 3 1 4 1 0 0 2
PL 10 2 4 1 2 0 3
GA 16 3 6 2 0 0 5
KY 4 1 4 1 1 0 2
LA 2 1 1 0 1 1 2
MD 16 4 2 0 1 0 4
MS 2 0 1 1 1 1 2
NC 17 3 7 2 5 0 5
SC 7 1 3 1 1 0 2
TN 5 1 2 1 1 1 3
VA 22 6 9 2 1 1 9
WV 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sub-ToUl 119 26 50 13 18 4 43
Total 331 74 179 46 85 20 140
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lA 16 4 5 2 0 0 6
IL 58 13 27 6 13 6 25
IN 12 3 6 1 4 0 4
MI 25 6 11 3 3 1 10
MN 28 6 21 5 6 1 12
OH 60 15 27 6 6 1 22
WI 57 11 10 2 7 0 13
Sub-ToUl 256 58 107 25 39 9 92
AR 6 2 4 1 0 0 3
AZ 3 1 4 1 2 1 3
CO 3 1 5 1 2 1 3
KS 6 2 1 0 0 0 2
MO 31 7 9 2 3 1 10
NM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OK 8 1 5 1 3 0 2
TX 18 4 21 5 13 2 11
UT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sub-ToUl 75 18 49 11 23 5 34
MT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ND 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
NE 7 3 0 0 0 0 3
SD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
WY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sub-Total 8 3 0 0 1 1 4
-
Total 339 79 156 36 63 15 130
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AK I 0 0 0 0 0 0
CA 43 10 31 7 12 2 19
HI 6 2 1 0 1 0 2
ID 0 0 2 1 2 0 1
NV 3 0 2 0 0 0 0
OR 8 2 5 1 3 2 5
WA 9 2 10 3 2 1 6
Sub-Total 70 16 51 12 2 0 5 33
Total 740 169 386 94 168 40 303
Notes to the columns:
Column 1 : abbreviations of States.
Column 2: number of foundations listed in National Guide.
Column 3: number of foundations selected.
Column 4: number of direct corporate giving programs listed in National Guide.
Column 5: number of companies listed in Corporate Giving but not included in Natioanl Guide. 
Column 6: number of companies selected from Corporate Giving.
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APPENDIX 2
Questionnaire Survey on Corporate Art Collections in America and Britain
(Methodology; List of Companies Completing Questionnaire;
Copy of Questionnaire and Cover Letter)
I. Methodology (American Survey)
1. The Sampling Population
The population for the questionnaire on corporate art collections is compiled from the 
following two directories:
Shirley Reiff Howarth, ed., International Directory o f Corporate Art Collections, 
1990-91 edition (Largo, Florida: International Art Alliance, Inc. and New York: 
ARTnews Associates, 1990) (hereafter International Directory)
American Art Directory 1991-92, 53rd edition (New York: R. R. Bowker’s Database 
Publishing Group, 1991.) Art Directory)
The International Directory is the most comprehensive listing of its kind. It contains 833 
entries for corporate art collections of various kinds in the United States. Our study, 
however, aims at surveying those companies which have demonstrated commitment to 
collecting contemporary art works. Those collections which are exclusively dedicated to 
works from the period before 1945 or artifacts which are completely irrelevant to the 
concerns of this study are therefore excluded. The following criteria of what constitutes 
"an art collection" are further employed to establish the population for the study:
The number of items in the collection must be no less than 100 or there must be a 
full-time curator in charge of the collection.
A large number of the listings in the International Directory, however, have no indication 
as to the total number of works in their collections, and it is impossible to trace such 
information without directly contacting each of the companies. Those collections are
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treated as part of the population because to exclude them would mean omitting a fairly 
large number of companies whose characteristics would otherwise not be understood 
properly, and the representativeness of the samples selected would therefore be prone to 
bias.
129 corporate art collections were listed in Art Directory. 20 of them not already listed 
in the International Directory were also selected. The population of the survey thus 
identified is 511 in total.
2. Stratification o f the Universe
Stratified sampling is adopted here in selecting samples for this questionnaire. The 
choice of this method has been made possible because the information required is 
available in the International Directory. It is aimed at ensuring that appropriate numbers 
of the companies are drawn from the homogeneous subsets of the population, and the 
degree of representiveness in the sampling can therefore be increased.
The whole population has thus been organised into discrete groups based on three
stratification variables: the geographical location of the company, its business type and
the size of its collection. The divisions of geographical areas are the same as those used
for the questionnaire on arts sponsorship (see Exhibit 1 at the end of the Appendix 1).
Companies are further divided into five groups according to the number of items in the
collection, as follows:
Number of items Number of
in collection companies
1. from 100 to 200 102
2. from 201 to 500 124
3. from 501 to 1,000 55
4. more than 1,000 83
5. unknown 147
Total 511
For classifying the company business types, the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
is applied with adaption for the specific needs of this study; see Exhibit 1 at the end of
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Appendix 2.
3. Sample Size and Selection
I decided to send out 250 copies of the questionnaire for the survey. I first divided the 
population into five groups according to the size of the collection and calculated how 
many samples within each group should be selected.
I then divided each group into six geographical areas. Within each geographical location, 
the population is further stratified by the business type of the company. The final 
selection of the samples is basically random in order to avoid any bias, but based on the 
relative proportion of the population represented by a given group, either by the size of 
the collection, the geographical location, or by the business type, within the desired 
sample size.
4. A Small Sample
In addition to the survey for the whole country, I also sent copies of the questionnaire 
to each of the companies which I visited in Washington D.C. and New York in the 
summer of 1990 and a few companies which seemed to be very interesting cases, even 
though it was not certain that they fulfilled the criteria adopted in defining the population 
of the questionnaire. This small sampling was intended to double-check the information 
which I had collected in the summer of 1990, and to monitor changes, if any, occurring 
over the past two years, especially under the severe recession.
4. Survey Operation (Mailing and Non-response Follow-up) and Response Rate
289 copies sent out in January 1993. This included a cover letter and a copy of the 
questionnaire. A follow-up mailing to the non-respondents of 227 companies was carried 
out in April 1993. Two more companies in Washington D.C. further completed the 
questionnaire on my return visit in April 1995.
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The final number of responses was 122 (including the ineligible, refused, irrelevant or 
invalid). Five of the companies which were in the mailing are irrelevant to the study, 
with one company having gone out of existence. 89 companies completed the 
questionnaire. However, five of them have only art works produced before 1945, 13 
collections listed in the International Directory with an unspecified number of works were 
found to be too small to include in the population, and one questionnaire is too 
incomplete to be included in the final analysis. The population is accordingly reduced 
to 487. The valid responses were 70, representing a 26.65 percent response rate.
n . Methodology (British Survey)
There are three main sources of information on corporate art collectors in Britain: the 
1990-92 International Directory o f Corporate Art Collections (as in American survey 
above), a list given to me by the National Art Collection Fund (NACF), which organised 
an exhibition. The New Patrons: Twentieth-Century Art from Corporate Collections (3-24 
January 1992) at Christie’s, and the membership list from the I99I Annual Report of the 
Association for Business Sponsorship of the Arts, which lists any company member with 
a corporate art collection.
There were 79 companies listed in the International Directory as owning collections of 
some kind in Britain; some 11 companies in the list from the NACF, and a further 26 
companies listed in ABSA annual report (including a list of 6 corporate collectors in 
Scotland provided by ABSA Scotland), which were not covered by the International 
Directory. In addition to these three sources, I supplemented some 34 companies from 
my own secondary source reading or other informants in the art world. The total of the 
population at the beginning was 151.
I wrote or telephoned each of the companies regardless of the nature of their collections 
in February 1992 to request information on their art collections, along with any other 
involvement in the contemporary art world. Firstly, I was unsure whether the 
information in the International Directory or the ABSA annual report was accurate or
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comprehensive. Secondly, to know some collections of non-art can often shed light on 
why certain companies are more keen to collect contemporary art than others.
As a result, 16 companies in the International Directory, for example, were found to 
have no/significant contemporary art collections (e.g. Colman Foods, John Harvey & 
Sons, Inchcape & Co. pic), or collections that were not in Britain (e.g. Banque Paribas, 
Rabobank Nederland); another 4 collections were sold, while 3 companies had ceased 
trading.
Because of the different size of the British economy, when selecting companies for the 
survey, I lowered the limit to 50 works in the collection provided that the collection 
contained a certain number of substantial works. Nor did at the time of my survey any 
British company have a full-time curator, as the American companies sometimes did. As 
a result, this previous criterion was not applicable to British companies. Given this 
criterion, and after preliminary contact, the total number of the sampling population is 
110.
To pre-test the questionnaire, I sent a copy to three of the companies in the sampling 
population. 110 copies of the questionnaires were then sent to the companies between 
17 June and 20 September 1994. A follow-up mailing of 61 non-respondent companies 
was carried out between 1 August and 27 September 1994, with the last two mailed out 
on 21 February 1995. Because of the relative easy access to British companies, I was 
also able to complete the follow-up telephone calls.
The final number of responses was 79 (including the ineligible, refused, irrelevant or 
invalid). 16 of the companies in the mailing were found to be irrelevant to our study, 
and the population was accordingly reduced to 94. 42 companies completed the
questionnaire, but one of them were not relevant to the survey (only collects early 
twentieth-century works), one collection owned by a foreign company is found not to 
have substantial holding in Britain, and the other two was too small, despite the fact that 
the works they owned were substantial). The valid responses are from 38 companies. 
The response rate is accordingly 35.85 percent.
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m . U. s. Respondents
89 American companies responded to the questionnaire. One company preferred to 
remain anonymous, and accordingly does not figure in the following list:
3M (Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Inc.) (MN); American Express Company (NY); 
Amoco Corporation (IL); Amway Corporation (MI); Arnold & Porter (DC); Arthur 
Andersen (DC): Banc One Arizona (AZ); Bank of Boston (MA); Bellevue Hospital 
Center (NY); BE & K Inc. (AL); Blount, Inc. (AL); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. (NJ); 
Broad Inc. and Kaufman and Broad Home Co. (CA); Brown & Bain (AZ); Burlington 
Northern Railroad (MN); Burroughs Wellcome Company (NC); Charlotte Observer 
(Knight Publishing Co.) (NC); Chase Manhattan Bank (NY); Chubb Life America (NH); 
Ciba-Geigy Corporation (NY); Cigna Museum & Art Collection (PA); CitiBank (NY); 
Commerce Bancshares, Inc. (MO); Commodities Corporation (NJ); Consolidated 
Freightways, Inc. (CA); Continental Corporation (NY); Covington & Burling (DC); 
Debevoise Plimpton (DC); Deere & Company (IL); Domino’s Pizza, Inc. (MI); Dow 
Jones & Company (NY); Drug Emporium (OH); Eli Lilly and Company (IN); Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston (MA); Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis (MN); First Bank 
System Inc. (MN); Franchise Finance Corporation of America (AR); Fried, Frank, 
Harris, Shriver & Jacobson (NY); Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver, Jacobson (DC); 
Gaylord Entertainment Co. (TN); General Mills Inc. (MN); Grubb & Ellis Company 
(CA); Hallmark Card Inc. (MO); Heublein Inc. (CT); Home Box Office (HBO) (NY); 
IBM Corporation (NY); IMT Insurance Co. (Mutual) (lA); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons 
Inc. (NY); Kelly, Hart & Hallman (TX); Kemper National Insurance Companies (IL); 
Kilpatrick & Cody (GA); KPMG Peat Marwick (FL); Kutak Rock (NE); Laughner’s 
Brothers Inc. (IN); Lincoln National Corporation (IN); Lintas Worldwide (NY); Lovelace 
Medical Foundation (NM); Lutheran Brotherhood (MN); Meredith Corporation (lA); 
Miller & Chevalier (DC); Nations Bank (FL); Nations Bank (VA); O’Melveny & Myers 
(CA); Pacific Telesis Group (CA); Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker (CA); Persis 
Corporation (HI); Philip Morris Companies Inc. (NY); Pitney Bowes Inc. (CT); Playboy 
Enterprises, Inc. (IL); Rançon Financial (CA); Safeco Insurance Co. (WA); Standard 
Federal Bank (MI); State Street Bank & Trust Co. (MA); Sullivan & Cromwell (D.C.);
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the Drackett Company (OH); the Haskell Company (FL); The Rouse Company (MD); 
The St Paul Companies (MN); Transco Energy Company (TX); Trenam, Simmons, 
Scharf, Barkin, Frye, O’Neil (FL); TRW Inc. (OH); U.S. Equities Realty, Inc. (IL); 
Union Bank of Switzerland (NY); United Missouri Bancshares, Inc. (MO); Vinson & 
Elkins (TX); Virlane Foundation (K & B Inc.) (LA); Wilmington Trust Co. (DE); 
Yellow Freight System Inc. (KS).
IV. U. K. Respondents
42 British companies responded to the questionnaire.
3i pic.; A. M. Transport (Shotts) Ltd.; AIB Allied Irish Bank; Arthur Anderson & Co.; 
Bank of Scotland; Bankers Trust Company London; BAA Heathrow Airport Ltd; BOC 
Group; the British Petroleum; British Rail Pension Fund; Brodies Solicitors; Chase 
Manhattan Bank; Cheltenham & Gloucester Building Society; Clydesdale Bank pic; 
Coopers & Lybrand; Freshfields; Hiscox Holdings Ltd.; IBM U.K. Ltd.; ICI Group 
Headquarters; Lloyds Bank; Long Term Credit Bank of Japan; MCL Group Ltd.; 
Midland Bank pic.; Mobil North Sea Ltd.; Pearl Assurance pic.; Price Waterhouse; 
Provident Financial; Prudential Corporation; Rothmans/PeterStuyvesant; Royal Bank of 
Scotland; Save & Prosper; Scottish Amicable; Sedgwick Group; Shell UK; W H Smith 
Group pic.; Société Générale Strauss Turnbull Securities Ltd; TSB Group pic.; Tyne 




A survey undertaken by Chin-tao Wu as part of the research project for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy at the University of London (in the Department of History of Art, University College London, 
Gower Street, London, WCIE 6BT)
Tel: 071- 387 9594 Fax: 071- 916 5939
Name of firm:_______________________
Name of person completing questionnaire:
Position in the firm:__________________
Date:_______
Where the following questions ask you to make a choice, PLEASE TICK THE APPROPRIATE 
BOX(ES). When asked to specify, please print yoiu* answers legibly in the space provided. 
However you may write in additional comments whenever you wish to do so.
A. The Historv and Content of the Collection:
1. When did the firm start collecting works of art?
2. Name of person(s) who initiated the collection?
3. What position did (s)he hold in the firm?
4. Why did (s)he initiate the collecting?
He or she had a personal interest in art. 
Relocation or expansion of the firm.
To keep up with business trends.
To enhance the working environment. 
To generate good public relations.





Very Fairly Important Nor Fairly Very
Important Important Unimportant Unimportant Unimportant
5. Did you use outside art consultant(s) when you first purchased art works? 
[ ] Yes.
[ ]No .
6. What was your initial purchasing budget?
[ ] Under £31,250.
[ ] £31,251 to £62,500.
[ 1 £62,501 to £312,500.
( 1 £312,501 to £625,000.
[ ] Above £625,000.
7. Did you obtain tax benefits from purchasing woiks of art? Please tick all that apply. 
[ ] Yes, they qualified as revenue expenditure.
[ 1 Yes, they qualified for capital allowances.
[ ] Yes, we reclaimed VAT on art purchases.
[ ] Yes, others (please describe in a few words what was the benefit)___________________
[ INo.
PLEASE TURN TO PAGE 2 --------------- >
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8. Have sales of art works from your collection ever had any Capital Gains Tax implications?
[ 1 Yes, (please specify)____________________________________________________________________
[ ] ^
9. Who has the authority to select works for the collection? Please tick all that apply.
[ ] Chairman/Chief Executive/Senior manager(s).
[ ] In-house art committee.
[ ] In-house art curator(s).
[ ] Outside art consultant(s).
[ 1 Public relations or advertising departments.
[ ] Art dealer(s).
[ ] Others (please specify)__________________________________________________________________.
10. Do you gather information on artists and their works by consulting... Please tick all that apply.
( ] Chairman/Chief Executive/Senior manager(s).
[ ] In-house art committee.
[ ] In-house curator(s).
[ ] Public relations or advertising departments.
[ ] Outside art consultant(s).
[ ] Art dealer(s).
[ 1 Other firms which also collect art.
[ ] National-level Arts Councils or Regional Arts Boards.
[ 1 Others (please specify)__________________________________________________________________
11. Do you have the following units or positions in your firm? (If not, please go to question 13.)
[ ] Part-time curator Date of establishment ______________
[ ] Full-time curator Date of establishment ______________
[ ] Art committee Date of establishment ______________
[ ] Art department Date of establishment ______________
12. If you have one or more full time curators in the firm, what are their professional qualifications?
13. If you do not have the above units or positions, what position does this person in charge of the 
collection hold?
14. Through whom (or with which galleries) have you made purchases?
Please specify__________________________________________________
15. How many items are there in yoiu* collection?
16. How many works in the following medium are there in your collection? (Exclude posters and 




Prints (limited edition only). ______________
Drawings. ______________
Photographs. ______________
Crafts(textiles/fibre art/ceramics, etc.). ______________
Mixed media.___________________________________________ ______________
Other (please specify)________________________________ .___ ______________
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17. How many works from the following periods are there in your collection? (Exclude posters and 
reproductions.)
[ ] Before 1945. ______________
[ 1 1945 to 1959. ______________
[ 1 1960s. ______________
[ ] 1970s. ______________
[ ] 1980s. ______________
[ ] 1990s. ______________
18. How many works in each of the following categories are there in your collection? (Exclude posters 
and reproductions.) Please distinguish between sculpture and two dimensional works where 
appropriate.
[ ] Styles before 1945. ______________
[ ] Abstract Expressionism. ______________
[ ] Minimalism. ______________
[ ] Conceptual art. ______________
[ ] Pop art. ______________
[ ] Neo-Expressionism. ______________
[ ] Photorealist. ______________
[ ] Pattern painting. ______________
[ ] Figurative/Modem. ______________
[ ] Figurative/Traditional. ______________
[ ] Land art. ______________
[ ] Fluxus and Arte Povera. ______________
[ ] Installations. ______________
[ ] Others, (please specify)________________________________. ______________
* If you are uncertain in which categories to place any of yoiu* works, would you instead please 
enclose a list of artists in your collection when you return the questionnaire ?
19. How many works in your collection are by artists from the geographical groups below? (Exclude 
posters and reproductions.)
[ ] Regional. ______________
[ ] National. ______________
[ ] U.S.A. ______________
[ ] European. _________ '
[ ] Asian. ______________
[ ] Afncan. ______________
[ ] South and Central American. ______________
[ ] Others (please specify)________________________________ . ______________
20. In your decision to purchase works, how influential is the fact that the work(s) of the artist has 
already been purchased/collected by one of the following? Neither
Arts Council of Great Britain. 
Regional Arts Boards.
Other public bodies.
Very Fairly Influential Nor Fairly Very
Influential Influential Uninfluential Uninfluential Uninfluential
[ 1 [ ] [ ] [ 1 [ 1
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ 1 [ ] [ ] [ ]
21. How influential is the fact that the artist’s works are already collected by other firms?
Neither
Firms in the region.
Firms of national significance. 
Firms of international significance.
Very Fairly Influential Nor Fairly Very
Influential Influential Uninfluential Uninfluential Uninfluential
[ 1 [ 1 [ 1 [ ] [ 1
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ 1 [ 1
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
22. How influential is the fact that the artist’s works are already collected by art museums?
Art museums in the region.
Art museums of national significance.
Art museums of international significance.
Neither
Very Fairly Influential Nor Fairly Very
Influential Influential Uninfluential Uninfluential Uninfluential
[ ] [ ] [ 1 [ ] [ ]
[ 1 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
PLEASE TURN TO PAGE 4
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23. Do you purchase works from young artists without an established reputation?
[ ] Yes.
[ ] No.
24. Are there any art works which depict nudity in your collections?
[ ] Yes.
[ ]No .
25. Does the firm have a preference for figurative or abstract works?
[ ] Yes, figurative works.
[ ] Yes, abstract works.
[ ] No preference.
26. Are there any works of art which you think would NOT be appropriate for the corporate 
environment?
[ ] Yes, (please specify)____________________________________________________________________
[
B. Your Current Practice;
27. What is the current value of your collection?
] Under £62,500.
1 £62,501 to £312,500.
] £312,501 to £625,000.
] £625,001 to £6,250,000.
] Above £6,250,000.
28. If you continue to buy art, how regular will your purchases be? Please tick all that apply.
] Irregular.
] We have an annual budget for purchases.
] It depends on the expansion of the firm’s floor space.
] It depends on the profitability of the firm.
1 Others (please specify)__________________________________________________________________ .
29. If you do not continue to buy art, can you say why? Please tick all that apply.
] Change of senior management.
1 Decline in trading profits.
] No more space for displaying art works.
] Current recession.
] Others, (please specify)__________________________________________________________________.
30. Is your present annual purchasing budget in the region of;
] Under £31,250.
1 £31,251 to £62,500.
1 £62,501 to £312,500.




f  you use outside art consultant(s) or dealer(s), on what basis do you do so?
] Occasionally.
] On a retainer basis.
] Do not use outside consultant(s).
Vhere do you display art worits? Please tick all that apply.
] Reception lobby(s).
] Corporate hospitality dining rooms.
] Chairman’s suite and the executive floor.
] Offices.
] Staff restaurants.
] In the open air.
] Others (please specify)_______________________________________________
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C. The Functions of the Collection;
33. What corporate image do you hope to project from your collection?
Please describe in a few words:___________________________________
34. Will you lend works from your collection to art museums/galleries ?
[ ] Yes.
[ ]No .
35. Have any of the works from your collection been exhibited in art museums/galleries?
[ ] Yes, (please specify which art museums/galleries)________________________________
[ ]No .
36. Have you organised any exhibitions of works from your collection to date? Please tick all that 
apply.
[ ] Yes, within corporate facilities.
[ ] Yes, tours to outside venues. (Please specify)______________________________________________.
[ 1 No.
37. Have you ever organised any art activities for the employees? Please tick all that apply.
[ ] Yes, lectures.
[ 1 Yes, guided tours of art works.
[ ] Yes, art receptions (previews).
[ ] Yes, others (please specify)_____________________________________________________________ .
[ ]No.
38. Have you ever had outside visitors to the collection? Please tick all that apply.
[ ] Yes, scholars and researchers.
[ 1 Yes, clients, business associates and guests.
[ ] Yes, organized educational groups.
[ ] Yes, general public.
[ ] Yes, others (please specify)_______________________________________________
[ ]No.
39. Have you ever sold any works from the collection?
[ 1 Yes.
[ ] No.
40. Have you ever donated any worics from the collection to art museums/galleries?
[ ] Yes.
[ ]No.
41. Has your collection been discussed in any periodicals?
[ ] Yes, (please specify)_____________________________________________ _
[ INo.
42. Have you published any catalogues or brochures for your collection?
[ ] Yes, catalogues.
[ ] Yes, brochures.
[ ]No.
43. Have you ever illustrated any works from the collection in other publications of the firm?
[ ] Yes, (please specify)_____________________________________________________________
[
PLEASE TURN TO PAGE 6 ---------------->
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44. Has your firm received any local or national awards for its art collection? 
[ ] Yes.
Please give the following details:
Award Date Description
[ ]No.
D. Other Involvement in the Arts:
45. How often do you commission works of art?
[ ] Never.
[ ] Seldom.
[ 1 Several pieces a year.
[ ] Other, (please specify)__________________
46. Have you ever operated an art gallery within your corporate facilities?
[ ] Yes, (please specify)___________________________________________________________________ .
[ ]No.
47. Do you or have you ever hosted a branch of a public museum or gallery within your corporate 
facilities?
[ ] Yes, (please specify)___________________________________________________________________ .
[ INo.
48. Does your firm have corporate membership of any art museums/galleries?
[ ] Yes, (please specify)__________________________________________________________________ .
[ ]No.
49. Have you operated matching-gift programs for art museums/galleries?
[ ] Yes, (please specify)___________________________________________
[ ] No.
50. Have you ever sponsored or initiated any arts awards?
[ ] Yes.
a. Please specify_____________________________________________
b. In what discipline(s) of the arts (eg. theatre, dance, music, visual arts etc.)
[ 1NÔ
51. Does your firm have membership of any of the following organisations? Please tick all that apply. 
[ ] Per Cent Club.
[ ] Business in the Community.
[ ] Association for Business Sponsorship of the Arts.
[ ] None.
52. Has your Chairman/Chief Executive or any of your senior managers ever served on the board of 
trustees of art museums/galleries or art-related organisations?
( ] Yes, (please specify)__________________________________________________________ ^ _____
[ INo.
Please r^um  the questionnaire to: Chin-tao Wu, 5 Gun Stre^, Bishopsgate, London, E l 6AH. 
Please also remember to enclose your annual report/accounts and other pertinent material on your 
art collection.
THANK YOU VERY MUCH!
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University College London 
Gower Street
_  London WCIE 6BT
UCL
'  = ' Tel: 071-387 7050 Ex.4597/6
Direct Line 071-387 9594 
Department of History of Art Fax: 071-387 8057
Please reply to: 5 Gun Street, Bishopsqate, London El 6AH
14 July 1994
Dear
I am a Ph.D. student in the Department of History of Art at University College London, My 
research is a comparative Anglo-American study of the relationship between the State, 
corporations and contemporary art during the 1980s.
I have visited a number of corporate art collections in the United States and the United 
Kingdom, including those of companies such as the Equitable, Philip Morris, Chemical 
Bank, BP, BOC and Robert Fleming. In order to present a more comprehensive picture of 
corporate collections, I need concrete statistical data to support my findings. Your firm has 
been listed in the annual report of the Association for Business Sponsorship of the Arts and 
seems to be a very interesting case. I would be very grateful if you could help me to 
complete the questionnaire. Even if not all the questions are relevant to your collection, 
your response will still be of interest to me.
The questionnaire looks long, but several British companies have completed it, and it will 
take about 30 minutes to fill out. Some of the questions require detailed information and 
if you find it inconvenient to find out the exact answers, I would be very grateful if you can 
give an approximate indication.
Any information you kindly give me will be treated as strictly confidential and will be used 
for research purposes only. No names of persons or references to the budget and policies 
of specific firms will be made in the thesis. If you do not wish the name to be listed as a 
source of information in any respect, please indicate in your reply.
I hope the result of the research will be of interest to you and I will send a summary to you 
in due course. When the research is published in the future, its details will be sent to you 
as well.
Is it possible for you to send me the company annual report and accounts, and other 
pertinent material on your art collection?
I would very much appreciate a reply within the next three weeks, even if it is only to 
inform me that you can not participate in this project.






Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)*




E: Transportation, Communication & Public Utilities 40-49
F: Wholesale Trade 50-51
0 : Retail Trade 52-59
H: Finance, Insurance & Real Estates 60-67
I: Services 70-89
J: Public Administration
Classification Adopted in this Study
1. Banking/ Financial Services/ Investments/ Insurance
2. Publishing/ Media/ Computer software
3. Legal services/ Accountancy/ Real Estate Development
4. Utilities/ Energy/ Communications/ Transportation/ Freight Companies/ Hotels
5. Mining/ Retail Trade/ Wholesale Trade
Producers of Food Products, Spirits, Tobacco Products 
Automobile and related industries/ Computers/ Office equipment 
Steel Industry/ Petroleum/ Natural Gas Industry 
Other Manufacturing Industries
6. Hospital, Medical services/ Pharmaceutical
* SIC codes are developed by the U.S. government in conjunction with the private business sector 
to comprehensively cover the U.S. industry by identifying its business type. The coding divides all 
economic activity into ten major divisions; see Million Dollar Directory: America’s Leading Public 




List of Persons Interviewed, Venues and Exhibitions Visited
26/7/1990 Visit to the Lobby Gallery, Deutsche Bank, New York. (30 minutes)
30/7/1990 Visit Ms Jacq Dorante, Development Officer, Studio Museum in Harlem,
New York. (30 minutes)
31/7/1990 Visit to the art exhibition at Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. (producer of
distilled spirits and wine). New York. (30 minutes)
31/7/1990 Visit to the art exhibition at the Lintas Worldwide headquarters
(advertising agency). New York. (30 minutes)
1/8/1990 Telephone interview with Ms Kim Maier, Director of National Programs,
Business Committee for the Arts, New York. (30 minutes)
2/8/1990 Visit to the art collection of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson (law
firm) and taking pictures of the collection. New York. (2 hours)
2/8/1990 Visit to the sculpture at the Chase Manhattan Plaza, New York.
2/8/1990 Visit to the Whitney Museum of American Art Downtown at Federal
Reserve Plaza, New York.
2/8/1990 Visit to the murals at the American Express Building, World Financial
Center, New York.
2/8/1990 Visit to the public art collection of Port Authority of NY & NJ at the
World Trade Center, New York.
3/8/1990 Telephone interview with Ms Margaret Mathews-Bereson, art consultant
and curator for Lintas Worldwide, New York. (30 minutes)
5/8/1990 Visit to the PaineWebber Art Gallery, New York. (30 minutes)
6/8/1990 Telephone interview with Ms Laura Perroti, Marketing Coordinator,
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, New York. (20 Minutes)
7/8/1990 Visit to the Joseph E. Seagram Building. (20 minutes).
7/8/1990 Visit to the Whitney Museum of American Art at Philip Morris, New
York.
8/8/1990 Visit to the Whitney Museum of American Art at Equitable Center, New
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York.
8/8/1990 Telephone interview with Ms Carla Caccamise Ash, Curator, Joseph E.
Seagram, Inc., New York. (40 minutes)
8/8/1990 Telephone interview with Mr Martin B. Cominsky, Director, BVA/USA,
Arts and Business Council, New York. (20 minutes)
9/8/1990 Visit to the art collection of Westpac Banking Corporation, New York,
(from 9:30 am. to 10:30 am.)
9/8/1990 Visit to the art collection of Gilman Paper Company and interview with
Mr Pierre Appraxine, Curator, Gilman Paper Company, New York, 
(from 11:00 am. to 12:00 am.)
9/8/1990 Interview with Ms Susanne Gyorgy, Director of the PaineWebber art
gallery, PaineWebber Group Inc., New York, (from 1:00 pm. to 2:00 
pm.)
9/8/1990 Visit to the art collection of Chemical Bank and the art gallery at the
Chemical Bank headquarters and interview with Ms Wendy Cromwell, Art 
Administrator, Chemical Bank, New York, (from 4:00 pm. to 5:00 pm.)
10/8/1990 Interview with Ms Amy Dion Gibstein, Viart Corporation (art consultant
firm), art consultant for the Goldman Sachs & Company (investment bank) 
and the Deutsche Bank, New York, (from 10:30 am. to 11:30am.)
10/8/1990 Visit to the art collection of Equitable Life Assurance Society and
interview with Ms Susan Massa, Assistant Curator, Equitable Life 
Assurance Society (insurance, financial service, and real estate). New 
York, (from 3:00 pm. to 4:00 pm.)
13/8/1990 Interview with Ms Pamela Gruninger Perkins, Head, Branch Museums,
and Coordinator, Building Program, Whitney Museum of American Art, 
New York, (from 4:00 pm. to 5:00 pm.)
23/8/1990 Visit to the art collection of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver, & Jacobson and
taking pictures of the collection, Washington, D.C. (from 1:30 pm. to 
2:30pm.)
30/8/1990 Attending the Education Panel Meeting, National Endowment for the Arts,
Washington, D.C. (from 11:15 am. to 2:30 pm.)
31/8/1990 Visit to the art collection of Arnold & Porter and interview with Josselyn
Neukom, Legal Assistant, Arnold & Porter, and Talbot M. Payne, art 
consultant for Arnold & Porter from Carey Ellis Company (art consultant 
company), Washington, D.C. (from 2:00 pm. to 3:30 pm.)
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5/9/1990 Visit to the art collection of Sullivan & Cromwell and interview with Mr
Robert H. Craft, Jr., Managing Partner, Washington, D.C. (from 1:30 
pm. to 4:00 pm.)
10/9/1990 Visit to the art collection of Miller & Chevalier, Washington, D.C. (from 
3:00 pm. to 4:00 pm.)
11/9/1990 Visit to the art collection of Covington & Burling and interview with Ms 
Melissa Busby Fernlund, Manager of Space Planning and Programs, 
Covington & Burling (law firm), Washington, D.C. (from 10:00 am. to 
11:30 am.)
11/9/1990 Visit to the art collection of KPMG Peat Marwick and interview with Ms
Victoria E. Fisher, Communications Coordinator, KPMG Peat Marwick 
(accountant firm), Washington, D.C. (from 3:00 pm. to 4:00 pm.)
17/9/1990 Interview with Ms Jean Efron, art consultant for Miller & Chevalier and
Sullivan & Cromwell, Washington, D.C. (from 4:00 pm. to 4:40 pm.)
19/9/1990 Visit to the art collection of the Washington Post and interview with Ms
Lina Lukens, Assistant to the Manager of Corporate Affairs, the 
Washington Post, Washington, D.C. (from 11:00 am. to 1:30 pm.)
21/9/1990 Interview with Mr Leonard A. Zax, Partner, Fried, Frank, Harris,
Schriver & Jacobson, Washington, D.C. (from 12:00 am. to 12:30 pm.)
24/9/1990 Attending the Overview Panel Meeting of the Visual Arts Program at the
National Endowment for the Arts (NEA), Washington, D.C. (from 9:00 
am to 7:00 pm.)
25/9/1990 Attending the Overview Panel Meeting of the Visual Arts Program, NEA,
Washington, D.C. (from 9:30 am. to 5:30 pm.)
26/9/1990 Attending the slide screening of the fellowship applicants. Visual Arts
Program, NEA, Washington, D.C. (from 10:00 am. to 11:30 am.)
26/9/1990 Visit to the art collection of Oliver Carr (development company),
Washington, D.C. (from 11:40 am. to 12:10 pm.)
27/9/1990 Interview with Ms Ellen O’Toole, Curator and Publication Manager,
Oliver Carr, Washington, D.C. (from 1:00 pm. to 2:00 pm.)
27/9/1990 Visit to the art collection of Oliver Carr at various buildings, including
Metropolitan Square, The Willard and the Commercial National Bank 
building, Washington, D.C.
27/9/1990 Attending the opening exhibition of the photographer Steve Gottieb and the
lecture by the artist at Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C. (from
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5:30 pm. to 7:10 pm.)
28/9/1990 Interview with Mr Silvio D. Lim, Program Specialist, Visual Arts
Program, NEA, Washington, D.C. (from 3:00 pm. to 4:30 pm.)
1/10/1990 Visit to the art collection of US News & World Report and interview with
Mr Mett Tucker, US News & World Report, Washington, D.C. (from
3:00 pm. to 3:30 pm.)
2/10/1990 Interview with Mr Bert Kubli, Program Specialist, Visual Arts Program, 
NEA, Washington, D.C. (from 2:00 pm. to 4:00 pm.)
2/10/1990 Interview with Mr Silvio D. Lim, Program Specialist, Visual Arts
Program, NEA, Washington, D.C. (from 4:30 pm. to 5:30 pm.)
3/10/1990 Interview with Mr Morgan C. Dodd, Annual Fund Director, Corcoran
Gallery of Art, Washington, D.C. (from 10:00 am. to 11:00 am.)
3/10/1990 Interview with Mr Michael Faubion, Assistant Director, Visual Arts
Program, NEA, Washington, D.C. (from 4:30 pm. to 7:15 pm.)
4/10/1990 Visit to the art collection of Ross, Dickson, Masback and interview with
the secretary to Mr Stuart T. Ross, Senior Partner, Ross, Dickson, 
Masback (law firm), Washington, D.C. (from 10:30 am. to 11:30 am.)
4/10/1990 Interview with Mr Berry Bergey, Program Specialist, Folk Art Program,
NEA, Washington, D.C. (from 2:00 pm. to 2:30 pm.)
4/10/1990 Interview with Mr Silvio D. Lim, Program Specialist, Visual Arts
Program, NEA, Washington, D.C. (from 4:00 pm. to 4:30 pm.)
4/10/1990 Interview with Mr Gary Larson, International Program, NEA, and the
author of The Reluctant Patron, Washington, D.C. (from 4:45 pm. to 
5:15 pm.)
5/10/1990 Interview with Mr Gary Larson, International Program, NEA,
Washington, D.C. (from 9:30 am. to 10:20 am.)
5/10/1990 Visit to the art collection of Kutak Rock & Campbell and interview with
Ms Jan S. Dietrich, Administrative Manager, Kutak Rock & Campbell 
(law firm), Washington, D.C. (from 10:40 am. to 12:00 am.)
5/10/1990 Interview with Mrs Nancy Pressly, Assistant Director, Museum Program,
NEA, Washington, D.C. (from 1:30 pm. to 2:00 pm.)
5/10/1990 Visit to the art collection of the World Bank and interview with Mr Sam
Niedzviecki, Senior Project Manager, World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
(from 3:30 pm. to 5:30 pm.)
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9/10/1990 Visit to the art collection of Latham & Watkins (law firm), Washington, 
D.C. (from 10:00 am. to 11:15 am.)
9/10/1990 Interview with Mr Gary Larson, International Program, NEA, 
Washington, D.C. (from 1:30 pm. to 2:30 pm.)
9/10/1990 Interview with Mr Leonard A. Zax, Partner, Fried, Frank, Harris, 
Schriver & Jacobson, Washington, D.C. (from 3:30 pm. to 4:30 pm.)
10/10/1990 Interview with Ms Nancy Pressly, Assistant Director, Museum Program, 
NEA, Washington, D.C. (from 2:00 pm. to 2:45 pm.)
10/10/1990 Visit to the art collection of Debevoise Plimpton and interview with Mr 
Craig Kellermann, Office Manager, Debevoise Plimpton (law firm), 
Washington, D .C^ (from 3:30 pm. to 5:30 pm.)
11/10/1990 Interview with Ms Mary-Kay Lombino, Program Specialist, Museum
Program, NEA, Washington, D.C. (from 12:20 pm. to 12:40 pm.)
11/10/1990 Watching the screening of Senate debate on the reauthorisation of the
National Endowment for the Arts, NEA, Washington, D.C. (from 12:30 
pm. to 4:00 pm.)
11/10/1990 Interview with Mr Michael Faubion, Assistant Director, Visual Arts
Program, NEA, Washington, D.C. (from 5:00 pm. to 6:30 pm.)
12/10/1990 Interview with Ms Mary-Kay Lombino, Program Specialist, Museum
Program, NEA, Washington, D.C. (from 10:00 am. to 11:00 am.)
12/10/1990 Interview with Ms Daphne Wood Murray, Director, Institute of Museum
Service, Washington, D.C. (from 11:00 am. to 12:00 am.)
12/10/1990 Interview with Ms Molly White, Director of Development, Washington
Project for the Arts, Washington, D. C. (from 5:00 pm. to 6:00 pm.)
17/10/1990 Interview with Mr Silvio D. Lim, Program Specialist, Visual Arts
Program, NEA, Washington, D.C. (from 10:30 am. to 12:00 am.)
18/10/1990 Interview with Mr David Bancroft, Program Specialist, Museum Program,
NEA, Washington, D.C. (from 3:00 pm. to 4:30 pm.)
19/10/1990 Interview with Susan Lubowsky, Director, Visual Arts Program, NEA,
Washington, D. C. (from 11:20 am. to 11:40 am.)
19/10/1990 Telephone Conversation with Ms Louis Dorick, Development Officer,
Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D. C. (20 minutes)
19/10/1990 Interview with Ms Marsa Semmel, Assistant Director, Humanities Projects
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in Museums and Historical Organizations, National Endowment for the 
Humanities (NEH), Washington, D. C. (from 4:00 pm. to 4:45 pm.)
22/10/1990 Interview with Mr Silvio D. Lim, Program Specialist, Visual Arts 
Program, NEA, Washington, D.C. (from 10:00 am. to 12:00 am)
22/10/1990 Interview with Mr David Bancroft, Program Specialist, Museum Program, 
NEA, Washington, D.C. (from 3:00 pm. to 3:30 pm.)
23/10/1990 Interview with Mr Andrew Oliver, Director, Museum Program, NEA, 
Washington, D.C. (from 3:20 pm. to 4:00 pm.)
23/10/1990 Interview with Mr Tim Meagher, Program Officer, Humanities Projects
in Museums and Historical Organizations, NEH, Washington, D. C. 
(from 4:00 pm. to 5:10 pm.)
24/10/1990 Interview with Mr Derry Liu, Program Specialist, Folk Arts Program,
NEA, Washington, D.C. (from 3:00 pm. to 5:00 pm.)
25/10/1990 Interview with Mr Paul Carlson, Program Administrator, Visual Arts
Program, NEA, Washington, D.C. (from 11:00 am. to 12:20 am.)
25/10/1990 Telephone interview with Ms Joan Asbill on the art collection of Miller
& Chevalier, Washington, D.C. (from 3:50 pm. to 4:10 pm.)
2/11/1990 Attending the National Council on the Arts 106th Meeting, NEA,
Washington, D.C. from 9:00 am. to 5:00 pm.
3/11/1990 Attending the National Council on the Arts 106th Meeting, - NEA,
Washington, D.C. from 9:00 am. to 5:30 pm.
6/11/1990 Telephone conversation with Mr Larry Rickard, Administrator, Museum
Program, NEA, Washington, D.C. (15 minutes)
6/11/1990 Interview with Ms Yvonne M. Sabine, Director, Council and Panel
Operations, NEA, Washington, D.C. (20 minutes)
8/11/1990 Interview with Ms Marilyn E. Hill, Curator, Westpac Banking
Corporation, New York, (from 11:15 am. to 12:10 pm.)
8/11/1990 Visit to the art collection of Kutak Rock & Campbell, New York, (from
1:00 pm. to 1:30 pm.)
8/11/1990 Visit to the art collection of LLADRO, USA, Inc. and the LLADRO art
gallery and interview with Ms Gloria Ortiz, Gallery Manager, LLADRO, 
USA, Inc., New York, (from 4:00 pm. to 5:15 pm.)
9/11/1990 Visit to the art collection of Sullivan & Cromwell branch at Park Avenue,
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New York, (from 11:00 am, to 12:00 pm.)
9/11/1990 Visit to the art collection of Sullivan & Cromwell branch at Broad Street 
and interview with Mr Jeffrey H. Brown, Director of Office Operations, 
Sullivan & Cromwell, New York, (from 1:00 pm. to 2:00 pm.)
9/11/1990 Interview with Mr Edward Jones, Program Associate, Metropolitan Life
Foundation (from 3:00 pm. to 4:00 pm.) and visit to the Metropolitan Life 
Gallery, New York, (from 4:00 pm. to 5:00 pm)
13/11/1990 Visit to the art collection of UBS Securities Inc. and interview with Mr
Michael Joyce, Office Manager, UBS Securities Inc., New York, (from 
9:30 am. to 10:00 am.)
13/11/1990 Interview with Ms Betsy Mercer and Ms Sheila Manley, Associate
Development Officers, Development and Membership, Whitney Museum 
of American Art, New York, (from 10:30 am. to 12:00 am.)
13/11/1990 Visit to the art collection of Baer, Marks & Upham and interview with Mr
William P. Gaske, Associate Attorney, Baer, Marks & Upham (law firm). 
New York, (from 2:00 pm. to 3:30 pm.)
13/11/1990 Interview with Mr Robert Martin and Mr Norman T. MacDonald,
Manager of Purchasing, Sullivan & Cromwell, New York, (from 4:20 
pm. to 5:00 pm.)
13/11/1990 Visit to the IBM Gallery of Science and Art, New York.
14/11/1990 Interview with Ms Margaret della Cioppa, Manager, and Ms Stacey
Gershon, Assistant Curator, Art Department, Chase Manhattan Bank, New 
York, (from 10:20 am. to 11:00 am.)
14/11/1990 Telephone interview with Mr Saul S. Wenegrat, Administrator, Art in
Architecture Program, Port Authority of NY & NJ, New York, (from 
11:00 am. to 11:30 am.)
14/11/1990 Visit to the art collection of Chase Manhattan Bank branch on Houston
Street, Soho, New York.
14/11/1990 Visit to the art collection of Philip Morris and interview with Ms Joellen
Garrant, Registrar, Art Department, Philip Morris, New York, (from 
4:10 pm. to 5:10 pm.)
5/2/1992 Interview with Robert Mcpherson, Exhibition Organiser, National Art
Collections Fund, London, (from 11:00 to 11:30 am.)
9/3/1992 Visit to Art Collection, Financial Times, London, (from 2:00 to 3:00
pm.)
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3/4/1992 Visit to Ms Carol Brennan, Publicity Executive, 3i, London, interview
with her. (from 3:00 to 4:00 pm.)
3/4/1992 Visit to Mr Nigel Frank, staff member of Art Guidelines and assistant to
curator Glenn Sujo, Arthur Andersen & Co., London, interview with him, 
tour of art collection, (from 5:30 to 7:00 pm.)
6/4/1992 Visit to Alistair Clements, House Manager, Granada Television, London,
tour of art collection, (from 5:00 to 6:10 pm.)
7/4/1992 Visit to Peter Wingrave, Desgin Manager, IBM, London, interview with
him, tour of art collection at IBM South Bank Centre, (from 2:00 to 3:30 
pm.)
8/4/1992 Visit to Michael Mackenzie, Sponsorship Manager, W.H. Smith, London,
interview with him, tour of art collection, (from 3:00 to 4:00 pm.)
10/4/1992 Visit to Sally Bellingham, Secretary to the Chief Executive Stuart Lipton,
Stanhope Properties pic., London, tour of art collection, (from 11:00 am 
to 12:10am.)
13/4/1992 Visit to Gill Murkin, Sponsorship Manager, TSB, London, interview with 
her, tour of art colleciton. (from 9:30 am. to 11:30 am.)
Visit to David Cohen, Director, Robert Fleming, London, (from 11:30 am 
to 1:20 pm.)
4/4/1992 Visit to Mardie Esterkin, Manager of Corporate Affairs, P & 0, London,
interview with her, tour of art collection, (from 3:10 pm to 5:45-pm.)
15/4/1992 Visit to Andrew Charalambous, Designer, Chase Manhattan Bank,
London, tour of art collection, (from 10:00 to 11:45 am.)
16/4/1992 Visit to William Backhouse, Chief Operating Officer, Baring Asset
Management Ltd, London, interview with him, tour of art collection, 
(from 5:45 pm to 7:20 pm.)
22/4/1992 Visit to Yvonne Connolly, Administration Officer, BOC, Windlesham,
Surrey, interview with her, tour of art collection, (from 2:30 pm to 5:00 
pm.)
23/4/1992 Visit to Patrick Acheson-Gray, Head Office General Manager, Unilever,
London, interview with him, tour of art collection, (from 10:00 am to 
12:00 pm.)
6/5/1992 Visit to Greg Campbell, Facilities Manager, Fidelity International,
London, tour of art collection, (from 9:00 am to 10:25 am.)
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8/5/1992
Visit to Peter Jeffcote, Partner, Freshfields, London, interview with him, 
tour of art collection, (from 11:30 am to 12:50pm.)
Visit to Philip Collins, Partner, Coopers & Lybrand Deloitte, London, 
interview with him, tour of art collection, (from 5:30 pm. to 6:45 pm.)
Visit to Malcolm Kemp, Office Services Manager, Hill Samuel Bank, 
London, interview with him, tour of art collection, (from 8:00 am to 9:50 
am.)
11/5/1992 Visit to Margaret Parkes, Design Manager, Chase Manhattan Bank, 
London, interview with her. (from 11:30 am to 1:00 pm.)
29/5/1992 Visit to Jayne Goodwins, Press Officer, Royal Bank of Scotland, London,
(from 11:00 am. to 11:50 am.)
1/6/1992 Visit to Nigel Reid, Linklaters and Paines (Gresham Street Office),
interview with him, tour of art collection, (from 10:00 am. to 11:00am.)
5/6/1992 Visit to Terry J. Moore, Properties & Services, Sedgwick Group pic.,
London, interview with him, tour of art collection, (from 3:30 pm. to 
5:00 pm.)
6/6/1992 Visit to Dr Moire Rudolph at St Thomas Hospital, London, interview with
her, tour of art collection, (from 1:45 pm to 4:30 pm.)
11/6/1992 Visit to the exhibition in the reception area at H il lier Parker, London.
15/6/1992 Visit to Michael Bell at the Société Générale Strauss Turnbull, London,
tour of art collection, from 5:35 pm to 6:10 pm.
17/6/1992 Visit to Ms Wendy Simpson, Office Services Supervisor, Theodore
Goddard, interview with her, tour of art collection, London, from 5:30 pm 
to 6:30 pm.
9/6/1992 Visit to James Dreaper, Head of Information, Banque Paribas, London,
interview with him, tour of art collection, from 10:00 am to 10:40 am.
24/6/1992 Visit to Ted Shepard, Consultant for Archive, Shell UK limited, London,
interview with him, from 2:10 pm. to 3:30 pm.
30/6/1992 Visit to Michael Rose, Community Affairs, Bankers Trust, London,
interview with him (on arts sponsorship and art collection), tour of art 
collection, from 10:30 am to 12:00 pm.
Visit to Margaret Parkes, Chase Manhattan Bank, London, tour of art 
works at the meeting rooms. Hospitality Floor, from 2:(X) to 3: 30 pm.
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2/7/1992 Visit to Lynette Royle, Manager Group Public Relations, Guinness pic.,
London, interview with her, from 9:00 am to 9:40 am.
6/7/1992 Visit to Anthony Bracking, Consultant in Public Affairs, SC Johnson Wax,
Limited, Frimley Green, Surrey, interview with him (on arts sponsorship 
and art collection), tour of art collection, from 11:00 am to 12: 25 pm.
7/7/1992 Interview with Ros Frost, Manager (Sponsorship), Barclays Bank pic.,
London, from 3:30 pm. to 4:15 pm.
8/7/1992 Visit to Valerie Castro, Human Resources and Facilities Manager,
Corporate Office Services, BP, London, interview with her, tour of art 
collection, from 9:30 am. to 11:45 am.
Interview with Lally Carlton-Jones, Head of Art Sponsorship, Department 
of Community Affairs, BP, London, from 11:45am to 12:30pm.
10/7/1992 Visit to Ms Pat Higgins, John Laing pic., London, interview with her,
tour of art collection, from 11:15 am to 12:00 pm.
30/7/1992 Visit to Terry Moore at Sedgwick Group pic., London, from 2:30 pm. to
3:30 pm.
3/8/1992 Visit to Ms Louise Haugh, McGrigor Donald, London, tour of art
collection, from 3:00 pm. to 3:15 pm.
7/8/1992 Visit to Ann Slavik, Coordinator, Deutsche Bank, London, from 3:00 pm.
to 5:00 pm, interview with her, tour of art collection.
12/8/1992 Visit to Michael Bell, Facilities Manager, Société Générale Strauss
Turnbull, London, to photograph the collection, from 5:45 pm. to 7:10
pm.
13/8/1992 Interview with Dr Tulip, Company Secretary, Unilever, London, from
10:00 am. to 11:15 am.
18/9/1992 Visit to Howard Meadows at J. Rothschild Administration Limited,
Spencer House, London, interview with him, tour of the building and 
collection, from 11:00 am to 12:10 pm.
24/9/1992 Visit to Ray Smith, Accountant, Premises and Facilities Division, at the
Citibank, Strand, and Cotton House, near London Bridge, London, 
interview with him, tour of art collection, from 9:00 am to 2:35 pm.
26/9/1992 Visit to Peter Jeffcote, Partner, Freshfields, London, to photograph the
mural in the staff restaurant and commisioned works in the entrance lobby.
2/10/1992 Tour of art collection, ICI, London.
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9/10/1992 Visit to Dr. John Orbell, Archivist, Baring Brothers, London, tour of art 
collection (from 4:30 pm to 5:30 pm), interview with him (from 5:30 pm 
to 6:00 pm.)
15/10/1992 Visit to Alan Cameron, Archivist, Executive Office, Bank of Scotland, 
tour of art collection in London Chief Office, interview with him, from 
10:30 am to 11:45 am.
21/10/1992 Tour of art collection at the executive floor, BP, London.
28/10/1992 Visit to Jean Wood', Secretary to the Chairman, Prudential Corporation,
London, tour of art collection (from 10:00 am to 11:00 am), interview 
with her (from 11:00 am to 11:50 am).
4/11/1992 Visit to Mary Hart, tour of art collection, Kleinwort Benson, London.
20/11/1992 Interview with Mr Nick Hagan, Tax Inspector, Citygate House, Moorgate,
Inland Revenue, London, (from 10:00 am to 11:45 am)
17/8/1993 Visit to Harveys Wine Museum (John Harvey & Sons: Wine Merchants,
Bristol); interview with Margaret B. Pigott, Curator, Harveys Wine 
Museum, from 10:30 am to 11:30 am, and visited the Museum Cellars 
with a group visit from 11:30 to 12:00 pm.
Visit to Sun Life Assurance Society pic., Bristol.
8/8/1994 Visit to John Watkins, Facilities Department, UBS, London, from 10:00
am to 11:00 am.
14/2/1995 Interview with Toby Scott, Business Assessment and Planning, Arts
Council of England, from 5:00 pm to 6:20 pm. (on Midland Bank 
Artscard)
28/2/1995 Interview with Campbell Grey, consultant, (on Natwest Painting Prize)
8/3/1995 Interview with Emma Davidson, Development Officerr, Whitechapel Art
Gallery, (on development)
22/2/1995 Interview with Ms Isobel Johnstone, Curator, Arts Council (of Great
Britain) Collection, South Bank Centre, from 11:00 am (about one hour)
24/4/1995 Visit to Kathy Keenan, Accountant, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriyer &
Jacobson, Washington D.C., interview with her, tour of art collection, 
from 10:00 am to 12:30 pm.
Interview with Linda Ayres, Assistant Director, Museum Program, 
National Endowment for the Arts Washington, D.C. from 2:00 pm to 2:45 
pm.
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Telephone conversation with Andy Finch, Association of American 
Museum, Washington D.C., from 3:30 pm to 4:00 pm.
Telephone conversation with Daniel Grant (on tax law related to corporate 
art collection), freelance journalist from Boston (ten minutes).
Telephone conversation with Annie Storr, Association of American 
Museum, Washington D.C., from 4:15 pm to 4:50 pm.
25/4/1995 Interview with Malcolm L. Richardson, Deputy Director, President’s 
Committee on the Arts and Humanities, Washington D.C. from 3:30 pm 
to 4:40 pm.
Interview with Scott Sanders, Deputy Chairman, National Endowment for 
the Arts, Washington D.C. from 4:45 pm to 5:15 pm.
Telephone conversation with Alan Fern, Director, National Portrait 
Gallery, Smithsonian Institution, Washington D.C. (on legal aspects)
26/4/1995 Visit to Laurie Kirby, Office Manager, Sullivan and Cromwell,
Washington D.C., tour of art collection, from 10:00 am to 11:15 am.
Interview with Michael Faubion, Deputy Director, Visual Arts Program, 
National Endowment for the Arts, Washington D.C. from 5:00 pm to 6:45 
pm.
27/4/1995 Interview with Robert H. Craft, Partner, Sullivan and Cromwell,
Washington D.C., from 11:30 am to 12:00 am.
Visit to Fred Weir, Director of Administration, Arthur Andersen, 
Washington D.C., tour of art collection, from 2:00 pm to 3:00 pm.
Telephone conversation with Tom Yarker, International Sculpture Center, 
Washington D.C., from 5:00 pm. to 5:20 pm. (on exhibitions held at 
companies)
Telephone conversation with Stephen Weil, Assistant Director, Hirshhorn 
Museum and Sculpture Garden, Smithsonian Institution, Washington D.C. 
(on legal aspects)
28/4/1995 Interview with Ms Patty Fagan Kehoe, Accounting Manager, Covington
& Burling, Washington D.C.
1/5/1995 Tour of art collection at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, New
York, from 12:(X) to 2:00 pm.
2/5/1995 Interview with Daniel W. Vecchitto, Director of Development, the
Museum of Modern Art, New York, from 2:00 pm. to 3:00 pm.
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3/5/1995 Interview with Tony Levy, Deputy Director, Zoning Study Group, 
Department of City Planning, New York City, from 10:15 am to 11:00
am.
4/5/1995
Interview with Jennifer Hellriegel, from 12:00 pm to 12:45 pm, and Curt 
Hagedorn, Alliance for Young Artists and Writers, New York, from 12:45 
pm. to 1:15 pm. (on Scholastic Arts Awards)
Interview with Carla Caccamise Ash, Curator, Joseph E. Seagram & Son., 
from 3:00 pm to 4:00 pm, and visited the art exhibition held at the 
headquarters on Park Avenue, New York.
Interview with Lynne M. Winter, Senior Development Officer for Special 
Exhibition Funding, Metropolitan Museum of Art, from 10:30 am to 
11:30 am.
Interview with Ms Pamela Gruninger Perkins, Director of the Publications 
and former Head of Branches, from 2:00 pm to 2:20 pm, and interview 
with Lisa M Krainski, Development Assistant, from 2:30 pm to 3:00 pm, 
Whitney Museum of American Art, New York.
Interview with Josephine Gear, former director of the Whitney Museum 
of American Art at the Philip Morris, New York, from 4:30 pm. to 5:30 
pm.
5/5/1995 Iterview with Laura Deer Moore, Program Specialist, Arts International,
Institute of International Education, New York, from 9:30 am to 10:15 
am. (on Reader’s Digest art fellowships)
Interview with Margaret Mathews-Berenson, art consultant. New York, 
from 11:30 am to 1:00 pm.
8/5/1995 Visit tp Norman T. MacDonald, Manager of Purchasing, Sullivan &
Cromwell, New York, tour of art collection, interview with him, from 
9:00 am to 9:50 am.
9/5/1995
Interview with Manuel Gonzalez, Executive Director, Art Collection, 
Chase Manhattan Bank, New York, from 10:30 am to 11:25 am.
Interview with Meiko Takayama, Development Department, Guggenheim 
Museum, New York, from 3:00 pm to 3:30 pm.
Interview with Ms Chris Myers, Viart Corporation, New York, from 5:00 
pm to 5:30 pm.
Interview with Pari Stave, Curator, Equitable Life Assurance Society, 
New York, from 10:00 am to 11:00 am.
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Interview with Jennifer P. Goodale, Specialist, Cultural Programs, Philip 
Morris Management Corp., New York, from 12:00 pm to 12:40 pm.
Interview with Vera Lutter, artist, commissioned by Hybo Bank, New 
York, to do the "Sight and Sense" installation at its headquarters in the 
Wall Street area, from 4:00 pm to 4:40 pm.
15/9/1995 Interview with Ms Isobel Johnstone, Curator, Arts Council (of Great
Britain) Collection (about 45 min).
29/9/1995 Interview with Julia Peyton Jones, Director, and Rebecca King Lassman,
Development, Serpentine Gallery.
6/10/1995 Interview with Roger Malbert, Head of National Touring Exhibitions,
South Bank Centre, from 2:30 pm. to 3:15 pm.
20/06/1996 Interview with Dick Humphreys, Head of Education, Tate Gallery, from
1:40 pm to 2:20 pm.
Interview with Catherine Lampert, Director of the Whitechapel Art 
Gallery, from 4:00 pm to 4:10 pm.
9/7/1996 Interview with Sandy Nairne, Director of Public and Regional Services,
Tate Gallery, from 3:00 pm to 4:00 pm.
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Table 1. 1






















Source: The Tax Foundation, Facts and Figures on Government Finances for footnotes describing some 
surcharges and other special rules.
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Table 2 .1
Marginal Tax Rates and the Price of Giving to Arts and Culture



















O-lOK 2.0 5.1 8 .4 .0 .98
10-20K 15.9 20.5 8.7 .0 .83
20-30K 17.9 43.1 8.5 .0 .81
30-50K 21.5 67.2 9.2 .0 .78
50-75K 27.8 85.3 12.9 16.6 .70
75-lOOK 29.1 85.3 14.8 10.9 .69
100-200K 32.2 92 .6 17.2 17.5 .65
200K + 2 8 ^ 93.8 30.9 55.0 .67
Total 100.0 .67
Notes and Sources (by column):
(1) A G I= adjusted gross income, in K =  thousands o f dollars; (2) and (3) weighted average 
in each group, for the Tax Reform Act o f 1986, from U.S. Treasury Dept. ; (4) Statistics o f  
Income (SOI 1988), Internal Revenue Service, for tax year 1985 (before appreciated 
property placed under the alternative minimum tax; calculated from Clotfelter (1985b, 213) 
and SOI for 1985; and (6 ) calculated from appendix equation (3) using column 2 for and 
g, column 4 for (I - C), a =  .5 for the ratio o f appreciation to value, and assuming that the 
alternative is immediate consumption. These prices apply to itemizers, but there are very 
few nonitemizers in the top few brackets with gifts to culture.
’ Charles Clotfelter, Federal Tax Policy and Charitable Giving  (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1985)
Source: Don Fullerton, "Tax Policy Toward Art Museums," in Martin Feldstein, e d ljie  




Distribution of Age of Miseums Type 
  Decade Established >
Tpye 1980's










Aquarium 0 .0 % 57.3% 0 .0 % 0 .0 % 0 .0 % 11.5% 0 .0 % 31.2% 1 0 0 .0 %
Arbor/Bot
Garden
1.9% 9.1% 17.2% 24.8% 0 .0 % 11.9% 9.1% 26.1% 1 0 0 .0 %
Art 13.0% 18.8% 18.5% 13.2% 5.1% 5.5% 7.2% 18.6% 1 0 0 .0 %
Children's 35.6% 32.6% 8 .8 % 0 .0 % 3.4% 5.7% 2.3% 11.5% 1 0 0 .0 %
General 9.4% 9.3% 9.1% 15.2% 8.9% 13.5% 9.0% 25.5% 1 0 0 .0 %
Historic Site 10.5% 1 0 .8 % 1 0 .8 % 16.3% 11.4% 14.0% 5.3% 2 1 .0 % 1 0 0 .0 %
History
Museum
9.2% 14.8% 16.9% 15.5% 1 2 .2 % 1 1 .2 % 4.4% 15.8% 1 0 0 .0 %
Natural History 9.4% 6.3% 14.6% 16.2% 8 . 1 % 9.4% 4.5% 31.6% 1 0 0 .0 %
Nature Center 11.3% 17.2% 28.5% 1 2 .6 % 8.7% 1 2 .0 % 2 . 1 % ; 7.5% 1 0 0 .0 %
Planeta-rium 18.1% 13.7% 6 .0 % 21.3% 23.9% 3.0% 0 .0 % 13.8% 1 0 0 .0 %
Science 10.4% 24.4% 2 2 .8 % 5.9% 1 1 . 1 % 4.5% 6 .0 % 14.9% 1 0 0 .0 %
Specialized 25.0% 27.8% 1 2 .2 % 7.7% 13.3% 2 . 1 % 0.5% 11.5% 1 0 0 .0 %
Zoo 1.4% 0 .0 % 3.6% 11.9% 14.3% 9.6% 5.0% 54.3% 1 0 0 .0 %
All Museums 10.9%
'A /A  A"C7
14.5% 14.8% 14.8% 9.9% 10.5% 5.3% 19.3% 1 0 0 .0 %
38 museums did not give a date for year established; year opened was used for these.
Sources: Daa Report: From the 1989 Nctiond Museum Survey (Washington D.C.: American Association of Museums, 1992), p. 64.
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Table 2 .3
1989 Sources of Operating Income 
Metropolitan Museum of Art, New Yorit
Amount
($)
% o f total 
^  incom e
Admissions 9,552,263 12.7
M embership 10,530,054 14.0
City o f New Y ork (U tilities) 5,490,671 7.3
City o f New York 
(Guardianship, M aintenance)
9,928,337 13.2
Endowment, including the 
C loisters
10,830,913 14.4
Net Income from  A uxiliary 
A ctivities
6 ,242,984 8.3
Gifts and Grants 3 ,911,163 8.9
Support for Special Exhibitions 12,034,348 5.2
Other 6 ,694,106 16.0
Total $75,214,676 100.0
Source: Compiled from M etropolitan Museum o f  A rt Annual Report f o r  the Year 1988-89.
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Table 2. 4




Face Value of 
Indemnities 
Outstanding 
(Millions o f  1987 
Dollars) ~
Amount They 
Would Have Paid 
in Insurance 
(Millions o f 1987 
Dollars
1976 3,935 189.3 1.35
1977 6,708 230.2 2.65
1978 9,029 299.4 1.89
1979 7,442 242.0 5.11
1980 4,307 315.7 1.22
1981 4,605 240.4 1.26
1982 6,290 343.4 2.89
1983 4,094 362.4 1.75
1984 3,191 389.8 3.20
1985 4,494 405.7 2.03
1986 7,074 420.1 5.66
1987 8,484 585.3 5.64
Source: Annual reports on the Arts and Artifacts Indemnity Act, National Foundation on the Arts 
and Humanities, Washington, D.C.
Quoted in Charles T. Clotfelter, "Government Policy Toward Art Museums in the United States," 
in Martin Feldstein, td .,T h e  Economics o f A rt Museums (Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press, 1991), p. 255.
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Table 3.1 Corporate Income and Contributions, 1940-1982
Year







1940 10.0 0.038 0.38
1950 42.9 0.252 0.59
1960 49.8 0.482 0.97
1970 75.4 0.797 1.05
1975 132.1 1.202 0.90
1980 234.6 2.359 1.01
1981 227.0 2.600" 1.14
1982 174.2 2.950" 1.69
Estimated by the Council for Financial Aid to Education.
Source: KzÛxrynTroy, Annual Survey o f  Corporate Contributions, 1984 edition. New York: Conference Board; 
quoted in Michael Useem, "Corporate Philanthropy," in Walter W. Powell, ed., Non-Profit Sector (New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 1987), p. 341.
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Table 3. 2 Corporate Gift and Pre-Tax Income in the United States ($ in billions)
Corporate Gifts Pre-Tax Net 
Income
Giving as a % of 
Income
1971 0.865 86.6 1.00
1972 1.009 100.6 1.00
1973 1.174 Î25.6 0.93
1974 1.200 136.7 0.88
1975 1.202 132.1 0.91
1976 1.487 166.3 0.89
1977 1.791 200.4 0.89
1978 2.084 233.5 0.89
1979 2.288 257.2 0.89
1980 2.355 237.1 0.99
1981 2.514 226.5 1.11
1982 2.906 169.6 1.71
1983 3.627 207.6 1.75
1984 4.057 240.0 1.69
1985 4.472 224.3 1.99
1986 5.179“ 221.6 2.33
1987 4.980 275.3 1.81
1988 5.400 316.7 1.71
1989 5.600 307.7 1.82
1990 5.900 304.7 1.94
* 1986 figure likely includes some gifts made in 1987, but reported on 1986 corporate returns for tax purposes. 
Reasonable estimate in 1986 is $4.870, for 1.77 % of income. Source: 1RS for giving data through 1987. 1RS 
figures reflect donations by corporations to nonprofits and to corporate foundations. They do not reflect giving 
by the foundations themselves, although all fiinds received by the latter are eventually distributed. Other sources: 
U.S. Department of Commerce, the Conference Board, Council for Aid to Education.
Source: Nathan Weber, The Annual Report on Philanthropy for the Year 1990, 1991 edition, 36th Annual Issue, 
New York, American Association for Fund-Raising Council, p. 8 8 .
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Table 4. 1 Gender of Tate Trustees by Decades of Appointment
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s
Number of Percent Number of Percent Number of Percent Number of Percent
Gender Trustees of Total Trustees of Total Trustees of Total Trustees of Total
Female —- —— —— — ' 3 27.3 2 28.6
Male 13 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 1 0 0 . 0 8 72.7 5 71.4
Total 13 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 1 0 0 . 0 11 1 0 0 . 0 1 1 0 0 . 0
* N o missing cases.
Table 4. 2. 1 Schooling of Tate Trustees by Decades of Appointment (Detail)


















Foreign Educated — — - 1 1 0 . 0 3 27.3 — —
Public Schools 5 45.5 3 30.0 4 36.4 3 42.9
Eton 1 9.09 4 40.0 — - — - 3 42.9
Other Clarendon Schools* 4 36.36 —- — 1 9.1 1 14.3
Grammar Schools ---- — ' 2 2 0 . 0 3 27.3 —— —
State Schools 1 9.09 —— — — —— ;—- —
Total 11' 1 0 0 . 0 IQ : 1 0 0 . 0 1 1 ' 1 0 0 . 0 r 1 0 0 . 0
' Missing case; 2
* Clarendon schools include Eton. H arrow . Charterhouse. M erchant T aylors’.
* Missing case: 0  ' Missing case: 0  * Missing case: 0 
Rugby. St. Paul’s. Shrewsbury. W estminster and W inchester; see C hapter 4 . note 75.
Table 4. 2. 2 Schooling of Tate Trustees by Decades of Appointment (Combined) ;


















Foreign Educated — — - 1 1 0 . 0 3 27.3 — — — •
Public Schools 10 90.9 7 70.0 5 45.5 7 1 0 0 . 0
State Educated 1 9.1 2 2 0 . 0 3 27.3 — - — '
4 1 3
Table 4. 3. 1 Um vasify Education of Tbte Thistees by Decade of Appointment (Detail)
' Missing case: I 
* Professional training includes law, surveyors, etc.
* Missing case: 0 * Missing case: 0


















Foreign Universities — — 1 1 0 . 0 2 18.2 — --
Oxford University 5 41.7 6 60.0 3 27.3 2 28.6
Cambridge University 3 25.0 1 1 0 . 0 1 9.1 3 42.9
Other Universities 2 16.7 - -■ 1 9.1
No Known University 
Education
1 8.3 1 • 1 0 . 0 3 27.3 1 14.3
Arts Professional 
Training
1 8.3 1 1 0 . 0 1 9.1 — —
Professional Training — — — — --- — 1 14.3
Total 1 2 ' 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 ^ 1 0 0 . 0 IP 1 0 0 . 0 ; 7 4 1 0 0 . 0
* Missing case: 0
TbUe 4. 3. 2  Univeisify Education of Tbte Thistees by Decade of Appointment (Combined)


















Foreign Universities — — 1 1 0 . 0 2 18.2 — —
Oxbridge (Oxford and 
Cannbridge Universities)
8 66.7 7 70.0 4 36.4 5 71.4
Other Universities 2 16.7 •- ■ - 1 9.1
No Known University 
Education
1 8.3 1 1 0 . 0 3 27.3 1 14.3
Arts Professional 
Training
1 8.3 . 1 1 0 . 0 1 9.1 —
Professional Training — — — — — — 1 14.3
Total 1 2 ' 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 " 1 0 0 . 0 IF 1 0 0 . 0 r 1 0 0 . 0
' Missing case: 1 
• Professional training includes law, surveyors, etc.
Missing case: 0 ’ Missing case: 0 * Missing case: 0
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Table 4. 4. 1 Occupation of Tate Trustees by Decades of Appointment (Detail)


















Academic (Social Sciences) 1 7.7 1 1 0 . 0 —— — ' —- — '
Academic (Arts and Humanities) 1 7.7 2 2 0 . 0 — ' — - 1 14.3
Arts (Writers, Critics, etc.) 3 23.1 —- — ' 1 9.1 1 14.3
Architect 1 7.7 — —- 1 9.1 —- —
Business (Public Relations) — - — - —- —- 1 9.1 —- —
Business (Solicitor) 1 7.7 —- —- —— — — — —
Business (Developer) — ' — ' 1 1 0 . 0 — — ■ — —
Business (Finance) 2 15.4 —- ---- 3 27.3 1 14.3
Business (Manufacturing) 2 15.4 2 2 0 . 0 2 18.2 1 14.3
Business (Entertainment) —- ---- 1 1 0 . 0 1 9.1 1 14.3
Business (Other Types) — ' ---- - ---- — ' 1 9.1 —- ——
Civil Service 2 15.4 3 30.0 — —
No Full-time Occupation — — —- — ' 1 9.1 1 14.3
Land Gentry — —— — • — —- — - 1 14.3
Total 13' 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 ^ 1 0 0 . 0 i r 1 0 0 . 0 r 1 0 0 . 0
o \
' Missing case: 0 '  Missing case: 0 ’ Missing case: 0 * Missing case: 0
Table 4. 4. 2 Occupation of Tate Trustees by Decades of Appointment (Combined)


















Arts and Academia* 5 38.5 3 30.0 1 9.1 2 28.6
Business Sector 6 46.2 4 40.0 9 81.8 3 42,9
Civil Service 2 15.4 3 30.0 —- — ' —- ——
No Full-time Occupation —— —- — ' 1 9.1 1 14.3
Land Gentry —- ---- — —— — ' —— 1 14.3
Total 13' 100.0 10' 100.0 11' 100.0 T 100.0
' Missing case: 0 '  Missing case: 0 * Missing case: 0 * Missing case: 0
"Arts and Academia" includes those in the categories of Academic and Arts in Table 4.4.1. "Architects" are included in the category of "Business Sector." The 
way in which architects conduct their business has more in common with the business sector than with the arts world. ^
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Table 4. 5.1 Position of Initiator of Arts Sponsorship Programmes (U. S.)
Number of Firms Percentage of Firms
CEO. or chairman 24 72.7
Senior Managers 3 9.1




Valid cases: 33 Missing cases; 21
Table 4.5. 2 Position of Initiator of Arts Sponsorship Programmes (U. K.)




Board of the company 9 6.5
Senior manager(s) 12 8.7
Middle manager(s) 4 2.9
Partners' 4 2.9
Public affairs^ 43 31.2
Sponsorship manager^ 3 2 .2
Collective decision 3 2 .2
Valid cases: 138 Missing cases: 31
' Partners as in partnerships which have different organisational structures and do not fit in the classification of 
company.
 ^ Public affairs include those departments which serve similar functions such as corporate communications, 
corporate affairs, community relations, and public relations, etc.
 ^ Sponsorship manages are generally located within the broader department of public relations. To separate them 
from the rest of the public relations department is to show the intensity of the involvement of the company.
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Table 4. 6. 1 Reasons for Starting Arts Sponsorship Programmes (U. S.)
To Keep Up with Business 
Trends


















Very Unimportant 6 13.6 2 4.3 2 4.4 5 II.6
Fairly Unimportant 9 20.5 2 4.3 ---- ---- 4 9.3
Neither Important Nor 
Unimportant
18 40.9 6 13.0 7 15.6 17 39.5
Fairly Important II 25.0 29 63.0 16 35.6 15 34.9
Very Important — — - 7 15.2 20 44.4 ? 4.7













Very Unimportant 4 10.0 2 4.3 2 5.0
Fairly Unimportant 3 7.5 2 4.3 7 17.5
Neither Important Nor 
Unimportant
12 30.0 6 13.0 20 50.0
Fairly Important 16 40.0 29 67.4 11 27.5
Very Important 5 12.5 7 10.9 — —
* Missing responses account for discrepancies in some to u ts .
4 1 9
Table 4. 6. 2 Reasons for Starting Arts Sponsorship Programmes (U. K.)
To Keep Up with Business 
Trends


















Very Unimportant 30 25.4 2 1,3 14 10.9 46 40.7
Fairly Unimportant 2 1 17.8 3 2 . 0 13 1 0 . 2 27 23.9
Neither Important Nor 
Unimportant
39 33.1 6 4.0 26 20.3 29 25.7
Fairly Important 23 19.5 71 47.7 45 35.2 1 0 8 . 8
Very Important 5 4.2 67 45.0 30 23.4 1 0.9













Very Unimportant 2 0 16.0 1 0.7 13 10.5
Fairly Unimportant 26 2 0 . 8 4 2.7 1 2 9.7
Neither Important Nor 
Unimportant
35 28.0 9 6 . 1 25 2 0 . 2
Fairly Important 37 29.5 67 45.3 42 33.9
Very Important 7 5.6 67 45.3 32 25.8
I










Sponsorship Committee 20 22.2 37.7
Marketing /Public Relation/ 
Corporate Affairs Department
15 16.7 28.3
Company Foundation 23 25.6 43.4
Others 4 4.4 7.5
90 100.0 169.8
Valid cases ; 53 Missing cases: 1
* Some totals include multiple responses.





CEO/Chairman/Senior Managers' 5 9.4
Sponsorship Committee^ 8 15.1
Marketing/Public Relations/ Corporate 
Affairs Department^
2 3.8
Company Foundation® 9 17.0
Joint decisions (including Chairman/ 
Chief Executive/Senior Managers) ^
26 49.1
Joint decisions (excluding Chairman/ 
Chief Executive/Senior Managers) ®
3 5.7
Valid cases: 53 Missing cases: 1
' Decisions made solely by CEO/Chairman/ senior managers.
 ^ Decisions made solely by sponsorship committee. The categoiy of sponsorship committee often includes CEO and 
chairman, but it is not possible to distinguish any further here.
 ^ Decisions made solely by marketing/public relations/corporate affairs department
* Decisions jointly made by any combination of the above four categories of people but including CEO/ Chairman/ senior 
managers.
'  Dedsions jointly made by any combinatkm of the above four categories of people but excluding CEO/ Chairman/ senior 
managers.
* The American survey has a built in bias toward company foundations in that the organisational shape of company 
foundations is a well established form of corporate contributions in the United States. The factor of company 
foundations is one used in the stratification of the sampling universe; the figures here can thus only be consid^ed as 
estimates.
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Table 4.7.2  Decision Makers in Arts Sponsorship Programmes (Combined)(U. K.)




Chairman/Chief Executive/Senior 115 43.7 
Managers
68.9
Sponsorship Committee 34 12.9 20.4
Marketing/Public Relation/ 103 39.2 
Corporate Affairs Department
61.7
Company Foundation >^ 0 . 8 1 . 2
Others Ç) 3.4 5.4
263 100.0 157.5
Valid cases : 167 Missing cases: 2
♦Some totals include multiple response.
Table 4. 7 . 2A Decision Makers in Arts Sponsorship Programmes (Detail) (U. K.)
N um ber o f 
F irm s
Percentage 
o f  Firm s
Chairman/Chief Executive/ Senior 
Managers'
47 28.3
Sponsorship Committee^ 11 6 . 6
Marketing/Public Relations/ Corporate 
Affairs Department^
31 18.7
Joint decisions (including Chairman/ Chief 
Executive/Senior Managers) *
67 40.4
Joint decisions (excluding Chairman/ Chief 
Executive/Senior Managers) ^
1 0 6 . 0
Valid cases: 166 Missing cases: 3
‘ Decisions made solely by Chairman/Chief Executive/ senior managers.
 ^ Decisions made solely by sponsorship committee. The category of sponsorship committee often includes CEO 
and chairman, but it is not possible to distinguish any further here.
 ^ Decisions made solely by marketing/public relations/corporate affairs department 
* Decisions jointly made by any combination of the above three categories of people but including 
Chairman/Chief Executive/ senior managers.
 ^ Decisions jointly made by any combination of the above three categories of people but excluding 
Chairman/Chief Executive/ senior managers.
422




(branch offices and plants)


















Very Unimportant 1 2 . 0 2 4.2 2 4.3 3 6 . 1
Fairly Unimportant 1 2 . 0 1 2 . 1 9 19.1 5 1 0 . 2
Neither Important Nor 
Unimportant
1 2 . 0 3 6.3 7 14.9 9 18.4
Fairly Important 4 8 . 2 7 14.6 25 53.2 15 30.6
Very Important 42 85.7 35 72.9 4 8.5 17 34.7
Facilities for Corporate 
Entertainment


















Very Unimportant 1 2 25.5 1 2 . 1 3 6.3 2 4.3
Fairly Unimportant 1 1 23.4 1 2 . 1 8 16.7 9 19.6
Neither Important Nor 
Unimportant
17 36.2 6 12.5 1 0 2 0 . 8 14 30.4
Fairly Important 5 1 0 . 6 24 50.0 24 50.0 15 32.6
Very Important 2 4.3 16 33.3 3 6.3 6 13.0
(Table 4.8.1 continues)
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Contribution to Local 
Community
Support by National 
Endowment for the Arts
Support by state arts 
councils


















Very Unimportant — —- 9 19.6 6 13.0 — - — '
Fairly Unimportant — - —- 9 19.6 1 0 21.7 3 6.3
Neither Important Nor 
Unimportant
1 2 . 0 23 50.0 23 50.0 4 8.3
Fairly Important 13 26.0 5 10.9 7 15.2 21 43.8
Very Important 36 72.0 — —- — — 2 0 41.7
w


















Very Unimportant 1 2 . 1 3 6.4 — ' —- — ' —-
Fairly Unimportant 4 8.5 1 2 . 1 2 4.3 2 4.3
Neither Important Nor 
Unimportant
7 14.9 1 0 21.3 8 17.0  ^ 7 14.9
Fairly Important 23 48.9 24 51.1 24 51.1 26 55.3
Very Important 1 2 25.5 9 19.1 13 27.7 1 2 25.5
Missing responses account for discrepancies in some totals.




(branch offices and plants)


















Very Unimportant 14 9.9 2 2 16.1 3 2 . 0 17 1 2 . 6
Fairly Unimportant 5 3.5 5 3.6 — — 1 2 8.9
Neither Important Nor 
Unimportant
2 1 14.9 17 12.4 17 11.3 34 25.2
Fairly Important 43 30.5 40 29.2 54 36.0 55 40.7
Very Important 58 41.1 53 38.7 76 50.7 17 1 2 . 6
Facilities for Corporate 
Entertainment


















Very Unimportant 8 5.3 6 4.3 34 26.2 39 29.8
Fairly Unimportant 5 3.3 16 11.5 34 26.2 30 22.9
Neither Important Nor 
Unimportant
23 15.3 40 28.8 43 33.1 40 30.5
Fairly Important 62 41.3 6 8 48.9 13 1 0 . 0 19 14.5





Contribution to Local 
Community
Support by National-Level 
Arts Councils
Support by Regional Arts 
Boards


















Very Unimportant 2 1.3 32 24.2 31 24.4 5 3.5
Fairly Unimportant 8 5.4 33 25.0 30 23.6 7 4.9
Neither Important Nor 
Unimportant
18 1 2 .1 46 34.8 48 37.8 13 9.1
Fairly Important 52 34.9 15 11.4 16 1 2 . 6 63 44.1
Very Important 69 46.3 6 4.5 2 1 . 6 55 38.5


















Very Unimportant 5 3.5 6 4.3 3 2 . 0 7 5.0
Fairly Unimportant 8 5.6 2 1.4 2 1.3 1 0 7.2
Neither Important Nor 
Unimportant
34 23.9 25 17.9 23 15.3 ; 25 18.0
Fairly Important 60 42.3 60 42.9 60 40.0 61 43.9
Very Important 35 24.6 47 33.6 62 41.3 36 25.9
* Missing responses account for discrepancies in some totals.
Table 4. 9. 1 Success of Arts Sponsorship Programmes (U. S.)

















Very Unssuccesslui — - • — — ' — — - — — ——
Fairly Unssuccessful — —- 1 2 . 1 2 4.3 —- —~
Neither Successful Nor 
Unssuccessful
5 1 0 . 0 11 22.9 17 37.0 14 30.4
Fairly Successful 27 54.0 28 58.3 2 0 43.5 2 1 45.7






Very Unssuccessful — — -
Fairly Unssuccessful —- ——
Neither Successful Nor 
Unssuccessful
6 1 2 . 0
Fairly Successful 30 60.0
Very Successful 14 28.0
* Missing responses account for discrepancies in some totals.
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Table 4. 9. 2 Success of Arts Sponsorship Programmes (U. K.)
NJ
OO

















Veiy Unsuccessful — ---- 3 2 . 1 5 3.2 3 2 . 0
Fairly Unsuccessful 2 1.3 7 5.0 4 2.5 2 1.3
Neither Successful Nor 
Unsuccessful
13 8 . 2 57 40.4 2 1 13.3 31 2 0 . 8
Fairly Successful 70 44.0 61 43.3 52 32.9 60 40.3






Very Unsuccessful 3 1.9
Fairly Unsuccessful 1 0 . 6
Neither Successful Nor 
Unsuccessful
16 10.3
Fairly Successful 73 46.8
Very Successful 63 40.4
* Missing responses account for discrepancies in some totals.
Table 4.10 Percentage of Dollar Allocation Among Beneficiaries of Corporate Support 




Public TV/ Radio 12J 10.9
Employee Matching Gifts 5.8 7.4
Theatres 6.0 7.0
Arts Fund and Councils 5.4 6.1
Cultural Centres 9.5 5.9
Dance 2.3 2.7
Other* 25.0 28.9
Number of Companies 415 370
* Other and subcategories 
unspecified
Source: Confcrtnct Board, Annual Report o f  Corporate Contribution, 1988 edition, Advance Report (New York: 
Conference Board, 1988); Quoted in Michael Useem, "Corporate Support for Culture and the Arts," in Margaret 
Jane Wyszomirski and Pat Clubb, The Cost o f  Culture, p. 54.
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Table 4.11.1 Preferred Organisations/Activities for Arts Sponsorship Programmes (U. S.)
u>O
Arts Centres Arts Councils/United 
Arts Funds

















Very Unlikely 3 6.7 5 10.4 — ' —~ 1 1.9
Fairly Unlikely 7 15.6 9 18.8 4 8.7 2 3.8
Neither Likely Nor 
Unlikely
9 2 0 . 0 6 12.5 5 10.9 6 11.5
Fairly Likely 1 2 26.7 17 35.4 2 1 45.7 18 34.6
Very Likely 14 31.1 11 22.9 16 34.8 25 48.1

















Very Unlikely 1 2 . 1 7 15.6 5 10.4 ; 5 10.9
Fairly Unlikely 5 10.4 17 37.8 2 4.2 1 0 21.7
Neither Likely Nor 
Unlikely
9 18.8 15 33.3 7 14.6 13 28.3
Fairly Likely 16 33.3 4 8.9 18 37.5 1 0 21.7
Very Likely 17 35.4 2 4.4 16 33.3 8 17.4
(Table 4.11.1 continues)



















Very Unlikely 2 0 43.5 — ---- 1 2 . 0 2 4.3
Fairly Unlikely 1 0 21.7 4 8 . 2 1 2 . 0 1 0 21.3
Neither Likely Nor 
Unlikely
1 1 23.9 1 0 20.4 2 4.0 13 27.7
Fairly Likely 2 4.3 18 36.7 2 0 40.0 1 2 25.5






Very Unlikely 1 2 25.0
Fairly Unlikely 19 39.6
Neither Likely Nor 
Unlikely
9 18.8
Fairly Likely 7 14.6
Vpry Likely 1 2 . 1
Missing responses account for discrepancies in some totals.
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DaWe 4.11.2 Referred Oganisations/Activities for Arts Sponsorship Programmes (U. K.)
wN)
Arts Centres Arts Councils (GB,Wales, 
Scotland, N. Ireland)

















Veiy Unlikely 14 20.0 38 53.5 35 50.0 9 12.0
Fairly Unlikely 24 34.3 16 22.5 15 21.4 17 22.7
Neither Likely Nor 
Unlikely
20 28.6 6 8.5 8 11.4 10 13.3
Fairly Likely 11 15.7 7 9.9 11 15.7 29 38.7
Very Likely 1 1.4 4 5.6 1 1.4 10 13.3









Number of Percentage 
Firms of Firms
Number of Percentage 
Firms of Firms
Very Unlikely 10 13.7 8 9.8 13 18.3 17 24.3
Fairly Unlikely 12 16.4 12 14.6 16 22.5 ; 18 25.7
Neither Likely Nor 
Unlikely
10 13.7 14 17.1 19 26.8 18 25.7
Fairly Likely 23 31.5 31 37.8 17 23.9 12 17.1
Very Likely 18 24.7 17 20.7 6 8.5 5 7.1
( Table 4.11.2 continues)

















Very Unlikely 17 23.6 6 8 . 1 1 2 16.2 5 6 . 1
Fairly Unlikely 19 26.4 8 1 0 . 8 1 0 13.5 6 7.3
Neither Likely Nor 
Unlikely
17 23.6 1 2 16.2 17 23.0 17 20.7
Fairly Likely 1 2 16.7 30 40.5 14 18.9 28 34.1

















Very Unlikely 2 2.3 7 9.5 15 2 1 . 1
Fairly Unlikely 2 2.3 9 1 2 . 2 23 32.4
Neither Likely Nor 
Unlikely
8 9.1 19 25.7 2 1 29.6
Fairly Likely 29 33.0 2 1 28.4 6 8.5
Very Likely 47 53.4 18 24.3 6 8.5
* Missing responses account for discrepancies in some totals.
** Note: Since the original sample includes members from the ABSA, Serpentine Gallery, Royal Academy, Tate Gallery, Hayward Gallery (South Bank Centre), Barbican Art Gallery and the 
Whitechapel Gallery, there is already a bias toward the visual arts. For the purpose of this comparison, 1 tlierefore chose to run the data based on ABSA members only (112 out o f the total respondents
(169) are ABSA members).
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TaHe 4. 12. 1 Percentage of Audiences in five Educational Categories by Art Fonn
Educational Level
Post-BA Training At Least College 
Graduate




Lee than High 
School Graduate
Art Form
Median Range Median Range Median Range Median Range Median Range
All Museums 17.5 6-35 41.1 1 0 - 6 6 72.3 30-93 27.6 8-69 9.0 4-57
Art Museums 2 2 . 0 18-35 48.0 41-66 83.5 75-90 17.0 10-25 5.5 4-16
Other Museum^ 13.5 6 - 2 0 34.4 10-53 59.6 30-93 40.4 8-69 13.1 7-57
All Performing Art^ 32.0 9-66 61.8 23-87 83.0 62-95 17.0 5-38 4.0 1-19
Theatre 32.7 20-50 58.0 23-80 82.7 56-93 17.1 8-44 4.0 1-15
Classical Music 37.5 2 1 - 6 6 63.0 46-87 83.4 63-95 14.6 5-37 1.7 1-19
Ballet and Danc^ 45.5 20-50 65.0 55-73 87.1 77-92 12.9 8-23 3.0 1-5
Opera 37.3 29-49 61.8 49-75 83.0 67-94 18.8 7-33 4.1 2-7
All Museums and Performing 
Arts
30.0 6 - 6 6 54.0 10-87 78.0 30-95 2 2 . 0 5-69 5.0 1-57
U.S. Population Over 24 Years 
of Age, 1975
NA'* 13.9 26.3 73.7 ) 37.5
' Includes science, history, natural history, anthropology and general museums.
 ^ Excludes audience of outdoor dramas.
 ^ Dance audience percentages apart from ballet available only for two education levels: at least college graduate and less tlian high school graduate.
* NA =  Not available.
* The table is adapted from Paul DiMaggio et d .. Audience Studies o f the Performing Arts and Museums: A Criticd Review (Washington D.C.: National Endowment for the Arts, 1978), p. 20.
Table 4. 12. 2 Occupational Distribution of Audience
Occupations of Employed Persons* Percentage of U.S. Employment 
(1975)^
Median Percentage of Employed 
Respondents in Arts Audience’
Number of Audience Studies 
Reporting Information for this 
Category
Profesionals 15.0 55.9 65
Teachers 4.1 2 2 . 1 2 2
Artists, Writers, Entertainers l.O 8 . 2 8
Managerial 10.5 14.9 51
Clerical/Sales 24.3 14.6 41
Service 13.7 3.7 13
Blue-Collar 33.0 3.7 71
Farmworkers 3.5 — ■
Major Activities of Persons 
Unemployed or Not in the Labor 
Force
Percentage of U.S. Population Aged 
16 Years or Over
Meidan Percentage of All 
Respondents in Arts Audience
Number of Audience Studies 





Students 5.5 18.0 80
Retired, Unemployed 1 1 . 2 4.5 65
'  U .S . Census categories and audience categories are only approximately com parable due to varying classilication schemes used in arts audience studies.
* Source: U .S . Bureau o f  the Census, Statistical Abstracts, 7975 (W ashington D C .:  Government Priming Office, 1976); U .S. Bureau o f  Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statbtics, 1976. Figure for U.S.
population aged 16 o r  over exclude military personnel.
* Because these are m edians and because not all occupational categories were given in each snidy, an aggregation o f the median percentages across occupations will not equal 100 percent. Thus, these figures 
offer only an approxim ate distribution o f  the arts audience by occupation.
* None o f the arts audience studies contained an occupational category for farm workers. Thus, they were either distributed among the other categories o r very few, if any, were found in the arts audiences.
* Source: Paul DiM aggio ct a t.. Audience Studies o f the Performing Arts and Museums: A Critical Review (W ashington D C .:  National Endowment for the A rts, 1978), p. 22.
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Table 4. 12. 3 Median Income of Audiences by Art Form
Art Form Median of Median Incomes' Range of Median Incomes Total Number of Studies
All Museums $17,158 $13,394-30,618 18
Art Museums 18,148 14,016-30,618 10
History Museums 16,757 13,394-29,055 3
Science Museums 17,269 14,765-20,851 5
All Performing Art^ 18,903 9,466-28,027 70
Ballet and Dance 20,082 16,452-22,404 10
Theatre
Excluding Outdoor Drama 19,342 9,469-25,784 27
Including Outdoor Drama 16,819 9,466-25,784 45
Orchestra 20,825 18,221-28,027 ; 11
Opera 21,024 19,017-27,245 5
w0\
' In constant mid-1976 dollars.
* Source: Paul DiMiggio et al.. Audience Studies of the Performing Arts and Museums: A Critical Review (Washington D.C.: National Endowment for the Arts, 1978), 
p. 30.






















Very Uninportant 1 2 29.3 1 2 28.6 3 6.7
Fairly Uninportant 4 9.8 1 2.4 2 4.4
Neither Important Nor 
Uninportant
17 41.5 13 31.0 8 17.8 2 3.9
Fairly Important 5 1 2 . 2 1 1 26.2 18 40.0 18 35.3
Very Inportant 3 7.3 5 11.9 14 31.1 31 60.8
* Missing responses account for discrepancies in some totals.
** Valid cases: 51. Missing cases: 3.
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14 11.5 7 5.0 2 1.3 15 10.5
Fairly Unimportant 15 12.3 9 6.4 3 1.9 1 0 7.0
Neither Important Nor 
Unimportant
2 0 16.4 13 9.3 7 4.5 2 0 14.0
Fairly Important 36 29.5 45 32.1 42 27.3 50 35.0
Very Important 37 30.3 6 6 47.1 1 0 0 64.9 48 33.6
* Missing responses account for discrepancies in some totals.
Table 4.14.1 Involvement Or Not in Institution to Which Sponsorship is Given (U. S.)
Number of Firms Percentage of Firms
Yes 17 33.3
No 34 66.7
Valid cases : 51 Missing cases: 3
Table 4.14.2 Involvement O r Not in Institution to Which Sponsorship is Given (U. K.)
Number of Firms Percentage of Firms
Yes 40 30.7
No 104 69.3
Valid cases: 150 Missing cases: 19
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Table 6. 1. 1 Reasons for Initiating Art Collections (U. S.)
He or She Had a Personal 
Interest in Art
Relocation or Expansion of 
the Firm
To Keep Up with Business 
Trends



















Very Unimportant 1 1 . 6 7 1 1 .1 2 0 42.6 1 1.5
Fairly Unimportant 1 1 . 6 — —- 6 1 2 . 8 — - —
Neither Important Nor 
Unimportant
7 1 1 . 1 6 9.5 16 34.0 2 2.9
Fairly Important 16 25.4 1 0 15.9 4 8.5 15 2 2 . 1
Very Important 38 60.3 40 63.5 1 2 . 1 50 73.5
To Generate Good Public 
Relations

















Very Unimportant 3 5.7 24 48.0 29 60.4 15 30.6
Fairly Unimportant 4 7.5 6 1 2 . 0 5 10.4 ; 8 16.3
Neither Important Nor 
Unimportant
1 1 2 0 . 8 15 30.0 14 29.2 19 38.8
Fairly Important 26 49.1 2 4.0 — —- 5 1 0 . 2
Very Important 9 17.0 3 6 . 0 —— — 2 4.1
N um ber o f respondents: 72 * Missing responses account for discrepancies in some totals.
Table 6. 1. 2 Reasons for Initiating Art Collections (U. K.)
He or She Had a Personal Relocation or Expansion of 
Interest in Art the Firm
To Keep Up with Business 
Trends


















Veiy Unimportant 2 6.5 9 31.0 1 2 50.0 2 5.7
Fairly Unimportant —- — 1 3.4 6 25.0 — —
Neither Important Nor 
Unimportant
1 3.2 1 3.4 4 16.7 1 2.9
Fairly Important 1 2 38.7 6 20.7 1 4.2 1 0 28.6
Very Important 16 51.6 1 2 41.4 1 4.2 2 2 62.9
To Generate Good Public 
Relations

















Veiy Unimportant 2 7.1 14 60.9 19 82.6 11 39.3
Fairly Unimportant 5 17.9 3 13.0 2 8.7 3 10.7
Neither Important Nor 
Unimportant
1 0 35.7 4 17.4 2 8.7 1 1 39.3
Fairly Important 7 25.0 —- — — — 3 10.7
Very Important 4 14.3 2 8.7 — — — —“
N um ber o f  respondents: 38 * Missing responses account for discrepancies in some totals.
441
Table 6. 2. 1 Tax Benefits Obtained from Purchasing Works of Art (U. S.)
to
Number of respondents: 72
* Missing responses account for discrepancies in some totals.
Investment Tax Credit for the 
Years 1980 Through 1985
(Accelerated) Depreciation Other Tax Benefits










No 49 96.1 49 94.2 48 94.1
Yes 2 3.9 3 5.8 1 2.0
Gift to Museums — — — ----- 2 3.9
Table 6. 2. 2 Tax Benefits Obtained from Purchasing Works of Art (U. K.)
Art Works Qualified as 
Revenue Expenditure
Art Works Qualified for 
Capital Allowances



















No 18 78.3 18 94.7 18 75.0 18 94.7
Yes 5 21.7 1 5.3 6 25.0 — —
Capital Depreciation — — — — ' — — 1 5.3
Number of repondents: 38
* Missing responses account for discrepancies in some totals.
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Table 6. 3 Art Purchases Categorised as Business Expenses (U. S.)
Number of Firms Percentage of Firms
Yes 3 5.9
No 48 94.1
Valid cases: 51 Missing cases: 21
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Table 6. 4. 1 Percentage of Corporate A rt Collectors from All Business Sectors by Decades (U. S.)


















Financial Services 5 41.7 8 38.1 16 41.0 24 36.4
Publishing/Media/Public
Relations
2 16.7 3 14.3 4 10.3 6 9.1
Legal Services/ 
Accountancy/ Real Estate 
Development




1 4.8 2 5.1 4 6 . 1
Manufacturing 4 33.3 5 23.8 11 28.2 17 25.8
Hospitals/Medical Services — • — —- — ' 1 2 . 6 2jj 3.0
Total" 1 2 ' 1 0 0 . 0 2 1 ^ 1 0 0 . 0 39’ 1 0 0 . 0 6 6 " 1 0 0 . 0
'  Missing case: 0
* F o r detailed classification o f business types, see Appendix 2 , Exhibit 1.
* Missing case: 0 ’ Missing case: 0 * Missing case: 0
 ^ F or the purposes o f  this analysis, five o f  the law firms in W ashington D .C . are excluded because they are over-represented in the sampling population as a result o f surveying each firm in W ashington 
D C .; for details o f  survey m ethodology, see Appendix 2. The total valid responses for this analysis are 67. including one collection started in the 1990s. If this collection is included, the percentage 
for each business type up to the time o f  the survey ( April 1993) would be : 34% . 8.7% . 23.2% . 5 .8% . 24.6%  and 2.9% .
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Table 6. 4. 2 Percentage of Corporate Art Collectors from All Business Secotr by Decades (U. K.)
ê
ON


















Financial Services 4 66.7 9 69.2 14 66.7 16 45.7
Publishing/Media/Public
Relations
— ' — • — ---- 1 4.8 1 2.9
Legal Services/ 
Accountancy/ Real Estate 
Development





Manufacturing 2 33.3 4 30.8 5 23.8 9 25.7
Hospitals/Medical Services —- — ---- - ---- —— — ' — — ■
Total** 6 * 1 0 0 . 0 13^ 1 0 0 . 0 2 1 ^ 1 0 0 . 0  ^ 35* 1 0 0 . 0
t Missing case: 0 1Missing case: 0 ) Missing case: 0 Missing case: 0
* For detailed classification o f  business types, see Appendix 2, Exhibit 1.
* The total valid responses for this analysis are 38, including another three collections (all from the financial sector) started in the 1990s. If these three collections are included, the percentage for each 
business sector up  to the time o f  the survey ( September 1994) would be: 50 .0% , 2 .6% , 18.4% , 5 .3% , 23 .7% , and 0 .0% .
TaWe 6. 5. 1 Position of Initiator of Coiporate Ait Collections (U. S.)
Number of Firms Percentage of Firms
CEO/Chairman 38 55.9
Senior Managers 5 7.4





Public Affair^ 1 1.5
Others 2 2.9
Valid cases : 68 Missing cases: 4
' Partners as in partnerships, which have different organisational structure and do not fit in tlie classification of compy.
■ Public affairs include those departments which serve similar functions such as corporate communications, corporate aftn, 
community relations, and public relations, etc.
TaWe 6. 5. 2 Position of Initiator of Corporate A it Collections (U. K )
Number of Firms Percentage of Firms
Chairman/ Chief Executive/ 
Managing Director
18 54.5
Senior Managers 4 12.1





Public Affairs 4 12.1
Property Department 3 9.1
Valid cases: 33 Missing cases: 5
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Table 6. 6.1 Persons with Selection Authority (Combined) (U. S.)
Number of Percentage of Percentage
Firms Responses of Firms
CEO/Chairman/Senior Managers 43 35.2 62.3
In-House Art Committee 28 23.0 40.6
In-House Curators 28 23.0. 40.6
Outside Art Consultants 17 13.9 24.6
Public Relations or Advertising 3 2.5 4.3
Department
Others 3 2.5 4.3
122 100.0 176.8
Valid cases : 69 Missing cases; 3 
* Some totals include multiple responses.
Table 6. 6. lA Persons with Selection Authority (Detail) (U. S.)
Number of Percentage
Firms of Firms
CEO/Chairman/Senior Managers' 10 14.1
Joint decisions (including Chairman/ Chief 33 46.5
Executive/Senior Managers) ^
Joint decisions (excluding Chairman/ Chief 6 8.5
Executive/Senior Managers)  ^
In-House Art Committee^ 9 12.7
In-House Art Curators^ 8 11.3
PR Department ^ 2 2.8
Unspecified Persons ’ 3 4.2
Valid cases: 71 Missing cases: 1 
' Decisions made solely by CEO/Chainnan/ senior managers.
* Decisions jointly made by any combination o f the above five categories o f people but including CEO/ Chairman/ senior managers.
’ Decisions jointly made by any combination o f the above five categories o f people but excluding CEO/ Chairman/ senior managers.
* Decisions made solely by in-house art committee. The category o f in-house art committee often includes chairman and CEO, but it 
is not possible to distinguish any further here.
* Decisions made solely by in-house art curators.
* Decisions made solely by marketing/public relations/corporate affairs department 
 ^ Decisions made solely by unspecified persons.
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Table 6. 6. 2 Persons with Selection Authority (Combined) (U. K.)







In-House Art Committee 10 21.7 28.6
In-House Curators 3 6.5 8.6
Outside Art Consultants 4 8.7 11.4
Public Relations or Advertising 
Department
4 8.7 11.4
Others 2 4.3 5.7
46 100.0 131.4
Valid cases : 35 Missing cases: 3








Joint decisions (including Chairman/ 
Chief Executive/Senior Managers) ^
8 22.2
Joint decisions (excluding Chairman/ 
Chief Executive/Senior Managers) ^
2 5.6
In-House Art Committee^ 7 19.4
In-House Art Curators^ 2 5.6
Unspecified Persons ® 2 5.6
Valid cases: 35 Missing cases: 3
' Decisions made solely by Chairman/Chief Executive senior managers.
 ^Decisions jointly made by any combination o f the above four categories of people but including Chairman/ Chief Executive/ enior 
managers.
'  Decisions jointly made by any combination o f the above four categories o f people but excluding Chairman/Chief Executive/ senior 
managers.
* Decisions made solely by in-house art committee. The category o f in-house art committee often includes chairman and CEO, but it is 
not possible to distinguish any further here.
* Decisions made solely by in-house art curators.
* Decisions made solely by unspecified persons.
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Table 6. 7.1 Are Some Works Inappropriate for Corporate Art Collections (U. S.)
Number of Firms Percentage of Firms
Yes 40 70.2
No 17 29.8
Valid cases: 57 Missing cases: 15
Table 6. 7. 2 Are Some Works Inappropriate for Corporate Art Collections (U. K.)
_____________________________ Number of_Firms_______ Percentage of Firms
Yes 12 40.0
No 17 56.7
Unable to Comment__________________________1_____________________ 3.3
Valid cases : 30 Missing cases: 8
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Fig. 2-1. Richard Wentworth, Toy, galvanised and tinned steel, 60 x 40 x 40 cm, 
1983, Arts Council Collection.
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Lift up your heart It’s so simple for some folks. Precious Legacy.
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Go! Go! Go! Take an object. Which is Which isit takes art to make a country great
We have a very sinqile rea son for sponsoring them:
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(If you were pleased, or moved, or touched, or enlightened by any of the art 
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Fig. 3-2. Leaflets to advertise the Midland Bank Artseard.
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Fig. 4-1. Tate Introduction booklet showing New Display banners with BP logo.
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Fig. 4-3. ICA/Toshiba leaflet for facilities hire & corporate membership.
499
Fig. 4-4. Rachel Whiteread, House, 1993, Bow Road, London.
500
Fig. 4-5. Rachel Whiteread, House (detail).
501
Fig. 4-6. House Label designed by Rachel Whiteread on Beck’s Beer.
502
Fig. 4-7. BP advertisement for its sponsorship of New Displays at Tate Gallery, 
which appeared in the Burlington Magazine and various other magazines.
503
Fig. 5-1. Sculptural court at Whitney Museum of American Art at Philip Morris, 
New York (with notice of prohibitions in use of space).
504
Fig. 5-2. View of Whitney Museum of American Art at Philip Morris, New York 
(with Michael Lekakis, Untitled, c. 1966-83).
505
cFig. 5-3. General view of Equitable headquarters, New York.
506
or\'.-Avt»vn"i>
Fig. 5-4. Façade o f  Whitney Museum of American Art at Equitable, New York
507
'ilrd
Fig. 5-5. Entrance to Whitney Museum of American Art at Equitable, New York
508
34
Fig. 5-6. Banner proclaiming "public space" at Sony Building, New York.
509
w\
Fig. 5-7. Plague indicating "public space" in corporate premises, AT & T 
Building, New York ("Public Space: owned and maintained by AT & T, 
550 Madison Avenue, New York City").
510
Fig. 5-8. Scott Burton, Urban Plaza North, 1985-86, Equitable, New York.
511
IFig. 5-9. Scott Burton, Urban Plaza North (detail).
512
Fig. 5-10. Roy Lichtenstein. Mural with Blue Brushstroke, 68 x 32 feet, Equitable,
New York.
513
Fig. 5-11. Terry Winters, Untitled I, 1988, oil on linen, 50" x 58", and Untitled I, 
1988, oil on linen, 50" x 50", Terry Winters Room, executive floor, 
Equitable, New York.
514




Fig. 5-13. View of PaineWebber Art Gallery, New York (general view).
eFig. 5-14. View of PaineWebber Art Gallery, New York (detail).
517
Fig. 5-15. Façade of Equitable Gallery, New York.
518
Fig. 5-16. View of photography exhibition Washington: Project o f a City by Steve
Gottlieb, held at law firm in Washington D.C.
519
Fig. 5-17. View of photography exhibition Washington: Project o f  a City (detail).
520
Fig. 5-18. View of photography exhibition held at London law firm.
521
Fig. 5-19. View o f photography exhibition held at London law firm.
522
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Fig. 5-20. Leaflet advertising the exhibition Drive! at the so-called BMW "Gallery" 
in New York.
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Fig. 5-22. Richard Deacon’s sculpture at Economist Building plaza, London.
525
Fig, 5-23. Richard Deacon’s sculpture at Economist Building plaza, London (detail).
526
Im
Fig. 5-24. View of exhibitions held at Chase Manhattan Soho branch, New York.
527
Fig. 6-1. Portraits of chairmen; ancien régime décor at London bank.
528
Fig. 6-2. Old-style décor and art collecting at London bank.
529
Fig. 6-3. View of Thames in boardroom of London bank (featuring J. E. Scougall, 
View o f River Thames, 26.5" x 40").
530
Fig. 6-4. Landscape in board dining room of London bank.
531
Fig. 6-5. General view of building and art display, international bank in London.
532
Fig. 6-6. Bank building and art display, London (detail).
533
Fig. 6-7. View of a trading floor of financial institution with commissioned work 
(Annabel Grey, Hanging Panels on a Railway Theme fo r  the Dealing 
Room, ink on raw silk, acoustic screen), London.
534
Fig. 6-8. Annabel Grey, Hanging Panels on a Railway Theme fo r  the Dealing 
Room (detail).
535
Fig. 6-9. Jenny Holzer, Having two or three peop le..., 1981-89, enamel on sheet 
metal, 21" x 23", in international bank, London.
536
Fig. 6-10. Reception lobby of London investment institution (with Len Tabner, 
Lindisfarne, 104" x 59").
537
mw
Fig. 6-11. Jean Dubuffet, Group o f Four Tree, 1972, fibreglass, aluminum and 
steel, 42" high. Chase Manhattan headquarters. Chase Manhattan plaza, 
New York.
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Fig. 6-12. Jean Dubuffet, Group o f Four Tree (detail).
539
Fig. 6-13. Commissioned mural at staff restaurant of London law firm (Timothy 
Rukavina, The Wind's Dominion, 1991).
540
Fig. 6-14. Timothy Rukavina, Tlîe W ind’s Dominion (detail).
541
Fig. 6-15. View of conference room of London law firm (with Robert 
Rauschenberg, Studies fo r  Chinese Summer-hall, 30" x 87%").
542
Fig. 6-16. Richard Artschwager, Book, 1987, formica and paint on wood, 5" x 20" 
X 12", edition of 40, at library of Washington D.C. law firm.
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Fig. 6-17. Kate Ericson and Mel Ziegler, Stones Have Been Known to Move, 1986- 
88, sixteen marble squares, 12" x 12" x 1" each, in reception lobby of 
Washington D.C. law firm.
544
Fig. 6-18. Martin Puryear, In Winter Burrows, 1985, tinted pine, 74" x 127" x 1 
% ", in reception lobby of Washington D.C. law firm.
545
Fig. 6-19. Gene Davis, Star o f  India, 1980, acrylic on canvas, 8"x 15", in reception 
lobby of Washington D.C. law firm.
546
Fig. 6-20. Daniel Buren, Framed/Explored/Defaced, 1979, colour aquatint in 
twenty-five fragments, 8" x 8" each, edition of 46, on stairway of 




Fig. 6-21. Gerhard Richter, Untitled, 1985, triptych, oil on canvas, entrance hall to 
BOC, Surrey, England (general view).
Fig. 6-22. Gerhard Richter, Untitled, 1985, triptych, oil on canvas, entrance hall to 
BOC, Surrey, England (detail).
549
Fig. 6-23. Sol Lewitt, Wall Drawing M 51, 1985, colour ink wash, two walls each 
92” X 360", double two-part drawings on two walls of room, 
commissioned mural, BOC, Surrey, England.
550
Fig. 6-24. William Tillyer, English Landscape, hospitality room of London 
manufacturing firm.
551
Fig. 6-25. Ron Nixon. Arnum  Carpet (204
square feet), ICI. London.
552
Fig. 6-26. View of stairway at multinational manufacturing company in London with 
Julian Opie, Morning Mail, 1985, oil paint on steel, 25 x 64 x 30 cm on 
the right, and Tricia Gillman, Family /, 1990, oil on canvas, 122 x 122 
cm).
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Fig. 6-27. Julian Opie, M orning M ail (detail).
554
Fig. 6-28. Sculpture display at plaza of Joseph E. Seagram Building, New York.
555
XnCQ
This pack of postcards illustrates the paintings 
in the Tl Group Art Collection which hangs in the 
Headquarters building at Abingdon.
The Collection is unique in that the works are 
all by young artists who are graduates from 
the Royal College of Art.
Tl Group is an award winner under the Business Sponsorship Incentive Scheme 
for its sponsorship of young painting students to study at the Royal College of Art. 
The BSIS is a  Government Scheme administered by ABSA (Association for the 
Business Sponsorship of the Arts)





















Fig. 6-30. Lincoln Perry, All in the Golden Afternoon, 1989, oil on canvas, Oliver 
Carr Building, Washington D C.
557




F ig. 6 -33 . Bruce M cLean (detail).
560
Fig. 6-34. Stephen Cox, Ludgate Development, London.
561
Fig. 6-35. Stephen Cox (detail).
562
Fig. 6-36. George Segal, Rush Hours, lifesize, bronze, Finsbury Avenue Square. 
Broadgate Development, London.
563







Fig. 6-39. Michael Craig-M artin, Globe and Umbrella (detail).
566
«4 »
Fig. 6-40. Xavier Corbero, The Broad Family, Exchange Square, Broadgate 
Development, London.
567
Fig. 6-41. Sol LeWitt, Wall Drawing: Bands o f Lines in Four Colors and Four 
Directions, Separated by Gray Bands, 1984-85, acrylic on limestone, six 
panels. Equitable, New York (detail).
568
Fig. 6-42. Sol Lewitt, Wall Drawings H580, various tilted forms with colour ink 
washes superimposed and black grid (drawing by Ken Bulter, Chris 
Claris, David Conearn, Mark Firth, Rebecca Schwab, Hannah Sofaer, 
Yoko Terrauchi, Jo Watanabe, 1988), 1 Appold Street, Broadgate 
Development, London.
569
Fig. 6-43. Barry Flanagan. Hare on Bell, 1983, bronze. Equitable. New York.
570
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Fig. 6-44. Barry Flanagan, Leaping Hare on Crescent and Bell, bronze, Broadgate 
Square, Broadgate Development, London.
571
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Fig. 6-45. Richard Serra, Fulcrum, off Eldon Street, Broadgate Development,
London.
572
Fig. 6-46. "Secretary" piece of Washington D.C. law firm (Dan Flavin, 1-7 "to Don 
Judd, Colorist", 1986, series of seven colour lithographs, 30" x 40 % " 
each, edition of 30).
573
Fig. 6-47. "Secretary" piece of Washington D.C. law firm (Joel Shapiro. Untitled 
#6, 7, 10, I I .  1979-80. series of four lithographs, 22" x 30" each, 
edition of 30).
574
Fig. 6-48. View of works obscured by files at international bank in London.
575




Fig. 6-50. The "Upside Down" picture (Georg Baselitz, Orange Eater, 1981-84, 50 
X 70 cm, etching), at international bank, London.
Fig. 6-51. Contemporary board room at London company (with Ivon Hitchens, 
Poppies Against a Grey Background, 1961-63, oil, on the right, and 
Barbara Hodgkins’ sculpture in the distance).
578
Fig. 6-52. Barbara Hodgkins, Two as One, marble (detail).
579
Fig. 6-53. Contemporary board room at London bank (with Javier Graces Ruiz, 
Shells, 1990, chalk on paper, on the right, and Vanda Harvey, Cardinal, 
1990, oil on canvas, on the left).
580
Fig. 6-54. Contemporary conference room at London bank (with Ricardo Cinalli’s
commissioned work).
581
Fig. 6-55. Antique furniture and décor; company dining room at London bank.
582
Fig. 6-56. Antique furniture and décor; company small dining room at London 
bank.
583
»Fig. 6-57. Sense of history at New York law firm.
584
Fig. 6-58. Sense of history at New York law firm.
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THE MICHELANGELO OF THE FUTURE 
COULD BE RIGHT IN YOUR. BACKYARD.
i
In the days of Michelangelo, the 
world was full of Sistlne Chapels to paint 
and of wealthy patrons, eager to help a 
struggling artist.
Today’s artist isn’t as lucky.
So the Metropolitan Life Foundation 
has a special mission. We encourage 
promising unknowns in many creative
fields, whether a playwright, a neighbor­
hood art center, or an entire dance 
company.
The Metropolitan Life Foundation 
aids established artists too, but our heart 
is with the lesser known.




Fig. 6-59. "The Michelangelo of the future could be right in your backyard;"
advertisement for Metropolitan Life Foundation; appeared in Forbes 28 
October 1985 and elsewhere.
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Fig. 6-60. Cover of Barings 1991 Annual Report (old style of annual report).
587
Fig. 6-61. Cover of 3i (Investors in Industry) Group 1989 Annual Report, with 
image taken from Bridget Riley, Midsummer (1989, oil on linen, 164.5 
X 159 cm), commissioned by the company.
588
Fig. 6-62. Portrait of Chairman, featuring Sir Brian Corby (the caption in the 
Annual Report reads: "Sir Brian Corbey, seated in the traditional 
Chairman's chair which features the Corporation's symbol of Prudence"), 
from Prudential Corporation p k  Annual Report 1991.
586
Fig. 6-63. Portrait of Chairman, featuring Sir Denys Henderson, with part of ICI 
art collection in background, from ICI Annual Report 1991.
590
Fig. 6-64. Paintings featured in Arthur Andersen Graduate Recruitment booklet, 
1991.
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Fis. 6-65. Picture of nude (Glynn William. Stcindifig Nude. 39 x 26 . charcoal, at 
international bank. London (general view).
592
Fig. 6-66. Picture of nude (detail).
593
Fig. 6-67. View of canteen with William Scott’s "Pots and Pans" pictures at
international bank, London.
594
Fig. 6-68.  Barbara  H e p w o r th ’s "Fried Egg" picture at international  bank. London.
595
Fig. 6-69. Barbara Hepworth’s "Fried Egg" picture (detail).
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Fig. 6-70. Susan Abbott, Table with Correspondences, water on arches paper, 1988,
at Washington D.C. law firm.
597
Fig. 6-71. Susan Abbott, Table with Correspondences (detail).
598
Fig. 6-72. Leslie Kuter, Portrait o f Two Accountants. 1988, wool, at international
accountancy firm, Washington D.C.
599
Fig. 6-73. Donald Judd. Untitled, 1977. anodized aluminum and galvanized steel, 
61 Vs" X 110 % " X 6", Fried. Frank, Flarris, Shriver & Jacobson, New 
York.
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Fig. 6-74. Donald Judd, Untitled (detail).
601
Fig. 6-75. Bruce Nauman, Welcome Shaking Hands, 1985, neon tubing, 182.8 x 
182.8. X 25.4 cm, Saatchi Collection, London.
602
Fig. 6-76. Bruce Nauman, Double Poke in the Eye / / ,  1985, neon sign, 24 x 36 x 
6 Vi", Washington D.C. law firm
603
Fig. 6-77. Bruce Nauman, Double Poke in the Eye II (detail).
604
America.
Land of the free, the brave and 
millions of illiterate adults.
“At u Litsi for Wonl8...IlliU!ruU: in  Amcricü"
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C O L U M B U S
W re also interested in computers.
These are some of the many art exhibitions, musical events, and 
television specials that IBM has supported over the years.
Which goes to show that a company known for state-of-the-art technology 
can also be interested in the state of the arts.
Fig. 7-1. IBM joint advertisement for arts sponsorship and computers; appeared m 
Forbes 28 October 1985 and 13 July 1987.
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Fig. 7-2. Façade of Museum of Modern Art, Oxford, with sponsor’s banners.
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MUSEUM OF MODERN ART OXFORD
10 NOVEMBER 1996 • 23 FEBRUARY 1997
Fig. 7-3. Poster for exhibition A b s o lu t  Vision: New British Painting in the 1990s.
607
Fig. 7-4. Detail o f A b s o lu t  Vision exhibition title.
608
Fig. 7-5. View of exhibition featuring Chris Ofili’s Impofted.
609
Fig. 7-6. Chris Ofili, Imported, 1996, oil paint, glitter, polyester resin, map pins 
and elephant dung on linen with 2 elephant dung supports, 121.9 x 91.4
cm.
610
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Fig. 7-9, Absolut Warhol, Absolut Vodka advertisement which appeared regularly 
in art magazines such as Artnews (September 1995).
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